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Hundreds of millions of dollars of public money have been spent creating Public 
Sector ICT Shared Services (PSISS) based on expectations of improved customer 
service and cost reduction.  Unfortunately, the promised benefits have often failed 
to materialise and governance has been identified as a barrier to PSISS success.   
The research first locates the concerns that governance, and in particular 
arrangements for governing PSISS, is contributing to PSISS failure in the academic 
and practice literatures on PSISS governance.  Our current knowledge of PSISS 
governance is principally informed by literature from three domains: management, 
public administration and information systems.  These domains, to an extent, exist 
in silos with unique traditions, perspectives and knowledge claims.  As a result, 
how it informs the governance of PSISS could be at best unhelpful and even 
confusing to practitioners.  This state of knowledge is not assisted by “how to 
govern” guides that obscure their different theoretical origins and do not appear to 
address the complexity of PSISS governance.   
Despite this apparent lack of coherent frameworks in the academic and practice 
literatures, practitioners are expected to use this literature to develop governance 
arrangements and perform effective PSISS governance.  This lack of coherence led 
me to ask my first research question: How do practitioners perceive PSISS 
governance in practice?   
Exploring how PSISS governance occurs in practice through the lived experience 
of PSISS governance practitioners led me to select grounded theory as an 
appropriate methodology and research design to examine 20 years of governance 
practice for an electronic identity (E-ID) PSISS in New Zealand.  My grounded 
theory of practice enabled construction of a public sector governance model to 
explore vertical and collaborative governance arrangements through three 
perspectives: system strategy, delivery and assurance.  The model has been 
extended to provide a system-wide public sector governance lens, which was used 
to reflexively explore current academic literature and seven practitioner informed 
critical public sector governance issues to answer my refined secondary research 
question:   How have governance arrangements addressed critical issues in public 
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Chapter One. Introduction  
Governments have invested hundreds of millions of dollars creating public sector 
ICT shared services (PSISS) based on expectations of improved customer service 
and cost reduction.  Unfortunately, the promised benefits have often failed to 
materialise (Walter, 2009; Chesterman, 2013; Hillier, 2019).  Governance and 
governance arrangements have been identified as a barrier to PSISS success and a 
reason PSISS failed to deliver benefits (National Audit Office, 2012; Hillier, 2019).   
As a public servant I have observed the opportunities and challenges posed by 
PSISS first hand.  I have worked on successful shared services and observed others 
failing.  On numerous occasions I have been frustrated to hear “it is a governance 
issue”, without more specific explanation forthcoming, as a reason to give up or 
avoid further participation.  My experiences in the public sector operational world 
motivated this research to improve the understanding and practice of PSISS 
governance.   
So, what exactly are PSISS?  According to the academic literature public sector 
ICT shared services is a combination of three areas: public sector services, shared 
services, and information and communications technology (ICT) services.  Public 
sector services are services provided on behalf of the government, either by public 
sector agencies or external providers (Norman, 2003).   
PSISS have been developing over the past two decades through ICT based 
initiatives (Gershon, 2004; Stephen et al., 2011).  Shared services began by 
consolidating and standardising specialist functions into a provider that could 
support an organisation or group of organisations (Walsh, McGregor-Lowndes, & 
Newton, 2008).  A single unit provides a function for the wider organisation, or 
extending the model, a single organisation provides that function for multiple 
organisations.  Shared services are generally applied in large multi-part 
organisations like multinational corporations or the public sector (Janssen & Joha, 
2006; Walsh et al., 2008). 
The use of the term shared services has mushroomed in literature and practice 
(Borman, 2010; Paagman, Tate, Furtmueller, & de Bloom, 2015).  Common 
examples of public sector shared services identified in academic literature include 
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payroll, content management and hosting ICT systems (Janssen, Kamal, 
Weerakoddy, & Joha, 2012; Chesterman, 2013).   
Having researched the literature for the three areas of public sector services, shared 
services and ICT services I have defined PSISS as an example of shared services 
provision where an ICT function is standardised and provided by one organisation 
to multiple public sector clients (Grant, McKnight, Uruthirapathy, & Brown, 2007; 
Wang & Wang, 2007) and potentially to citizen and non-citizen customers as well 
as private sector clients (Senyucel, 2007; Eaton, Hedman, & Medaglia, 2017).  
Shared services provide an opportunity to reduce expenditure.  Annually New 
Zealand spent an estimated $2 billion on public sector ICT (Cabinet Office, 2010b), 
with international investment in public sector ICT in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars (National Audit Office, 2007; Gardiner, 2015; Office of the President, 
2019).  Shared services offer financial and customer benefits but also introduce 
several risks to the Executive, PSISS providers and clients including service 
disruption, reputational damage and additional costs (Chesterman, 2013; Hillier, 
2019).  Realising benefits and mitigating risks is further complicated by the inter-
organisational nature of shared services (Wang & Wang, 2007; Walsh et al., 2008). 
Scholars have identified that inter-organisational steering and control are required 
to deliver shared services to clients and customers, prompting debate about 
governance for PSISS (Grant et al., 2007; Janssen et al., 2012).   
As a starting point, I sought to understand how academic literature theorises PSISS 
governance and its practice.  To this end I conducted a literature review to 
investigate the concerns that governance, and in particular arrangements for 
governing PSISS initiatives, were contributing to PSISS failure.  I found that 
governance is not a single clearly defined concept and was theorised in multiple 
domains (Frederickson, 2005; Pollitt & Hupe, 2009).  Our current knowledge of 
PSISS governance is principally informed by literature from three academic 
domains: management, public administration and information systems.  These 
domains are to an extent siloed as each has a worldview consisting of traditions, 
perspectives and knowledge claims arising from each specific domain and the 
purpose of governance within that domain (Crotty, 1998; Van Gigch, 2002).   
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Working across domains is challenging, particularly when worldviews do not align 
(Alasuutari, Bickman, & Brannen, 2008).  Areas of specific focus, which differ 
across the domains, are mirrored in the practical guidance on governance forms 
that emerge from each of the domains.  The management domain has focussed 
primarily upon governance within the private sector and the development of a 
corporate governance literature and practices (Bevir, 2007).  The public 
administration domain focus is upon the public sector which initially resulted in 
the creation of the bureaucratic form for the efficient delivery of services (Wilson, 
1989).  More recently this domain has been heavily influenced first by the New 
Public Management (NPM) administration reforms, introduced at the end of the 
1980s, and later by post-NPM governance approaches (Pollitt, 2017; Reiter & 
Klenk, 2019).  The information systems domain has focussed upon the use of 
information and communications technology as an alternative means of service 
delivery to be integrated into existing business processes and systems of delivery, 
and has led to a further set of information technology (IT) governance theories and 
practices (Huff, Maher, & Munro, 2006).  These three domains, forms and main 
practice areas are shown in Table one.   
Domain Governance Form Main Practice Area 
Management Corporate 
Governance 
Private Sector  
Public Administration Bureaucracy Public Sector  
Information Systems IT Governance Information and 
Communications Technology  
Table One: Domains, Forms and Practice Areas 
The academic domains and focus areas are wider than governance, although 
governance literature has increased in significance in the past 20 years (Bevir, 
2007).  The academic literature has increasingly begun to acknowledge emerging 
new governance forms and this knowledge, in its turn, is influencing governance 
practice.  Essentially the primary focus of each domain has influenced the practice 
literature emerging from that domain and these practice literatures are neither well 
integrated or aligned in the forms they take or their practice focus.   
Over time governance forms developed for both private and public sectors and later 
for information and communications technology (Hilmer, 1993; Weill & Ross, 
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2004; Ansell & Gash, 2008).  As a result corporate governance, bureaucracy and 
IT governance emerged as governance practice forms with their own academic 
literature and practice (Bevir, 2007).  The siloed focus of governance literature 
across these three domains is shown in Figure one.  
 
Figure One: Governance Domain, Form and Practice 
Delving deeper I identified two groupings of governance knowledge indicative of 
limited use of academic literature in practice.  The first grouping from academic 
literature, predominantly in the information systems domain, indicated 
practitioners were using industry derived models to perform governance 
(Guldentops, 2004; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2005; Ali & Green, 2007).  The 
second were models which showed practitioners “how to govern” (Cadbury, 1992; 
ITGI, 2005a).  Both of these groupings were developed based on a combination of 
academic literature and practical experience (Brotby, 2008; Lainhart, 2012).  
Reflecting upon my own experience I had seen little use of academic theory in 
PSISS governance, however I had observed the common usage of industry models 
in practice.  This led me to question whether practitioners were in fact using 
academic theory, or simply consuming it second hand through these models, 
potentially contributing to a disconnect between the domains of governance theory 
and PSISS governance practice.  My curiosity was  reinforced in the information 
systems literature where academic literature was criticised for lacking relevance 
and lagging behind industry publications (Davenport & Markus, 1999). 
It seems that practitioners develop governance arrangements to perform PSISS 
governance.  These governance arrangements are patterns of governance elements 
e.g. structures, roles and relationships; put in place to set direction and enable 
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delivery of objectives (Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999; Oliveira & Hersperger, 
2018).  If, as indicated, practitioners are not drawing directly from a sufficiently 
inclusive academic literature, reflective of all the domains affecting PSISS 
governance, this may be a contributing factor to PSISS failure.   
In addition, the use of industry models holds the promise of ‘best practice’, 
however some scholars raise concerns about their applicability, for example: 
stating “best practicism is the errant belief that there are certain practices that are 
truly ‘best’ and that replicating another organization’s processes, strategies and 
ideas within your organization will somehow miraculously yield a better reality” 
(Sanwal, 2008, p. 1).   
The use of industry models is criticised for failing to meet local conditions 
(Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010).  Many industry models are developed overseas in 
the US or Europe which can differ from local conditions, in this case New Zealand, 
limiting their applicability (Brotby, 2008; Lainhart, 2012).  For example: corporate 
governance arrangements contributed to the failure of Enron Corporation, which 
was a driver for the introduction of US legislation called the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
This Act contributed to the creation of best practice corporate and IT governance 
guidelines to meet the new legislative requirements (Damianides, 2005).  Whilst 
considered best practice, it is questionable whether these guidelines, influenced as 
they were by US legislation, would be applicable to other constituencies; 
particularly as in this case compliance with the foreign Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
was found to result in large costs to organisations which outweighed benefits 
(Boyle & Grace-Webb, 2007).  
Industry models add another layer of complexity to the practice of PSISS 
governance.  It appears that practitioners attempting to perform PSISS governance 
through the creation of governance arrangements are faced with siloed academic 
governance literature that originates in three domains, each with different focus 
areas.  Practitioners appear to have an alternative to academic theory with the 
introduction of industry models, which introduces another potential disconnect 
between literature and practice.   
14 
 
My literature review identified that practitioners are attempting to create 
governance arrangements and perform governance using literature from all three 
domains I have described here, whether that be through industry models or through 
creation of their own governance arrangements (Ali & Green, 2007).  Further, each 
of the domains has created its own governance forms, with specific focus areas of 
governance practice.  The initial public administration governance form, 
bureaucracy, has been over written by three governance forms: corporate 
governance, collaborative governance and IT governance; which were observed 
through public sector reforms of the late 1980s and introduction of e-government 
(Weill & Ross, 2004; Bevir, 2007; Torfing, 2016a).  Practitioners are now expected 
to use a combination of these three governance forms to develop their governance 
arrangements to perform public sector governance, as shown in Figure two.   
 
Figure Two: Governance Forms in the Public Sector  
These factors led me to focus my research on the lived experience of PSISS 
governance practitioners to contribute to our theory of PSISS governance and its 
practice.  The following sections detail the steps I took to answer my research 
questions and provide a reader’s guide to the thesis.   
Chapter two defines public sector ICT shared services before introducing the reader 
to international practice for PSISS and E-ID.  I present selected academic theory in 
two phases: firstly to provide an understanding of governance and sensitise my 
fieldwork; and secondly to review my findings against current literature.  As 
explained above, extant theory is informed by three domains which do not appear 
to be explicitly integrated at either the theoretical or the practice level.  The need 
to identify governance in practice is established and my literature-informed 
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governance framework is presented for use as sensitising concepts.  The different 
characteristics inherent in governance forms are discussed and used to develop a 
model for analysis of practitioner responses.     
Chapter three introduces the New Zealand public sector and provides insights into 
how the environment, particularly institutions and actors, influence the governance 
of the PSISS.  I also present the results of a pilot study exploring use of my 
framework through a PSISS in the New Zealand public sector to refine my research 
design and provide confidence in the suitability of my framework for this research 
(Blumer, 1969; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
Chapter four presents my research design.  It introduces the overall strategy I 
selected to integrate the different components of my research in a coherent and 
logical way, to address my research problem and answer my research questions.  I 
conducted empirical research into PSISS governance taking a constructivist 
approach to understanding practice, viewing PSISS governance as a socially 
constructed reality (Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2006; Timmermans & Tavory, 
2012).  I selected grounded theory based on Corbin and Strauss (2008) to conduct 
my research using semi-structured interviews to solicit practitioner perspectives to 
gain evidence of practice.  Grounded theory was used to analyse practitioner 
interviews to answer my first research question: How do practitioners perceive 
PSISS governance in practice?  This resulted in construction of a theory supported 
by a grounded practitioner narrative as a rich description of PSISS governance in 
practice.  To answer my second research question: How have governance 
arrangements addressed critical issues in public sector governance? I conducted 
theoretical integration for the development of a middle range theory to reduce the 
gap between literature and practice (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).  This 
involved construction of an official narrative through qualitative document 
analysis, to enable reflexive integration of official narrative, grounded practitioner 
narrative and academic theory (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Charmaz, 2014).  
In Chapter five I present changes to PSISS governance arrangements and 
instruments through a 20-year time series covering the period 1999 to 2019 as 
evidenced from document analysis.  This narrative serves two purposes.  First, 
deriving as it does from official, documented accounts of PSISS governance, it 
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represents one perspective on PSISS governance: what I have called an official 
narrative.  This official narrative also serves a second purpose of showing how 
governance arrangements and the mechanisms that influence these arrangements 
have changed over time.  Particular attention is paid to who is performing 
governance and the interaction between parties.   
Chapter six presents the results of my grounded theory analysis.  Practitioner 
perspectives were analysed using the governance framework and governance 
characteristics model, developed from my literature review in Chapter two, as 
sensitising concepts.  This resulted in the creation of my grounded theory supported 
by a rich practitioner narrative on PSISS governance.  This practitioner narrative 
provided an input for theoretical integration with the official narrative and existing 
theory to construct a mid-range theory as an answer to my research questions 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Tavory & Timmermans, 2014).  
Chapter seven presents a governance narrative, which was the result of a first 
iteration of theoretical integration, conducted through abductive reflection of the 
practitioner narrative, the official narrative and existing literature.  This reflection 
resulted in the identification of eight grounded theory themes constructed from 
practitioner perspectives on PSISS governance, which are unpacked in this chapter.  
In Chapter eight I reflexively explore the eight themes from my mid-range theory 
against current academic literature, providing insights into seven critical 
governance issues for theoretical attention.  
Chapter nine concludes the thesis and includes identification of contributions of 
the research and limitations.  Reflexive analysis of practice against current 
literature has helped to refine my grounded theory, and allowed construction of a 
public sector governance model as my initial contribution to the body of 
knowledge.  Using this model as a lens for further reflexive analysis enabled 
identification and exploration of governance in practice for comparison with 
current literature to provide additional contributions to knowledge. To aid future 
researchers, I identify the limitations of my research and present future 
opportunities for research that could leverage this study.  Figure three provides a 




Figure Three: Thesis Overview 
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Chapter Two. Literature Review  
This literature review provides a synthesis of the key components of my research, 
including PSISS governance, drawn from academic literature and how they relate 
to the public sector.  It shows a disconnect between academic theory and practice, 
establishing the need to research governance in practice.  I then discuss how I 
turned to the literature to develop sensitising concept tools to take into the field to 
aid with analysis.  This approach is consistent with grounded theory, incorporating 
information from multiple sources to enable richness of explanation (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).   
My literature review was done in two main time spaces: firstly, to understand 
governance in the academic domains and then sensitise my fieldwork; and second 
to review my findings in the light of recent literature.  For completeness both passes 
are covered in this chapter.   
PSISS 
Public sector ICT shared services is a combination of three areas: public sector 
services, shared services and ICT services.  Public sector services are services 
provided on behalf of the government, either by public sector agencies or external 
providers (Norman, 2003).  Shared services involve standardisation and provision 
of common functions (Young & Tavares, 2004; Walsh et al., 2008).   
PSISS are an example of shared services provision where an ICT function is 
standardised and provided to multiple public sector agencies (Grant et al., 2007; 
Wang & Wang, 2007).  Some academic literature extends this definition to include 
services which can be provided to citizen and non-citizen customers as well as 
private sector clients (Senyucel, 2007; Suomi, 2008; Eaton et al., 2017).  
PSISS involve multiple participants and cut across organisational boundaries.  
PSISS are often researched from a technical perspective, which has been criticised 
for ignoring the horizontal aspects of governance in favour of technical integration 
(Sorensen & Lofgren, 2009).  PSISS research can also focus upon interactions 
between organisations and participants (Ansell, Trondal, & Ogard, 2016).  This 
research focusses upon the interactions rather than the technical perspective for an 
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operational PSISS through perspectives of participants involved in the governance 
of the PSISS (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).   
To clarify what PSISS are I have presented an illustrative example in Figure four 
of a generic PSISS.  An agency becomes a PSISS provider to other agencies (A to 
D).  In this example the provider agency has contracted an outsourced vendor to 
host the service, whilst still maintaining the contractual relationship for providing 
services to client agencies.   
  
Figure Four: Generic PSISS   
In some cases, ICT service vendors have attempted to leverage terms like cloud 
computing and shared services to rebadge existing services offerings as shared 
services because they share infrastructure (Marshall, 2010).  These are commodity 
offerings that could be consumed by any organisation, raising questions about the 
authority and ability for the public sector to have an active role in governance.  
Therefore, these services have not been included in the scope of this research. 
The term provider in Figure four is used to refer to the agency providing the PSISS 
(Walsh et al., 2008); and the term client denotes a public or private sector 
organisation who could use the PSISS; and customer denotes citizen and non-
citizens using the PSISS.  These terms were chosen as they were used in practice 
by PSISS documentation and research participants (State Services Commission, 
2019b).  Public sector in the research is the collective of all public sector agencies 
(Bevir, Rhodes, & Weller, 2003; Norman, 2003).   
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Academic literature provides examples of early shared services in both the public 
and private sector.  Public sector organisations used shared computing services in 
the 1970s and early 1980s to maximise the use of expensive resources (Toland, 
2010).  Private sector organisations used shared services in the 1980s to drive 
efficiencies by consolidating support functions across corporations into one group 
to provide centralised services (Ulrich, 1992; Lacity & Fox, 2008).  Later shared 
services were promoted as an extension of business process reengineering to drive 
efficiencies by removing duplicate functions (Hammer & Champy, 1994; Ulbrich, 
2006).   
In the 1980s and 1990s public sector reform, combined with the introduction of 
distributed computing and the personal computer, contributed to agencies 
purchasing and running their own, or contracting out the management of, 
information systems and back office functions (Paagman et al., 2015), and in turn 
criticisms of fragmentation and inefficiency (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & 
Tinkler, 2005).  
Public sector reviews and efficiency drives identified opportunities for shared 
services (Gershon, 2004, 2008).  The most common motives for PSISS were cost 
reduction and improved quality of service (Borman, 2010; Paagman et al., 2015).  
Early optimism about the ability to deliver these benefits appear to have been 
tempered by difficulties in practice (Gill & MacCormack, 1999; Hillier, 2019).  
Other motives identified in literature included reduction of risk, access to external 
resources, organisational redesign and business process improvement (Ulbrich, 
2006; Wang & Wang, 2007; Paagman et al., 2015).   
Moves to join up government services across the public sector through electronic 
government, or e-government, followed public management reforms of the 1980s.  
Provision of digital services, which was enabled by the diffusion of internet and 
web based technology, was becoming more common (Calista & Melitski, 2007).  
Digital services provided from government to government, government to business 
and government to citizens earned the name e-government (Silcock, 2001; 
Margetts, 2006) and the beginnings of some sector wide e-services led to an 
increasing use of the term shared services (Janssen & Wagenaar, 2004; Grant et al., 
2007).   
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E-government is sometimes seen as a partnership between government and citizens 
(Silcock, 2001).  Others saw e-government from a technical perspective where 
technology could drive change through process digitisation (Dunleavy et al., 2005). 
The transformational potential of e-government was connected to public value   
(Cordella & Bonina, 2012; Bannister & Connolly, 2014).  Researchers investigated 
implementation of single services, or in some cases groups of services, reviewing 
the nature of the transformation from several perspectives, focussing upon process 
change, management and results (Weerakkody & Dhillon, 2008); change 
management processes employed to deliver a new service and how the change was 
managed (Nograsek, 2011); and service performance and usage of new services 
(Margetts, 2006).  Other scholars focussed upon the softer aspects of 
implementation such as the diffusion of e-government and stakeholder 
requirements, and the results of the transformation on stakeholders over time 
(Senyucel, 2007; Carter, 2008).  
Grand claims were made about what could be achieved through e-government and 
introduction of e-governance (Bovaird, 2003).  E-government was to deliver public 
value through ICT enabled reforms, freeing up resources to perform high value 
tasks (Cordella & Bonina, 2012), and fundamentally altering the way services were 
provided.  NPM was pronounced dead with technology leading public sector 
transformation, which led to calls for specific governance arrangements (Dunleavy 
et al., 2005).  In this aspirational mood different approaches to the governance of 
shared services emerged.   
One view was e-governance as a means of innovation across the public sector, 
however scholars found the technical nature of innovation projects indicated a 
focus on delivery over public value (Potnis, 2009).  The reduction of outcomes to 
measurable project outputs has been criticised for not considering public sector 
constraints (Lofgren & Allen, 2019), which has led to wider criticism of the 
‘projectification of the public sector’ (Hodgson, Fred, Bailey, & Hall, 2019).   
Some information systems literature attributed success and failure of shared 
services to implementation and management.  Success was seen to require strong 
technical skills, change management and process standardisation.  Management 
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were required to provide top cover to technical resources, approve funding, 
mandate adoption and resettle staff whose functions were replaced by technology 
improvements.  Social and organisational challenges could be governed through 
hierarchical direction and control (Miskon, Bandara, Gable, & Fielt, 2011).   
Regardless of the governance employed many e-government programmes failed to 
deliver expected benefits; be they e-democracy, sector transformation or increased 
efficiencies (Heeks, 2006; Lips, 2011).  Shared services programmes were 
commonly part of the e-government offerings (Janssen & Wagenaar, 2004; 
Weerakkody & Reddick, 2012).  Various shared services initiatives were created 
internationally.  Governments set up shared services functions for all-of-
government services, sectors collaborated and clusters of organisations came 
together to develop shared services (Janssen & Wagenaar, 2004; Dollery & 
Akimov, 2008).   
According to Paagman et al (2015) the most common rationale for shared services 
were increased efficiency and improved customer services.  Others included access 
to external resources, ability to focus on core activities, risk mitigation, process 
standardisation and the ability to concentrate on innovation (Joha & Janssen, 2010; 
Miskon et al., 2011; Janssen et al., 2012).  
Some research identified examples of smaller organisations working in clusters to 
gain access to resources they would not have on their own.  They found moving to 
shared service arrangements could be problematic due to a lack of inter-
organisational controls, which could delay realisation of expected benefits.  As a 
result shared service providers and public sector organisations came under pressure 
from the Executive to reduce costs (Janssen & Wagenaar, 2004).  The motives of 
different parties involved in shared services were questioned and tensions 
identified between cost reduction and provision of improved customer services 
(Paagman et al., 2015).   
Researchers investigated relationships between organisations involved in shared 
services to understand their effect on performance and perceived success of the 
PSISS (Janssen & Joha, 2006).   
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Shared services required trusted information sharing and access mechanisms, 
leading to the introduction of electronic identity PSISS (Kubicek & Noack, 2010).  
Concerns about malicious actors, fraud and service failure led to criticism about 
governments entering E-ID programmes with a limited understanding of the 
principles of identity management (Collings, 2008).  As my research investigates 
the governance of PSISS the following section uses academic literature to provide 
the reader an understanding of E-ID PSISS and their governance.   
Electronic Identity  
I selected the New Zealand E-ID PSISS, which is currently called RealMe, to 
investigate PSISS governance.  It has been known by several different names over 
the past 20 years, including: Government Logon Service (GLS), Igovt logon 
(Igovt), Identity Verification Service (IVS), Data Verification Service (DVS) and 
RealMe.  To make it easier for the reader I have referred to the service as the PSISS 
in this research, although quotes may refer to the service by a name used by 
respondents.   
The party providing the PSISS, hereafter referred to as the provider, has changed 
over time from the State Services Commission (SSC) to the Department of Internal 
Affairs (DIA).  The provider has entered numerous contractual relationships with 
vendors and partners for provision of the PSISS.  Changes of provider and 
contractual relationships enable comparison throughout analysis, providing 
richness however they can be confusing for readers.  Where possible I indicate 
changes to names, roles and relationships throughout the thesis and in the glossary 
in Appendix A.   
Scholars have used the term E-ID to describe an electronic form of identification 
which could be provided digitally as an online service or through identification 
cards (Melin, Axelsson, & Soderstrom, 2016; Eaton et al., 2017; Göransson, 2018).  
The E-ID PSISS in my research is a digital identity so I use the term E-ID to mean 
an online service, unless stated otherwise.   
Initial investigations identified two approaches to governing electronic identity: 
centralised and decentralised.  Centralised E-ID were designed and controlled by a 
central governance function overseeing design and delivery of electronic identity 
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solutions.  The selected PSISS is a centralised solution (State Services 
Commission, 2006b).  Decentralised E-ID left selection of E-ID to agencies 
implementing solutions.  Decentralised governance arrangements, like those in 
Australia, have been excluded from scope to enable consistent comparison of 
governance arrangements (Lips & Pang, 2008).   
International examples are drawn from the European Union (EU) and the United 
Kingdom (UK).  The EU provided a rich source of academic E-ID literature into 
the use of regulations, early adoption and working with external vendors, 
particularly the Scandinavian peninsular countries’ relationships with banks.  The 
United Kingdom enabled comparison with another country with a Westminster 
tradition and a centrally governed PSISS.  The UK case uses academic and grey 
literature to provide richness.   
International Examples  
E-ID design began in the 1990s with Finland and Denmark, followed by Estonia.  
In 1999 the European Union issued a directive promoting use of electronic 
signatures.  The directive set the expectation electronic signatures should be secure 
enough to admit as legal evidence (European Parliament, 1999; Polanski, 2015).  
By 2010 eight EU countries had implemented E-ID PSISS and as a rule adoption 
of the E-ID by customers and clients was reported as slower than anticipated 
(Kubicek & Noack, 2010).   
Estonia and Finland implemented services early.  Denmark began design early 
however it was interrupted leading to a delay in implementation.  Other countries 
including Norway, Spain and Germany also faced delays as service design was 
interrupted.  Some countries including Finland, Sweden and Denmark redesigned 
and renewed their offerings to meet changing requirements (Kubicek & Noack, 
2010; Eaton et al., 2017).  The design, interruptions and delivery of E-ID identified 
in the European Union are shown, with the United Kingdom and New Zealand 





Figure Five: E-ID Implementation  
Sources: (Kubicek & Noack, 2010; Eaton et al., 2017; Hillier, 2019) 
Finland.  In 1999 Finland introduced national E-ID cards, called FINED, which 
had machine-readable smartcard chips.  These cards replaced older national 
identity cards and were one of three electronic identity solutions in use in Finland 
at the time.  A consortium of banks ran a system called TUPAS and mobile 
technology operators ran their own systems.  The FINED system was criticised for 
the installation costs of card readers, training time required to operate the system 
and poor user experience.  FINED struggled to make ground on the existing 
TUPAS system which was commonly used (Bazarhanova, Yli-Huumo, & 
Smolander, 2019).  Ten years after implementation only 10% of adults had FINED 
cards, whereas almost all adults in Finland had a TUPAS identity.  More strikingly 
99.9% of ecommerce and e-government transactions used TUPAS compared to 
0.1% using FINED (Rissanen, 2010).   
The dominance continued until introduction of new European Union and Finnish 
regulations for electronic identification and trust services (EIDAS) in 2015 
(Bazarhanova et al., 2019).  EIDAS was an EU initiative for the development of a 
common electronic identity framework (Cuijpers & Schroers, 2014).  The 
framework was intended to facilitate a single digital market for electronic identity 
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beyond national solutions (Polanski, 2015).  Finnish regulation was amended to 
align with EIDAS (Bazarhanova et al., 2019). 
The regulations impacted the TUDAS monopoly introducing new service 
providers, reducing the cost of customer transactions from 0.5 Euro to 0.1 Euro and 
enabling service brokers to consume the TUDAS service to interact directly with 
customers, reducing reliance on banks (Bazarhanova et al., 2019).  This example 
indicates regulations can have significant influence for E-ID governance and 
highlights the poor performance of a public sector E-ID (FINED) occurring over 
an extended period.   
Estonia introduced an electronic identification card which was mandated for all 
citizens above 15 years old.  The cards provided access to government and private 
sector services including education, banking and health care.  The mandate saw 
adoption grow to 98% of Estonians (Anthes, 2015).   
Building on adoption Estonia developed a shared service platform for digital 
services eventually providing 600 electronic services to citizens and 2,400 services 
to companies (Anthes, 2015; e-estonia, 2019).  As a result, 99% of public services 
are reported as being available online 24/7.  Use of digital services has saved 
Estonia a reported 1407 years of working time annually, resulting in Estonia being 
promoted as a leader in governance for E-ID and shared services (Vassil, 2015; 
Jaffe, 2016; e-estonia, 2019).   
Estonia developed a plan to leverage the EIDAS regulation to provide electronic 
identities to e-residents.  The number of e-cards was scheduled to grow from 1.3 
million Estonians to 10 million e-residents by 2025.  Signing up as an e-resident 
was envisioned to provide access to Estonian, and wider European Union electronic 
services and databases.  This would enable people from outside Estonia to invest 
in Estonia, create businesses and trade with the wider European Union (Anthes, 
2015, p. 18). 
The Estonian example presents E-ID as an enabler for providing public and private 
sector services internationally.  Estonia has high levels of customer adoption which 
was attributed to the mandate.  The large number of services and ability to develop 
an eco-system appears linked to customer adoption and mandate.  Interestingly 
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Estonia saw the EIDAS regulations as an opportunity to increase their services 
internationally.   
Denmark’s early attempts to design an E-ID were interrupted by government 
delays and poor adoption (Hoff & Hoff, 2010).  Denmark began investigating a 
citizen smartcard ID in 1992, however after reviews and parliamentary debates the 
smartcard initiative was stopped due to privacy concerns.  Optional cards were 
proposed in 1996, however debates about technology options and doubts about 
benefit realisation resulted in the proposal being stopped (Hoff & Hoff, 2010).  The 
1999 EU Directive prompted further investigation (European Parliament, 1999).   
The Danish government established a digital task force in 2001 to develop 
requirements and issue a tender for a digital signature service.  Two vendors 
responded, a banking consortium and a telecommunications company.  The 
telecommunications company was selected and awarded a contract to provide the 
E-ID.  The new E-ID went up against the existing banking ID solution, called 
NEMID.  After five years the E-ID had 250,000 users compared to 2.2 million users 
of NEMID.  The E-ID was criticised as difficult to install, not providing useful 
services and not meeting the 1999 regulations, limiting development of online 
offerings.  When the contract expired in 2008 the government went to market and 
selected NemID (Hoff & Hoff, 2010), which was mandated as the national E-ID 
(Eaton et al., 2017; Medaglia, Hedman, & Eaton, 2017).  NemID allowed the 
Danish government to meet the requirements of the EU directive and provide a 
single identity service for both public and private sector services (Hoff & Hoff, 
2010).  
The Danish case shows the challenges getting agreement to proceed with a PSISS.  
The use of contractual mechanisms for vendor provision enabled vendor transition, 
as opposed to having to write off investment in a PSISS.  
Sweden ratified the 1999 EU directive although there was little interest in E-ID.  
In 2001 Sweden developed a framework for digital identity provision.  The 
government purchased identity services from vendors who were responsible for 
issuing E-ID, managing technical infrastructure and contact with citizens.  An 
agency called VERVA was formed to oversee E-ID vendors.  The Swedish 
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government allowed multiple providers, however Swedish BankID built the largest 
market share (Eaton et al., 2017).  VERVA was disbanded in 2008 and the e-
Government Delegation was created in 2009, followed by the E-ID Board in 2011 
(Gronlund, 2010; Göransson, 2018).  The E-ID Board centrally co-ordinated E-ID 
provision and developed trust frameworks requiring E-ID vendor compliance 
(Göransson, 2018).  BankID become the most common E-ID service, processing 
1.2 billion transactions in 2015.  The influence of BankID has extended to 
involvement in the design of citizen ID cards (Eaton et al., 2017; Göransson, 2018).  
Citizens have expressed security and privacy concerns about who can see their 
identity information and where it is shared (Göransson, 2018). 
Swedish E-ID governance was criticised as laissez-faire and contributing to a 
technical focus on service delivery (Gronlund, 2010; Eaton et al., 2017).  The 
changes to governance arrangements through the introduction and replacement of 
governance groups appear to have contributed to the limited outcome focus.   
 Norway.  In 2003 the Norwegian government developed a specification to meet 
the 1999 EU directive and went to the market.  Eight years of government debate 
followed about whether to build an E-ID or pursue commercial offerings.  In the 
interim various identity solutions were created.   
In 2005 Norwegian banks released BankID which grew to over 3 million users and 
was adopted by local government, health and postal services (Eaton et al., 2017).  
The government set up their own E-ID service called MinID to provide access to 
public sector services.  The MinID service provided less security than commercial 
offerings, limiting customer services it could access (Agency for Public 
Management and e-Government, 2019). 
In April 2012 the Norwegian government issued a new E-ID tender resulting in 
three successful vendors, including BankID.  Norwegian citizens could use three 
E-ID services or the legacy MinID service to access government services (Eaton et 
al., 2017).  The delays caused by debate identifies a potential governance issue.  
The Norwegian example also raises questions about the development and ongoing 
support of a public sector E-ID that is built to a lower specification than commercial 
offerings.   
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Norway spent a long-time debating E-ID options, set up their own central E-ID 
system and then opened out the market to include commercial vendors.  Norway, 
like other Scandinavian countries, found adoption of bank identity solutions was 
often quicker than public sector E-ID services.  In all cases banks were the largest 
E-ID vendors in terms of customers and transactions.  Although all four countries 
ended up working with banks they set up different governance arrangements 
indicating the diversity of E-ID governance arrangements in practice.   
New Zealand.  The e-Government Unit and strategy were established in 2000 and 
Managing for Outcomes guided joining up government services towards the joint 
goals of improved customer services and reduced costs (MFO Steering Group, 
2003; Cook, 2004).  Shared services were centrally coordinated by SSC who 
oversaw identity, security and network services (Gill & MacCormack, 1999; State 
Services Commission, 2006b).  The identity service was approved in 2003 and 
released into production in 2007 (State Services Commission, 2003a, 2007).  New 
Zealand PSISS are presented in Chapter five.   
Australia.  Rather than develop centralised E-ID services Australia set non-
obligatory guidelines and delegated EID selection to agencies (Lips & Pang, 2008).  
This does not enable direct comparison of governance arrangements for the PSISS 
researched, so Australia has not been included, although they could be explored by 
future research.  
United Kingdom.  In 2004 the Gershon review identified £20 billion savings a 
year by 2007/8 and the reduction of 84,000 civil servant positions (Gershon, 2004; 
Scrutiny Unit, 2005).  These savings were expected to be made from improved 
processes and freeing up staff to perform high value activities (Dollery & Grant, 
2010).  The potential for savings and improved customer services inspired the 
United Kingdom to undertake shared services initiatives (National Audit Office, 
2007).     
The UK was a late adopter and initially undertook shared services without an E-
ID, and did not commence development of their authentication strategy and 
framework until April 2011 (Hillier, 2019).  By this time the UK shared services 
programme, and government ICT in general, had been unfavourably reviewed.   
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A 2007 National Audit Office (NAO) review found shared services “savings to 
date are relatively small” (National Audit Office, 2007, p. 7).  In a 2011 review 
NAO raised governance concerns within the shared services programme.  Service 
benefits were not routinely measured, there were no specific adoption targets for 
shared services and stakeholder satisfaction levels were falling.  Concerns were 
raised about technology selection processes as “the technology that underpins the 
services is becoming obsolete and is unlikely to be appropriate for new digital 
services” (National Audit Office, 2011, p. 9).   
NAO reviews occurred against a backdrop of criticism about IT governance across 
the UK government with services failing to deliver expected benefits, and 
governance structures criticised as unclear (Stephen et al., 2011).  The shared 
services programme was offered an opportunity with calls to “standardise and 
simplify core elements of government ICT in order to bear down on costs and 
reduce duplication across the system” (Stephen et al., 2011, p. 58).  The Cabinet 
Office released a new shared services strategy in July 2011 to overcome criticism 
of the programme (National Audit Office, 2012).   
A NAO value for money review highlighted governance concerns the new strategy 
would have to overcome.  In the seven years since the Gershon Review shared 
services were expected to cost £0.9 billion, they cost £1.4 billion representing a 
half a billion pound overspend.  Savings of £159 million were forecast by 2011, 
whereas only one service had broken even.  These figures led to the conclusion the 
programme had failed to deliver value for money (National Audit Office, 2012).   
Governance arrangements were failing to provide value for money or standardised 
services as “by creating complex services that are overly tailored to individual 
departments, government has increased costs and reduced flexibility.  In addition, 
it has failed to develop the necessary benchmarks against which it could measure 
performance” (National Audit Office, 2012, p. 7).  Other criticisms included “slow 
decision-making and the lack of a clear vision” (National Audit Office, 2012, p. 
20).   
The shared services programme was reprioritised with the Cabinet Office 
accountable for delivering £400 million to £600 million savings per year and was 
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charged to work closely with clients to ensure benefits realisation (National Audit 
Office, 2014b).  The E-ID was identified as an enabler for the delivery of the 
Government Digital Strategy through planned delivery of government services as 
digital offerings by default, which would enable government services to “generate 
cost savings of between £1.7 billion and £1.8 billion per year” (National Audit 
Office, 2014a, p. 1). 
The E-ID was designed to provide a common identity service to enable identity 
assurance for clients and customers (National Audit Office, 2014a).  Five service 
vendors, including Barclays bank, were selected to provide identity services with 
funding based on customer adoption.  The E-ID was released in May 2016 under 
the collective name Verify (Hillier, 2019).   
Two years later NAO reviewed the shared services programme against the dual 
expectations of value for money and working with clients, finding it had “failed to 
deliver the planned benefits” (National Audit Office, 2016, p. 29).  Concerns were 
raised about the provider’s ability to work with clients as “no organisations met 
their target date for adopting single operating platforms for their shared services” 
(National Audit Office, 2016, p. 4).  The review was critical of the new governance 
arrangements stating “there was a failure in leadership, governance and 
accountability” (National Audit Office, 2016, p. 34).   
The programme struggled to build relationships with suppliers and clients.  Clients 
raised concerns about a conflict of interest with the Cabinet Office who was the 
provider handling contracts with identity vendors, delivering an identity service as 
a joint venture and acting as a client consuming identity services.  An assurance 
review by the Major Projects Authority identified a lack of role clarity, however 
reported no evidence of improper conduct (National Audit Office, 2016).  The need 
for a review indicates limited trust of the new governance arrangements.  The E-
ID was an enabler of the shared services programme, the perceived failure of the 
programme did not bode well for the E-ID performance or governance 
arrangements.  These concerns were realised when E-ID services, then called 
Verify, were reviewed in 2019.   
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The review found Verify failed to meet performance targets and vastly 
overestimated expected benefits.  The forecast adoption target was 25 million 
customers by 2020, however only 3.9 million customers were using the service by 
March 2019, less than a sixth of the target.  Similarly, 46 government client services 
were forecast by March 2018, whereas only 19 client services were verifying 
customer identities through Verify by March 2019.  In financial terms the estimated 
benefits were £2.5 billion over 10 years, the provider attempted to reset the 
expectation to £366 million.  The review cast doubts on the validity of the benefits 
that had been were reported as realised by the provider as the “National Audit 
Office could not replicate the benefits using data supplied” (Hillier, 2019, p. 5).  
This finding was compounded by a belief the provider had shifted additional costs 
to clients, particularly for integration and additional manual processing required to 
use Verify.  Poor client experience impacted the ability to gain client adoption for 
an “onerous system that is not fit for purpose” (Hillier, 2019, p. 5). 
The governance of Verify was criticised for “lacking strong leadership and 
oversight, despite being subjected to over 20 internal and external reviews” 
(Hillier, 2019, p. 6).  Specific governance issues included poor decision making 
compounded by a lack of accountability, a lack of strategic direction and poor 
intellectual property protection.  The government decided not to renew the existing 
funding or contracts post 2020, with private sector providers expected to take over 
responsibility for Verify (Hillier, 2019).   
The United Kingdom used a framework and contracted out the Verify E-ID service 
to five vendors.  The E-ID was introduced as part of a shared service programme 
that was already perceived as failing.  The slow adoption of the E-ID reflected the 
poor performance of the shared services programme.  Governance arrangements 
were criticised for providing poor strategic direction, a lack of accountability and 
unrealistic performance targets.   
Exploring international E-ID practice has provided insights for comparison with E-
ID in New Zealand.  There appear to be many different arrangements for the 
governance of E-ID PSISS and numerous examples of services failing to deliver 
expected benefits.  It appears common for adoption to be slow, particularly for E-
ID that only provide access to public sector services.   
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There appears to be tension between public and private sector E-ID and access to 
services.  Involvement of private sector vendors with existing solutions appeared 
to offer increased access to customers, as shown in Scandinavian examples, 
although this may increase privacy and security concerns.  Adopting commercial 
solutions may impact the control the government has over changes to the E-ID.  
Frameworks, contractual mechanisms and regulation appear to be commonly used 
to manage external vendors and define services.  Other options identified include 
using multiple vendors.   
The international examples identified factors that appear to impact the service 
boundary of the E-ID, and therefore governance arrangements, including whether 
the E-ID: 
• is built and supported by the government, bought commercially or both 
options are undertaken, 
• is provided by one or multiple vendors, 
• provides access to public and/or private sector services, 
• meets specific privacy and security requirements, 
• is mandated for usage by customers and the public sector, 
• is subject to regulation from the country or external bodies, 
• has a central body accountable for governance, and 
• is supported by the government and wanted by other agencies and 
customers. 
The range of these factors indicates PSISS governance is challenging, especially 
given the reported failure of many of these services.  These factors indicate a gap 
in practical knowledge.  The next step is to explore and present the academic E-ID 
literature in relation to this knowledge gap.   
E-ID Research 
Requiring a person to provide proof of identity to gain access to services has been 
in place for centuries e.g. passports or bank accounts.  The methods used to prove 
identity to gain access can occur through various channels including digital, 
telephone, by post or physical access (Gronlund, 2010).  Governments have 
commonly provided authorised forms of citizen identity to provide access to 
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services, secure borders and show proof of ability to operate motor vehicles or own 
firearms (Lips, Taylor, & Organ, 2009; Eaton et al., 2017).   
Countries need to identify their citizens and to manage entitlement to services.  The 
introduction of new technologies, including the internet, enabled the digitisation of 
national identity solutions (Melin et al., 2016).  Information systems that hold 
information about citizens, particularly those used to manage entitlements, require 
up-to-date information about the individual (Lips & Pang, 2008; Polanski, 2015).  
Authorised forms of identity can be used to provide access to services, however 
this access requires management to avoid fraud, which has led to the creation of 
Identity and Access Management (IAM) solutions to ensure the right people have 
access to the right services for the right reasons (Göransson, 2018; Gartner, 2019).  
There are multiple technical functions required for the provision of identity and 
access to information services.  These functions have changed over time, as have 
the names used to describe them (Gronlund, 2010; Grassi, Garcia, & Fenton, 2017; 
Medaglia et al., 2017).  Technical functions are important for design and operation 
of E-ID, so I will provide an overview, however as my research investigates PSISS 
governance my focus will be upon how identity and access contribute to PSISS 
governance and provision, which includes addressing security and privacy 
concerns.   
An identity is a set of attributes that provides the information required to uniquely 
describe a person or device to enable recognition (Ng-Kruelle, Swatman, Hampe, 
& Rebne, 2006).  Access is the ability to make use of a system or service (Kissel, 
2013).  Access is granted to systems or services when authorised identity and 
access rights for the scenario are accepted (Göransson, 2018).  A centralised access 
method, like an E-ID PSISS, provides the ability to access multiple services 
through a single authorised identity.  This removes the requirement for multiple 
digital identities which would require a customer to remember multiple user names 
and passwords (Kubicek, 2010). 
Traditional identity and access solutions were paper based.  These solutions were 
criticised as time consuming, inaccurate and expensive to maintain (Sullivan & 
Burger, 2019).  Since the 1990s governments have increasingly promoted digital 
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channels to improve services to customers and reduce costs, leading to the 
promotion of digital first initiatives and strategies (Maude, 2013; Stalla-Bourdillon, 
Pearce, & Tsakalakis, 2018).  These digital channels have required the public sector 
to rethink information sharing and particularly privacy and security implications 
(Lips & Pang, 2008; Göransson, 2018).   
Some countries started with a national identity system or identifier, others did not 
(Arora, 2008).  Prior to the introduction of E-ID many governments were reliant 
upon identity information from multiple digital and paper based systems, which 
could be out-of-date or time consuming to access and verify (Arora, 2008; Goede, 
2019).  Even with E-ID many governments found there was limited adoption, 
which did little to improve data quality (Collings, 2008).  Electronic identity was 
required to connect systems, and by connecting systems to enable delivery of 
digital channels through e-government programmes (Lips & Pang, 2008). 
Digital channels connect government services and require identity and access 
provision across organisational and information system boundaries (Melin et al., 
2016).  In information systems literature this is commonly known as federation, “a 
process that allows the conveyance of identity and authentication information 
across systems”, where authentication is the process of verifying the identity before 
access can be provided (Grassi et al., 2017, p. 46).  Federated identity services 
emerged as information systems began to share information across both system and 
organisational boundaries.  Concerns over privacy and security were weighed 
against the ability to access information and the associated systems (Fonstad & 
Subramani, 2009).  
Federation is challenging for shared services as security was traditionally located 
at the organisational boundary through firewalls and security appliances to keep 
external people out of information systems (Lindup, 1996; Moulton & Coles, 
2003).  Federation relies on trust between organisations and customers for identity 
credentials to be passed to enable access to services (Bjorner, Prasad, & Parida, 
2016).  E-ID PSISS can be used to provide identity and potentially access to 
services, or passing of credentials that enable clients to grant access to services 
(Kubicek & Noack, 2010; Schweighofer & Hötzendorfer, 2013; Hedstrom, 
Karlsson, & Soderstrom, 2016).   
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Whether a secure credential or actual client service access is provided by the PSISS 
has become an issue internationally, with the introduction of privacy legislation 
like the Global Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe impacting 
international providers (Bennett, 2018; Stalla-Bourdillon et al., 2018).  With large 
fines for breach of privacy many commercial and government identity services 
require redesign to ensure compliance (Houser & Voss, 2018).  It increasingly 
appears the role of E-ID PSISS will be to pass secure credentials to enable access 
rather than provide access per-se.  Accordingly I have tightened my research focus 
on E-ID PSISS as federated identity services that enable secure access to services 
across the public sector (Melin, Axelsson, & Soderstrom, 2013; Göransson, 2018).   
Electronic identity PSISS appear to be a conundrum as they have been considered 
a part of national infrastructure, yet have no value in and of themselves (Lips et al., 
2009; Eaton et al., 2017).  Clients can use the E-ID to create digital services and 
provide them securely to customers, however, if customers do not adopt the E-ID 
it has no value beyond being a technology front end (Lips et al., 2009; Melin et al., 
2016).   
Although technology is only the mechanism that connects customers to client 
services there is a risk the technology used to deliver E-ID PSISS can become the 
focus (Rose & Grant, 2010).  This risk is echoed in much of the academic literature 
which focuses upon the technical aspects of the E-ID PSISS rather than the access 
to services and benefits provided to clients and customers (Melin et al., 2016; 
Göransson, 2018).  One example was a tendency to refer to the token or card used 
to pass the identity information rather than the benefits accrued by providing and 
accessing client services (Soderstrom, 2016).  As a result of the technical focus 
there have been calls for research into the organisational and inter-organisational 
aspects of E-ID PSISS to increase contextual understanding of practice beyond 
technology (Melin et al., 2016). 
Customer convenience was identified as a key driver for adoption.  Federated E-
ID was promoted as a single service where users would only need one identity and 
password, meaning the benefit to customers was they would not need to remember 
multiple logins and passwords.  Researchers found limited client services meant 
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citizens were only using their E-ID sparingly meaning it was just another user name 
and password to remember (Kubicek & Noack, 2010).   
Client adoption was commonly identified as a success factor for E-ID (Zefferer & 
Teufl, 2015).  Moving beyond an organisational boundary led to the identification 
of integration challenges and as clients struggled to connect their resistance grew 
(Melin et al., 2013).  Other implementation issues included new equipment costs 
and difficulty getting the new technology to work for customers.  Mandates were 
explored with customers issued E-ID and clients compelled to adopt the E-ID.  
Even with mandates adoption was reported as slow which was taken as an 
indication that many E-ID programmes were not initially successful (Kubicek & 
Noack, 2010; Bazarhanova et al., 2019).  
European studies identified government directives as significant forms of 
regulation for the introduction and progress of E-ID.  The introduction of EU 
Directive 1999/93/EC for digital signatures was identified as a driver the creation 
of E-ID across the EU.  This directive also set the level of security required for 
legally admissible agreements and enabled the sharing of biometric information for 
EU passports (Ng-Kruelle et al., 2006; Polanski, 2015).  Another later directive 
issued in 2015 provided leverage to control banks who were monopolising E-ID in 
Finland, leading to cost reduction and the ability to consume bank identity services 
through service brokers (Bazarhanova et al., 2019).   
As E-ID were released and involved parties across the public and private sectors 
literature indicated the requirement of a centralised body to oversee the operation 
and any changes to E-ID services (Bazarhanova et al., 2019).  Governance 
arrangements were observed as centralised registration or decentralisation of E-ID 
(Lips & Pang, 2008).  Some scholars found the use of centralised or decentralised 
governance influenced decisions about the provision of services, which in turn led 
to discussions about privacy and security (De Hert, 2008; Polanski, 2015).   
Government issued identity documents are valuable, making them targets for fraud, 
which is also the case for digital versions of these identities.  Providing the identity 
credentials required to access multiple client services increases the potential impact 
on customer rights including security and privacy (Lips et al., 2009).  Privacy needs 
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to be considered from an inter-government and intra-government perspective.  The 
provider holds personally identifiable information in the E-ID with the intention of 
providing services.  Holding personal information places a duty of care on the 
provider and clients to protect the privacy and security of customer information.  
Protection needs to ensure proper use and sharing of information by the public 
sector and with clients, as well as ensuring no unauthorised access occurs (Collings, 
2008; Lips et al., 2009).   
The introduction of electronic identity services were expected to provide 
convenience however they introduced security risks (Arora, 2008).  Some research 
took a narrow focus upon the introduction of E-ID as technology, developing 
technical solutions to security concerns (Melin et al., 2013).  Examples of these 
solutions include smart card technology, biometrics, tokens for digital identity and 
mobile device solutions (Lips et al., 2009; Zefferer & Teufl, 2015). 
Privacy enhancing services were promoted by some scholars (Ng-Kruelle et al., 
2006; Melin et al., 2016).  Examples were provided where users had to agree to 
personal information being passed to client service providers.  The intention of 
privacy enhancing services is to ensure only enough information, like a token, is 
passed to authenticate the user without passing personally identifiable information.  
In some cases this was reinforced by legislation or regulations, for example: EU 
regulations required that only the personal information required for a transaction 
should be passed and stored (Kubicek, 2010).  It also means customer identity 
needs only be changed once rather than by every client meaning the E-ID could 
provide the most up-to-date identity information about a customer, who only has 
to update their information once for multiple client services (Lips & Pang, 2008).  
Tensions were identified between privacy and national security where providers 
needed to ensure a balance between privacy and the state role of national security 
and law enforcement (De Hert, 2008).  As well as privacy and security issues, 
providers have been faced with challenges to deliver their E-ID PSISS.   
In the 1990s there were limited federated identity offerings, so providers built their 
own solutions or bought in vendors to build a solution for them.  As more 
commercial identity offerings began to emerge governments were provided with 
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additional vendor options, leading to the introduction of a variety of hosting 
models, including outsourcing (Eaton et al., 2017).  The relationship between banks 
and providers emerged in several articles, particularly in the Scandinavian 
peninsular.  In these cases banks had their own E-ID solutions with larger footprints 
than public sector E-ID.  As a result, Scandinavian countries were faced with a 
choice, either compete or work with the banks.  Four countries faced this challenge 
and all of them developed different vendor relationships.  These ranged from 
outsourcing, selecting the bank as the sole or one of multiple vendors, or 
competition and eventual encapsulation of the banking solution (Kubicek & Noack, 
2010; Eaton et al., 2017).  The use of outsourcing options was observed as 
introducing capability challenges for E-ID providers (Collings, 2008).   
A reliance on contractors and outsourcing of specialist information technology 
functions limited the ICT capability of the public sector (Gauld, 2006; Fishenden 
& Thompson, 2013).  In many countries the public sector found they did not have 
the capability or specialist skills to develop and deliver large information systems, 
like E-ID (Hippold, 2019).  The relationship between E-ID and the private sector 
was explored in literature including vendor relationships and provision to private 
sector clients.  
Researchers investigated E-ID lifecycle management for service improvement.  In 
one interesting case the full lifecycle was presented as developing, implementing 
and managing the E-ID (Melin et al., 2016).  This left questions about retiring the 
E-ID or moving to a new solution.  Using traditional methods of running ICT the 
provider would have to write off the investment in the existing service before 
investing in new infrastructure and a new service.  An example of outsourced 
governance arrangements from Denmark showed how a provider could use 
contractual mechanisms to transition service vendors without having to write off 
costs.  This indicates governance arrangements can influence the ability to retire a 
solution or make modifications (Hoff & Hoff, 2010).   
Whilst outsourcing can provide benefits, governance arrangements need to meet 
other challenges posed by outsourcing E-ID.  If delivery is outsourced the provider 
is still accountable for privacy as personal information is an asset to be protected, 
which is reflected in privacy legislation (Hedstrom et al., 2016).  Outsourcing does 
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not mean outsourcing your brain, or the provider relinquishing their accountability 
to govern the PSISS (Blount & Zanella, 2010).  The potential impact when 
outsourcing agreements fail to protect national identity information was 
highlighted in Sweden where disclosure of driver licence, vehicle and military 
information damaged public confidence in the government (Anderson, 2017). 
Partnering with banks bought privacy and security tensions to light.  Online 
banking has high levels of security as the risk of fraud is high, however based on 
principal actor theory they have a need to maximise shareholder wealth which 
places pressure on the bank to monetise personal customer information (Linder & 
Foss, 2015).   
As E-ID scope changes there is a requirement to manage additional security or 
privacy risks (Arora, 2008).  Offering services to the private sector may increase 
adoption, however it raises security and privacy questions, placing additional 
accountabilities on the provider.  Private sector organisations may be tempted to 
use the personal information for financial gain.  Citizens may object to a private 
company holding their personal information, particularly if it contains sensitive 
information or reuse of information for a purpose the citizen had not agreed (De 
Hert, 2008; Kubicek, 2010).   
Government service providers have been increasingly using cloud and commercial 
ICT solutions to provide their ICT services and interact with customers.  This could 
include investigating or implementing commercial or cloud options for electronic 
identity provision (Houser & Voss, 2018; Jackson, 2019).  Cloud services can 
introduce security and privacy issues.  Providers need to be aware of where their 
information is stored and transmitted as it may be accessible by other governments 
under legislation like the Patriot Act (Stefanick, 2007).   
Today one of the most common methods of federated authentication is present in 
social media.  The suitability of these new methods for providing common identity 
were questioned, for example the use of social media as a form of E-ID to provide 
access to certain services (Parycek, Schossböck, & Rinnerbauer, 2015).  There is a 
view that as customers currently consume identity services like Google or 
Facebook that these could be used to provide access to government services.  
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Integration with these services could also remove the requirement to develop and 
maintain costly E-ID solutions providing a low-cost option for E-ID.  While these 
factors appear advantageous they raise concerns about data sovereignty, privacy 
and security (Knopper, 2016). 
Scholars expressed concerns about the influence of large social media corporations 
which has been coined “government by google” (Knopper, 2016).  Social media 
companies make money from advertising and selling data.  Many do not charge for 
identity services leading to concerns “if the service is free then the product is your 
personal data” (Polykalas & Prezerakos, 2019, p. 1).  Facebook hit the media when 
the company Cambridge Analytica harvested personal information from millions 
of users who were American voters and used the information to develop software 
to influence the results of the US election (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harris, 2018).   
The security of commercial solutions is another concern.  Scale makes them 
valuable targets as seen in a 2013 breach at Yahoo where up to one billion customer 
accounts were compromised (Thielman, 2018).  Similarly in 2018 Google was 
forced to close their google+ offering when a breach resulted in up to 500,000 user 
accounts being compromised (Wong & Solon, 2018).  Any government service 
relying upon google+ for identity would be left without a method to identify users, 
which would result in service disruptions.   
PSISS governance is challenging.  Optimism about opportunities for large savings 
and improved services have been dampened by reported governance failures 
(Stephen et al., 2011; Hillier, 2019).  Academic research identified several PSISS 
governance challenges including security and privacy of customer information.  
New opportunities for cost reduction and improved service provision including 
outsourcing, cloud service provision and technology improvements appear to come 
with associated governance challenges.  Investigating practice can provide insights 
into improving the understanding and practice of PSISS governance, and how these 
opportunities and challenges are addressed, providing rationale to conduct 




According to Rhodes (2007) governance was traditionally based around the 
exercise of power by royalty and later by the government.  Over time other 
governance forms were introduced including corporate governance, IT governance 
and collaborative governance.  The following section introduces the reader to these 
governance forms through selected academic literature before discussing the 
introduction of the governance forms to the public sector.   
Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance defines the roles and responsibilities of participants involved 
in directing and controlling an organisation (Cadbury, 1992; Musson & Jordan, 
2005).  Two corporate governance models emerging from corporate governance 
literature are: the Principal–Agent model and the Stakeholder model (Kasey, 
Thompson, & Wright, 1997; Matei & Drumasu, 2015).  These models debate 
whether an organisation is in business to satisfy the needs of shareholders or the 
interests of its stakeholders (Hilmer, 1993; Johnson & Scholes, 1999).  This 
distinction is important, as it impacts which factors will be used to measure 
organisational performance (Kasey et al., 1997; Johnson & Scholes, 1999).  
Governance arrangements differ across theorists, organisations and countries 
(Johnson & Scholes, 1999; Li & Harrison, 2007).  There are many other grey areas 
when attempting to define corporate governance.  Principal-agent arrangements 
focus on compliance and a prescriptive methodology, enforced by government 
direction like the Cadbury Report and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Cadbury, 1992; 
Damianides, 2005).  Stakeholder arrangements take a less prescriptive approach 
recognising there are different ways for corporate governance to operate in 
different contexts (Johnson & Scholes, 1999).  What appears consistent is the focus 
upon the organisation boundary.    
The most common approach to corporate governance identified in literature are 
principal-agent models, based on agency theory, so I have selected them to 
represent corporate governance for my research (Van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 
2009; Subramaniam, Stewart, Ng, & Shulman, 2013).  Agency theory has also 
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become common in the public sector through NPM reforms (Bovens, Goodin, 
Schillemans, & Gailmard, 2014). 
Agency theory has been characterised as top down, command and control.  A 
principal-agent relationship exists where one party, the principal, delegates tasks 
to another, the agent, who performs those tasks (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In the private 
sector boards of directors act as the principal who contract management to deliver 
on behalf of shareholders.  Vertical accountability is employed with the board 
accountable to shareholders and management accountable to the board (Hilmer, 
1993; Woodward, Edwards, & Birkin, 2001).   
Agency theory was developed to explain how private sector corporations could 
exist, based on an assumption of opportunistic managers seeking to satisfy their 
own interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Van Ees et al., 2009), which is known as 
the agency problem, where managers will not always act to maximise shareholder 
value (Fama, 1980).  Divergence between agent actions and principal interests 
result in agency costs, requiring the principal to put mechanisms in place to align 
agent actions with shareholder interests to ensure that agency costs are reduced to 
maximise shareholder value (Kulik, 2005).  Agency costs are commonly reduced, 
rather than eliminated, as the cost and effort required to eliminate agency cost 
commonly outweighs benefits (Bovens, Goodin, Schillemans, & Gailmard, 2014).   
According to Van Ees et al. (2009) agency costs are addressed through rules and 
hierarchical control.  Prescriptive mechanisms including rules, policies and 
practices are created for management to follow, with the intention of maximising 
shareholder value and minimising agency cost (Kulik, 2005; Donaldson, 2012).  
Mechanisms for reducing agency cost include incentives, formal definition of roles 
and responsibilities and performance monitoring (Kulik, 2005; Van Ees et al., 
2009).  The board is accountable for answering questions that arise outside formally 
defined mechanisms, which reinforces the creation of formal controls (Hart, 1995).  
Previously undocumented roles are formalised or managed with board oversight 
(Hilmer, 1993).   
Control mechanisms are in place to ensure roles and responsibilities are well 
defined, aligning processes with performance goals (Hilmer, 1993; Van Ees et al., 
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2009).  Contractual mechanisms enable the formalisation of controls and allocation 
of accountability, with incentives offered to encourage behaviour aligned with 
corporate strategy to enable the attainment of shareholder value (Van Ees et al., 
2009; Kultys, 2016).  Under agency theory the board and management are 
delegated authority within formally defined & prescribed limits (Linder & Foss, 
2015).  Managers are accountable to the board for decisions they make, similarly 
the board is accountable to shareholders (Hilmer, 1993).  Shareholders expect the 
board to hold management accountable for unethical behaviour, particularly if they 
could damage shareholder value (Kulik, 2005).   
According to Hilmer (1993) boards ensure formally defined roles are performed; 
and define the responsibilities of the parties for performing these functions.  
Performance specification is provided through contractual means including 
performance plans and job descriptions (Stremitzer, 2018).  Formal definition is 
intended to provide management clarity for action and accountability (Bovens, 
Goodin, Schillemans, & Gailmard, 2014).  Management are provided autonomy to 
act within delegations as defined in roles, responsibilities and organisational 
processes (Hilmer, 1993).  Management performance is measured against 
contractually agreed performance targets by the board through the use of controls 
and performance monitoring (Stremitzer, 2018).  Performance monitoring is 
conducted using contractual mechanisms with formally agreed performance levels, 
tied to incentives (Van Ees et al., 2009).   
The use of incentives and controls has been questioned by some scholars pointing 
to corporate governance failures where agents have been seen as gaming the system 
(Cohan, 2002).  These failures were identified as contributing to increased 
legislation and prescriptive guidance for corporate governance (Cadbury, 1992; 
Bevir, 2007).   
Legislation and regulation require compliance, however, they have been observed 
as conflicting with the need to maximise shareholder value (Bryce, 2002; Elson & 
Gyves, 2003).  This potential conflict has led to questions about the applicability 
of agency theory in the public sector where the government could be considered 
the principal, appointing public sector agents and the legislator (Boston, 2011; 
Schachter, 2014).   
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Corporate governance in the public sector differs across jurisdictions (Considine & 
Lewis, 2003; Bevir, 2007).  The use of vertical governance, derived from agency 
theory, has been employed to provide alignment with strategic goals; however 
issues have arisen, particularly for the delivery of outcomes (Subramaniam et al., 
2013).   
Vertical accountability is also limited when working across the public sector, 
particularly where collaboration is required from multiple stakeholders with 
conflicting goals (Osborne, 2010; Schachter, 2014).  Agency theory presents the 
relationship between principal and agent as a single relationship, but this is not 
always the case.  Conflicting goals, often present when there are multiple 
principals, can lead to confusion for management (Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011).   
Much of the agency theory research has focussed upon finding the optimal mix of 
formal controls, incentives and monitoring mechanisms for delivering shareholder 
value (Van Ees et al., 2009).  Formal controls have been criticised as normative 
definition of how organisations should be governed (Donaldson, 2012).  It is argued 
that it is impossible for these formal controls to cover all eventualities or fully 
reflect the operating environment (Hart, 1995).  Other scholars argued the use of 
formal mechanisms can be expensive (Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011).  The 
employment of formal controls in the public sector has raised concerns that 
informal elements, particularly those that are difficult to formally capture, will be 
ignored (Subramaniam et al., 2013).  Some scholars promote agreement between 
parties use softer, subjective performance measurement to address these issues, 
however they appear incongruent with agency theory (Woodward et al., 2001; 
Stremitzer, 2018) 
The critics of principal-agent theory argue formal controls are over simplistic 
methods for resolving real world problems.  The use of monitoring systems and 
incentives may address gaps between shareholder and management interests, 
however they provide limited benefit for other organisational challenges.  
Oversimplified mechanisms can be easy to report and present, however, they do 
not represent the richness of human behaviour leading to impractical heavy-handed 
solutions to complex problems (Kultys, 2016).   
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Employment of multiple rules can introduce contradictions between rules, 
requiring additional work to interpret and update.  Other issues have included the 
rigidity of rules and threat of punishment limiting the willingness to act, take risks 
or attempt innovative solutions to business problems (Kultys, 2016).  Risk aversion 
is particularly relevant in situations where organisations are required to work across 
organisational boundaries to deliver an outcome (Bevir, 2007).  ICT enabled shared 
services have introduced services that cut across organisational boundaries, 
challenging existing governance arrangements (Dunleavy et al., 2005).   
Corporate governance is expected to enable delivery of shareholder value (Van Ees 
et al., 2009), as such, ICT should be employed in ways that will increase 
shareholder value without incurring agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kulik, 
2005).  Tensions arose with calls for a separate IT governance function and 
criticism of the limited ICT understanding of those performing corporate 
governance (Huff et al., 2006).  The following section explores information 
technology governance literature, which will enable further comparison between 
the corporate governance and information technology forms.   
Information Technology Governance 
The term IT governance was introduced in the early 1990s to describe 
arrangements required to ensure delivery of ICT capabilities required to support 
organisational goals (Brown & Grant, 2005).  Weill and Ross conducted seminal 
research, conducting IT governance research projects with over 300 enterprises in 
over 20 countries.  They defined IT governance as the decision-making ability and 
accountability framework that encourages the right sort of behaviour for the use of 
ICT (Weill & Ross, 2004).   
IT governance aligns organisational ICT with wider organisational strategies 
(Weill & Ross, 2004; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2009).  Effective IT 
governance is expected to provide improved ICT performance for an organisation 
and it is asserted improved ICT performance provides improved efficiency and 
productivity (Guldentops, 2004; Ali & Green, 2012).  Drawing from management 
literature, it is possible to infer IT governance seeks to ensure the interaction of 
technology and social systems will improve alignment with corporate goals.  This 
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alignment is intended to enable  corporate success, which can be translated as 
shareholder value (Weill & Ross, 2004; Kulik, 2005).   
Before moving into a detailed description of IT governance I will present traditions 
of information systems research that informed IT governance, including some of 
the tensions experienced in information systems as a multidisciplinary domain 
informed by theories from other domains. 
Information systems research investigates ICT and the relationship between ICT 
and society (Gregor, 2006; Kline, 2015).  The role played by information systems 
has been expressed from an organisational perspective, where deployment of ICT 
can impact organisational processes and people, to wider investigations into the 
interaction between ICT and society (Lee, 2001; Benbasat & Zmud, 2003).  
Information systems literature from the 1990s and 2000s included epistemological 
debates about the merits of positivism or interpretivism with a large skew towards 
positivist research (Ricciardi, 2010).  A 1991 study found only 3.2% of a sample 
of 155 information systems research articles were interpretive studies (Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991).  A follow up study in 2004 saw interpretive studies increase to 
19% which was seen as increased interest “in obtaining scientific knowledge in real 
world settings” (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004, p. 197), with information systems 
researchers seeking to understand the world from the experiences of people who 
are part of the phenomena (Schwandt, 1994; Gregor, 2006).   
Other debates in information systems literature include the relationship between 
ICT and society.  ICT was identified as a factor influencing societal change through 
processes, people, structure and culture (Nograsek & Vintar, 2011).  Some theorists 
promoted technological determinism where ICT drove societal change, others 
promoted social enablement where ICT enabled societal change (Dafoe, 2015).   
Kline (2015) identified two dimensions for exploring technological determinism, 
firstly system design and secondly the impact of the introduction of ICT on society.  
Investigating the reasons and methods employed to design and create systems 
provided insights into the intended purpose of the system, whether it is a technical 
initiative or socially influenced.  The second dimension enables comparison of 
intent and whether ICT directly causes societal change.   
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Exploring technological determinism and social enablement through information 
systems literature I found technological determinism was commonly criticised, 
whereas the identification of ICT as an enabler was common (Cordella & Bonina, 
2012; Dafoe, 2015).  Although ICT was identified as an enabler there were 
tensions.  Whereas stakeholder involvement was common in literature addressing 
the design and creation of systems (Langer, 2008), there were articles that 
identified management decisions based on the inevitability of technical change 
leading to organisational change (Leonardi, 2004).  Debates raged within the 
information systems domain and across domains as highlighted in e-government 
literature.   
E-government spawned a range of academic debates from technical approaches 
where e-government was electronic delivery of government information and 
services, to others aimed at improving the political process and social inclusion, 
which appear to echo the technological determinism vs social determinism debates 
in information systems literature (McCullagh, 2003; Dunleavy et al., 2005; Kline, 
2015).   
The multi-disciplinary nature of information systems has contributed to criticism 
of information systems research as being ontologically weak and lacking a 
common language, struggling to create a cohesive identity for the information 
systems discipline which was deemed an ‘identity crisis’ (Gregor, 2006).  
Researchers were criticised for moving beyond investigations of information 
systems into related fields (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003).  Another criticism was 
information systems research was becoming increasingly distant from practice.  
Academics were viewed as attempting to publish in more prestigious journals 
building rigor, and their academic credentials, but losing relevance.  Information 
systems practice was identified as fast changing and academic literature was 
struggling to keep up (Davenport & Markus, 1999).   
It was argued the multi-disciplinary nature of information systems was not 
adequately reflected in literature, further limiting the relevance of research 
(Davenport & Markus, 1999; Gregor, 2006).  Multi-disciplinary solutions were 
implemented in practice, but the academic literature was not keeping up (Drucker, 
1994; Davenport & Markus, 1999). 
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Information systems research has struggled with overlapping domain boundaries, 
particularly with the introduction of people and theories from other domains.  
Information systems is a relatively new discipline where academics and 
practitioners come from a range of backgrounds and disciplines including 
management, physics and computer science.  Each person brings their own 
experiences and language to the field.  Given the multidisciplinary nature of 
information systems, Gregor (2006) argued for the use of a range of theory types 
in information systems research, going beyond arguments about positivist or 
interpretive studies, asserting as information systems research sat on the 
intersection of technology and social interaction both needed to be considered.  
Rather than attempting to copy other disciplines, she advocated knowledge 
drawing upon different traditions, which appears consistent with the introduction 
of management theory into information systems, and more specifically the 
alignment of IT governance with corporate governance.   
She promoted contributions to the body of knowledge ranging from analysis and 
description to explicit prescriptions.  Whilst acknowledging the benefit of testable 
propositions and prescriptive methods she asserted that description and explanation 
could improve understanding and thereby contribute to knowledge.  Other 
multidisciplinary concerns included the ability to communicate across different 
domains using a common language and how to manage the introduction of theories 
from other domains (Davenport & Markus, 1999; Gregor, 2006).  IT governance is 
a point in case, where tensions about the role of ICT and alignment of information 
systems influence governance arrangements.   
IT governance can consist of centralised and decentralised arrangements (Weill & 
Ross, 2004; Brown & Grant, 2005).  Centralised governance arrangements place 
ICT decision making within a central IT governance function, whereas 
decentralised arrangements place ICT decision making with business units (Brown 
& Grant, 2005).  Centralised governance arrangements provide a single point of 
prioritisation and oversight of ICT decisions designed to enable tight control and 
alignment with corporate goals (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016; Benaroch & 
Chernobai, 2017).  Conversely decentralised arrangements are advocated for 
responsiveness to business unit needs (Brown & Grant, 2005).  Centralised 
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arrangements were identified in literature as the dominant approach so have been 
selected as representative of IT governance for this research (Sambamurthy & 
Zmud, 1999; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017; Aasi, Rusu, Leidner, Perjons, & 
Corrales Estrada, 2018).   
The corporate governance function delegates decision making authority to IT 
governance to ensure strategic alignment (Weill & Ross, 2004).  Alignment of IT 
governance with corporate governance is provided through top down or vertical 
governance controls to provide accountability (Acar, Guo, & Yang, 2008; Gregory, 
2009).  These vertical controls can be observed as a response to legislative change 
and increased risk to directors, which have driven the uptake of IT governance 
particularly in the private sector.   
Internationally the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) placed onerous 
control obligations on boards of directors, leading to tighter board controls over 
information and communication technology and an increased adoption of IT 
governance (Damianides, 2005; Ilott, 2016).  More recently the risk of cyber 
security attacks and increased legislative liability has increased governance focus 
and controls upon ICT (Asgarkhani, Correia, & Sarkar, 2017).   
Scholars have picked up on the increased significance of information systems for 
public sector transformation (Weill & Ross, 2004).  This significance is increased 
when considering the history of high-profile ICT failure in the public sector (Agar, 
2003; Gauld, 2006; Stephen et al., 2011).   
Other scholars have focussed upon improved service provision to citizens, 
government and private sector clients (Bovaird, 2003; Chadwick, 2006; Gauld, 
2006; Margetts, 2006) improved control and digitisation (Dunleavy et al., 2005; 
Dunleavy & Margetts, 2010) and changes to democracy and citizen participation 
(Gronlund, 2003; Kim, 2008).   
The introduction of new technology including the internet and improved federated 
security have enabled increased information sharing and collaboration across 
organisational boundaries.  This has led to some academic criticism of IT 
governance for stopping at the organisational boundary, however it is still common 
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in information systems literature and practice (Alreemy, Chang, Walters, & Wills, 
2016; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016; Ilott, 2016) 
Information systems, including shared services, work across organisational 
boundaries.  Additionally information systems can introduce fast paced change to 
existing ways of working across organisational boundaries (Ansell et al., 2016).  
The use of vertical IT governance controls to reduce risk and enable legislative 
compliance may constrain the use of information systems for inter-organisational 
collaboration.  This view was supported by Ilott (2016) who criticised the 
inadequacies of IT governance for collaborative initiatives, pointing to a limitation 
of vertical governance, and implying a need to explore the informal and 
collaborative aspects of IT governance for PSISS (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 
2011; Ansell et al., 2016).   
IT governance focusses upon alignment of ICT activities with organisational goals.  
IT governance groups provide direction and controls to ensure alignment and 
compliance (Ali & Green, 2012).  Autonomy is provided by delegation from the 
corporate governance function to the IT governance function.  IT governance 
approval provides formal delegation for delivery by management (Weill & Ross, 
2004).  The IT governance function oversees management activities to ensure 
delivery of business objectives (Aasi et al., 2018).  The alignment with corporate 
governance reinforces the vertical nature of IT governance (Weill & Ross, 2004).  
Much of the IT governance research sought to oversee an organisation’s ICT 
services, reinforcing the organisational boundary as the scope of IT governance 
(De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).   
Information technology governance has procedural characteristics giving the 
impression of a set of processes and controls reported to the board to assist in the 
delivery of organisational goals (ITGI, 2005a, 2008a).  IT governance performs 
monitoring of ICT decision making as well as approving the policies and 
procedures for centrally controlling ICT resources (Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  
IT governance literature commonly states that ICT requires direction and control 
(Van Grembergen, 2004), however there is confusion about who performs IT 
governance (Lainhart, 2012; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  Empirical research 
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identified the need for IT governance to be performed at multiple levels in an 
organisation (Weill & Ross, 2004).   
IT governance is commonly performed by a combination of executives and 
management (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).  This combination has led to 
confusion developing common definitions of accountability.  This sentiment has 
been reflected in the design of industry governance models where IT governance 
has been identified as the responsibility of both boards of directors and senior 
management, where both groups are accountable for ensuring alignment of ICT 
capabilities with organisational goals (ITGI, 2008b; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 
2016). 
Governance groups are expected to ensure the formal documentation of governance 
roles and relationships between the parties performing the IT governance function 
and providing the authority they are delegated to act (Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999; 
Grant et al., 2007).  Industry models are commonly used and provide methods for 
mapping accountabilities and formally defining key roles and relationships, for 
example the responsibility assignment matrix commonly known as RACI 
(Guldentops, 2004; Lainhart, 2012).   
There have been attempts to formally codify IT governance into a guidebook to 
follow, predominantly using vertical governance controls (Cilli, 2003; Guldentops, 
2004; ITGI, 2006).  These vertical controls have been presented as a response to 
legislative change and increased risk to directors, which have driven the uptake of 
IT governance particularly in the private sector.   
Centralised IT governance seeks to minimise the influence of informal elements to 
enable control over ICT resources (Ferguson, Green, Vaswani, & Wu, 2013).  
Academic literature indicates common usage of industry models to define roles and 
relationships, with new relationships codified to enable centralised monitoring and 
control (Lainhart, 2012; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).  There appear to be 
a range of these industry IT governance models in common use.  Parent and Reich 
(2009) identified fourteen models which they characterised as prescriptive and 
control focussed.  Additionally, I found several examples where scholars have used 
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these models to conduct research, blurring the line between academia and practice 
(Guldentops, 2004; Von Solms & Von Solms, 2005; Ali & Green, 2007). 
Formal IT governance has to be carefully designed, with that design implemented 
through managers making decisions based on that design (Weill & Ross, 2004).  
Ali and Green (2012) identified that an IT governance function, senior management 
involvement and alignment with corporate performance measurements were 
positive influences on the success of IT governance.  Other scholars expressed 
concerns about the lack of ICT knowledge within IT governance groups leading to 
poor decision making or improper use of controls resulting in poor performance or 
financial losses (Huff et al., 2006; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  Weill and Ross 
stated only 38% of senior management knew their information and communication 
technology function was governed, suggesting there are gaps in the design and 
implementation of IT governance.  Designing successful formal governance 
requires an understanding of the competing elements within and outside an 
organisation which is used to align the different goals, objectives and governance 
within the organisation.   
Vertical accountability is common where the IT governance function is 
accountable to the corporate governance function.  The IT governance function 
define agreed deliverables through formal contractual mechanisms (Sambamurthy 
& Zmud, 1999; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).  Contracts can be internal or 
with external vendors where outsourcing has been employed, often as an 
opportunity to reduce cost or improve organisational performance (Loh & 
Venkatraman, 1992; Ali & Green, 2012).  Where direct relationships are not 
captured, softer measures have been used to monitor performance including 
customer and stakeholder satisfaction scores (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).   
IT governance promotes a culture of compliance.  Vendors and ICT employees 
comply with contracts, organisations comply with policies and processes (Ali, 
Green, & Parent, 2009).  Legislation and regulation require compliance, for 
example: information sharing and outsource agreements can require compliance 
with international regulations including the recent GDPR (Damianides, 2005; 
Higgins & Sinclair, 2008; Houser & Voss, 2018).  Performance is commonly 
specified using contractual mechanisms.  These include project business cases, 
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employment contracts, service level agreements and outsource contracts (De Haes 
& Van Grembergen, 2016).  Performance measurement is conducted by the IT 
governance function based on agreed contractual mechanisms through periodic 
monitoring, project reporting and contract reviews (ITGI, 2005b).  Contracted 
parties are responsible for advising the IT governance function on decisions outside 
their delegation.  The IT governance function is responsible to the corporate 
governance function for action or inaction (ITGI, 2008b).  
IT governance involves monitoring a range of contractual mechanisms, although 
some scholars cite trust relationships between senior management and the IT 
governance group as a significant factor for successful IT governance (Chin, 
Brown, & Hu, 2004).  Others have called for board member and senior 
management representation on IT governance groups (Lainhart, 2012).  This 
representation was identified as a requirement for alignment of corporate and ICT 
strategy and as providing the authority for ICT decision making and enforcement 
(Ali et al., 2009; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  Trust has been presented as 
dependent upon governance maturity.  In low levels of governance maturity trust 
is low and controls used to reduce self-interest.  Collaboration and co-production 
were identified as reliant upon the existence of high levels of IT governance 
maturity, as reflected in industry governance models which commonly promote 
process maturity models for assessing alignment and controls (Ali & Green, 2012; 
De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016). 
Centralised IT governance has developed from corporate governance literature, 
indicating it is more closely aligned to the private sector, suggesting a gap in public 
sector IT governance.  IT governance is commonly presented as aligned to 
corporate governance principles to attain corporate goals, as ICT decisions should 
not be made in isolation of the wider context (Weill & Ross, 2004), however this 
does place a constraint upon applicability to the public sector where accountability 
can include the Executive, clients, central agencies and accountability to citizens 
(Damodaran, 2005; Rhodes, 2007).   
Public Administration 
This section introduces bureaucracy discussing the introduction of corporate 
governance, collaborative governance and IT governance to the public sector.  
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Academic literature relating to public sector application of these governance forms 
is explored to provide the reader with an understanding of the alternatives facing 
practitioners who are attempting to design governance arrangements and perform 
governance in the public sector.   
Bureaucracy as a Public Sector Governance Form 
Bureaucracy is traced back to the word bureau meaning a place where officials 
work and the Greek word for rule.  From this perspective bureaucracy is considered 
a system of rule dominated by officials (Bevir, 2007).   
Max Weber was credited with identifying the characteristics of bureaucracy 
(Ferlie, Lynn, Pollitt, Meier, & Hill, 2009).  He presented bureaucracy as an 
alternative to charismatic or custom based authority.  Rather than trust an individual 
or previous behaviour Weber promoted authority based upon reason, where rights 
and obligations are defined by rules and administered by an objective professional 
public service (Bevir, 2007).   
Weber developed an analytic construct referred to as an ideal type to capture the 
essence of bureaucracy.  Although Weber stated that the ideal type “cannot be 
found anywhere in reality” (Bartels, 2009, p. 450), as Weber expected deviation 
from the ideal type, he promoted the ideal type as a way to measure how far an 
organisation was from the ideal, to enable comparison (Bevir, 2007).  Under the 
ideal type individual public servants followed general rules, worked in specific 
areas of hierarchical organisations, were impartial, had specialised training, were 
promoted based upon seniority or performance and were paid reasonable fixed 
salaries (Bartels, 2009).  These characteristics were later used to define bureaucracy 
as procedural governance, legitimised through legislation where rules were 
developed to enable reliable treatment (Considine & Lewis, 2003).   
In practice public servants were separated from the Executive to retain impartiality 
(Bevir, 2007).  Public interest was defined by politicians and experts and the public 
were viewed as largely disinterested in political engagement and participation 
(Kelly, Mulgan, & Muers, 2002; Stoker, 2006).  Elections provided the mandate 
for public political endorsement with political parties keeping the public interest as 
the Executive or in opposition (Stoker, 2006).  Bureaucracies were hierarchical in 
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nature with clearly defined command and control structures (Ferlie et al., 2009).  
Public sector managers were responsible to ministers and had to respond to their 
political direction.  The policy process involved formulation of prescriptive policy 
with managers implementing policy and accountable for managing inputs (Kelly et 
al., 2002; Bovens, Goodin, Schillemans, & Peters, 2014).  Managing inputs was a 
technical approach for delivery of policy through implementation (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973; Hupe & Hill, 2015).   
The bureaucratic practice of applying rules to enable standardised, consistent, 
impartial actions opened up the public sector to automation through the 
introduction of ICT for improved efficiency and time saving (Agar, 2003; Ferlie et 
al., 2009).  Early computing was expensive, bulky and there was limited supply of 
computing resources, be that equipment or specialist staff.  The scarcity of resource 
led to the emergence of computer bureaus providing ICT services across the public 
sector.  At that time IT governance was the management of scarce resources and 
access to processing time (Toland, 2010).  
The public sector had a monopoly on provision of public services and was criticised 
as inefficient and cumbersome.  Public officials were criticised as having too much 
power which became known as the ‘yes minister’ syndrome (Stoker, 2006).  The 
bureaucratic form was challenged, based on dissatisfaction with the performance 
of the public sector and a perceived inability to respond to change or efficiently 
deliver services (Bevir, 2007; Ostrom, 2008).  Theory began to emerge promoting 
introduction of performance management and treating public organisations like 
private sector corporations.  In the 1970s tougher planning and accountability 
controls, based upon those in private sector corporations, were introduced to public 
sector organisations in the USA and the UK, which was identified as the 
introduction of corporate governance to the public sector (Considine & Lewis, 
2003).   
Bureaucracy was criticised as “systems designed by a genius to be run by idiots” 
(Osborne & Plastrik, 1997, p. 17).  Bevir found “bureaucracy carries strong 
emotive overtones and elusive connotations that in everyday parlance evoke 
negative images of red tape, costly administrative inefficiencies, cumbersome 
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procedures, and unresponsive public officials who are oblivious and unresponsive 
to the needs and wants of citizens” (2007, p. 57). 
NPM Reforms and the Introduction of Corporate Governance  
Academic debate ensued with some arguing for bureaucracy.  Wilson (1989) 
believed the inflexibility and inefficiency of some government agencies arose from 
the political system rather than bureaucrats running agencies.  Other scholars 
argued it was lazy to criticise bureaucrats as inherently inefficient and they 
criticised reformers for not undertaking serious assessments of bureaucracy 
compared with reform results (Goodsell, 1983; Gormley, 2016).  Others argued 
reforms were a result of financial mismanagement by governments, whereby public 
sector reform was a method for balancing the books (Meier, 1997).  Ultimately 
these arguments were dismissed and reforms proceeded in the 1980s and 1990s, 
influenced by private sector theories including agency theory (Boston, 1996; 
Pollitt, 2017).   
The reforms were commonly called New Public Management and they introduced 
changes that can be observed as the introduction of corporate governance 
(Considine & Lewis, 2003; Bevir, 2007).  Examples include the privatisation of 
departments and the introduction of boards for crown entities, which can be 
observed as the direct introduction of corporate governance to the public sector.  
Similarly agency theory can be observed in the introduction of contractual 
agreements between ministers and chief executives (Dormer & Ward, 2018).   
As the public sector was being decentralised, through NPM, so was computing 
power.  NPM reforms coincided with distributed computing and the introduction 
of the personal computer (Agar, 2003).  ICT provision moved from talking about 
the computer singular to personal computers sitting on most desks (Mahoney, 
1988).  Corporatisation saw the sale of bureaus, which in some cases were then 
contracted back to the public sector as outsourced offerings (Bradbury, 1999).  The 
NPM reforms, including the sale of bureaus, increased agency ability to source 
their own organisational ICT services through increased chief executive authority 
and autonomy (Jensen, 2003).   
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Automation promised cost reduction including reducing employee numbers (Agar, 
2003).  Contracting to outsourced ICT providers became commonplace (Currie, 
1996; Lin, Pervan, & McDermid, 2007).  IT governance became about driving 
value aligned to corporate goals and ensuring quality of service (ITGI, 2005a; De 
Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).  Public sector organisations commonly used 
industry models to develop their IT governance arrangements to ensure alignment 
with corporate goals (Ali & Green, 2012). 
Post-NPM Reforms and the Introduction of Collaborative Governance  
The NPM reforms were criticised for contributing to public sector fragmentation 
(Reiter & Klenk, 2019).  Agencies were seen to be acting independently, focussing 
upon their own outputs rather than wider sector outcomes (Schick, 1996).  The 
drive for public sector efficiency meant services delivered to the public were 
becoming disconnected.  Academic theories like public value raised questions 
about the value the public sector was providing to society (Moore, 1995).  The 
public sector was faced with a challenge of delivering outcomes that required 
collaboration across agency boundaries (Cook, 2004; Boston & Gill, 2011).   
The post-NPM reforms coincided with the diffusion of the internet, which enabled 
interconnected networks of computers to communicate across the public sector 
(Agar, 2003).  Digital channels opened up new methods of service provision.  New 
technology advances were identified as methods to increase public value through 
improved services including increased, faster access to public sector services and 
cost savings through automation.  Scholars investigated improved service provision 
to citizens, government and private sector clients (Chadwick, 2006; Gauld, 2006), 
improved control and digitisation (Dunleavy et al., 2005) and changes to 
democracy and citizen participation (Kim, 2008).  
E-government and shared services programmes were created to join up government 
and provide public value (Cordella & Bonina, 2012).  Collaborative forms of 
governance were proposed to oversee the delivery of public value through joined-
up-government (Stoker, 2006) although they appeared to struggle against existing 
governance arrangements (Boston & Gill, 2011; Ryan, 2011).   
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New forms of inter-organisational governance were proposed to increase public 
sector collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Reiter & Klenk, 2019).  Labels were 
proposed in public administration literature for the new governance form.  These 
included post-NPM (Reiter & Klenk, 2019), collaborative governance (Bevir, 
2007) network governance (Stoker, 2006), digital-era governance (Dunleavy et al., 
2005) and new public governance (Osborne, 2011).  I have selected the label 
collaborative governance, based on the intention of increased inter-organisational 
collaboration (Provan & Kenis, 2007; Osborne, 2010; Reiter & Klenk, 2019).   
Collaborative governance literature has increased the focus upon governance 
across organisational boundaries and interactions between the organisation, 
participants and the external environment (Ansell et al., 2016).  The increased focus 
on horizontal inter-organisational governance has not removed vertical governance 
arrangements in the public sector, which is similar to how NPM, or corporate 
governance, did not fully replace bureaucracy (Dunleavy et al., 2005).   
Collaboration is a term many in the public sector agree is positive, however there 
are differing views about what collaboration means and whether it is occurring 
(O'Flynn, 2009).  Collaboration is working together to produce something, often 
beyond the ability of an individual agency to deliver (Morse, 2010; Emerson et al., 
2011).  Collaborative governance has been criticised for taking more time, energy 
and money than other governance forms due to the requirement to develop 
direction, controls and processes that satisfy the needs of many stakeholders (Bevir, 
2007).  Another challenge facing collaborative initiatives is separation from 
existing vertical accountabilities (Torfing, 2016a).  Participants are commonly 
required to participate as members of a collaborative initiative and continue to 
deliver for their organisation.  Similarly organisations are expected, and sometimes 
mandated, to participate whilst they continue to deliver vertically; impacting their 
autonomy (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).   
Academic literature has contributed to the challenge of collaboratively governing 
horizontally across agencies to deliver outcomes.  Much of the collaborative 
literature has focussed upon networks of agencies and other stakeholders 
attempting to add public value (Bovaird, 2005; Stoker, 2006).  Networks do not 
have to operate within the formalised construct of an organisation, however they 
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still require governance to ensure participants engage collectively, resources are 
used effectively and conflict is resolved (Provan & Kenis, 2007).  
Many issues dealt with by collaborative governance are presented as wicked 
problems (Klijn, 2010; Ansell et al., 2016).  Collaborative governance direction is 
outcome focussed, often created by consensus and attempts to ensure the goals of 
the collaborative initiative reflect the needs of participants (Rogers & Weber, 
2010). 
Working horizontally across organisational boundaries has raised questions about 
how the public sector should be governed.  Collaborative governance within the 
public sector can be policy driven and have specific regulatory and legislative 
obligations, raising questions about the role of the Executive (O'Flynn & Wanna, 
2008).  The Executive provide direction and oversee agency performance.  Many 
existing public sector governance mechanisms were designed for vertical 
governance.  Scholars proposed changes to these vertical governance arrangements 
ranging from changes to individual elements of governance e.g. accountability 
(Boston & Gill, 2011) to proposing new theories like New Public Governance or 
Digital Era Governance to replace NPM (Dunleavy et al., 2005; Osborne, 2010).   
Interagency collaboration requires trust and commitment to accept joint risk and 
share resources to undertake change for mutual benefit (May & Winter, 2007; 
O'Flynn, 2009).  Proposed benefits from collaboration include increased trust 
whilst reducing conflict and fragmentation, access to improved capability and 
transition to more effective services (Ezz, Papazafeiropoulou, & Serrano, 2009; 
O'Flynn, 2009).  Collaboration is no guarantee of service improvement; particularly 
where relationships are unclearly defined, have limited trust or appetite for risk 
(May & Winter, 2007).  Over time informal norms and methods need to be replaced 
by inter-organisational structures and processes for ongoing direction and 
management (Emerson et al., 2011).   
Collaborative initiatives struggled with the residual NPM governance 
arrangements, particularly the reporting and compliance requirements which took 
time and valuable resources away from collaborative efforts (Ryan, 2011).  
Institutional constraints including siloed organisational structures and existing 
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agency deliverables coupled with minimal incentives and heavy penalties for 
failure discouraged collaborative effort (Plimmer, 2011).   
Some scholars propose employment of alternate governance arrangements, 
selection of which depends upon maturity and the type of initiative (Donahue, 
2011).  Innovation is one area where alternate collaborative governance 
arrangements have been promoted.  Heavy touch governance arrangements were 
seen as stifling innovation (Torfing, 2016a).  Lighter touch accountabilities were 
proposed for exploratory or smaller initiatives, particularly in the early stages.  In 
some cases minimal arrangements were proposed, which could be extended as the 
initiative matured.   
Donahue (2011) proposed the use of consensus based patterns for performance and 
accountability, stating that at a minimum parties involved in initiatives should have 
agreed the proposed public value delivered by the initiative, aligned their interests 
and have readily measured performance criteria, which requires monitoring to 
occur.  Other scholars believed that formalised accountability was required.  
Boston and Gill (2011) attempted to provide a pragmatic approach that balanced 
the need for hierarchical controls with the flexibility required for collaborative 
working.  They identified the ability to sanction as a key requirement for any 
accountability relationship.  The challenge as they saw it was collaborative 
initiatives introduce horizontal governance as opposed to the vertical, principal-
agent relationship common in corporate governance.  To overcome this challenge, 
they proposed two methods: enforceable agreements and external sources of 
authority which could ensure that someone could be held to account for a 
collaborative initiative.   
Participation in collaborative initiatives can introduce activities not included in 
accountability arrangements.  Collaborative governance arrangements exist of both 
formally defined roles and responsibilities and informal interactions between 
actors.  Capturing and understanding informal roles and relationships requires 
interpretation of “everyday practices of network actors rather than being formally 
constructed and embodied in constitutional documentation” (Mathur & Skelcher, 
2007, p. 233).  Researchers are required to enter the field to capture the specific 
contextual values and beliefs of actors that reveal informal interactions (Hajer & 
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Wagenaar, 2003).  Whilst these interactions may not be enforceable through 
accountability arrangements there is an ethical expectation that these 
responsibilities will be performed, however, in collaborative arrangements without 
an applicable enforcement mechanism these can be problematic (Gregory, 1995; 
Boston & Gill, 2011). 
Some researchers found in the absence of formal decision-making authority 
participants relied upon influence to ensure their interests were considered 
(Thomson & Perry, 2006; Klijn, 2007).  Participant autonomy was recognised in 
collaborative governance literature as provided through both formal and informal 
means.  Tensions were identified between the collective interest represented by 
collaborative goals and the individual interests of organisations and individuals 
(Thomson & Perry, 2006).  Concerns were raised that participants would withdraw 
from collaboration if they did not get their needs met (Bevir, 2007).  The inability 
to rely solely upon enforcement through formal governance mechanisms like 
contracts and sanctions, and with participants moving to further their interests, 
raised questions about trust in collaborative accountability governance 
arrangements (Klijn, 2010).   
Trust was identified as a requirement for generating mutual understanding and 
enabling shared participation (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).  Researchers found 
trust building at early stages of collaborative initiatives contributed to building 
commitment  and developing collaborative goals (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson 
& Nabatchi, 2015).  Maintenance of trust was identified as a challenge for 
collaborative governance arrangements.  Trust levels were observed as decreasing 
when the number of participants increased, leading to questions of how trust levels 
could be maintained across all participants, rather than in small clusters (Provan & 
Kenis, 2007).   
Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) claimed collaborative governance requires more 
leadership than other governance forms, thereby requiring leaders to exercise 
influence as well as  authority.  Leaders were required to undertake collaborative 
problem solving, incentivise participation and gain consensus (Getha-Taylor & 
Morse, 2012).  The collaborative governance function is commonly required to 
establish governance arrangements which oversee the development of common 
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goals and agreement of performance measurement criteria (Morse & Stephens, 
2012).  
IT Governance in Public Administration 
Scholars have presented the purpose of IT governance as performing monitoring 
of ICT decision making as well as the policies and procedures for controlling ICT 
resources to encourage the right sort of behaviour for the use of ICT (Weill & Ross, 
2004; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  
IT governance involves monitoring and evaluating performance against a range of 
contractual mechanisms (Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  The IT governance 
function reports these to corporate governance, although decision rights can be 
delegated from the corporate governance function (Weill & Ross, 2004).  Trust 
relationships between senior management and the IT governance function have 
been identified as a significant factor for successful IT governance (Chin et al., 
2004).  Others have called for senior leadership representation (i.e. board member 
or senior management) on IT governance groups (Lainhart, 2012), to improve 
alignment of corporate and ICT strategy, and provide authority for ICT decision 
making and enforcement (Ali et al., 2009; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  Whilst 
acknowledging the requirement for senior leader participation in IT governance, 
concerns have been raised about the lack of ICT knowledge among senior leaders 
contributing to poor decision making or improper use of controls resulting in poor 
performance or financial losses (Huff et al., 2006; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).   
IT governance is commonly linked to corporate governance principles to attain 
corporate goals (Weill & Ross, 2004).  Industry groups, including the Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and IT Governance Institute 
(ITGI), have developed numerous prescriptive IT governance models to aid with 
practice (Parent & Reich, 2009; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016; Wilkin & 
Chenhall, 2019).  Scholars have observed practitioners commonly following these 
prescriptive models designed to provide IT governance to support corporate 
strategies (Weill & Ross, 2004; Parent & Reich, 2009).  Alignment to corporate 
goals appears to place a constraint upon the applicability to collaborative cross-
sector initiatives (Damodaran, 2005; Rhodes, 2007).  IT governance has developed 
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from corporate governance literature, meaning it is more closely aligned to the 
private sector, suggesting a gap in public sector IT governance literature.   
With the public sector joined-up through collaborative initiatives and ICT 
connecting them across the internet, there appears to be another gap, this one 
between practice and industry IT governance models commonly used in practice.  
Corporate governance controls are designed to work in an organisational context 
where there is clear vertical accountability (Norman, 2003; Acar et al., 2008; 
Gregory, 2009).  Information systems, including shared services, work across 
organisational boundaries.  Additionally ICT can introduce fast paced change to 
existing ways of working across those organisational boundaries (Ansell et al., 
2016).  The use of corporate governance aligned IT governance controls may 
constrain the use of ICT to introduce new ways of collaborating across 
organisations.   
After reviewing management and information systems literature it appears that the 
public administrative governance form bureaucracy has been overwritten 
numerous times by other governance forms in practice.  An example of the 
introduction of governance forms can be observed in literature presenting changes 
to the policy process (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Lipsky, 1993; Hupe & Hill, 
2015).  Rather than a technical, procedural approach to policy implementation, the 
reforms have highlighted a range of different approaches to policy and formulation 
including the use of vertical controls, mandates and horizontal deliverable 
measurement (Hupe & Hill, 2015).  The adoption of governance forms designed 
for other areas of practice appears challenging for public sector governance as 
previously shown in Figure two, in Chapter one. 
Practitioners developing and running PSISS governance arrangements have three 
governance forms to select from.  It is perhaps little wonder that practitioners 
commonly choose to use normative industry models that provide ‘how to govern 
guidance’ (Ali & Green, 2007; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).   
Industry Governance Models  
The addition of industry governance models adds another layer of complexity to 
the practice of PSISS governance.  It appears that practitioners attempting to 
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perform PSISS governance through the creation of governance arrangements are 
faced with siloed academic governance literature that originates in three domains, 
each with different focus areas.  Practitioners appear to have an alternative to 
academic literature with the introduction of industry models, which introduces a 
potential disconnect between literature and practice (Weill & Ross, 2004; Higgins 
& Sinclair, 2008).   
Industry groups have developed numerous prescriptive IT governance models to 
aid with practice (Parent & Reich, 2009; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016).  
Some scholars asserted that practitioners commonly follow these prescriptive 
models which are designed to provide governance to support corporate direction 
(Weill & Ross, 2004; Parent & Reich, 2009).  Alignment to corporate direction 
appears to place a constraint upon the applicability to use these industry models to 
govern collaborative cross-sector initiatives (Damodaran, 2005; Rhodes, 2007). 
Industry models appear to be based upon practice and academic literature (Brotby, 
2008; Lainhart, 2012).  The assertion these models were being used in place of 
literature in practice was consistent with my 25 years of practitioner experience.  
This led me to question whether practitioners were in fact using academic literature, 
or simply consuming it second hand through these industry models, potentially 
contributing to the disconnect between literature and PSISS governance practice.  
Reading wider led me to identify scholars researching the views of practitioners 
who had adopted these models (Ali & Green, 2007; De Haes & Van Grembergen, 
2016), combined with other scholars criticising academic literature for not being as 
relevant to practice as industry publications (Davenport & Markus, 1999). 
Industry models hold the promise of best practice, simplification and ease of 
implementation (Sanwal, 2008).  Scholars have argued best practice is contextual, 
and in many cases these models are not applicable to local situations.  Similarly the 
simplification afforded by these models has been criticised for lacking depth of 
response and for adding additional work where it is not required (Boyle & Grace-
Webb, 2007; Brotby, 2008).   
Governance arrangements are patterns of governance elements e.g. structures, roles 
and relationships; put in place to set direction and enable delivery of objectives 
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(Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999; Oliveira & Hersperger, 2018).  If, as indicated, 
practitioners are not drawing directly from academic literature this may be a 
contributing factor to PSISS failure.   
It appears PSISS governance draws on multiple theories and governance forms, but 
there is no easy way to translate how this occurs in practice.  This translation is 
made more challenging through the introduction of industry models which could 
be drawing upon academic literature across three domains and presented in several 
different ways across multiple models (Higgins & Sinclair, 2008).  The added 
complexity is shown in Figure six. 
 
Figure Six: Industry Governance Models 
My research is intended to contribute to bridging the gap between academic 
literature and practice.  Industry governance models are a secondary concern, 
which led me to the decision to exclude them as inputs for my analysis, including 
the creation of sensitising concepts and characteristics.  
The apparent widespread use of industry governance models requires them to be 
included here for background as, based upon literature and my analysis, they 
influence governance arrangements and governance in practice.   
Closing the Governance Gap by Exploring Practice 
Governance arrangements have been identified as contributing to the perceived 
failure of PSISS (National Audit Office, 2012; Hillier, 2019).  Academic literature 
can be used to guide practice, in this case PSISS governance (Lacity, Khan, & 
Willcocks, 2009).   
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Multidisciplinary Approaches from Literature 
The multidisciplinary nature of public administration is evidenced through the 
presence of theories from other domains imported into the public administration 
domain (Van Thiel, 2014).  My literature review identified the use of governance 
forms, originating in multiple domains, in the public sector.   
Practitioners have a range of academic and industry literature they can use to 
develop governance arrangements and perform governance.  The governance forms 
are segmented across different domains which resulted in no single discipline or 
practice literature for practitioners to draw upon.  Selection and integration of these 
governance forms is challenging (Grant et al., 2007).  The majority of academic 
literature surveyed advocates the use of individual governance forms or 
combinations of governance forms (Weill & Ross, 2004; Dunleavy et al., 2005).  
Other scholars advocated the selection of normative industry models, which have 
also been presented as problematic (Guldentops, 2004; Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2005). 
The segmented nature of literature has led me to investigate multidisciplinary 
research approaches to contribute to the body of knowledge, with the intention of 
surmounting the gap between academic literature and practice.  Investigation of 
academic literature from management, information systems and public 
administration domains identified three examples where scholars had developed 
approaches to conduct multi-disciplinary research.   
Example One. Gregor (2006) advocated the use of theory from other domains to 
contribute to the body of knowledge.  She identified social science, design science 
and natural science as contributing theory to information systems.  Bringing these 
theories into the body of knowledge was seen to require an interpretivist 
perspective where theory was not created to be testable using traditional positivist 
approaches, rather theory was to be created to increase understanding of social 
situations from participants’ lived experiences.  Gregor advocated the creation of 
“mid-range theory as particularly important” for researching practice (Gregor, 
2006, p. 616).  
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Having identified the multidisciplinary nature of information systems research 
Gregor (2006) produced two additional insights useful for my research, a taxonomy 
for theoretical contribution and three requirements for conducting multidisciplinary 
research.  She promoted selection of research method based on the type of theory 
being produced, which she saw as an attribute unique to information systems.  She 
promoted a taxonomy to classify theory based on analysis, explanation, prediction 
and prescription, which lead to five possible types of information systems theory:  
• theory for analysis 
• theory for explanation 
• theory for prediction 
• theory for explanation and prediction, and 
• theory for design and action. 
Gregor (2006) identified three requirements for researchers conducting multi-
disciplinary research.  As the researcher will be importing theory into the 
(information systems) domain researchers need to develop a common language 
across domains, create a method for identification and analysis of theory from other 
domains and finally to use their research to contribute to the body of domain 
knowledge.  I have considered how I can apply these requirements to my research 
design in Table two.   
Requirement  Design Considerations 
Common language I developed a governance framework from 
academic literature that identified and defined 
generic elements and sub-elements present in 
all governance forms.  This framework enables 
the identification of governance in practice. 
Identify and analyse theory 
from other domains 
As I am identifying the presence of governance 
forms for further analysis, I have created a 
literature-based characteristics model that 
defines characteristics of each governance form 
for all elements and sub-elements.  This 
enables the identification of different 
governance forms for analysis.  
Contribute to body of 
knowledge 
Development of mid-range theory based on 
practitioner perspectives for explanation to 
contribute to the body of knowledge.   
Table Two: Design Considerations from Gregor 
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Example Two.  Davenport and Markus (1999) were information systems scholars 
who called for multidisciplinary research into either information systems 
implementation or, interestingly, the role of information systems in resolving 
public sector policy problems.  They were concerned that academic research was 
becoming increasingly irrelevant to practice and was falling behind industry 
literature.  To overcome these challenges, they advocated working closer to 
practice and delivering relevant research that would be used by practitioners.  These 
calls are similar to criticism about the lack of academic involvement in public 
sector reforms where governments “were quite explicit about not turning to 
academics” (Kettl, 1999, p. 130).  Common language was identified as a 
requirement to bridge the gap between literature and practice, not just with 
academics, but with practitioners, indicating a need to pilot my literature informed 
governance framework with practitioners before entering the field to conduct 
research (Davenport & Markus, 1999).  Considering these findings has led to the 
design considerations in Table three.   
Finding Design Considerations 
Multidisciplinary information systems 
research can be conducted on 
technology implementation or public 
sector policy.   
Investigating PSISS governance 
provides an opportunity to 
investigate implementation of an 
information system within a wider 
public sector policy frame. 
Common language is required across 
domains and with practitioners.  
Pilot literature informed governance 
framework and associated elements 
as sensitising concepts before 
conducting research.  
Table Three: Design Considerations from Davenport and Markus 
Example Three.  Researching public administration literature led me to the work 
of Raadschelders (2008, 2010, 2011) who conducted a comprehensive review of 
public administration literature and traditions, which resulted in assertions the 
public administration domain is multidisciplinary in nature and there is a need to 
conduct research to reduce the gap between literature and practice.   
Instead of attempting to separate public administration into a siloed discipline 
Raadschelders acknowledged the complexity and reach of government.  As 
government, and the public sector, has multiple relationships across society it is of 
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interest to researchers from multiple disciplines making it multi-disciplinary in 
nature (Raadschelders, 2011).  The NPM and post-NPM reforms evidenced this 
multi-disciplinary nature through the introduction of theory influenced by other 
domains (Edwards, Halligan, Horrigan, & Nicholl, 2012).  It is this multi-
disciplinary nature that “prevents the development of a unifying theory” 
(Raadschelders, 2011, p. 128).   
Rather than feeding off the scraps of other disciplines, Raadschelders presented 
public administration acting as an umbrella for knowledge about government, 
covering knowledge that has been developed in other domains or by other 
disciplines.  After exploring the history of public administration, and the associated 
academic literature, he proposed basing the study of public administration on four 
traditions, each with their own research objectives and approaches.  These 
traditions are scientific knowledge, relativist perspectives, practical wisdom and 
practical experience.  He calls for integration of these traditions to further 
understanding of the public sector, thereby reducing the gap between academic 
literature and practice (Raadschelders, 2011).   
Raadschelder’s call has been adopted by other public administration literature, 
which promotes the use of the four traditions to bridge the disconnect between 
literature and practice (Franklin & Ebdon, 2005), providing examples where the 
disconnect has increased through the introduction of literature from multiple 
domains (Kettl, 1999).  The following section introduces the four traditions and 
outlines my rationale for selecting one of the traditions for my research into 
bridging the gap between governance literature and practice in the public sector.  
Scientific knowledge is derived from the scientific method where hypotheses are 
created and tested empirically to improve the understanding of public 
administration with the intention of developing a unifying theory (Raadschelders, 
2011).  Testing hypotheses requires isolation of the components to be tested, which 
can be challenging in a social context like the public sector (Eppel, 2017).  Other 
challenges include the requirement for the researcher to be independent and to 
approach the research from a monodisciplinary perspective (Raadschelders, 2011).   
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Relativist perspectives interpret the interactions between individuals, organisations 
and processes (Eppel, 2017).  Relativist perspectives are subjective and develop 
understanding through interpretation of an aspect of reality to uncover and explore 
values, traditions and culture (Raadschelders, 2008, 2011).  Researchers 
deconstruct situations to describe rather than provide prescriptive findings as 
values are contradictory (Franklin & Ebdon, 2005).   
Practical wisdom comes from a tradition of public administrators providing advice 
to rulers stretching back hundreds of years (Machiavelli, 1997).  Practical wisdom 
is intended to advise on three concerns: where we are going, should we go there 
and how we can get there (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  To address these concerns a ruler 
needs to understand the social context, the current and desired relationships 
between ruler and ruled, and have authority.  A multidisciplinary approach is 
required given the breadth of government and the application of theory across 
domains.  Practical wisdom reflects upon what is usable from across domains, 
interpreting these inputs to address the concerns listed above (Raadschelders, 
2011).   
Practical experience provides research that illustrates the challenges facing 
government and attempts to bridge the gap between academic literature and 
practice by exploring real world situations and designing methods to improve 
practice using available theory (Raadschelders, 2011).  The objective of practical 
experience is identifying the best method for implementation of policy and to make 
technical refinements to practice (Franklin & Ebdon, 2005; Orr & Bennett, 2012). 
My research requires me to explore how governance occurs in practice to gain an 
understanding of how practitioners perceive PSISS governance, to what extent the 
different governance forms are reflected in practice, and what issues have arisen 
from application of these different forms.  Researching practitioner perspectives 
led me to consider practical wisdom or practical experience.  The decision came 
down to the purpose of my research, whether I was trying to explore the application 
of theory across domains or designing the best method of implementing PSISS 




Finding Design Considerations 
Multidisciplinary approaches are 
suitable for public administration 
research to reduce the gap 
between academic literature and 
practice. 
Perform multidisciplinary 
research exploring the 
application of governance forms 
in the public sector. 
There are four traditions that can 
guide research: scientific 
knowledge, relativist 
perspectives, practical wisdom 
and practical experience. 
I selected the practical wisdom 
tradition to guide my research 
exploring the application of 
governance theory across 
domains using practitioner 
perspectives.   
Table Four: Design Considerations from Raadschelders 
Researching Practitioner Perspectives  
Exploring academic literature relating to multidisciplinary research has provided 
me with design considerations for conducting my research.  These insights have 
been incorporated into my research design in Chapter four.  
Confirmation that multidisciplinary research is suitable for public administration, 
as a multidisciplinary domain, provided me with confidence to proceed.  
Raadschelders’ practical wisdom tradition provides guidance for conducting 
research from a practitioner perspective.  As information systems scholars, 
Davenport and Markus (1999) identified the value of multidisciplinary research 
investigating the role of information systems in the public sector, which can be 
interpreted as including the governance of PSISS.  Gregor presented different types 
of theory and their potential to contribute to the body of knowledge, leading me to 
identify the potential to contribute through explanation and the construction of a 
mid-range theory.     
Before progressing to my research design, I needed to address two requirements 
raised in the multidisciplinary research literature: common language and theory 
identification.   
Gregor, Davenport and Markus identified a need for a common language to enable 
academic literature from multiple domains to be employed.  For my research this 
meant a common language for governance, which could be consistently applied to 
corporate, IT and collaborative governance.  I developed a literature informed 
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governance framework to provide a common language for the three forms.  This 
framework enabled the identification of governance in practice.  The governance 
framework is presented in the following sensitising concepts section.  Davenport 
and Markus extended the common language requirement to include practitioners, 
leading me to pilot my framework using a similar PSISS as a case study.  The pilot 
involved comparison with context specific documentation, in this case New 
Zealand reform literature and government documents and trialling my framework 
with practitioners.  The pilot study is presented in Chapter three.   
Gregor identified a need to identify literature from different domains to enable 
analysis.  As I am identifying the presence of governance forms for further analysis 
I have created a model that defines characteristics of each governance form for my 
governance framework.  My characteristics model is presented in the governance 
characteristics section which follows the sensitising concepts section. 
Sensitising Concepts  
PSISS governance cuts across three domains of academic literature: management, 
public administration and information systems (Van Gigch, 2002).  The use of 
combinations of corporate, collaborative and IT governance makes it difficult to 
identify governance in practice.  Rather than focussing upon the differences 
between the governance forms I have developed a theoretical framework using 
common elements of governance literature from corporate, collaborative and IT 
governance to identify governance in practice.   
My governance framework served three purposes, firstly to broadly define a 
common language for governance elements present in all three governance forms, 
secondly to take into the field to identify governance in practice and finally to assist 
with initial analysis.  The framework was supported by a characteristics model that 
presents specific element characteristics for each of the governance forms.  Once I 
had identified the governance elements in practice the characteristics model 
enabled me to explore the presence, and influence, of the different governance 
forms (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  This section introduces my literature informed 
framework and characteristics model presenting how they were constructed.  
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Initial categorisation of public sector literature identified four governance forms: 
bureaucracy, corporate, collaborative and IT governance.  Bureaucracy was 
challenged based on dissatisfaction of the performance of the public sector and a 
perceived inability to efficiently deliver services, leading to the introduction of 
corporate reforms.  Over time there was dissatisfaction with the limitations of 
bureaucratic and/or corporate approaches which led to front line intervention 
(Lipsky, 1993) and later led to calls for collaborative approaches (Stoker, 2006).  
The increased significance of information & communications technology led to 
calls for a distinct IT governance form (Weill & Ross, 2004; Ali & Green, 2007). 
These governance forms were observed in academic literature covering public 
sector reforms and associated changes to governance arrangements in practice 
(Norman, 2003; Boston, 2011).  Literature covering these reforms were explored 
to identify governance elements for my literature-informed governance framework.  
The elements identified were compared to the governance literature across domains 
to assess the plausibility of conducting research into the public sector using the 
governance framework.   
Reviewing governance literature led me to the conclusion governance can be 
divided into formal and informal governance (Lynn, Heinrich, & Hill, 2000).  The 
literature showed formal governance is officially documented in organisations and 
could be further divided into three formal governance elements: direction, controls 
and structures (Hilmer, 1993; Stoker, 1998; Edwards, 2002; Bevir, 2007).  Informal 
governance was less tangible, in that it was not documented, and was more likely 
to persuade than dictate (Johnson & Scholes, 1999; Lynn et al., 2000). 
 I defined governance as the direction, controls, structures and informal elements 
that influence the running of organisations (Stoker, 1998; Lynn et al., 2000; 
Edwards, 2002; Bevir, 2007).  My initial governance framework presents four 




Figure Seven: Governance Element Framework 
Placing the governance elements in a frame enables a structured literature based 
starting point for researching PSISS governance that could be compared with 
practitioner views of governance.  It is important to note the framework is only a 
starting point and will not provide an explanation of governance (Sabatier, 2007).  
Direction and controls are the focus of governance scholars advocating command 
and control techniques (Hilmer, 1993).  These are present in the New Zealand 
public sector accountability framework which specifies performance levels and 
ensures adequate performance measurement, holding the agency accountable for 
non-performance (Schick, 2001; Pallot, 2003; Mulgan, 2004; Gregory, 2009).  
Structural governance elements can extend the formal direction and control to 
define formal roles and relationships, as well as the authority held by actors 
(Sambamurthy & Zmud, 1999).  The NPM reforms introduced several structural 
changes moving from a centrally controlled bureaucracy to a contract based system 
with increased authority and autonomy for agencies (Halligan, 2007; Lodge & Gill, 
2011).  This has led to a situation in some countries where the public sector consists 
of sets of relationships between the Executive, individual ministers and the wider 
public sector, each of which perform elements of governance (Scott, 2003; Boston, 
2012).  The NPM reforms were followed by several reforms, loosely called post-
NPM reforms, which were considered responses to perceived shortcomings of 
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NPM including fragmentation of the public sector (Dunleavy & Margetts, 2010).  
Other scholars explored the softer informal aspects of governance (Lynn et al., 
2000; Bovaird, 2007).  My research considers all four governance elements as part 
of the governance of PSISS so I will explore direction, control, structures and 
informal governance.  
Based on my experience in the public sector I have observed multiple governance 
arrangements, all exhibiting different mixes of formal and informal governance.  
This provided a starting point, but unfortunately the four elements did not provide 
enough detail for the purposes of my intended research, so I dug deeper into the 
literature to identify suitable sub-elements within the four elements for further 
investigation.  After reviewing over 250 peer reviewed, indexed governance 
papers, a sample of fifty-three were selected to identify governance sub-elements 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; O'Leary, 2010).  This resulted in the identification of 
multiple instances of fifteen governance sub-elements: accountability, authority, 
autonomy, culture, formal roles, formal relationships, informal roles, informal 
relationships, leadership, legislation and regulation, performance specification, 
performance measurement, political interests, responsibility and trust.  The 
governance elements and sub-elements were combined to develop my initial 
theoretically and empirically informed governance framework presented below in 
Figure eight. 
 
Figure Eight: Governance Elements  
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The governance elements highlight the divide between formal and informal 
governance.  In Figure eight formal governance is divided into three elements: 
direction, controls and structural governance.  
Direction sets the course for the organisation.  Direction consists of autonomy, 
legislation and regulation and performance specification.  Controls are mechanisms 
that are put in place to ensure direction is followed.  Controls identified are 
accountability, responsibility and performance measurement.  Structural 
governance relates to the formal roles and relationships and the provision of 
authority that empowers them. 
Informal governance influences the formal governance elements.  Informal 
governance consists of the softer sub-elements culture, trust, leadership, political 
interests, informal roles and informal relationships. 
The elements, and sub-elements, were all identified in the three governance forms, 
which led to the creation of generic definitions for each element and sub-element 
to enable the identification of governance in practice as shown in Figure nine.   
 
Figure Nine: Identifying Governance Elements in Practice 
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The fifteen governance sub-elements have been categorised in the framework 
under the four governance elements.  What is interesting is in academic literature 
they are often discussed in terms of the relationships between sub-elements.  The 
obvious examples are direction and controls where performance specification sets 
the direction  and performance measurement reports the results of agency activities 
against the specified performance criteria (Baehler, 2003; Gregory, 2009).  Rather 
than exploring each element in isolation I have attempted to show how they are 
presented as interacting in the literature and provide examples of attributes that can 
be used to identify them in practice.   
The governance sub-elements will be presented as groups of related sub-elements, 
which is consistent with the selected academic literature, enabling comparison of 
academic perspectives.  Finally, the selected element and sub-element definitions 
will be presented.  The groupings are: 
• Authority and Autonomy,  
• Responsibility, Accountability and Performance Specification and 
Measurement, 
• Formal and Informal Roles and Relationships,  
• Legislation and Regulation, and  
• Other Informal Sub-elements.   
Attributes for identifying these sub-elements in practice have been identified 
through academic literature with illustrative examples shown in the following 
sections.  
Authority and Autonomy 
Authority is the delegated right to make decisions, whereas autonomy is freedom 
from controls.  Autonomy is linked to authority as an individual may have 
autonomy, however they must be delegated decision making authority and the 
resources to carry out the decision.  Autonomy can be constrained through reduced 




Stoker (1998) identified authority and autonomy as important aspects of 
governance relationships as they enable collaboration.  Reduced authority and 
autonomy leads to questions about delivery of outcomes and outputs, resulting in 
tensions between agencies and the Executive (Norman, 2003).  Autonomy 
increases as the degree of freedom from formal governance controls increases 
(Young & Tavares, 2004).  If collaboration is required between agencies it is 
questionable whether increased centralised governance controls will improve the 
ability of agencies to work together to successfully attain interagency outcomes or 
outputs (Janssen & Wagenaar, 2004; Ezz et al., 2009).  
The question of whether collaboration, and indeed agency autonomy is required for 
governance is debated in theory and practice (Janssen & Wagenaar, 2004; Cabinet 
Office, 2007).  Hilmer (1993) takes a position that directions are set and controls 
in place to ensure compliance, with limits to authority and little autonomy 
provided.  Johnson and Scholes (1999) have a more inclusive approach where 
collaboration is required and therefore autonomy is provided and management are 
afforded increased authority.  This has parallels in public administration literature 
where governance functions are delegated to agencies, whether formally or 
informally (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Provan & Kenis, 2007).  
Authority is provided, and can be identified in practice, through performance 
agreements, legislation and contracts (Eglene, Dawes, & Schneider, 2007; Bryson, 
Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014).  Autonomy can be identified through changes to 
legislation and regulation and through contracts, including service level agreements 
(Aulich, Batainah, & Wettenhall, 2010).   
Responsibility, Accountability and Performance 
Responsibility and accountability are used interchangeably in literature and 
practice.  Responsibility relates to issues about choices based on conflicting 
options.  Once the decision is made the individual or group can be held culpable 
for their action, or inaction.  Particular forms of responsibility in the public sector 
include ministerial responsibility and managerial responsibility (Gregory, 2009).  
Accountability is about providing an answer for actions that were or were not taken 
by an individual.  The Executive have political accountability and are accountable 
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to the people for the use of authority provided through election, ensuring no misuse 
of authority.  This includes accountability to the public for the actions of agencies 
acting on their policies.  Agencies are accountable to the Executive for use of 
delegated authority provided to perform their roles.  This is known as managerial 
accountability (Wallis & Gregory, 2009).   
Accountability is being held to account for specified tasks, when provided 
commensurate authority, including resources (Mulgan, 2000; Gregory, 2009).  The 
accountable party is required to provide an account of how and why decisions were 
made, authority was exercised, and actions were taken.  This account is provided 
to specified others who have the right & capacity to monitor performance and to 
invoke sanctions & rewards (Gregory, 2009; Schillemans, 2011). 
Poorly designed accountability can result in an accountability deficit (Brown & 
Troutt, 2007; Wallis & Gregory, 2009).  An accountability deficit occurs when 
performance does not meet the expected level of accountability.  The identification 
of an accountability deficit often leads to the creation of new accountability 
mechanisms (Schillemans, 2011).  Some scholars are wary of the introduction of 
new accountability mechanisms to resolve a perceived accountability deficit.  They 
cite accountability overload, resulting in administrative costs outweighing benefits 
provided through the additional mechanisms (Brown & Troutt, 2007). 
Accountability needs to be considered from both vertical and horizontal 
perspectives.  The accountability relationship between ministers and agencies is 
based upon vertical governance.  Collaborative initiatives, like PSISS, introduce 
the dimension of accountability to other agencies and stakeholders (Goldsmith, 
2004; Stoker, 2006).  This raises questions about whether horizontal governance 
mechanisms are required to govern PSISS (Ulbrich, 2010).  
Collaborative governance arrangements exist in both formally defined roles and 
responsibilities and informal interactions between actors (Mathur & Skelcher, 
2007).  Many of these activities, particularly informal interactions, may not be 
enforceable through vertical accountability mechanisms leading to challenges for 
collaborative governance (Gregory, 2009; Boston & Gill, 2011).   
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When conducting collaborative governance scholars have recommended light 
touch accountabilities, consensus based patterns for enforcement or influence 
based enforcement (Torfing, 2016a).  Others believed that formalised 
accountability was required.  Boston and Gill (2011) attempted to provide a 
pragmatic approach that balanced the need for hierarchical controls with the 
flexibility required for collaborative working.  They identified the ability to 
sanction as a key requirement for any accountability relationship.  The challenge 
as they saw it was collaborative initiatives introduce horizontal governance as 
opposed to the vertical, principal-agent relationship common in corporate 
governance.  To meet this challenge, they proposed accountability through external 
based authority and enforceable agreements.  
Performance specification defines the expected level for deliverables, these should 
be clearly defined and measurable (Baehler, 2003).  Performance measurement 
involves the creation, analysis and reporting of agency activities against specified 
performance criteria (Lynn et al., 2000; Wallis & Gregory, 2009).  The relationship 
between accountability and performance is often expressed in terms of an 
accountability framework where agencies are delegated the authority to make 
decisions and held accountable for attaining a specified level of performance 
(Schick, 1996; Cook, 2004; Wallis & Gregory, 2009).  Formal agreements are 
established to specify performance expectations, with controls put in place to 
measure performance (Schick, 1996; Aulich et al., 2010).  Performance 
measurement is used to track agency progress towards attaining specified 
performance goals, which are commonly expressed in terms of outputs and 
outcomes (Ryan, 2006).  
Responsibility and accountability can be observed in performance reports, 
legislation and through contractual measures including performance agreements 
and service level agreements (Jensen, 2003; Gregory & Lonti, 2008).   
Performance specification can be identified through performance agreements, 
performance reporting and other contractual measures including service level 
agreements.  Performance measurement can be observed through performance 
reporting including annual reports, performance reviews, service level reporting 
and contract reviews (Gregory & Lonti, 2008). 
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Formal and Informal Roles and Relationships  
The roles and relationships of public servants have changed since the introduction 
of public sector reforms in the 1980s (Boston, 2011).  The roles performed by 
public servants have been viewed as more independent, complex and multi-faceted 
than previously performed in a traditional bureaucratic model (Poulsen, 2007).  
Public service agencies are commonly led by their Chief Executive (CE) in 
conjunction with the minister and government, all of whom perform elements of 
governance.  This differs from agencies, like crown entities, who have politically 
appointed boards who provide governance on behalf of the government (Scott, 
2003).  The NPM reforms reinforced vertical accountability, increasing the role of 
agencies and altering the relationships between ministers and agencies through 
increased agency autonomy (Aulich et al., 2010).  Schick (1996, 2001) stated that 
formally defined contractual relationships are preferred in the public sector because 
they are clearer and easier to enforce, although he felt these relationships could 
detriment third parties who use agency provided services.  This is particularly 
relevant in the principal-agent relationship between ministers and the agencies 
providing services.  The relationship between minister and agency forms part of 
the accountability framework which is vertical in nature.  This vertical relationship 
could exclude third party agencies who adopt PSISS, which is particularly relevant 
when the third-party agency is reliant on agency provided services to deliver their 
own contracted services (Grant et al., 2007; Dormer & Ward, 2018).  
The principal-agent approach to governance focuses on financial performance, 
which is satisfied by undertaking three functions: review and approve strategy, 
ensure policies on key issues are in place, and review compliance (Hilmer, 1993).  
Many collaborative governance scholars have concentrated on the roles agencies 
and other third parties play through theories like network governance (Stoker, 
2006) where governance functions are decentralised from the government and rely 
upon relationships between agencies and third parties.  Networks are presented as 
more collaborative in nature than formal principal-agent contractual relationships, 
which is reinforced by Lindquist (2011) who found interpersonal relationships are 
more likely to lead to collaborative behaviour and horizontal interactions, and 
Piccoli (2005) who found some ICT enabled services rely upon interpersonal 
relationships and trust developing over time.   
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After reviewing academic literature I compiled the following definitions for roles 
and relationships.  Formal roles are codified descriptions of functions performed 
by positions and groups (Hilmer, 1993; Schick, 2001).  Formal relationships are 
codified descriptions of activities that occur between positions and groups 
performing functions (Hilmer, 1993; Chapman & Duncan, 2007).  Informal roles 
are un-codified functions performed by positions and groups.  Informal 
relationships are un-codified activities occuring between positions and groups 
performing functions (Johnson & Scholes, 1999; Chapman & Duncan, 2007). 
Attributes that can be used to identify formal roles and relationships include 
government direction, legislation and regulation (Scott, 2003).  For example the 
State Sector Act (SSA) (1988) placed chief executives in charge of agencies 
providing delegated authority with increased autonomy (Baehler, 2003; Jensen, 
2003).  Several key relationships appear to exist between agencies, the government 
and outsource providers (Collier, Fishwick, & Johnson, 2001; Norman, 2003).  
Many of these relationships are formally defined in service level agreements, 
contracts and publications including strategies and annual reports (Eglene et al., 
2007; Aulich et al., 2010).    
Legislation and Regulation 
Legislation has been defined as Acts of Parliament passed into law through the 
legislative programme, and regulations defined as rules or directives made by the 
Executive that can have a technical nature and may need to be updated frequently 
making legislation unsuitable (Goldfinch & Roberts, 2013; Cabinet Office, 2017).  
Some corporate governance literature states the influence of legislation on 
governance practice is limited (Hilmer, 1993; Bovaird, 2005), however this does 
not appear to be the case for the public sector.  Public sector reforms have been 
strongly influenced by legislative change (Christensen & Laegreid, 2010).  This is 
compounded by the role the House plays in the public sector as legislator and 
through controls like steering committees, as well as the role of the government in 
setting performance targets and monitoring performance of public sector agencies 
(Norman, 2003; Scott, 2003).  Regulation has been identified as a vehicle for 
increasing the adoption of PSISS particularly through mandates (May & Burby, 
1996; Anthes, 2015).  
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There have been numerous legislative and regulatory changes that altered 
governance arrangements (Polanski, 2015; Bazarhanova et al., 2019).  The 
introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley and GDPR have impacted how governance is 
performed and information is held (Damianides, 2005; Stalla-Bourdillon et al., 
2018).  In New Zealand examples include the introduction of three pieces of 
legislation that shaped the NPM reforms: the State-Owned Enterprises Act (SOE) 
1986, the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act (PFA) 1989 (Norman, 
2003; Boston, 2011).  Other examples include a regulation directing agencies to 
use PSISS (Brownlee, 2010; Cabinet Office, 2010a) and specific legislation to 
enable private sector clients to use PSISS to provide services to citizen and non-
citizen customers.  The legislation and regulation examples listed above indicate 
for the role played by legislation and regulation in governance, and the governance 
of PSISS, the challenge is identifying the applicability of legislation and regulation 
to the public sector context being researched.   
Other Informal Sub-elements 
The remaining informal sub-elements are: culture, political interests, leadership 
and trust.  Given the flexible nature of informal sub-elements I have explored 
multiple views from literature for contextual understanding and I have chosen 
broad definitions for sub-elements to enable exploration in my research.   
Culture has been discussed in terms of a barrier to change or something to be 
controlled and influenced from the top through formal governance mechanisms 
(Bevir, 2006).  Alternate views discuss the ambiguity of the local context and the 
challenge faced by centralised top-down approaches to culture change 
(Christopolous, Horvath, & Kull, 2012; Sorensen, 2013).  The view that local 
culture is important, particularly for collaboration, is reflected in shared services 
literature.  An example is the tension between efficiency provided through 
standardisation against the flexibility required to deliver services that are 
meaningful for adopting agencies (Janssen & Joha, 2006; Ulbrich, 2010).  I have 
defined culture as the implicitly understood assumptions and practices of 
organisations (Johnson & Scholes, 1999).  
85 
 
Politics will be investigated through bureaucratic political intentions rather than the 
political system.  Peters (2008) discusses the need for government to take political 
control of governance, citing the devolution of governance associated with network 
governance and movement from the centre bought about through the NPM reforms.  
Jessop (1997) investigated the lessening influence of the government on 
governance and the increased focus on partnerships between the Executive, 
agencies and third parties.  Skelcher (2011) took a wider perspective looking at the 
role of government across different top-down and bottom-up arrangements through 
the use of meta-governance.  I have defined political interests as the personal goals 
and agendas of individuals and groups involved in PSISS governance (Johnson & 
Scholes, 1999).  Traditionally the Executive was involved in politics with public 
servants expected to be non-political (State Services Commission, 2008d).  
Focussing upon political interests will provide the ability to explore the political 
interests of more than just the Executive, which appears relevant based on the 
literature and the number of actors involved in governance.  
Leadership is a broad field with several different perspectives.  For this research 
leadership focuses on the role played by leaders steering, shaping and influencing 
governance (Johnson & Scholes, 1999).  Some NPM reforms used legislation to 
change the leadership dynamic in the public sector, commonly placing chief 
executives in charge of agencies with increased decision making ability (Baehler, 
2003; Jensen, 2003).  The adoption of agency theory saw them acting on behalf of 
the government, being provided delegated authority with increased autonomy to 
manage their agencies (Newberry & Pallot, 2003; Chapman & Duncan, 2007).  
Skelcher (2011) and Sorensen (2006) discuss the need for political leadership in 
governance which could impact the ability of chief executives to lead their 
organisations.  Similarly, the introduction of PSISS appears to impact agency 
leadership.  The risk for agencies appeared to lie in the transition and ultimate 
success of PSISS.  If they lose their internal ICT capability to the provider they will 
want transition to be seamless, and after transition for new PSISS to be provided 
to a standard that meets their needs, which is similar to outsourcing arrangements 
(Ali & Green, 2012).  If the new PSISS does not meet their needs and they have 
lost the internal capability to provide the service themselves, they are reliant on the 
86 
 
provider.  This could be problematic for PSISS where outages could impact 
services that support agency deliverables (Gershon, 2008; Ezz et al., 2009).   
Trust is the level of confidence and belief that exists between individuals and 
groups (Smith, 2010).  As previously discussed trust is seen as important for 
informal relationships.  Osborne (2010) presents trust as a key requirement for 
collaboration.  This may be particularly relevant for PSISS given the potential 
reliance of one agency’s outputs on the delivery of PSISS by a provider.  Trust 
based governance is also raised in terms of network governance relationships 
involving third parties, particularly given the dependency on informal relationships 
to support more formal contractual relationships (Rufín & Rivera-Santos, 2012).  
Attributes for informal elements appear to be harder to identify as they are often 
not documented by organisations.  Leadership and culture can be read into 
publications including strategies, annual reports and statements of intent.    Policies, 
strategies, assurance reviews and agency annual reports can be used to infer 
leadership, trust and culture change as well as resolution of inter-organisational 
political interests for PSISS (Gershon, 2004; Stephen et al., 2011; National Audit 
Office, 2012).  
Governance Elements and Definitions 
Reviewing the academic literature enabled me to identify governance elements for 
my framework and select the following generic definitions for the identification of 
governance in the field, presented in Table five.  
Element Sub-Element Definition 
Direction  Governance direction is the overarching policy or plan 
rather than detailed instruction for operational 
management. 
 Autonomy The freedom to act and freedom from controls. 
 Legislation and 
Regulation 
Legislation is law.  Regulations are rules or directives 
made by the Executive that can have a technical nature 
and may need to be updated frequently making 
legislation unsuitable.  
 Performance 
Specification 
Performance specification defines the expected level for 




Element Sub-Element Definition 
Controls  Governance controls are mechanisms put in place to 
ensure directions are followed. 
 Accountability Accountability is about providing an answer for actions 
that were or were not taken by an individual.  
 Performance 
Measurement 
Performance measurement involves the creation, 
analysis and reporting of agency activities against 
specified performance criteria.  
 Responsibility Responsibility relates to issues about choices based on 
conflicting options, once the decision is made the 
individual or group can be held culpable for their action, 
or inaction.   
Structural 
Governance 
 Structures relate to the formal roles and relationships 
and the provision of authority that empowers them.  
 Authority Authority is the formally empowered ability to act. 
 Formal Roles Formal roles are codified descriptions of the functions 
performed by positions and groups. 
 Formal 
Relationships 
Formal relationships are the codified descriptions of 




 Informal governance elements influence governance 
structures, direction and controls.  Often these factors 
are intangible or not formally captured and include 
culture, informal roles and relationships, leadership, 
political interests and trust. 
 Culture Culture is the implicitly understood assumptions and 
practices of organisations.  
 Informal Roles Informal roles are un-codified functions performed by 
positions and groups. 
 Informal 
Relationships 
Informal relationships are un-codified activities that 
occur between positions and groups performing 
functions. 
 Leadership Leadership is a broad field with several different 
perspectives.  Leadership focuses on the role played by 
leaders steering, shaping and influencing governance. 
 Political 
Interests 
Political interests are the personal goals and agendas of 
individuals and groups. 
 Trust Trust is the level of confidence and belief that exists 
between individuals and groups. 
Table Five: Governance Framework Definitions 
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The governance elements, and generic definitions, were taken into the field as 
sensitising concepts to link theory to practice and to use for preliminary analysis of 
practitioner responses (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  After utilising the framework 
as sensitising concepts to identify governance I used a secondary analysis tool to 
explore the presence of the governance forms.    
Governance Characteristics 
Reviewing academic literature showed me that the governance elements, and sub-
elements, were present in each of the governance forms.  What was different was 
how elements were presented in literature relating to the individual governance 
forms.  I observed common characteristics within forms and contrasting 
characteristics across forms.  Once governance had been identified using the 
sensitising concepts I found I could use these characteristics to identify the 
governance forms for further analysis, as shown in Figure ten.      
 
Figure Ten: Characteristics to Explore Governance Forms in Practice 
The characteristics for each governance form relating to the elements and sub-





Corporate Governance IT Governance Collaborative Governance 
Direction Governance 
direction 
Direction is aligned to 
management actions, aligning 
with the needs of shareholders 
to maximise returns and 
shareholder value. 
 
Vertical alignment.  IT governance 
aligns an organisation’s ICT with 
wider organisational strategies.  
 
Collaborative governance direction 
is outcome focussed, often created 
by consensus and attempts to ensure 
the goals of the collaborative 
initiative reflect the needs of 
participants.   
 Autonomy Autonomy to act within 
delegation as defined in roles 
and responsibilities and 
organisational processes. 
Autonomy is provided by delegation 
from the corporate governance 
function to IT governance function.  
IT governance approval provides 
formal delegation for delivery by 
management.   
Autonomy is considered from two 
angles: the autonomy of the 
collaborative initiative and 
participants to act; as well as the 
autonomy of organisations to 
participate in the collaborative 
initiative.   
 Legislation and 
Regulation 
Legislation and regulation 
require compliance however 
they play a limited role as the 
focus of corporate governance is 
to maximise shareholder benefit.  
Legislation and regulation can 
play a larger role after corporate 
governance failures. 
Legislation and regulation require 
compliance.  Information sharing and 
outsource agreements can require 
compliance with international 
regulations.   
Collaborative governance within the 
public sector can be policy driven 





Improve performance by 
ensuring roles and 
responsibilities are well defined, 
aligning processes and 
incentives with strategic goals.   
 
 
Performance is commonly specified 
using contractual mechanisms.  These 
include project business cases, service 
level agreements and outsource 
contracts. 
Performance goals are commonly 






Corporate Governance IT Governance Collaborative Governance 
Controls Governance 
controls 
Reliance on formal controls to 
ensure management actions are 
aligned with corporate strategy 
to deliver shareholder value.   
IT governance performs monitoring of 
IT decision making as well as the 
policies and procedures for 
controlling IT resources. 
Collaborative governance 
commonly includes horizontal 
controls including accountability, 
responsibility and performance 
measures.   
 Accountability  Vertical accountability.  
Management are held 
accountable by the board.  The 
board is held accountable by the 
shareholders.  Accountability is 
formally defined in role 
descriptions, contracts, policies 
and performance agreements.   
Vertical accountability where IT 
governance function is accountable to 
corporate governance function.  
Parties delivering to IT governance 
are accountable for agreed 
deliverables through formal 
mechanisms including performance 
agreements, contracts, project 
business cases and service levels.  
Introduction of horizontal and 
shared accountability still requires 
formal definition of who is 
accountable to whom for what, with 
the ability to sanction. 
 Performance 
measurement 
Management performance is 
measured against contractually 
agreed performance targets by 
the board through the use of 
controls and performance 
monitoring.   
 
Performance measurement is 
conducted by the IT governance 
function based on agreed contractual 
mechanisms through periodic 
monitoring, project reporting and 
contract reviews.  
Performance measurement and 
monitoring is required to ensure the 
robust evaluation of agreed 
performance targets. 
 Responsibility  Managers answer to the board 
for decisions they make, 
similarly the board answers to 
shareholders.  Managers are 
held responsible for unethical 
behaviour, particularly if it 
could damage shareholder value.   
Contracted parties are responsible for 
advising the IT governance function 
on decisions outside their delegation.  
The IT governance function is 
responsible to the corporate 
governance function for action or 
inaction.   
Collaborative governance entails 
certain obligations or duties that can 
be considered ethical, if not legal.  






Corporate Governance IT Governance Collaborative Governance 
Structural Structural 
elements 
Boards address interactions and 
relationships through the 
process of decision making and 
controls over resources.  
 
Structures capture the governance 
roles and relationships of parties 
performing the IT governance 
function and the authority they are 
delegated to act.   
Collaborative governance 
commonly recognises horizontal 
roles and relationships and the 
influence of stakeholders.   
 Authority Under agency theory the board 
and management are delegated 
authority within formally 
defined, clearly prescribed 
limits.  
The corporate governance function 
delegates decision making authority to 
IT governance to ensure strategic 
alignment.   
Authority is present in both formal 
delegation and through influence.  
 Formal roles Clearly defined roles and job 
descriptions, use of contractual 
mechanisms.  
Contract-based controls including 
service level agreements, contract 
based outsourcing arrangements, or 
employment contracts and 
hierarchical controls.   
 
Collaborative governance can 
consist of formal and informal 
roles.  Over time informal roles and 
relationships are commonly 
replaced by inter-organisational 
structures and processes, including 
formal roles and responsibilities, for 
ongoing direction and management.   
 Formal 
relationships 
Hierarchy based role 
accountability and relationships 
are formally defined through 
contractual mechanisms in 
organisational charts.   
Industry models define key roles and 
relationships and methods for 
mapping accountabilities.  An 
example is the responsibility 
assignment matrix (RACI). 
Collaborative governance can 
consist of formal and informal 
relationships.  Over time informal 
roles and relationships are 
commonly replaced by inter-
organisational structures and 
processes, including formal roles 
and responsibilities, for ongoing 





Corporate Governance IT Governance Collaborative Governance 
Informal  Informal 
governance 
elements 
Informal elements are to be 
influenced and controlled 
through formal mechanisms.  
Gaps are commonly addressed 
by the board.   
Centralised IT governance seeks to 
minimise the influence of informal 
elements to enable control over ICT 
resources.  
Collaborative governance 
commonly recognises informal 
governance elements.   
 Culture A culture of self-interest which 
is aligned to interests of 
shareholders through incentives 
and controls. 
A culture of compliance.  Vendors 
and ICT employees comply with 
contracts, the organisation complies 
with policies and processes.   
An outcome based culture looking 
beyond organisational goals to 
deliver public value beyond 
corporate boundary.  
 Informal roles Corporate governance attempts 
to codify roles and 
responsibilities to ensure 
alignment with strategy to 
deliver shareholder needs.  
Previously undocumented roles 
are formalised or managed with 
board oversight.   
Industry models are used to define 
roles and relationships.  New 
relationships are codified to enable 
centralised monitoring and control.  
Collaborative governance 
arrangements exist of both formally 
defined roles and responsibilities 
and informal interactions between 
actors.  Understanding informal 
roles and relationships requires 
interpretation of everyday 
interactions of network actors.   
 Informal 
relationships 
Corporate governance attempts 
to codify roles and 
responsibilities to ensure 
alignment with strategy to 
deliver shareholder needs.  
Informal relationships are 
codified through processes or 
contracts or managed with board 
oversight.  
IT governance attempts to measure 
and control activities.  Where direct 
relationships are not captured 
specified softer measures are used to 
monitor performance including 
customer and stakeholder satisfaction 
scores.   
Collaborative governance 
arrangements exist of both formally 
defined roles and responsibilities 
and informal interactions between 
actors.  Understanding informal 
roles and relationships requires 
interpretation of everyday 
interactions of network actors.   
 
 Leadership The board are responsible for 
overseeing performance, boards 
IT governance focusses upon 
alignment of ICT activities with 
Collaborative governance 





Corporate Governance IT Governance Collaborative Governance 
must ensure these roles are 
performed; and define the 
responsibilities of the different 
parties for performing these 
roles. 
organisational goals.  IT governance 
groups provide direction and controls 
to ensure alignment and compliance.   
challenges including collaborative 
problem solving, incentivising 
participation and gaining consensus. 
 Political 
interests 
Board and management are 
opportunistic which is 
controlled through incentives 
and controls.  
 
Business units have different 
requirements.  Centralised 
prioritisation and oversight of ICT 
decisions enables strategic alignment.  
Political interests are recognised 
and participants may use formal 
authority or influence to further 
their interests.   
 Trust 
 
Agents are opportunistic, so 
trust is low, the board are 
required to align incentives and 
controls to avoid agency costs. 
Trust is dependent upon maturity.  In 
low levels of maturity trust is low and 
controls used to reduce self-interest.  
Co-production occurs under high 
levels of IT governance maturity.   
Trust is required to generate mutual 
understanding and enables 
participation.   
 







In keeping with my grounded theory research method, review of the state of the 
existing literature is not a one off but something that is returned to at each phase of 
the research (Charmaz, 2014).  Therefore, after I had completed my grounded 
theory analysis, I again returned to the literature which had been developing apace.  
This section provides a synthesis of that more recent governance literature since 
2016. 
When I began my research, I found limited literature addressing the integration of 
governance forms (Wilkin & Chenhall, 2010; Hirschheim & Klein, 2012).  My 
literature informed governance framework was a synthesis of governance literature 
from this earlier time which I used to sensitise my grounded research.  In the 
interim academic literature has continued to explore governance.  I have reviewed 
and presented selected literature to provide insights into recent peer-reviewed 
thinking about public sector governance and, in particular, the governance of 
PSISS.    
The issues of control and turbulence were observed in recent PSISS governance 
literature across governance forms.  The use of governance controls were identified 
in literature which promoted alignment of corporate and IT governance controls as 
a method for addressing board and corporate liability (Tonelli, de Souza Bermejo, 
Dos Santos, Zuppo, & Zambalde, 2017; Vejseli & Rossmann, 2017).  Some of 
these researchers investigated the use of governance controls to address liability 
arising from data protection and privacy breaches, as evidenced in the passing of 
privacy and data protection legislation including the European GDPR (Jackson, 
2019).  When observed through a historical lens, similar concerns were identified 
in the 2000’s through Sarbanes Oxley and in the 1990’s through the Cadbury 
Report, which resulted in tighter governance controls to address corporate and 
board liability (Cadbury, 1992; Damianides, 2005).   
Other recent examples of research into the use of IT and corporate governance 
controls have explored the use of industry frameworks, particularly security and 
audit frameworks (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016; Ettish, El-Gazzar, & Jacob, 
2017; Wilkin & Chenhall, 2019).   
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Recent research into IT and corporate governance controls also appear to have built 
upon previous research from the 2000’s into the use of these governance 
frameworks (Guldentops, 2004; Van Grembergen, 2004; De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2009).  These older examples were explored in my initial review of 
literature where I found much of the corporate and IT governance literature were 
formalised and rule based with the intention of using controls to mitigate risk.  I 
also found limited integration of academic literature across governance forms, 
which was supported by a review of IT governance literature conducted by Wilkin 
and Chenhall (2010) who revealed limited integration of IT governance literature 
with only 11 of the almost 500 journal articles they reviewed providing a holistic 
perspective of IT governance.  In a follow up study Wilkin and Chenhall (2019) 
explored IT governance literature developments, and while exploring the use of 
controls in the governance of IT they also identified an increased literature focus 
upon governance through IT, where IT controls support corporate governance.  
This appears to identify a changing relationship between corporate and IT 
governance through a two-way interaction, rather than the previously presented 
control of IT by corporate governance.  This could be indicative of tensions 
between governance forms, organisations and individuals as information 
technology initiatives, like PSISS, can cross organisational boundaries.    
These tensions have been defined as ongoing contradictions between co-existing, 
often inter-dependent, elements (Schad, Raisch, & Smith, 2015; Defillippi & 
Sydow, 2016), and have been explored in recent research through collaborative 
inter-organisational projects (Lampel & Braun, 2020) and contrasting governance 
forms (Plotnikof, 2016). 
Much of the research into IT governance and corporate governance promoted the 
use of governance frameworks as controls to overcome organisational governance 
tensions (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016; Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  
Whilst this research can provide useful insights for integration of these two 
governance forms, there appears to be an ongoing inherent limitation for public 
sector governance, particularly for inter-organisational governance arrangements.   
Although they advocated alignment between corporate and IT governance through 
controls, in their review Wilkin and Chenhall (2019) alluded to the limitations of 
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corporate governance within the public sector, particularly when working in inter-
organisational networks.  As a result, they identified a gap in knowledge, calling 
for future research into inter-organisational governance arrangements, and in 
particular resolution of accountability issues through non-contractual, or informal, 
governance mechanisms.  This call appears to signify a departure from the use of 
formal, predominantly contract based, vertical controls commonly present in 
corporate governance under agency theory to deal with turbulence or complexity.   
The application of vertical controls for inter-organisational governance 
arrangements has been criticised, as has the application of corporate and IT 
governance.  Lips (2019) highlighted the nested relationship between corporate 
governance and IT governance, and the inherent limitations of vertical governance 
arrangements derived from these governance forms.  She also criticised technology 
led governance approaches (Dunleavy et al., 2005; Dunleavy & Margetts, 2010) as 
contributing to public sector governance arrangements that have limited system-
wide focus, limiting the ability to deliver system outcomes.  This brings into 
question the applicability of IT governance for the governance of inter-
organisational IT enabled initiatives like PSISS.   
Corporate governance is performed by a board who act as agents overseeing the 
activities of an organisation, public sector governance is different to a corporation 
as it occurs across organisational boundaries requiring a system wide governance 
focus (Lips, 2019).  This approach to the governance of social systems, like the 
public sector, are explored holistically as eco-systems (Steelman, 2016).    
My initial review of literature identified theories proposing alternate public sector 
governance approaches which were technocentric or collaborative (Dunleavy et al., 
2005; Stoker, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2008).  Collaborative governance literature has 
progressed with a range of labels used including multi-level governance, 
integrative governance, meta-governance and adaptive governance (Ansell & 
Torfing, 2016; Stout & Love, 2017), with technocentric approaches like Digital Era 
Governance falling by the wayside (Lips, 2019).   
The application of governance mechanisms horizontally across inter-organisational 
boundaries was more common in collaborative governance literature.  In the 1990s 
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and 2000s collaborative governance literature noted inter-organisational tensions 
between vertical and horizontal governance arrangements including multiple 
accountabilities (Christiansen, 1997) integrating policy and implementation, 
fragmentation of performance management and the applicability of existing audit 
functions (Considine, 2002; Pollitt, 2003).  Subsequently these tensions have been 
presented as push-pull relationships between government and collaborative 
governance participants where existing, predominantly vertical, governance 
arrangements and collaborative governance arrangements are required to co-exist 
(Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2016).  The co-existence of vertical and horizontal 
governance mechanisms in practice points to an ongoing need to incorporate 
collaborative governance into the investigation of public sector inter-organisational 
governance arrangements (Lips, 2019).    
Reviewing recent collaborative governance literature led to the identification of 
examples where researchers have attempted to deal with the turbulence and 
complexity of public sector governance, particularly the challenges of governing 
across multiple organisations (Ansell et al., 2016; Klasic & Lubell, 2020; Lopes & 
Farias, 2020).  This is not a new challenge given the research investigating the 
delivery of public value and outcomes in the 1990’s and 2000’s  (Moore, 1995; 
Osborne, 2010; Scupola & Zanfei, 2016).   
Even with the increased body of research literature it has been claimed little is 
known about collaborative governance, with existing research criticised for 
producing prescriptive governance arrangements (Gash, 2016).  Limited 
knowledge of participant interests including motives, expectations and meanings 
attributed to governance arrangements have been identified as a gap in the body of 
knowledge (Gustafson & Hertting, 2017).  These criticisms have resulted in calls 
for research to (i) investigate participant interests and (ii) increase understanding 
of the interactions between participants and governance arrangements (Gash, 2016; 
Gustafson & Hertting, 2017).   
In corporate governance literature, governance arrangements for an organisation 
are overseen by a single board of directors acting as agents for shareholders 
(Benaroch & Chernobai, 2017).  Tensions between participants have been 
identified in literature when attempts are made to employ corporate governance 
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arrangements in inter-organisational governance arrangements (Stafford & 
Stapleton, 2017).  These tensions have been observed in the public sector over the 
past forty years through introduction of corporate governance arrangements 
through New Public Management and inter-organisational governance 
arrangements like New Public Governance (Scupola & Zanfei, 2016). 
Reflecting upon the nested nature of IT governance within corporate governance 
arrangements (Ilott, 2016; Vejseli & Rossmann, 2017; Wilkin & Chenhall, 2019) 
led me to examine nested relationships in public sector and collaborative 
governance literature.  The relationship between the government and public sector 
has been recognised as a nested governance relationship, and in some cases agents 
have been authorised to perform governance on the government’s behalf (Torfing, 
2016b; Gjaltema, Biesbroek, & Termeer, 2019).  The presence of nested 
governance arrangements has been identified as increasing complexity, with 
construction of a system view recommended as a way to explore nested governance 
arrangements in collaborative governance arrangements and for public sector 
governance (Steelman, 2016), particularly for ICT enabled digital services (Lips, 
2019).   
Academics have explored the applicability of collaborative arrangements for public 
sector ICT shared services (Torfing, 2016a; Lopes & Farias, 2020), and whether 
the scope of governance arrangements are scalable to enable inclusion of new 
organisations or services (Scott & Thomas, 2017; Ansell & Gash, 2018).  The 
introduction of new services and stakeholders has been identified as a potential 
cause of tensions which has been posed as a governance challenge (Lopes & Farias, 
2020).  This signifies a gap in knowledge that could be explored through the 
construction of a system view of PSISS governance in practice to explore tensions 
between participant interests and PSISS governance arrangements.      
Delving further into the literature led me to identify three examples where tensions 
could be explored: Accountability, Privacy and security, and Projectification.  
The first example of tensions identified in academic literature is accountability.  
Public sector accountability was traditionally between the minister and department.  
The NPM reforms introduced agency theory to the public sector which reinforced 
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the use of vertical accountability and associated governance arrangements.  Cross-
sector initiatives, like PSISS, raised questions about the suitability of vertical 
governance arrangements, with some academics calling for the introduction of 
horizontal governance arrangements and accountabilities to other agencies and 
stakeholders (Torfing, 2016a; Lopes & Farias, 2020).   
Poorly designed accountability mechanisms have been identified as resulting in 
accountability deficits where performance does not meet the expected level of 
accountability (Schillemans, 2011).  The addition of accountability mechanisms to 
multiple parties has been identified as contributing to accountability deficits, and 
potential accountability overloads (Bovens, Goodin, Schillemans, & Halachmi, 
2014; Han, 2020).  The introduction of horizontal governance mechanisms and 
associated accountabilities have been criticised for adding to accountability deficits 
and overloads through the additional objectives and expectations, dubbed “the 
problem of many eyes” (Dormer & Ward, 2018, p2). 
Academic literature has explored tensions over the use of horizontal accountability 
and vertical accountability mechanisms in governance arrangements across 
organisational boundaries (Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2016; Papadopoulos, 2016; 
Stafford & Stapleton, 2017).  These tensions have been explored by researching 
dimensions including authority (Papadopoulos, 2016; Sorensen & Torfing, 2016; 
Gjaltema et al., 2019) the use of mandates or agreements (Gash, 2016; Schou & 
Hjelholt, 2018), participation (Bang, 2016; Scott & Thomas, 2017) and co-
production (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2016).  This research provides an opportunity to 
empirically explore the presence of these tensions through governance 
arrangements in practice.     
The second example of tensions identified in literature is between performance 
targets, privacy and security.  E-ID have been presented as passports for the 
internet, providing trusted identity information which can be used to transact 
internationally (van Dijck & Jacobs, 2020).  As such privacy and security have 
been identified in academic literature as important design considerations for PSISS 
(Melin et al., 2016; Houser & Voss, 2018), and as socio-political issues (van Dijck 
& Jacobs, 2020).    
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Legislative reform, including GDPR, have been presented as requiring PSISS, and 
in particular E-ID PSISS, to deliver more than technical security and legal 
compliance.  There is an expectation that governance arrangements for these PSISS 
have to consider not just electronic transactions between clients and customers, but 
also national and international privacy and security concerns (Houser & Voss, 
2018; van Dijck & Jacobs, 2020).  The perceived failure of PSISS to meet 
legislative privacy requirements, like GDPR, have reinforced these views (Stalla-
Bourdillon et al., 2018).   
The focus upon the dual PSISS performance targets of reduced cost and increased 
adoption (Paagman et al., 2015; Zefferer & Teufl, 2015) appears to have introduced 
tensions about the privacy and security of citizen information, and in some cases a 
need to redesign services (Göransson, 2018; Houser & Voss, 2018).    
The sharing of e-ID information across organisations, and international boundaries, 
identifies an opportunity to explore governance tensions particularly between 
PSISS performance targets, security and privacy.   
The third example of tensions identified in PSISS governance was identified in 
projectification, or the widespread use of project management.  Project 
management is a common method to organise the delivery of public sector ICT 
initiatives, and associated benefits, through formalised processes (Sirisomboonsuk, 
Gu, Cao, & Burns, 2018; Hodgson et al., 2019).  Although the use of project 
management is widespread, there is a history of public sector ICT project failures 
(Gauld, 2006; Lofgren & Allen, 2019).  The wide-spread use of project 
management in the public sector has come under scrutiny for contributing to sector 
fragmentation and promoting a focus on short term deliverables (Derakhshan, 
Turner, & Mancini, 2019), particularly where policy problems are not clearly 
defined (Godenhjelm, Sjöblom, & Jensen, 2019).  A project management focus on 
short-term deliverables has been identified as potentially problematic for inter-
organisational initiatives, leading to calls for improved governance of projects 
(Godenhjelm et al., 2019; Hall, 2019; Hodgson et al., 2019).   
The common use of project management to deliver benefits appears to conflict with 
the perception of project failures and academic criticism (Hodgson et al., 2019).  
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This is particularly concerning when considering the perceived failure of inter-
organisational initiatives like PSISS (Stalla-Bourdillon et al., 2018; Godenhjelm et 
al., 2019).  These factors provide an opportunity for empirical exploration of the 
literature identified tensions in the governance of projects.  
Exploration of recent academic literature has identified three examples to explore 
tensions present in governance arrangements: accountability, privacy and security, 
and projectification.  Conducting empirical research exploring these tensions 
through practice could provide insights for both practice and academic knowledge.  
The following section presents a contextual overview of the New Zealand public 





Chapter Three. New Zealand Context 
This chapter introduces the New Zealand public sector context for the research and 
a pilot study that was undertaken to trial the use of sensitising concepts to identify 
PSISS governance in practice.  In the first section, the public governance models 
at work in New Zealand’s public sector are outlined, including some of the 
adjustments and reforms made during the period covered in the research.  In the 
second section I explain a pilot study undertaken to test the fitness of the sensitising 
concepts synthesised at the end of Chapter two and inform the research design.   
Public Sector Governance in New Zealand 
There is a bureaucratic model in evidence.  In the form of this model before 1988 
the elected government was responsible for the governance of the public sector, 
with individual ministers responsible for the delivery of their government 
departments.  Public interest was defined by politicians and experts and the public 
were viewed as largely disinterested in political engagement and participation 
(Kelly et al., 2002; Stoker, 2006).  Elections provided the mandate for public 
political endorsement with political parties keeping the public interest as the 
government or in opposition (Considine & Lewis, 2003).  Public sector managers 
were accountable to ministers and had to respond to their political direction.  The 
public sector had a monopoly on the provision of public services and was viewed 
as inefficient and cumbersome.  Public officials were criticised as having too much 
power.  Public sector organisations were commonly called departments, and the 
main role of  departments was to manage inputs (Kelly et al., 2002; Stoker, 2006).   
In 1984 New Zealand’s debt levels were high and the credit rating had been 
downgraded.  The public sector was seen as an inefficient overhead (Chapman & 
Duncan, 2007), and highly centralised, particularly information systems which 
were centrally provided by Government Computing Services (GCS) (Jensen, 
2003).  These factors were the target of change when the bureaucratic model was 
replaced by some comprehensive changes to the model that have subsequently been 
grouped together as the NPM reforms (Boston, 2011).   
NPM changed New Zealand’s public sector governance model from a centrally 
controlled bureaucracy to a contract based system with increased agency authority 
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and autonomy (Halligan, 2007; Pollitt, 2017).  New Zealand undertook a large 
change programme with aggressive timeframes introducing private sector methods 
to improve public sector performance (Stoker, 2006).  These changes were 
considered the most radical and complete public reform of any country in the 
OECD (Chapman & Duncan, 2007).  
The NPM reforms have been characterised as organisational change, and 
considered the dominant idea behind management and governance change in the 
public sector for two decades since their introduction in the 1980s (Dunleavy et al., 
2005).  The government implemented multiple legislative changes that altered 
Chief Executive authority and autonomy, governance roles and relationships, and 
the accountability framework.  These changes were primarily through amendments 
to the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public 
Finance Act 1987 (Norman, 2003).  The legislative reform introduced public sector 
organisation types including agencies, crown entities, crown agents and state-
owned enterprises (State Services Commission, 2019b).  For clarity the term 
agency will be used to describe post reform public sector organisations.   
The State Owned Enterprises Act provided principles for governance and 
accountability, establishing trading services into profit driven companies.  The SSA 
outlined arrangements for administration and oversight of government agencies 
(Treasury, 2005).  The Act placed chief executives in charge of agencies with 
increased decision making ability (Baehler, 2003; Jensen, 2003).  Informed by 
agency theory chief executives, as agents of the government, were provided 
delegated authority and autonomy to manage their agencies thereby reducing the 
role of the State Services Commission (Newberry & Pallot, 2003; Chapman & 
Duncan, 2007).    The PFA delegated responsibility for financial management to 
agencies while the Treasury retained some supervisory oversight.  Chief executives 
were made accountable for agency performance leading to a silo based approach 
with vertical governance structures and relationships (Perera, Velayutham, & 
Rahman, 2001; Jensen, 2003).   
The relationship between ministers and chief executives formed part of a wider set 
of relationships including Cabinet, individual ministers and the wider public 
service, all of whom performed elements of governance (Scott, 2003).   
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Cabinet leads the Executive branch, directing individual ministers, who in turn 
direct public servants, in particular chief executives, who act as administrative 
heads of agencies.  Cabinet must retain the confidence of the House or lose the 
ability to form a government.  Unanimity means Cabinet speaks with one voice and 
binds individual ministers to support Cabinet decisions.  Cabinet must maintain 
confidentiality of Cabinet discussions.  Confidentiality and unanimity reinforce 
each other (Palmer, 2006). 
Unanimity provides clarity on the government’s policy direction.  The government 
has political accountability, to the people through the Parliament and their elected 
representatives.  This includes accountability to the public for the actions of 
agencies implementing their policies.  Agencies in turn are managerially 
accountable to the government for their use of resources and delegated authority 
(Wallis & Gregory, 2009).   
Political accountability translates into individual ministerial responsibility and the 
requirement to toe the party line or face removal.  The ability to remove ministers 
based on the doctrines of unanimity or individual ministerial responsibility are key 
components of prime ministerial power, and can profoundly affect the relationship 
between chief executives and their ministers (Palmer, 2006).   
Ministers collectively constitute the Executive who administer or execute policy.  
Ministers are accountable to Parliament for ensuring their departments perform 
efficiently and effectively (Gregory, 1998; Cabinet Office, 2017).  They are 
supported in their portfolios by the public service.  Ministers are expected to 
provide direction and priorities for the public service, however, they are not 
expected to interfere in day-to-day management.  In carrying out their roles public 
servants are expected to support ministerial portfolio functions, develop strategies 
that support the aims of their minister and implement the policies of the government 
(Cabinet Office, 2017).   
Managerial decision making authority is delegated to the chief executives 
(Norman, 2003; Duggett, 2009).  For example prior to NPM, government ICT 
services were provided by Government Computing Services which was sold to 
EDS in 1995 (Bradbury, 1999).  The sale of GCS increased agency ability to 
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provide their own organisational ICT services through increased chief executive 
authority and autonomy (Jensen, 2003).   
While NPM enabled the delegation of managerial authority from government to 
public sector organisations, it appeared to introduce confusion about who is 
responsible for the delivery of outcomes.  Fragmentation of the public sector into 
narrowly focussed organisations led to chief executives being responsible for 
specific deliverables called outputs, and in some cases within the jurisdiction of 
their agency, but left uncertainty about accountability for the delivery of inter-
agency outcomes (Cook, 2004).  The perceived riskiness of needing to rely on other 
agencies for successful delivery of their outcomes contributed to a lack of desire 
for interagency collaboration.  Norman (2003) used a metaphor for the move from 
bureaucracy to NPM as killing off organisational dinosaurs yet spawning packs of 
velociraptors with strong appetites for private sector independence, often beyond 
the appetites of the government.  Other criticisms include limited cross-government 
collaboration, excessive managerial autonomy, reliance on legislative reform and 
a vertical governance focus (Boston, 2011; Lindquist, 2011).   
A centre left coalition government elected in 1999, oversaw a second generation of 
governance reforms including the introduction of Managing For Outcomes (MFO) 
and legislative change (Chapman & Duncan, 2007).  Schick (1996) highlighted the 
lack of coordination between agencies, limiting the ability to manage resources to 
deliver outcomes (Cook, 2004).  Areas targeted for improvement included 
integration of services across agencies and improved state sector alignment 
(Mallard, 2001).  MFO was based on public value (Cook, 2004), through meeting 
the needs of the public (Moore, 1995; Spano, 2009).   
Outcomes can be complex and may require inputs from several agencies, making 
them difficult to co-ordinate and measure, particularly with the silo based public 
sector introduced through NPM (Alford & O'Flynn, 2009; Rutgers, 2009).  Under 
MFO departments were encouraged to demonstrate how they contribute to 
outcomes (MFO Steering Group, 2003).   
The MFO framework defined three levels of measurement for the services provided 
by the government: Outcomes, Impacts and Outputs.  Outputs are goods and 
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services ministers purchase from public and private sector providers.  Outcomes 
are impacts from delivery of an output or class of outputs.  Impacts are intermediate 
term outcomes.  The government purchased outputs to deliver desired outcomes 
from government agencies or third parties (State Services Commission, 2008c; 
Treasury, 2017).  
MFO took a citizen centric approach identifying policy value as residing in 
implementation and measured in how citizens and clients respond to outcomes 
(MFO Steering Group, 2003; Ryan, 2006).  To support MFO the government 
introduced legislative reform to improve whole of government service delivery 
(Chapman & Duncan, 2007; Parliament, 2008), including amendment to the Public 
Finance Act 1989; amendment to the State Sector Act 1988; and The Crown 
Entities Act 2004 (Newberry & Pallot, 2005; Treasury, 2005).  The legislative 
reforms were intended to improve integration of service delivery by providing for 
multi-output appropriations to improve interoperability between agencies and 
delivery of outcomes, and providing the State Services Commissioner a wider remit 
across the government (Chapman & Duncan, 2007).   
ICT in the Public Sector 
Many post NPM initiatives, like e-government, were led by the SSC who were 
accountable for both overseeing the public sector and delivering shared services 
(State Services Commission, 2006a, 2008b).  SSC created the e-Government Unit, 
establishing the Government Chief Information Officer (GCIO) and investigating 
the introduction of PSISS to improve coherence and integration of public sector 
services (State Services Commission, 2003b). 
In essence, legislative changes since 2000 made minimal changes to the core 
elements introduced by the earlier NPM reforms.  There were new requirements 
for more consistent governance and accountabilities with increased monitoring by 
central agencies (Chapman & Duncan, 2007).  SSC and Treasury were critical of 
the silo-based public sector, apportioning blame for the failure of collaborative 
initiatives on limited chief executive accountability.  They believed without 
outcome based performance requirements chief executives simply delivered their 
outputs and avoided collaboration (State Services Commission & Treasury, 2005). 
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SSC’s role changed in the late 2000s in respect of e-government following the 
failure of several SSC led e-government initiatives: the Government Shared 
Network (GSN), and removal of the GCIO Laurence Millar.  The e-government 
implementation arm, Government Technology Services (GTS), moved from SSC 
to DIA (Pullar-Strecker, 2009).  Tensions emerged between GCIO and GTS with 
the general manager of GTS, Stephen Crombie, critical of governance 
arrangements stating, “government ICT projects, both locally and internationally, 
had failed because of the absence of a solid strategy and effective governance."  
Millar countered arguing that public sector system “savings weren't reflected in the 
cost of the project.  It was losing half-a-million dollars a month but was saving 
much more across government.  Yet, in a narrow accounting concept, it was a 
failure" (Pullar-Strecker & McEntee, 2009, p. 1). 
Around 2008, after nine years of global and nationwide economic growth and 
stability, economic conditions changed with New Zealand and the world faced with 
recession.  A newly elected more centre-right government saw that budget deficits 
for the next 10 years were projected to reach $12 billion.  In response Deputy Prime 
Minister Bill English stated the public sector was facing significant long-term 
change and called for agencies to do more with the same funding or possibly more 
with less (Small, 2009b).   
Agencies were asked to find savings through line by line reviews and reduced 
funding caused internal pressures to reprioritise expenditure, reallocate resources 
and increase cost reduction.  The pressure for cost reduction led to the 
establishment of several efficiency initiatives including improvement of 
administrative and support services, agency performance, cross-government ICT 
services, procurement and the creation of centres of expertise (Treasury, 2010).  As 
well as shared services moving to DIA (Pullar-Strecker, 2009), SSC lost capability 
through budget cuts and the loss of 22 jobs (Small, 2009a).   
The Executive established new priorities for ICT supported by new legislation, 
overseen by a Cabinet committee who issued a directive mandating client adoption 
of PSISS (Cabinet Office, 2010a).  DIA provided leadership for sector ICT, 
established new governance arrangements and provided direction by issuing the 
New Zealand Government ICT Strategy and Action Plan to 2017 (Department of 
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Internal Affairs, 2013b).  New targets for PSISS adoption were set, reset, and in 
many cases failed to be met (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014a, 2015a, 2017d).  
In 2015 the monitoring of large public sector projects was moved from SSC to 
Treasury (Treasury, 2017).  
In 2017 after nine years of centre-right government another government has 
introduced new legislation to reform the public sector (Hipkins, 2018; State 
Services Commission, 2019c).  The proposed reforms include cross-sector 
governance changes to improve outcomes to citizens (State Services Commission, 
2019a).   
DIA continues as lead agency for public sector ICT, which is now called functional 
leadership.  The Chief Executive of DIA has had a title change from GCIO to 
Government Chief Digital Officer (GCDO).  New targets have been agreed with 
the Executive, through a Cabinet committee, for the delivery of shared services 
through to 2021 (Dunne, 2017a).  These changes occurred with a backdrop of 
technology failures in large agency ICT enabled programmes at the New Zealand 
Transport Agency and Statistics New Zealand, and criticism of the government’s 
approach to technology leadership, all of which have received widespread media 
coverage (Cropp, 2019; Dreaver, 2019; Pennington, 2019; Pullar-Strecker, 2019).   
In this brief overview of public sector governance changes we see how the 
Executive has shaped and reshaped the public sector through legislation and 
regulative changes.  There were changes to the relationships and roles played 
through the introduction of contractual mechanisms for performance specification 
and management which in turn impacted accountability relationships.  Exploring 
the New Zealand reforms in this way identifies some of the parties involved in the 
governance of PSISS and shows how their roles and relationships have changed 
over time.   
Pilot Study – Government Shared Network 
When initiating this research, I was concerned the academic literature we met in 
Chapter two might not allow adequate identification of governance sub-elements 
in practice and conversely if my framework might have too many sub-elements to 
conduct research.  I also wanted to trial my framework as a set of sensitising 
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concepts on a PSISS that had been in place in the same operating environment as 
my selected PSISS and during similar time periods.  The pilot also enabled me to 
identify PSISS governance participants for my research design.   
Before entering the field, I ran a pilot to trial my interview protocol and use of 
governance framework as sensitising concepts (Davenport & Markus, 1999; 
O'Leary, 2010) with experts involved in the governance of the Government Shared 
Network PSISS.   
Interviews were conducted with six expert practitioners who had held senior 
executive positions with experience of the governance of PSISS in New Zealand.  
Interviewees were selected due to their PSISS experience.  This was a snowball 
sample, and did not purport to represent the full spectrum of views (O'Leary, 2010).  
Human Ethics Committee (HEC) approval and approval from participants was 
obtained before commencing interviews.  Participants took part in individual face-
to-face semi-structured interviews of about one hour.  Qualitative data analysis was 
conducted concurrently with data collection, using NVivo version 9 to enable 
emergent participant insights to be incorporated into future and follow up 
interviews (O'Leary, 2010).  The interviews identified governance elements in 
practice and explored practitioner views on the governance of PSISS.  
Pilot Study Description.  In 2004 SSC conducted an ICT feasibility scoping 
exercise based on the premise of rationalised ICT infrastructure.  The scoping 
found an all-of-government shared network may provide benefits, however no 
other PSISS’s were deemed suitable.  As a result, the Government Shared Network 
was created.  The possibility of a directive mandating GSN adoption was debated 
and rejected (Cabinet Office, 2007). 
GSN was provided by Government Technology Services at SSC.  GSN was to 
provide network infrastructure services government agencies could opt to adopt 
(State Services Commission, 2008a).  GSN was expected to provide increased 
bandwidth and better service quality to agencies at a cheaper cost than they were 
currently paying.  The GSN was supplied at a cost of $21.7 million for 2006/7 
which was $8.5 million more than forecast in supplementary estimates.  This 
breached the Public Finance Act and required a write down of the assets by $10.6 
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million.  This loss was blamed on poor client adoption of the GSN and contributed 
to the GCIO resigning (State Services Commission, 2008a; Walter, 2009).   
An independent review of GSN was commissioned by the State Services 
Commissioner (State Services Commission, 2008a).  The GSN failure was a 
catalyst for moving GTS from SSC to the Department of Internal Affairs.  The role 
of GCIO, the GTS unit, services, 62 employees and $15 million of assets were 
transferred on 1 July 2009 (State Services Commission, 2009; Department of 
Internal Affairs, 2011b).  GSN was redesigned and rebranded as one.govt and 
provided by GTS at DIA (Gillespie, 2010).  
On the 22nd of September 2010 public service agencies were directed by the 
Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee (CEGIC) to adopt PSISS 
unless they had a compelling reason to opt out (Cabinet Office, 2010a).  Any 
agency wishing to opt out, or taking action to undermine the programme, would be 
reported to the Expenditure Control Committee (Brownlee, 2010).  
Based on case documents the major difference was GSN had no mandate, whereas 
one.govt had a mandate.  Contractual arrangements were used by both GSN and 
one.govt for performance specification and performance measurement between 
provider, vendors and clients.   
The presence or absence of a directive mandating service adoption provided a point 
for analysis using my sensitising concepts.  Similarly, contractual arrangements 
were used for the analysis of the governance sub-elements performance 




Figure Eleven: Government Shared Network 
Although contractual arrangements appear to have been used both times, 
interviewees perceived a difference in their use.  GSN was criticised for having 
poorly defined contracts that were not quantifiably measurable.  On one hand 
one.govt was praised by interviewees for providing clearly defined, measurable 
performance criteria in their contracts.  On the other hand, an interviewee inferred 
that, if the mandate was in place for GSN the service would have cost a lot more 
money and in their opinion would not have delivered a usable service.  The 
elements and sub-elements identified by interviewees for one.govt are presented in 
Figure twelve. 
 
Figure Twelve: One.Govt 
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As shown in the illustrative example the pilot suggested using sensitising concepts 
for analysis would be relevant.  Evidence of all sub-elements were identified in the 
analysis of the interviews, providing confidence in the empirical relevance of using 
the governance framework to conduct the research.  No other sub-elements were 
identified. 
Having developed, and piloted, my governance framework as sensitising concepts 
provided confidence for use in the field.  I gained valuable feedback from 
participants on the interview process and piloting enabled me to improve my 
interview technique and identify potential issues with conducting interviews and 
analysis.  The results of my pilot were used to refine my research design and select 
the PSISS I would research (O'Leary, 2010).   
In the next chapter I use the introduction to New Zealand’s public sector 
governance and the findings from my pilot study to set out the research design to 
answer my research questions.   
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Chapter Four. Research Design 
This chapter presents my plan for conducting empirical research and explains the 
decisions I made when implementing my plan (Holloway, 1997).  The first part 
presents my paradigm and method decisions, while the second details how I 
conducted my research and justifies my choices.   
Paradigm and Method Decisions 
This section starts by reintroducing my research problem and research questions 
before exploring research design selection.   
Research Problem   
Governments have invested heavily in Public Sector ICT Shared Services with the 
intention of providing improved services to clients and customers, whilst providing 
savings across government.  Unfortunately, these benefits have commonly failed 
to materialise.  Governance and governance arrangements have been identified as 
contributing to the perceived failure of these services (National Audit Office, 
2012).   
In Chapter two we saw that current knowledge of PSISS governance is principally 
informed by literature from three domains: management, public administration and 
information systems.  Each of these domains holds segmented or silo-like 
worldviews of governance arising from a specific domain and the governance focus 
within that domain field.   
As a result, the governance of PSISS could be at best unhelpful and even confusing 
to practitioners.  This state of knowledge is not assisted by segmented domains or 
the tendency to simplify governance into “how to govern” guides that obscure their 
different theoretical origins and do not appear to address the complexity of PSISS 
governance.   
Research Questions   
Despite the range of literature and practice discourses, practitioners are expected 
to use this segmented literature to develop governance arrangements and perform 
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PSISS governance.  This led me to ask my first research question: How do 
practitioners perceive PSISS governance in practice?    
Conducting grounded theory analysis enabled development of a mid-range theory 
supported by a governance practice narrative, and the means to answer my 
secondary research question: How have governance arrangements addressed 
critical issues in public sector governance?     
Research Paradigm  
All empirical research is interpreted by the researcher who uses empirical data, 
regardless of how it is collected and analysed, to draw inferences and conclusions.  
How these inferences are made depends upon ontology, epistemology and 
methodology, collectively referred to as a research paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005; Willis, 2007).   
A research paradigm is a philosophical model reflecting the world view, belief 
system, common assumptions and values shared by a scientific community when 
conducting research (Holloway, 1997).  A researcher adopts a paradigm when 
conducting research and must defend that decision (Blaikie, 2007).  This is 
important as justification is viewed as a key element for the acceptance of 
knowledge (Brueckner, 2008).  I evaluated four paradigms: positivist, post 
positivist, constructivist and critical theory for their fit with my research question, 
finally selecting the constructivist paradigm.  
Paradigm Selection.  Governance is a contested concept with a variety of 
definitions, originating across domains (Frederickson, 2005; Rhodes, 2007).  Given 
the perception that governance has contributed to the failure of PSISS, there is 
merit in gaining a deeper understanding of the governance of PSISS.  How I 
approach this depends upon my research paradigm.   
My research focuses upon the gap between theory and practice and the need to gain 
an understanding of the social interactions and context, requiring interpretation of 
practitioner perspectives combined with insights from theory, previous research 
and secondary literature (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Tavory & Timmermans, 
2014).   
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Constructivists view reality as social in nature and embrace understanding from a 
wide range of participants in the phenomenon.  They view meaning as constructed 
by people interacting with the world (Crotty, 1998).  My research aim was working 
with participants in the governance of PSISS to gain a deeper understanding based 
on their experience, which is consistent with the constructivist paradigm.   
Ontologically constructivists accept there are multiple viewpoints that are equally 
valid.  Knowledge is constructed based on the views of participants (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991; Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  This differs ontologically from positivist 
and post positivist realist ontologies.  Rather than seeking objective truth 
constructivists seek subjective knowledge (Creswell, 2009).  Constructivists 
conduct research in a natural setting with participants involved in the phenomenon 
and seek to interpret it through them.  The researcher is seen as part of the context 
and brings their experience to the research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008), which is consistent with my use of sensitising concepts as an entry 
point.   
Research Approach   
An important consideration when selecting a research methodology is whether the 
research is conducted using quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods.  Scientific 
research is grounded in quantitative research (Chua, 1986).  Qualitative research 
methods came to prominence in the 1960s to investigate real world settings and 
capture contextual richness (Crotty, 1998; Yin, 2011).  Another option is to use a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative research called mixed methods 
(Johnson & Onwuengbuzie, 2004).   
Approach Selection.  Reflecting upon the fit between philosophy and qualitative 
research, constructivists commonly employ qualitative methods to gain a deeper 
understanding of a phenomenon through the views of multiple participants 
(Creswell, 2009; Jarvensivu & Tornroos, 2010).  This aligns with my use of 
qualitative methods to gain a deeper understanding through participant 
perspectives, making qualitative methods suitable for conducting this research.  
A research design and associated methodology should be suitable for answering 
the research problem.  My research will use participant perspectives to access their 
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understanding of a relatively new real-world phenomenon (Charmaz, 2014).  There 
are a limited number of experts involved in governance of PSISS in New Zealand, 
limiting the effectiveness of quantitative approaches.  Similarly the research seeks 
to explore the phenomenon from a public administration perspective through the 
richness of participant experience which requires open-ended questions and the 
ability to explore understanding as it emerges (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Yin, 2011).  
These characteristics align well with qualitative research.  Qualitative research 
studies real-world phenomena focussing on the views of participants and the 
contextual conditions.  As a qualitative researcher I needed to get close enough to 
the phenomenon to gain an in-depth understanding and capture what was actually 
occurring through the views of participants, including gathering direct quotes to 
explore the phenomenon (Patton, 2002).  Mixed methods were discounted as 
qualitative methods appear to provide a reasonable research strategy and the 
additional design requirements appeared to outweigh the benefits of adding 
quantitative research methods.   
Qualitative research was selected as it is useful for investigating contemporary 
issues, particularly where boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly defined, which appears to fit for PSISS governance (Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998).   
Research Methodology   
Grounded theory research is grounded in the behaviour, words and actions of those 
being studied.  Methodologically the researcher enters the world being studied to 
observe the interactions and interpretations that occur (Goulding, 2002).  
Using a constructivist approach all knowledge is considered as a valid input, 
including that which occurs before as well as during the research (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).     
Scholars have debated which paradigms are aligned to grounded theory research.  
Looking at some of the key grounded theory practitioners: Glaser’s work has been 
considered post-positivist, with others including Corbin adopting a constructivist 
worldview (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Birks & Mills, 2010; Charmaz, 2014).  What 
can be taken from this debate is exemplary grounded theory has been conducted 
117 
 
using different philosophical positions, including a constructivist philosophical 
worldview.   
Constructivist grounded theory research investigates a single phenomenon through 
participant perspectives in a natural setting using qualitative methods to gain a 
deeper understanding (Creswell, 2009).  Qualitative research investigates a 
phenomenon by gaining a deeper understanding through eyes of participants.  As 
constructivist research is context based it is suited to a qualitative case as it 
considers the understanding constructed by participants in the context being 
researched (Jarvensivu & Tornroos, 2010).   
I found grounded theory would provide me with the ability to analyse data to 
construct mid-range theory from practitioner perspectives.  The selection of a 
single PSISS as a critical case enabled me to place a boundary around the scope of 
my research.  
A critical case has strategic importance for researching a phenomenon, in this case 
PSISS governance (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  As identified in Chapter two E-ID are 
presented, in literature and practice, as a prerequisite for the delivery of secure 
shared services that protect customer privacy.  The E-ID selected has strategic 
importance as 20 years of practitioner insights can be sought into the governance 
of the PSISS.  My selection criteria are presented in the research conduct section.  
Using a constructivist lens, I have applied grounded theory to construct theory by 
becoming a part of the research process, gaining a deeper understanding of the 
influence of governance on PSISS through participant perspectives coupled with 
my knowledge and experience (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).  I brought 
my previous experience to the field, which included my literature based governance 
elements in the form of a conceptual framework and characteristics model (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
Grounded theory was introduced to discover theory from data, based on systematic 
collection and analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Rather than trying to develop 
universal top down theories, grounded theory offers practical mid-range theory 
building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Grounded theory is a 
non-positivist, qualitative methodology that utilises inductive procedures to 
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identify theoretical concepts from data, based on respondents’ perspectives on their 
own experiences of the phenomenon being researched (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
Glaser and Strauss have since disagreed about how grounded theory research 
should be conducted.  Glaser advocated approaching the research with an open 
mind, whereas Strauss allowed the researcher to enter the field with research 
questions enabling the use of personal experience, knowledge and literature (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994; Goulding, 2002).  Other scholars subsequently introduced 
alternate approaches to conducting grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014).  My research 
follows Strauss’ approach and my grounded theory research design was based upon 
the work of Corbin and Strauss (2008).   
Data collection for grounded theory can come from a range of different qualitative 
sources (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).  I 
explore qualitative methods for data collection in the following section.   
Data Collection  
Qualitative data can be collected from three sources: direct observation, documents 
and interviews.  Observation occurs within the setting where the researcher 
captures detailed descriptions of activities in practice.  Document analysis uses 
excerpts to capture the context and meaning from published materials.  Interviews 
are useful for generating direct quotes from participants in the phenomenon under 
investigation (Patton, 2002).   
I sought to gain a deeper understanding of PSISS governance through participant 
insights (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  In New Zealand, where I am conducting my 
research, PSISS have been around since the early 2000s.  As there are a limited 
number of participants involved in the governance of PSISS in New Zealand, I 
decided to draw on the perspectives of participants involved over the full life to 
date of the service with the drawback that previous participants no longer involved 
in the governance of the PSISS could not be directly observed.  The use of 
documents has limitations in that there is no ability to prompt for clarification to 
gain a deeper insight into participant understanding.  Interviews were selected as 
the most suitable method to collect data for my research.   
119 
 
Interviewing requires more than turning up and asking questions (Patton, 2002).  I 
developed an interview protocol to define the questions and guide the interviews 
(Galletta, 2013; Charmaz, 2014).  As part of the interview protocol I considered 
whether to use open or closed questions.  Closed questions were discounted as they 
would not elicit enough of what is not already known or contribute to deepening 
understanding.  Open-ended questions are useful for gaining rich data grounded in 
participant experience from the domain which the research is being conducted.  
Using open-ended questions enabled me to draw participants into the research 
(Galletta, 2013).  
I chose to undertake semi-structured interviews with open ended questions.  Semi-
structured interviews are favoured by grounded theory researchers as they can 
assist with generation of rich accounts of a participant’s experience, yet still 
provide the flexibility for the interview to open up relevant areas the researcher had 
not previously considered (Goulding, 2002).   
Interviews are the primary method of data collection however documents, 
including academic and practice literature, were used for theoretical integration and 
mid-range theory construction (Patton, 2002; Charmaz, 2014; Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2014).   
Data Analysis   
Data analysis was conducted to build mid-range theory using grounded theory 
based on Corbin and Strauss (2008).  They present theory building as a process that 
starts by creating concepts from the raw data, defining the relationships between 
concepts to identify categories, and integrating categories into a theoretical whole 
with each step of analysis captured in memos.  To support researchers using their 
process Corbin and Strauss (2008) provide thirteen tools that can be used to 
perform grounded theory and I discuss the tools I selected and how I used them to 
conduct analysis and construct theory.   
Theoretical Integration 
According to Corbin and Strauss (2008) theoretical integration is the construction 
and validation of a theory of practice grounded in empirical data through the 
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integration of categories into a central category.  Theoretical integration requires 
internal and external validation.  Internal validation requires the categories to be 
integrated into a rich, cohesive whole; which resonates with practitioners.  
My research has two questions.  The first question: How do practitioners perceive 
PSISS governance in practice? can be answered through the construction of a 
grounded theory using practitioner perspectives.  This requires theoretical 
integration to ensure the grounded theory resonates with practitioners.   
My second research question: How have governance arrangements addressed 
critical issues in public sector governance? requires an additional round of 
theoretical integration to enable external validity.     
Charmaz (2014) asserts external validity requires reflexive interplay between 
practice, case documentation, and theory, with the interplay used to conduct 
theoretical integration.   
The addition of documents relating to the governance of the researched PSISS can 
be used to “corroborate or refute, elucidate, or expand on findings across other data 
sources” to aid with validation and guard against bias (Gross, 2018, p. 545).  
Conversely, other scholars warn the addition of case documents can introduce bias 
as they have been created for a purpose other than the research, and can require 
management to ensure the selected documents will contribute to the research, 
which requires qualitative document analysis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; O'Leary, 
2010).  I therefore decided to conduct theoretical integration with the addition of 
case documents using qualitative document analysis based on O’Leary’s (2010) six 
step process for textural analysis to construct what I refer to as an official narrative.  
This process was selected as it is an iterative approach and enabled the reflexive 
analysis required for theoretical integration.    
Reflexive analysis of my grounded theory, case documents and theory enabled 
theoretical integration (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).  This was 
conducted to construct and validate a mid-range theory against current literature 
that answers my second question: How have governance arrangements addressed 




Following Corbin and Strauss (2008) enabled me to enter the field with research 
questions enabling the use of personal experience, knowledge and literature.  As 
an internal researcher I had prior knowledge of the phenomenon and participants.  
I sought to address personal bias by employing techniques to ensure the 
trustworthiness of the data I was gathering and that my findings were as accurate 
as possible.  Internal, or self-reflexivity was sought, acknowledging the role I play 
as a constructivist researcher whilst ensuring the research accurately reflected the 
views of participants.  Self-reflection was greatly assisted through the use of 
memos.  Corbin and Strauss address bias through Sensitivity, which was sought in 
the collection and analysis of data, employing external reflexivity through 
validation with participants and supervisors, and strengthened through the use of 
multiple narratives.  Research quality was assessed using the ten quality criteria 
presented by Corbin and Strauss (2008, pp. 305-307) presented in Table seven.   
Quality Criteria Description 
Fit Do the findings resonate with 
professionals and participants? 
Applicability of findings Do the findings offer new 
explanations or insights? Do they 
add to the existing knowledge?  
Concepts Have concepts been developed and 
can they be used to foster common 
understanding? 
Contextualisation of concepts Do the findings reflect the context 
and associated influence on 
concepts? 
Logic Is there a logical flow of ideas, so the 
findings make sense?  
Depth Are concepts described richly to 
increase understanding? 
Variation Is the complexity of the context 
reflected in the findings? 
Creativity Does the research say something new 
or present old ideas in a new way? 
Sensitivity Did the researcher demonstrate 
sensitivity to the data? Did the data 
drive the results? 
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Evidence of memos  There should be evidence of memos 
in the final report. 
Table Seven: Research Quality 
Research Conduct  
This section documents how I conducted my research.  A research conduct 
overview was used to guide the research and support analysis and methodical 
conduct (Yin, 2011; Tavory & Timmermans, 2014).  The overview was used as an 
outline rather than a prescriptive plan, to ensure coverage whilst enabling the 
incorporation of emergent concepts and categories.  As such it is a useful tool for 
providing the reader with a high-level view of research design decisions.  The 
overview was evaluated through the research process to enable changes to be 
incorporated (Yin, 2011).  I found this to be a useful tool for maintaining 
methodological coherence across my research methods and activities as the 
grounded theory guidance was predominantly focussed upon analysis (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008).  My research overview is shown in Table eight.  
Requirement Response 
The literature review identified a 
common language requirement for 
multidisciplinary research, in this 
instance PSISS governance 
(Davenport & Markus, 1999; 
Gregor, 2006).   
I developed a literature informed 
governance framework that identified and 
defined generic elements and sub-
elements present in all governance forms.  
This framework provides a common 
language for governance and sensitising 
concepts that enable the identification 
and analysis of governance in practice. 
The literature review identified 
multidisciplinary research requires 
a method to identify and analyse 
theory, in this instance governance 
forms, in practice (Gregor, 2006).   
My governance framework enables 
identification of governance in practice.  I 
have extended the framework to create a 
characteristics model that enables the 
identification and analysis of theory from 
governance forms in practice.  
Qualitative data collection will 
occur through semi-structured 
interviews supported by 
documentation.  Conducting semi-
structured interviews requires 
planning and the creation of an 
interview protocol (Galletta, 2013). 
I created an interview protocol to guide 
data collection.  My protocol included an 
interview schedule outlining questions 
(Appendix B), an information sheet and 
consent form.   
Frameworks, models and data 
collection and analysis methods 
A pilot study was planned and conducted 
after ethical and participant approval was 
123 
 
should be trialled before entering 
the field (O'Leary, 2010).   
gained.  Insights were used to refine 
frameworks, models and methods.   
Before conducting data collection 
ethical and participant approval is 
required.  
HEC and participant approval was gained 
for both pilot study and subsequent field 
work.  
Identify boundaries of research 
phenomenon and select a PSISS to 
research. 
Criteria for selection of PSISS were 
defined and used to select the electronic 
identity PSISS RealMe.  
Perform data collection. Data collection was performed using the 
refined interview protocol.   
Gain a deeper understanding of 
governance in practice.  
Grounded theory analysis was conducted 
using my governance framework as 
sensitising concepts, leading to 
theoretical integration based on Strauss 
and Corbin (2008).  Reflection of 
findings against academic and secondary 
literature sources was conducted to 
provide thematic integration and 
development of mid-range theory (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Alvesson & Karreman, 
2011).  
External validity requires reflexive 
interplay between practice, case 
documentation, and theory to 
conduct theoretical integration 
(Charmaz, 2014).   
A second round of theoretical integration 
was conducted using reflexive interplay 
to integrate the practitioner narrative, 
official narrative and existing theory. 
 Table Eight: Research Conduct Overview 
Framework and Characteristics Models 
The literature review identified PSISS governance as multidisciplinary, with 
governance forms from multiple academic domains employed in the public sector.  
Multidisciplinary researchers have identified requirements for a common language 
and methods.  This section introduces my governance framework and 
characteristics model used to meet these requirements.  
Regardless of an inductive approach, theory and previous experience sensitises a 
researcher to how data is likely to be grouped (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  A 
conceptual framework is a tool that explains the main things being studied and the 
relationships between them (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
Grounded theorists commonly develop a conceptual framework and take it into the 
field for testing, refinement or qualification.  The conceptual framework often 
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evolves out of the research through interaction and analysis.  A conceptual 
framework can be considered as the current version of a researcher’s map of the 
area under research.  As the researcher’s knowledge of the area increases the map 
becomes increasingly grounded and better defined (Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
Conceptual frameworks lend themselves to graphical representation that outlines 
prior theorising and empirical research to identify relationships, variables, gaps and 
overlaps in existing knowledge.  This representation can be refined several times 
through field work and reflection upon theory (Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
Governance literature as a phenomenon is theorised across multiple academic 
domains.  Practitioners were developing PSISS governance arrangements using 
literature from three academic domains, using three governance forms and trying 
to perform governance in the public sector using these arrangements.  This led me 
to question how I could identify governance in practice.  After reviewing 250 
academic governance papers I found fifteen common governance elements to 
enable identification of governance in practice (O'Leary, 2010).  What I observed 
was, although the common elements were present in all three governance forms, 
each form attributed different characteristics to the elements.  I came to the 
realisation I could take the governance elements into the field, however I would 
need to populate them using practitioner perspectives (Mills et al., 2006; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008; Offe, 2009).   
To guide me in the field I created broad definitions for each element to use as 
sensitising concepts, providing me with a general reference to guide me in 
identifying empirical evidence of governance (Blumer, 1954; Miles & Huberman, 
1994).  I placed the elements and broad definitions in a literature informed 
governance framework that I could use as a personal reference but would not show 
to practitioners (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  I later 
extended my governance framework to include characteristics from governance 
forms for each governance element which could be used for grounded theory 
analysis (Bowen, 2006).   
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My framework was refined in a pilot study of a shared service, the Government 
Shared Network, through interaction with research participants.  My framework 
was presented to academics and practitioners for further feedback and refinement.   
In this current research my literature informed governance framework was used to 
provide a useful list of initial concepts for analysis.  However, consistent with my 
grounded theory approach, I took care to remain open to new ideas and concepts 
and to let go if literature concepts did not fit the data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 
21).  My framework was used as sensitising concepts to identify governance in 
practice and for initial analysis, contributing to the creation of concepts and 
providing depth for explanation.  Interplay and constant comparison in theoretical 
integration between academic literature (theory) and observations from practitioner 
perspectives (practice) enabled me to refine my framework.  Comparison occurred 
between initial and follow up interviews with respondents and reflection upon 
academic and practitioner literature.  My refined framework is a contribution to the 
existing knowledge base and is presented in Chapter two, in Figure nine. 
The governance framework enabled identification of governance in practice, 
however, once identified it did not provide the ability to differentiate between 
different forms of governance.  To overcome the challenge of identifying 
governance forms in practice to enable analysis I developed a model which 
identified characteristics for every governance element and sub-element for the 
three governance forms.  The detailed characteristics model is presented in Chapter 




Figure Thirteen: Governance Characteristics 
My governance framework and characteristics model are presented in Chapter nine 
as a contribution to the body of knowledge. 
Interview Protocol 
I developed my interview protocol which included interview questions, a 
participant information sheet and consent form which were approved as part of my 
HEC application.  Interview questions structured in an interview schedule, which 
is presented in Appendix B, were created using the three segment approach 
advocated by Galletta (2013).  The first segment was designed to involve 
participants and elicit responses grounded in experience, whilst leveraging the 
researcher’s knowledge of literature.  The middle segment leverages initial 
responses to gain a greater understanding through more specific questioning and 
probing.  In-depth questioning was used to ensure the research phenomenon of 
interest was fully explored from the interviewee’s perspective.  The final segment 
was used to reflect upon interviewee responses in the context of their interview, 
other interviews or theory.  The respondent was asked for additional thoughts and 
thanked for participating.   
I reviewed my interview questions with supervisors and tested the order.  I also had 
a run-through of the interview and practiced recording and transcribing with a 
senior ICT professional (O'Leary, 2010).   
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Before entering the field I planned a pilot study to inform my research design, trial 
my use of interviews and to evolve my framework for use as sensitising concepts 
for data collection and analysis (Blumer, 1969; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  This pilot 
study required ethical approval and participant consent.   
Ethical Approval and Consent 
As my research involves human participants there are ethical requirements that 
need to be satisfied from academic, agency and individual perspectives. Before 
entering the field I obtained the following approvals for the pilot and later field 
research: 
• HEC approval and 
• Participant approval. 
PSISS Selection   
The unit of analysis is participant perspectives in a New Zealand PSISS.  A review 
of PSISS in New Zealand identified twenty-one possible candidate PSISS for my 
research.  To enable grounded theory analysis the PSISS needed  to have been in 
place long enough to enable comparison over time (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014).  
I developed additional selection criteria using qualitative research manuals and 
previous shared services research (Marshall & Rossman, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 
2008; Niehaves & Krause, 2010), resulting in the following selection criteria: 
• Criterion One: PSISS still in operation 
• Criterion Two: PSISS provided to agencies in New Zealand 
• Criterion Three: Historical PSISS with a variety of governance elements 
enabling comparison over time.  
• Criterion Four: PSISS with breadth and depth providing ability to explore a 
wide range of governance elements 
• Criterion Five: Ability to gain insight into PSISS governance through a 
critical case  
I selected a single PSISS providing electronic identity services, currently known as 
RealMe, looking for depth and richness for a deeper understanding rather than 
multiple PSISS.  The rationale for selecting RealMe was the service has been in 
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place, through various guises, since the early 2000s.  It was a service that had been 
through multiple iterations and there was publicly published information about the 
service.  The selection of a single PSISS enabled me to explore the governance of 
the PSISS through the perspectives of participants using grounded theory.  It also 
enabled me to balance limited time and resources with the feasibility of making a 
meaningful contribution to the body of knowledge.  
Data Collection 
Data collection was conducted using semi-structured interviews.  Human Ethics 
Committee approval and approval from participants was acquired before 
interviews commenced.  Interviews were conducted with twenty-one expert 
practitioners who had held senior positions with experience of the governance of 
PSISS in New Zealand.  Participant responses were solicited through open ended 
questions to gain rich text-based responses.  Interviews were typically 60-90 
minutes long and were audio-recorded for improved transcription with respondent 
agreement.   
Interviews identified governance elements in practice and explored practitioner 
views on the governance of PSISS.  Interviewees were selected due to their PSISS 
governance experience.  A snowball sampling technique was used based on the 
limited number of experts involved in the governance of the selected PSISS and 
participant referrals provided the ability to identify potential participants (O'Leary, 
2010).  Potential interviewees were initially identified through documentation 
about the PSISS and more identified later through as part of the interview process. 
This occurred directly through Question 4 “who else played a key role in the 
service”, and through other responses made in the interviews.    
Once each interview was transcribed it was copied to NVivo to enable concurrent 
analysis.  I persisted with this process until the point of saturation, which was 
established as all possible perspectives that could be bought to bear were in the data 
i.e: I had spoken to people involved in different stages, who performed different 
roles and had different organisational backgrounds, and no new concepts emerged 




I sought to deepen understanding through constructivist grounded theory, 
conducting analysis of practitioner perspectives based on Corbin and Strauss 
(2008).  They present theory building as a process that starts by creating concepts 
from the raw data, defining the relationships between concepts to identify 
categories, and integrating categories into a theoretical whole with each step of 
analysis captured in memos (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 106).  A codebook 
outlining the codes constructed for this research are presented in Appendix D.  
Example memos are provided in Appendix E.  
Corbin and Strauss (2008) recommend refining and validating theory with 
practitioners.  When I spoke to practitioners and academics about my theory there 
was general agreement that the theory made sense to them.  What was interesting 
was how they began trying to use the theory to explain their current work situations, 
which caused me to reflect upon the application of my theory within the wider 
public sector context.  Reflecting upon my analysis I observed comments from 
respondents about the wider public sector, particularly the relationship between 
PSISS governance and wider public sector governance.   
I viewed this as an additional step in my theoretical integration, where I would 
reflect upon the relationship between PISSS governance and public sector 
governance using themes generated from analysis of practitioner responses, with 
the intention of providing a better understanding of what was happening in practice, 
based on insights from practitioners (Alvesson & Karreman, 2011; Tavory & 
Timmermans, 2014).   
Creating Concepts.  Corbin and Strauss (2008) present thirteen tools for data 
analysis used to identify and create concepts.  These tools form a toolkit researchers 
can use to perform analysis on different problems.  According to Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) rather than use each and every tool for a job the researcher should 
explore the tools in the toolkit and use the best ones for the job at hand.  
I used NVivo version 11 software to manage my coding.  I began coding using the 
initial concepts from the literature-based governance framework.  New concepts 
began emerging through the use of analytic tools to mine respondent data and 
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memos for reflection.  By trialling the different analytic tools I found several 
different ways to explore the data and develop concepts.  The Nvivo tool helped 
with the use of simile, antonym and direct word searches.  Memos were useful for 
reflection, particularly the use of questioning and making constant and theoretical 
comparisons between data.  Analytic tools like the “so what” metaphors and flip 
flop were useful for teasing out different meanings for the data and questioning my 
personal experiences and initial interpretation.   
Creating concepts enabled me to begin exploring relationships between concepts, 
which in turn led to creation of new concepts and eventually categories.  
Relationships were explored through the creation of memos.   
Memos are Elaboration.  Memo writing was continuous throughout the coding 
process, providing insights to explore as they emerged through data analysis 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).  Through the combination of analysis 
and reflective elaboration I identified new concepts.  Grouping and exploration of 
these concepts led to the creation of categories and theoretical integration.  Memos 
were key to theoretical integration, which started as ideas drawn from the 
practitioner responses and developed through writing and extending memos which 
eventually became the eight themes.   
Relationships between concepts.  Relationships between concepts were explored 
to create categories.  Categories are high level concepts that represent phenomena 
by grouping concepts with shared properties (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
Corbin and Strauss promoted the use of three analysis tools to build categories and 
conduct theoretical integration, these are the paradigm, the 
conditional/consequential matrix and process.  Although I tried all three tools I 
found the matrix and process the most useful.  I present these tools below and then 
talk about how I employed them in my analysis in subsequent sections.   
The matrix and paradigm are designed to identify the key conditions that shape the 
context.  The paradigm is used to identify context through conditions, interactions, 
emotions and consequences.   
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The matrix provides a conceptual guide to explore where the action or interaction 
occurs using concentric circles from the action to groups, organisations and finally 
the international arena.  The matrix presented by Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 94) 
is presented in Figure fourteen.  
 
Figure Fourteen: The Conditional and Consequential Matrix  
Process is represented in data through changes in actions, interactions or emotions 
in response to structural changes or consequences.  Structure and process are linked 
because people act in response to events, situations or problems.  Conceptualisation 
of process is based on the context and the researcher’s interpretation of context.  
Researchers interpret the context based on their understanding of how respondents 
perceive or define situations and what meaning respondents attribute to the 
situation.  Conceptualisation depends upon the interpretation of the researcher and 
how they use their analysis to link categories by showing relationships between 
process and structure (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 99) 




Figure Fifteen: Process  
The Matrix.  The matrix identifies changes to responses by individuals (be they 
action, interaction or emotion) over time by exploring the context surrounding the 
individual making the response (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Using the matrix 
enabled me to confirm the contextual boundaries and key parties for analysis. 
Placing the matrix in the context of my research I found action and interaction were 
observed through the provider to the public sector.  The public sector primarily 
involved interactions between the provider, public sector clients and the Executive.  
Beyond the public sector was interaction at a national level where customers and 
private sector clients became involved.  International customers became involved 
at the international layer.  This resulted in construction of the matrix for my 




Figure Sixteen: Matrix 
Further exploration of context resulted in constructuction of Figure seventeen, 
which presents the parties most commonly referred to by respondents as: provider, 
public sector clients the Executive and customers.   
 
Figure Seventeen: Key Parties. 
The identification of key parties enabled me to analyse actions and interactions 
between these parties when exploring concepts.  Categories were identified by 
grouping concepts and exploring relationships between concepts through analysis 
of changes in process and structure.  Through this process of analysis, I identified 
five categories: 
• Adoption 




• Risk, and  
• Resistance  
Exploring and defining relationships between categories, grounded in outputs from 
analytical tools, provided the inputs required to undertake theoretical integration.   
Construction of Grounded Practitioner Theory.  The first part of theoretical 
integration involves linking categories around a central category and integrating 
these into a wider theoretical scheme.  A grounded theory does not have to be an 
explicit hypothesis, rather it can be a rich narrative.  Theory construction is 
explanatory in that theory provides explanation.  “The idea is to raise the concept 
of the study up to a more abstract level where it can have broader applicability but 
at the same time remain grounded in data” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 102).   
My central category was constructed using Corbin and Strauss’ (2008, p. 105) 
criteria for choosing a central category, which is presented below: 
• It must be abstract; that is, all major categories must be related to it and 
placed under it, 
• It must appear frequently in data.  This means that within all, or almost all, 
cases there are indicators pointing to that concept, 
• It must be logical and consistent within the data.  There should be no 
forcing of data, 
• It should be sufficiently abstract so that it can be used to do research in 
other substantive areas, leading to the development of more general theory 
and 
• It should grow in depth and explanatory power as each of the other 
categories is related to it through statements of relationship. 
The process tool was used to develop a central category incorporating my five 
categories.  The central category provides a theoretical explanation of the research 
and is presented in Chapter six.  The following section shows how the process tool 
was used to construct the central category. 
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A researcher investigates a phenomenon which is the event or major idea through 
a central category.  The process is the means of investigation.  Process is related to 
structure because people respond to the issues, problems, situations goals and 
events that occur in their lives.  Responses can take the form of action, interaction 
or emotional response.  There are infinite variations in response as people interpret 
situations and attribute meaning in different ways.   
When exploring process through analysis of responses I identified two lifecycle 
methodologies suggested by respondents: project management and software 
development life cycles.  My intention was to explore these processes through 
responses and related documents to identify a process that represented the 
sequences of evolving interactions identified in my research.   
The Guidance for Monitoring Major Projects and Programmes published by the 
SSC found that the majority of departments used the Office of Government 
Commerce’s Prince2 project methodology, with others using the Project 
Management Institute (PMI) methodology (State Services Commission, 2011).   
Prince2, Projects in Controlled Environments, was created in 1989 by the Central 
Computer and Telecommunications Agency (later renamed the Office of 
Government Commerce) in the UK (Matos & Lopes, 2013).  The Prince2 project 
lifecycle consists of a pre-project, initiation, subsequent stages, a final stage and 
post project (Hughes, Dwivedi, & Rana, 2017).   
The Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) was created by the PMI 
to provide a set of knowledge principles for project management and was first 
published in 1987 (Matos & Lopes, 2013).  The sixth edition of the PMBOK has 
four generic project life cycle stages: starting the project, organising and preparing, 
carrying out the work and ending the project (Rose, 2013).   
A software development life cycle (SDLC) is a structured technique used to 
develop software (Massey & Satao, 2012).  The SDLC covers activities from 
requirements analysis through to the operation and maintenance of the system.  The 
SDLC is historically connected to the waterfall approach of development (Bassil, 
2012).  Typical stages in a waterfall SDLC are requirements analysis, design, 
implementation, testing and operation & maintenance (Massey & Satao, 2012). 
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Exploring the project management lifecycle and SDLC identified processes that 
were used to create and operate the PSISS.  Whilst project management was used 
in the delivery of the PSISS, a project management lifecycle is a generic process 
that can be used for any project.  Similarly, the PSISS was developed using a 
waterfall SDLC methodology, which was a common process used for ICT system 
development.  These two processes were unsuitable as a central category as they 
lacked the explanatory power of a central category.  They are abstract and appeared 
in the data and have been used in other areas of research.  Unfortunately, being 
existing processes from literature there would be limited ability to grow in depth 
and explanatory power through relationship to other categories as they are not 
derived from the grounded theory analysis, potentially leading to forcing data into 
an existing process.   
I returned to interview responses and mined the data for process using NVivo.  
What emerged was a process for the PSISS that incorporated elements of SDLC 
and project management.  The central category is summarised in Figure eighteen.   
 
Figure Eighteen: Central Category. 
Respondents perceived governance changes occurred between the initial concept 
and implementation of the PSISS.  When the PSISS moved from an idea to actual 
delivery the governance arrangements became more formal in nature.  The provider 
was observed as open and consultative during concept, which was perceived to 
change when they moved to implement.   
The focus changed from building the PSISS to getting public sector clients to adopt 
the PSISS.  This led me to question whether I should limit the process to public 
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sector adoption or to include private sector clients.  Initially the PSISS was intended 
to prove online identity for New Zealand citizens to access public sector services.  
Over time the PSISS was adopted by private sector clients and later by international 
customers.  The two options were therefore: 
• Concept, build, public sector, citizens; and 
• Concept, build, client, customer. 
I selected the concept, build, client and customer option as it fits the requirement 
for abstraction.  It works whether the clients are public or private sector.  It also 
works whether customers are citizens or not, which is particularly important as 
non-citizens consume government services.  
The central category was integrated with the five categories, as shown in Figure 
nineteen. 
 
Figure Nineteen: Grounded Theory 
Consultation was conducted to improve quality, to ensure the grounded theory 
resonated with professionals, participants and academics and the findings were 
applicable to practice and theory.  The results of this analysis are presented in 
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Chapter six as a rich grounded practitioner narrative arising from grounded theory 
construction.  My grounded theory is presented in Chapter nine as a contribution 
to the body of knowledge.  
Theoretical Integration 
The first round of theoretical integration resulted in the creation of my grounded 
theory supported by a rich practitioner narrative on PSISS governance, to provide 
an answer for my first research question.  This practitioner narrative provided an 
input for theoretical integration with the official narrative and existing theory to 
construct a mid-range theory as an answer to my second research question (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Tavory & Timmermans, 2014).  This section presents the second 
round of theoretical integration.   
Official Narrative.  In parallel to the grounded theory analysis of interview data, 
documents related to the case were analysed using O’Leary’s (2010) six step 
process for textural analysis which guided me to plan for contingencies, gather 
texts, review their credibility, interrogate the documents, reflect and refine my 
process, and analyse the data.  The document analysis enabled the construction of 
an official narrative, presented in Chapter five.   
I began by gathering the published performance and strategy documents related to 
the PSISS.  These were selected as they were audited and required for the 
accountability framework and budget processes (State Services Commission & 
Treasury, 2000).  Further documents were added as they were discovered through 
the interview, analysis and validation processes.  These were mentioned by 
practitioners or referred to by other documents.  All documents were recorded, 
scanned when required and electronic copies saved in Endnote to enable access and 
management.  Documents were reviewed for authenticity and bias.  Interrogation 
of the documents was used to construct the official narrative for reflexive analysis 
and comparison with theory and practitioner perspectives.  Sensitising concepts, 
from my literature informed governance framework, were used to conduct initial 
interrogation, grouping data into initial categories for analysis, similar to my 
grounded theory analysis.  The process was iterative and constant refinement and 
comparison were used across documented sources to construct the official 
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narrative.  The official narrative was then used as an input for the second round of 
theoretical integration involving reflexive analysis of the practitioner narrative, 
official narrative and existing theory.  New documents emerged throughout 
theoretical integration and were incorporated into the official narrative.     
Reflexive Analysis.  Having developed my grounded theory that practitioners 
viewed PSISS governance as a process I moved to perform theoretical integration 
through reflexive analysis.   
Governance as a process is an arrangement commonly employed in IT governance 
to deliver projects or manage systems through their lifecycle.  Most governance 
arrangements were contractual and governance relationships were vertical in nature 
which are both common in corporate governance.   
Public sector ICT shared services are delivered within the wider public sector 
system context where governance arrangements for PSISS interact with wider 
public sector governance arrangements (Lips, 2019).  Grounded theory analysis 
enabled the construction of a grounded theory of practice which was used to 
identify and reflexively explore tensions between governance arrangements.   
Critical issues were generated through analysis of my grounded theory, grounded 
practitioner narrative and validation with practitioners (Charmaz, 2017).  These 
issues were reflexively compared with the official narrative and academic theory 
leading to the creation of memos which resulted the construction of eight themes 
for theoretical integration (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Tavory & Timmermans, 2014).  
These themes are presented in Chapter seven.  Reflexive analysis identified 
inconsistencies between the grounded practitioner narrative, official narrative and 
academic literature, requiring further interplay with existing literature to throw new 
light on the phenomenon of PSISS governance (Alvesson & Karreman, 2011).   
This enabled the identification of critical public sector governance issues and the 
construction of a perspectives model to provide a system-wide lens (Steelman, 
2016; Lips, 2019).   This lens could be used to reflexively explore current academic 
literature and practitioner informed critical public sector governance issues to 
answer my refined secondary research question:   How have governance 
arrangements addressed critical issues in public sector governance?   
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My secondary research question was refined through the second round of 
theoretical integration, which is consistent with grounded theory research (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).   
Reflexive interplay with academic literature from the three domains and deeper 
exploration of practice through practitioner perspectives and case documentation 
enabled identification of seven critical issues.  Through empirical exploration of 
these critical governance issues, I have attempted to answer my second research 
question by constructing a mid-range theory consisting of:  
1) A public sector system governance model.  
2) Identification and exploration of system governance arrangements and 
mechanisms in practice. 
3) Identification and exploration of relationships between governance 
arrangements and tensions present in the system.  These include: 
(a) Exploring the following tensions identified in literature: 
Accountability, Project management and Privacy & security in 
practice.   
(b) Identifying and exploring additional tensions in practice.  
The results of this reflexive analysis were validated with practitioners and 
academics.  They are presented in Chapter eight.   
The mid-range theory and critical issues were constructed to provide theoretical 
insights into the phenomenon through empirical examples, and where possible to 
propose a resolution for the knowledge gap presented by critical issues (Alvesson 
& Karreman, 2011; Charmaz, 2017).    These are included as contributions to the 
body of knowledge in Chapter nine.  
Risks and Mitigations 
The following risks were identified and are presented with associated mitigations 





Quality Use the ten quality criteria from Corbin and Strauss 
(2008).  Supported by the use of the following 
research tools: research conduct overview, conceptual 
framework, semi-structured interviews and grounded 
theory analytical tools.   
Findings lead to 
research design or 
governance element 
changes 
I used an emergent approach with grounded theory, 
the design and elements open to change as practitioner 
views informed theory. 
Insufficient access to 
case study 
documentation 
Public agencies publish results, documents are a 
secondary source to support respondent views. 
Balanced view Interview a range of actors from different perspectives 
including PSISS provision and adoption.  Grounded 
theory iterations provide the ability to reflect 
practitioner perspectives.  The researcher is an active 
part of the research.   
Validity of governance 
elements as sensitising 
concepts 
Governance elements were explored with expert 
practitioner interviews in pilot and presented for 
academic review in doctoral proposal.   
Suitability of analysis 
tools 
I found that the NVivo database had limitations when 
writing and connecting data so I developed a separate 
database to assist with write up, particularly when 
linking memos, and developing themes for reflective 
analysis.  The second database was used for thematic 
integration to avoid queries becoming tangled by 
multiple scenarios.  
Table Nine: Risks and Mitigations  
142 
 
Chapter Five. An Official Narrative of PSISS Governance  
I selected the New Zealand electronic identity PSISS which is currently called 
RealMe to investigate PSISS governance.  The governance narrative presented in 
this chapter was developed by analysing a selection of official documents, for that 
reason I refer to it as an ‘official’ narrative.  It provides the reader with an 
understanding of the official conceptualisation of the PSISS and its governance 
arrangements.  It was constructed using O’Leary’s (2010) six step process for 
textural analysis and the use of sensitising concepts as detailed in my research 
design in Chapter four.   
The selected documents included legislation, government documents and press 
releases.  These documented sources provided the ability for comparison and 
contrast with practitioner views.  The terms used in documents to refer to services, 
the parties involved and their interactions, which all changed over time.  To make 
it easier for the reader I have chosen consistent terms where possible yet retained 
the variety of terms in direct quotes.  Appendix A contains a glossary and cross-
references alternate terms. 
The key terms I use in respect of governance of the PSISS are: The Executive, 
Provider, Clients and Customers. 
The Executive consists of the Prime Minister and government Ministers who 
administer policy and ensure the public sector performs efficiently and effectively.  
The Executive is informed by the Cabinet who form the core decision making body 
of Executive government (Cabinet Office, 2017).   
The Provider was the agency who was accountable for the creation and 
performance of the PSISS.  The initial provider was the State Services 
Commission.  The provider was transferred to the Department of Internal Affairs 
in 2010.  
Clients are parties who can provide customer facing online services integrated with 
the PSISS.  Public sector clients were commonly known as departments before the 
NPM reforms and agencies after the reforms.  Private sector clients were introduced 
after legislative reform in 2012.   
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Customers use the PSISS to consume client services.  The PSISS started by 
targeting New Zealand citizens, and over time the provider began targeting 
international citizens as customers.   
This synthesis presents the reader with an overview of the PSISS over a 20-year 
period from the early concept in 1999 to the current publications available in 2019.  
Particular areas of focus include the changes to the service, legislation, strategies, 
performance targets and participants in governance of the PSISS.  Participants 
include the Executive, provider, clients, customers and the organisations 
performing monitoring and review of the PSISS.   
A time series is presented after the narrative showing the events in chronological 
order.  This is followed by a summary of performance targets and results for the 
PSISS. 
The PSISS ‘Official’ Narrative 
In the late 1990s SSC investigated the use of shared services in the public sector.  
As a result they concluded there were “a range of support functions currently 
undertaken in-house by Public Service departments for which a shared services 
approach may be more efficient” (Gill & MacCormack, 1999, p. 7).   
Investigating opportunities for efficiencies through shared services led SSC to 
develop and publish the e-government vision in May 2000.  The vision was 
developed to provide strategic guidance for information and communications 
technology in the New Zealand Public Sector (State Services Commission, 2006b).  
An e-government programme of work was designed to deliver the vision.   
The E-government programme was approved by the Executive in July 2000 with 
the intention of better managing investment on information and communications 
technology and offering more accessible public services (State Services 
Commission, 2001).   
The Executive empowered the State Services Commissioner to establish 
governance and deliver the programme (Mallard, 2004).  A governance advisory 
board of senior public and private sector executives was created to advise the 
Commissioner on programme direction (State Services Commission, 2001).  The 
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e-Government Unit was created to deliver the programme (State Services 
Commission, 2001).   
The e-government strategy was released in April 2001, presenting the plan to 
deliver the vision that “by 2004 the Internet will be the dominant means of enabling 
ready access to government” (Mallard, 2004, p. 1).   
Large public sector ICT projects failures, most notably the police system INCIS, 
resulted in publication of guidelines for managing and monitoring public sector 
ICT projects in 2001 (State Services Commission & Treasury, 2001).  As a result 
of the INCIS inquiry the “State Services Commission and the Treasury were 
required to monitor IT projects to provide second opinion assurance to Ministers” 
(State Services Commission, 2001, p. 55).  Coverage was all public service and 
only crown entities directed by their responsible Minister (State Services 
Commission & Treasury, 2001).  This meant SSC was empowered as shared 
services provider to deliver a large programme of ICT change as well as being 
required to monitor major ICT projects as a central agency.   
Work continued on the e-government programme identifying new shared services 
resulting in the revision of the e-government strategy by the provider and 
ratification by the Executive in June 2003 (State Services Commission, 2003a).  
Common authentication was identified as an enabler of shared services leading the 
provider to develop a business case for an Authentication Programme to deliver the 
PSISS, beginning with the Government Logon Service.   
The Executive “agreed to proceed with the design of a system of authentication for 
people and businesses that interact on-line with Government services; the piloting 
of a prototype shared policy workspace; and an extension of the secure electronic 
environment to a larger proportion of the Public Service and State sector” (State 
Services Commission, 2003a, p. 48).  The Executive also agreed to the creation of 
a network shared service called the Government Shared Network.  
Before shared services were released the Executive undertook legislative reform 
through the Public Finance (State Sector Management) Bill which empowered the 
Commissioner as provider to deliver shared services.  The Bill resulted in three 
pieces of legislation: Amendment to the Public Finance Act 1989; Amendment to 
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the State Sector Act 1988; and The Crown Entities Act 2004 (Newberry & Pallot, 
2005; Treasury, 2005).   
The PFA amendment was intended to improve integration of service delivery by 
enabling multi-output appropriations to improve interoperability between agencies, 
moving towards outcome based delivery.  The amendment to the State Sector Act 
was intended to improve all-of-government service delivery by providing the State 
Services Commissioner a wider remit across the public sector (Chapman & 
Duncan, 2007).  Section 107 of the Crown Entities Act (2004) required compliance 
with the all-of-government direction affording the ability for specific directions to 
be issued by the Minister of State Services and Minister of Finance.  
The Commissioner sought to leverage his new mandate by introducing six state 
service development goals designed to enable delivery of "a system of world class 
professional State Services serving the government of the day and meeting the 
needs of New Zealanders” (Prebble, 2005, p. 1).  The SSC launched the 
Development Goals for the State Services in 2005 with Executive support.  
Agencies were expected to assist delivery of these goals.   
The Development Goals set the framework for how SSC, Treasury and the DPMC 
led and tracked performance.  They identified system-wide changes required to 
advance the Executive vision for the State Services to meet the needs of New 
Zealanders (State Services Commission, 2008a).  By clearly defining and 
publishing the goals with timelines and measurable milestones the Commissioner 
was attempting to set a clear agenda for the next generation of State Services (State 
Services Commission, 2007).   
The Authentication Programme was developing the GLS and identifying new 
services to enhance the PSISS including the Identity Verification Service.  In a 
March 2005 report to the Executive, the provider identified opportunities to 
leverage the DIA’s Evidence of Identity Framework and identity processes to 
create a working identity verification service for use across the public sector (State 
Services Commission, 2005).  The Executive gave approval to proceed with design.  
The programme engaged Audit New Zealand to conduct quality assurance of the 
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Authentication Programme and associated procurement processes (State Services 
Commission, 2005).   
The provider completed GLS development in 2006, creating a shared service to 
issue and manage logons for clients whose customers perform authenticated 
transactions online.  The GLS was the first service produced by the Authentication 
Programme and was intended to provide a single login for multiple systems without 
exchanging identity data between clients.  The provider promoted the GLS as 
improving ease of use, security and convenience for customers, affordable access 
to high quality authentication services for clients and significant cost savings for 
the Executive (State Services Commission, 2006a).   
A memorandum of understanding was agreed between SSC and the Privacy 
Commissioner (Parliament, 2007).  Privacy commission staff were involved in 
PSISS design and performed privacy impact assessments (State Services 
Commission, 2006a).  The GLS project had placed particular emphasis on privacy 
requirements, leading to completion of an independent privacy impact assessment.  
Emphasis was also placed upon security resulting in several third-party security 
reviews.  The stated intention was for privacy impact assessments and security 
reviews to be undertaken for each subsequent release (State Services Commission, 
2006a).  The ongoing nature of assessments and reviews indicated a commitment 
to security and privacy over time.   
The provider developed a business model for GLS which was presented to the 
programme steering committee.  They approved inclusion in the Authentication 
Programme business case for the next phase.  The business case covered the next 
two years and was submitted to the Executive after consultation with 14 potential 
clients and Treasury.  The case proposed rolling out GLS as an all-of-government 
service and the collaborative detailed design of the IVS which would be led by 
DIA.  The business case and funding were approved by the Executive in June 2006 
(State Services Commission, 2006a).  As part of business case approval the 
Executive “agreed that no department should make an investment in its own 
identity verification capability, outside of the Identity Verification Service, even if 
funded from within baselines or depreciation, without first consulting SSC and the 
Treasury and seeking Cabinet approval” (State Services Commission, 2007). 
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Although the business case and funding were approved, operational issues delayed 
the Authentication Programme leading to a request for Executive approval to 
transfer $672,000 to 2006/7 indicating progress was slower than planned which 
may have delayed the release of the PSISS (State Services Commission, 2006a).  
As at 30 June 2006 GLS had been built and tested and was ready to be moved to a 
production environment.  At that stage clients could integrate their services with 
GLS (State Services Commission, 2006a).   
The Authentication Programme continued to design IVS which was conducted 
collaboratively with DIA.  All major design work was reported as complete by 
January 2006, which provided cost estimates for the business case.  An independent 
privacy impact assessment was conducted for IVS to preserve customer privacy.  
Although the major design work was reported as completed there was ongoing 
design work on IVS until June 2006 (State Services Commission, 2006a).   
The e-government strategy was revised, with an increased focus upon enabling 
transformation, submitted to the Minister of State Services in September and 
endorsed by the Executive in October 2006.  The Minister endorsed the updated 
strategy and encouraged “all New Zealand’s State Services agencies to use the 
Strategy as their road map for e-government initiatives” (State Services 
Commission, 2006b, p. 2).  The strategy was promoted as a tool that clients could 
use “to help shape their individual or sector work programmes to move government 
towards the goals” (State Services Commission, 2006b, p. 15), rather than the 
strategy acting as a prescriptive or enforced governance mechanism. 
On 31 March 2007 GLS was integrated with SSC’s shared workspace service.  The 
shared workspace was “a collection of over 150 individual collaboration 
workspaces being accessed 5,000 times each month by State servants, vendor staff 
and other members” (State Services Commission, 2007, p53).  SSC reported that 
two clients had successfully performed testing of GLS in the production 
environment but did not state which clients they were in the annual report.  
GLS was reported to the Cabinet Committee on Government Expenditure and 
Administration as successfully tested and implemented on 18 July 2007.  The 
project was reported as delivered within the agreed scope, quality and budget.  
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Although the project was reported as successfully delivered there were 
implementation issues identified in the SSC annual report.  The implementation 
took longer than expected, resulting in Executive approval to carry forward $3.696 
million unspent funding to 2007/8.  There was additional support from the 
Executive as the appropriation for the output class was increased by $7.766 million 
due to the Executive decision to fund the Authentication Programme and roll out 
GLS across the public sector (State Services Commission, 2007). 
In 2007 the Executive instructed the public service and relevant parts of the state 
sector to use the PSISS, then known as the government login and IVS, for 
authentication (State Services Commission, 2007).  In 2008 the Executive issued a 
direction for crown agents to use all-of-government authentication shared services 
including logon and IVS (Parliament, 2008).  GLS was released following a suite 
of authentication standards that were intended to improve the quality and 
consistency of client authentication (State Services Commission, 2006a).   
Between 2001 and 2006 there were no quantifiable measures found in annual 
reports.  Respondents characterised performance as delivering the PSISS.  On 30 
June 2006 the GLS had been built and tested and was ready to be moved to a 
production environment, meaning clients could integrate their services with GLS.  
The performance target for the PSISS was set as getting up to six clients to 
implement the PSISS in the 2007/08 financial year (State Services Commission, 
2008a). 
The PSISS had been released, although it had taken seven years from the creation 
of the e-government programme to delivery into production.  An investigation was 
undertaken into shared services in New Zealand with inputs based on the shared 
services experiences in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.  Based on the 
findings of the investigation the Cabinet Policy Committee noted on 4 April 2007 
there was little scope for efficiency gains from shared services.  The committee 
directed the State Services Commissioner to work with Treasury and DPMC to 
report back by 31 July 2007 on “how sharing good practice processes and systems 
and a requirement to review shared services opportunities may be implemented, 
and the feasibility, and likely costs and potential benefits, of a shared services 
approach for small agencies” (Cabinet Office, 2007, p2). 
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The State Services Commissioner used his overview section in the 2007 SSC 
annual report to highlight the perceived shared services successes he had delivered.  
In relation to the Authentication Programme he stated “I am pleased to report that, 
in the last year, there has been significant progress on the All-of-government 
Authentication Programme’s workstream, with the launch of a suite of 
authentication standards and the roll-out of the Government Logon Service” (State 
Services Commission, 2007, p6).   
The Commissioner believed legislative reform provided him a mandate to compel 
client adoption and increase the system-wide focus for the state service through the 
introduction of the Development Goals for the State Services (State Services 
Commission, 2007).  Having the Commissioner lead the e-government 
programme, sector goals and oversee monitoring of ICT programmes appears to 
have blurred the lines of accountability.   
The SSC produced the New Zealand E-Government 2007: Progress Towards 
Transformation report to present their vision for e-government and promote 
success to date.  The view presented in the report was “major developments in e-
government are pointing to the beginnings of a paradigm shift in how agencies 
conduct their business.  Both the GLS and GSN have been built and are in 
operation, and agency uptake is gaining momentum” (State Services Commission, 
2008b, p79).   
The progress report was positive about the future, however there were concerns 
about current performance.  Performance targets were set for 2007/8 and 2008/9.  
These targets were for client agreement to adopt the PSISS and for integration of 
client systems with the PSISS.  The provider failed to meet performance targets 
based on client agreement or integration.  Interestingly although results were 
published, performance targets for the first year do not appear to have been 
specified, raising questions about whether targets had been previously agreed 
(State Services Commission, 2008a, 2009).   
The authentication programme was renamed igovt in 2008.  The programme was 
described as “collaboration to develop system infrastructure” indicating a system 
asset view rather than seeing the services as information systems (State Services 
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Commission, 2008b, p46).  The intent of the programme was to provide improved 
services to New Zealanders whilst lowering the cost of service provision to the 
Executive by building one service that could be consumed by multiple clients.  The 
GLS became the igovt logon and IVS became the igovt Identity Verification 
Service (Department of Internal Affairs, 2010).   
The programme continued investigating future services including the Government 
Online Attribute Assertion Meta System (GOAAMS) and an organisational 
authentication service, to varying levels of success.  GOAAMS was a project that 
developed a service to enable customers to use the authoritative data held about 
them online and in real-time, removing the need to submit the same information 
multiple times across government systems.  GOAAMS was successfully integrated 
with the PSISS and won design awards (Liberty Alliance, 2007).   
The provider collaborated with the Ministry of Economic Development to create 
the organisational authentication service.  This service was investigated but not 
progressed, until years later as the New Zealand Business Number (NZBN) (State 
Services Commission, 2008a; Department of Internal Affairs, 2019c).   
SSC was developing new ideas for services but struggling with delivering to 
performance goals.  The Executive agreed to changes to the delivery of e-
government in New Zealand.  Under these changes the leadership function for e-
government would stay at SSC with the operations function transferred to the DIA 
by July 2009.  As a result, in July 2008 the ICT branch at SSC was split in two.  
The first part was a leadership function for the Government Chief Information 
Officer, and the second the operations function to run shared services called 
Government Technology Services (Walter, 2009).   
Although there were concerns about the authentication programme the 
performance of the GSN was worse as “it had become clear by mid-2008 that take-
up by public sector agencies was well short of expectations and that the projected 
gap between expenditure and revenue, at some $700,000 per month, was not 
financially sustainable” (Walter, 2009, p. 11).  Questions were asked about the 
contractual arrangements undertaken in the development of the GSN, which 
resulted in the Executive instigating the Walter Review.  Although the inquiry was 
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completed in March 2009 the decision had already been made “on 3 February 2009 
the GSN project would be discontinued and participating agencies would be moved 
to a new provider in the private sector” (Walter, 2009, p. 11).  Discontinuing the 
GSN and moving e-government services to DIA were not the only changes 
underway.   
New Zealand had an election in November 2008 that resulted in a change to a 
National party led government.  The messaging from the new Executive was there 
would be Budget deficits for the next 10 years that could reach $12 billion.  The 
Finance Minister Bill English told the Public Sector to make savings or expect 
“significant and long-lasting change that would be forced upon it” (Small, 2009c, 
p. 1).   
One of these changes was the transfer of both the leadership and operations 
functions of the e-government programme to DIA.  In a press release on 7 October 
2010 the Internal Affairs Minister the Hon Nathan Guy announced “the functions 
of the Government Chief Information Officer would transfer to the Chief Executive 
of the Department of Internal Affairs” (Duncan, 2010, p. 1).  This meant the 
leadership and operations functions were transferred from SSC to DIA, although 
SSC retained their major ICT project monitoring function, which was confirmed 
with the 2011 release of the guidance for monitoring major projects and 
programmes document (State Services Commission, 2011). 
The Executive concluded that public sector ICT was inefficient and needed to 
change.  A 2008 survey indicated the $2 billion spent on public sector ICT was 
fragmented with duplicate infrastructure and limited use of online service 
provision.  Clients were avoiding shared service adoption, which was reinforced 
through the current accountability model between Ministers and chief executives 
that encouraged siloed operational ICT management (Cabinet Office, 2010b, p. 8). 
The Executive acted to address these issues by initiating a directive for shared 
services adoption, legislative change and the introduction of new directions and 
priorities for government ICT.   
On the 22nd of September 2010 the Executive directed public service agencies to 
adopt PSISS through the Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee 
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(Cabinet Office, 2010a).  Any client wishing to opt out, or taking action to 
undermine the programme, would be reported to the Expenditure Control 
Committee (Brownlee, 2010).  The directive appeared to reduce the coverage of 
the previous 2007 and 2008 Executive directives, particularly for crown agents. 
Legislative change was planned with the initiation of the Electronic Identity 
Verification Bill (EIVB) (2012) and the Identity Information Confirmation Bill 
(IICB) (2012).  The EIVB was intended to enable secure interactions between 
customers and clients, the IICB was intended to confirm customer identity 
information.  Both pieces of legislation increased the scope of the PSISS to include 
private sector clients.   
The Executive approved the replacement of the 2006 eGovernment Strategy with 
the Directions and Priorities for Government ICT, which was government policy 
to direct the ICT activities of the State Service (Duncan, 2010).  The public service 
and crown entities were invited to align their ICT strategies with the directions and 
priorities (Cabinet Office, 2010a).  Client chief executives were directed to use 
PSISS and work with lead agencies to ensure the PSISS met client needs.  The 
Executive charged DIA with creation of a common ICT capability roadmap to 
guide client ICT planning and implementation (Cabinet Office, 2010b).   
In response to the new directions and priorities DIA and SSC collaborated to 
produce a poster outlining the Directions and Priorities for Government ICT, based 
on the premise “ICT is central to the delivery of lower cost, higher quality public 
services” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2011b, p1).  This poster provided six 
directions for government ICT intended to deliver a future state to overcome issues 
identified in the Directions and Priorities Cabinet paper.  In July 2012 public 
service chief executives were directed to “secure GCIO agreement to their strategic 
ICT plans and investment intentions” (Cabinet Office, 2012, p. 3). 
The monitoring of major ICT projects changed to monitoring major projects and 
was undertaken by the State Services Commission, which is interesting as they 
were monitoring ICT programmes when the e-Government programme failed.  
SSC replaced the 2001 project monitoring guidelines with Guidance for 
Monitoring Major Projects and Programmes in 2011, which incorporate the 
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gateway review process (State Services Commission, 2011).  Public service 
departments were directed to follow the guidance by Cabinet.  Crown Agents were 
expected to implement a similar level of assurance for their projects.   
Shared services were identified as a tool for integrated service delivery across the 
public sector.  The PSISS had a role to connect clients and customers through 
secure identity provision.  Performance targets changed to measure adoption for 
both clients and customers.  The provider initially struggled to meet performance 
targets for new customers and clients (Department of Internal Affairs, 2010).   
In 2010 the provider was set a target of 250,000 customer logons issued in addition 
to client services connecting to the PSISS.  The result for 2010 was just over 50,000 
customer logons which represented around one fifth of the target.  Only 16 clients 
integrated with the PSISS which was short of the target of 24 integrations.  After 
the failure to issue the specified number of customer logons the target for 2011 was 
decreased from 250,000 to a range of 100,000 to 250,000.  The provider exceeded 
this range but still fell short of the original target.  The number of clients connecting 
target was also dropped from 24 to a range of 15 to 25, which the result of 12 
connecting clients failed to meet.  Performance mechanisms for 2011 were 
changed altering provider accountabilities, resulting in the new logins exceeding 
the new low target, although the integrations did not reach the new target.  The 
integration performance mechanism was changed again to clients agreeing to 
integrate and the target dropped again from 15 to 10.  The new targets for 
measuring clients were met in both 2012 and 2013, however they would not have 
met the previous targets, indicating the shifting of goalposts was occurring.  The 
provider met the revised customer login target for 2012 and surpassed both old and 
new figures with the rate almost trebling in 2013.  The annual report attributed most 
of the increase (around 300,000) to the introduction of the studylink service used 
by students to apply for funding.  A one off ICT based service performance target 
of 99% availability was also met (Department of Internal Affairs, 2011a, 2012, 
2013a).   
The provider had a vision for the igovt service as a one-stop-shop for electronic 
identity verification, which was enhanced by expanding the PSISS into the private 
sector through legislative reform and partnership with New Zealand Post.  The 
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partnership was intended to maximise efficiencies for the Executive and increase 
adoption of shared services by both customers and clients.  NZ Post would provide 
an address service that could integrate with the PSISS enabling sharing of address 
information with clients for customer approved services.  Customers would be 
provided with access to Post shops where they could sign up for verified identities 
and get photographs taken for their accounts.  NZ Post would also engage with 
private sector clients to adopt the PSISS, although this was dependent upon new 
legislation being enacted (Department of Internal Affairs, 2011a). 
The Electronic Identity Verification Act (2012) and the Identity Information 
Confirmation Act (2012) were both passed on 18 December 2012.  The new 
legislation opened the PSISS to private sector adoption.  The intent was for more 
clients to integrate their services with the PSISS with the belief this would increase 
customer adoption.  The Executive enacted the Electronic Identity Verification 
Regulations (2013) in February 2013 defining which clients could provide services, 
for how long and specified privacy related information about duration and retention 
relating to electronic identity credentials.  Private sector clients were invited to join 
in a controlled fashion, whereas the public sector was directed to join.  Further 
legislative reform followed to extend the coverage of the Cabinet mandate.  The 
mandate was extended to incorporate 27 selected Crown Entities and District 
Health Boards, meaning a total of 60 public sector clients were covered 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2014a).  Executive directions were issued under 
the Crown Entities Act 2004 section 107 to adopt the PSISS as a “mandatory ICT 
common capability” (Parliament, 2014, p. 3).  Crown agents not listed were 
instructed “to avoid doubt, that earlier direction continues to apply” meaning they 
were still subject to the 2008 directive and expected to use the PSISS (Parliament, 
2014, p. 3).    
The Executive built on legislative reforms by endorsing the Better Public Services 
(BPS) programme.  In March 2012 the Prime Minister announced ten results 
expected as part of BPS.  Result 10 was designed to improve customer interactions 
with government as shown in the Result 10 outcome “New Zealanders can 
complete their transactions with government easily in a digital environment” and 
Result 10 target “by 2017 an average of 70% of New Zealanders’ most common 
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transactions with government will be completed in a digital environment” 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2014b, p. 6).   
In 2013 the GCIO released the ICT Strategy and Action Plan 2017 which set new 
targets for the PSISS, and wider cross-sector ICT (Department of Internal Affairs, 
2013b).  The strategy was a response to the Executive Directions and Priorities for 
Government ICT (Cabinet Office, 2010b), and SSC’s Better Public Services 
programme (State Services Commission, 2018), promoting a “culture of 
collaborative leadership and operation” through new collaborative cross-sector 
governance arrangements (Department of Internal Affairs, 2013b, p. 24).  The 
strategy was overseen by a Cabinet committee with a review planned for 2015 “to 
ensure that it remains relevant and incorporates emerging technologies and 
practices” (Dunne, 2015, p. 1).  The Executive used the 2017 strategy to charge the 
Government Chief Information Officer, who was also the chief executive at DIA, 
with leading the transformation of all-of-government ICT to provide system-wide 
assurance, delivery of integrated online services and business savings of $100 
million dollars per year by 2017 (Department of Internal Affairs, 2013b). 
The DIA was appointed lead agency for Result 10 of BPS making the department 
accountable for "achieving the target of 70% of New Zealanders' most common 
transactions with government being completed in a digital environment by 2017" 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2012, p10).  In January 2013, a Digital Service 
Council was established with representatives from participating clients, to provide 
governance of the Result 10 programme and champion change as a client and 
across the public sector (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014b).  The PSISS was 
identified as contributing to the delivery of Result 10 and was rebranded RealMe 
with the new brand launched on 1 July 2013 (Department of Internal Affairs, 
2013a).   
In December 2013 the Executive issued a directive under the Crown Entities Act 
requiring a group of crown agents to gain approval from the GCIO before finalising 
or implementing ICT strategic plans or investment decisions.  This direction 
enforced the “Government Chief Information Officer’s functional mandate for 
leadership of government ICT” (Parliament, 2014, p. 3) providing coverage across 
“60 public sector agencies and district health boards” (Dunne, 2017a, p. 2).  
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Although the directive reinforced the GCIO functional mandate it did not provide 
the GCIO with a mandate across the state services, or even across all crown agents.    
The provider led a Service Innovation Group (SIG) which oversaw the collective 
efforts of eight group members who were clients participating in delivery of Result 
10 (Department of Internal Affairs, 2015b).  The SIG developed the Result 10 
Blueprint as government policy for online customer service delivery.  The blueprint 
consisted of “10 priority actions aimed at putting the customer at the centre, 
increasing system capability, and supporting New Zealanders through the digital 
transition” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014a, p. 6).  The Executive endorsed 
the blueprint in June 2014 and set the expectation that public sector clients align 
their customer facing online service activities with the blueprint (Department of 
Internal Affairs, 2014a).  The expectation was that the provider and the Result 10 
clients, as members of the SIG, would work with clients to develop and implement 
an adoption plan for the RealMe login and verified account services.  This plan was 
required to consider how RealMe could enable more digital transactions and 
federated service delivery.  The SIG was expected to prioritise PSISS 
enhancements including mobile enablement to encourage increased client adoption 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2014b).  The Result 10 blueprint was explicitly 
linked to the PSISS through Blueprint Action 5, “Adopt RealMe and deliver 
integrated digital services” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014b, p. 42).   
The provider believed increased adoption of RealMe would “drive uptake of digital 
transactions by promoting trust and confidence in transacting digitally” 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2014b, p. 43).  The push began to increase private 
sector client adoption.  The rebranded PSISS was sold as a tool for banks to comply 
with anti-money laundering legislation (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014a).   
The previous focus on New Zealand citizens as customers changed to “include all 
individuals who are customers, or potential customers, of New Zealand 
government services.  This includes New Zealand citizens living overseas, 
immigrants and visitors to New Zealand” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014b, 
p. 13).  Customers were able to adopt two services, a RealMe login and a RealMe 
verified account.  The RealMe login provided the ability for customers to use the 
same username and password to access a range of client online services.  Services 
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that required additional security were delivered through the provision of a unique, 
one-time RealMe code which could be sent to a mobile phone or generated by a 
hardware token.  The RealMe verified account allowed customers to securely 
release verified information about themselves like their identity and address to 
clients to prove who they are or where they live.  The RealMe verified account 
required the customer to first prove who they are, by providing an approved form 
of identity information and having their photograph taken at a participating NZ 
Post shop (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014a). 
The Executive approved a refresh of the strategy and action plan in 2015 with a 
drive towards clients increasing the adoption of public cloud services which was 
expected to reduce the cost of public sector ICT.  The performance target for Result 
10 remained unchanged.  The PSISS continued to be overseen by a Cabinet 
committee and sector programme assurance (Dunne, 2015).   
In 2015 the Executive issued a Cabinet minute changing public sector leadership 
roles.  Treasury were provided system leadership for investment management and 
GCIO was confirmed as functional leader for government ICT.   
Project guidance and monitoring, including the gateway review process, was 
moved to Treasury and the 2011 guidance was replaced by the 2017 guide for 
Managing Benefits from Projects and Programmes (2017).  Cabinet empowered 
Treasury to lead the government’s investment management system which 
effectively set the enforceable boundary for the new project guidance as all state 
services, with exceptions including Tertiary Education Institutions and school 
boards (Cabinet Office, 2015). 
Use of the term functional leader appears significant as it placed the GCIO under 
the authority of the State Services Commissioner.  “Functional leaders means those 
individuals or business units appointed by the State Services Commissioner to give 
effect to functional leadership” (Cabinet Office, 2015, p. 3), signalling a shift as 
the ICT Strategy and Action Plan did not mention the relationship with SSC.  The 
authorising parties were the Minister of Internal Affairs and GCIO.   
Progress was presented against the Result 10 target for 2017, although interim 
targets were only presented once in the 2015/16 annual report  where the provider 
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had reached 50.7% which was close to the interim target of at least 53% and the 
provider believed results were “on-track to support achievement of the Result 10 
target” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2016, p. 139).   
The PSISS was recognised as a privacy enhancing service with the award of the 
Privacy Trust Mark by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in 2018 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2018a).  The provider began releasing customer 
services that leveraged the inherent security and privacy provided by the PSISS 
including services that were designed to connect a group of online services around 
a customer life event like birth (SmartStart) and death (End of Life).  These two 
services acted as an entry point for other online services and required a PSISS 
account to gain access.  SmartStart was launched in December 2016 and won four 
online service awards.  SmartStart had been accessed 98,000 times by June 2017 
and 227,000 times by June 2018.  The end of life service was introduced in late 
2017 and had been visited 31,000 times by June 2018 (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2018a).   
The Executive created a new ministerial portfolio for Government Digital Services 
(GDS) in 2017, signalling the importance of digital services to New Zealand.  The 
GDS vision was all New Zealanders will thrive in a digital world.  The provider, 
and PSISS, had a role in supporting the new portfolio’s priorities including digital 
inclusion, the national digital strategy and customer rights including privacy and 
security (Department of Internal Affairs, 2018a).    
The Executive reviewed the PSISS results from October 2016 to March 2017 and 
announced that Result 10 performance targets were on track to be delivered as 
“agency projections give us confidence that the target of an average of 70 per cent 
of New Zealanders' most common transactions with government being completed 
in a digital environment will be met by the end of 2017” (Dunne, 2017b, p. 1).  The 
performance targets were refreshed for another four years to 2021 so “by 2021, 80 
per cent of the transactions for the twenty most common public services will be 
completed digitally” (Dunne, 2017b, p. 6).  Although new targets were set the 
Executive had not been advised which services would be included in the 20 most 
common services to be measured (Dunne, 2017b).  This was done in the absence 
of a new ICT Strategy to replace the Strategy and Action Plan.   
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Progress to the 70% target was presented as 58% for June 2017.  In the 2017/18 
DIA Annual Report, for the year ended 30 June 2018, the performance results were 
reported as 65.7% of New Zealander’s government transactions were completed in 
a digital environment.  The provider did not reach the 70% target set for Result 10 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2018a).   
A new Strategy for a Digital Public Service was released in November 2019.  In 
this strategy the Minister of Government Digital Services states “our public service 
is already trusted and highly regarded as a global leader in digital government” 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2019c, p. 2), although “foundations that could 
better support New Zealanders in dealing with government, such as digital identity 
and informed consent tracking, are patchy or not present” (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2019c, p. 17).   
Time Series 
Date Event Comment on Event 
Late 1990s Early consultation on 
identity service 
In the late 1990s the SSC investigated the 
use of shared services in the public 
sector.  They concluded that shared 
services could provide support functions 
more efficiently. 
May 2000 SSC published the e-
government vision 
The e-government vision provided a 
strategic vision for ICT in the Public 
Sector.   
July 2000 e-government 
programme established 
The Executive established the e-
government programme in July 2000 to 
deliver the vision.  
2000/1 State Services 
Commissioner set up 
the e-Government Unit 
The State Services Commissioner took 
the lead on shared services in New 
Zealand establishing the e-Government 
Unit to deliver the programme.   
2001 SSC role monitoring 
major ICT projects   
Publication of guidelines for managing 
and monitoring public sector ICT projects 
in 2001 confirmed SSC monitoring role. 
2001 e-government strategy SSC released the initial E-government 
Strategy in April 2001.  The mission of 
the strategy was to make the internet the 
dominant means access to government by 
2004.  
2001 Governance Advisory 
Board 
The Commissioner set up a governance 
Advisory Board whose role was to advise 
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the Commissioner on the direction of the 





In addition to leading the development of 
PSISS for the public sector SSC was 
required to perform a monitoring function 
on major ICT projects.   
June 2003 SSC published the 
revised e-government 
strategy 
The e-government strategy was revised 
by the provider and ratified by the 
Executive in June 2003.   
June 2003 The PSISS business 
case was approved for 
Authentication  
The Executive approved the 
authentication programme business case 
for design and delivery of an 
authentication system for people and 




The Executive set up 
legislative reform and 
empowered the 
Commissioner  
Amendment to the Public Finance Act 
1989 provided the ability for multi-output 
appropriations.  The amendment to the 
State Sector Act provided the State 
Services Commissioner a wider remit 
across the government.  The Crown 
Entities Act required use of all-of-
government services and compliance 
with directions.   
2005 State service 
development goals 
The SSC launched the Development 
Goals for the State Services which 
identified system-wide changes required 
to advance the Executive vision.  Clients 
were expected to assist in the delivery of 
these goals.   
2005 Identity Verification 
Service 
Executive approval to leverage DIA’s 
Evidence of Identity Framework and 
identity processes to create a working 
identity verification service for the sector.  
2005 Independent Audit Audit New Zealand conducted quality 
assurance of the Authentication 
Programme and the procurement 
processes.   
2006 GLS developed The SSC completed development of the 
Government Logon Service.  The GLS 
provided a single login for multiple 
systems without exchanging identity data 
between clients.   
2006 Delay to delivery  Operational issues delayed the 
Authentication Programme leading to a 
request for Executive approval to transfer 
$672,000 to 2006/7 financial year.   
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June 2006 GLS roll out model The provider developed a business model 
for the GLS in September 2005.  The 
business case and funding were approved 
by the Executive in June 2006. 
June 2006  Built and tested As at 30 June 2006 the GLS had been 
built and tested and was ready to be 
moved to a production environment.   
2006 Privacy and Security MOU with Privacy Commission to 
participate in service design.  
Independent privacy impact assessment 
and several third-party security reviews 
performed on GLS.     
2006 IVS Design  The IVS was designed collaboratively 
with DIA.  All major design work was 
reported as complete by January 2006.  
An independent privacy impact 
assessment was conducted to preserve 





The e-government strategy was revised, 
with an increased focus upon enabling 
transformation.  The Minister launched 
the revised strategy in November 2006. 
2007 GLS successfully tested 
and implemented 
The GLS was reported to the Cabinet 
Committee on Government Expenditure 
and Administration as successfully tested 
and implemented on 18 July 2007.  
Executive set the expectation that GLS 
would be adopted. 






Government Online Attribute Assertion 
Meta System implemented providing 
access to approved customer data across 
government systems.  Organisational 
authentication service investigated but 
not implemented. 
April 2007 Cabinet concerns Cabinet noted there was little scope for 
efficiency gains from shared services.  
SSC, DPMC and Treasury directed to 
report back by 31 July 2007 on shared 
services opportunities costs and benefits. 
2007 State Services 
Commissioner response 
to concerns 
The State Services Commissioner used 
the 2007 SSC Annual Report to highlight 
shared services successes including 
rollout of the GLS, his mandate and the 
role SSC would play delivering shared 
services in the future.   
2008 PSISS promoted as 
success by SSC  
The SSC produced the New Zealand E-
Government 2007: Progress Towards 
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Transformation which reported the GLS 
in operation and pointed to a paradigm 
shift in how clients operated.   
2007 IVS directive Executive approved IVS business case 
and required departments to use the IVS 
or seek Cabinet approval. 
2008-2009 Provider struggling to 
deliver performance 
targets   
Failed to deliver adoption targets 
 
2008 PSISS rebranded as 
igovt 
The Authentication Programme was 
renamed igovt in 2008.  The Government 
Logon Service became the igovt logon 
and IVS became the igovt Identity 
Verification Service.  
July 2008 Plan to move operations 
to DIA and keep the 
leadership role at SSC   
In July 2008 the provider ICT branch at 
SSC was split.  The leadership function 
was intended to stay at SSC with the 
operations function transferred to the 
Department of Internal Affairs in July 
2009.   
July 2008 Problems within the 
provider  
The GLS was not approved by the 
Executive for release until 18 July 2007, 
and it failed to meet performance targets 
for 2008.   
2008 Executive changed  New Zealand had an election in 
November 2008 that resulted in a change 
of Executive who forecast Budget deficits 
for the next 10 years.  The Finance 
Minister told the Public Sector to make 
savings or expect change to be forced on 
them.   
2009 GSN service failure  The GSN was not financially sustainable 
leading to the decision to move clients to 
a new provider in the private sector.  This 
damaged the reputation of the provider.   
2010 Executive direction  The Executive concluded public sector 
ICT was inefficient and needed to 
change.  A 2008 survey indicated $2 
billion spent on public sector ICT was 
fragmented with duplicate infrastructure 
and limited use of online service 
provision.   
2010 Directions and 
Priorities  
The Executive approved the replacement 
of the 2006 eGovernment Strategy with 
the Directions and Priorities for 
Government ICT.   
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2010 Performance targets 
changed to include 
customers as well as 
clients 
In 2010 the provider was set a target of 
250,000 customer logons, the provider 
delivered just over 50,000.  Client target 
was 24 clients connecting to igovt logon 





On 22 September 2010 public service 
agencies were directed by the Executive 
to adopt PSISS unless they had a 
compelling reason to opt out.   
October 
2010 
The PSISS leadership 
and operations 
functions transferred to 
DIA   
In a press release on 7 October 2010 the 
Internal Affairs Minister announced the 
provider leadership and operations 
functions including the GCIO role were 
transferred from SSC to DIA, although 
SSC retained their major ICT project 
monitoring function.   
2011 SSC role monitoring 
major projects 
reinforced 
Release of guidance for monitoring major 
projects confirmed SSC’s monitoring 
role.   
2011 Partnership with New 
Zealand Post  
The provider partnered with New 
Zealand Post to expand igovt adoption 
and maximise efficiencies in service 
delivery.  Post was to drive private sector 
PSISS adoption once supporting 
legislation was enacted. 
2011 Provider response to 
Directions and priorities 
DIA and SSC collaborated to produce a 
poster outlining the Directions and 
Priorities for Government ICT, making 
ICT central for delivery of lower cost, 
higher quality public services.  This 
poster provided six directions intended to 
deliver a future state that would 
overcome issues identified in the 
Directions and Priorities.  
2012 Better Public Services, 
Result 10 
In March 2012, the Prime Minister 
announced ten desired results as part of 
the Better Public Services programme.  
The Result 10 outcome is: New 
Zealanders can complete their 




New legislation was 
passed to enable private 
sector to adopt the 
PSISS 
The Electronic Identity Verification Bill 
and the Identity Information 
Confirmation Bill were passed on 18 
December 2012.  
2013 Lead agency The Executive charged the Government 
Chief Information Officer with leading 
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the transformation of all-of -government 
ICT to provide system-wide assurance, 
delivery of integrated online services and 
business savings of $100 million dollars 
per year by 2017. 
2013 Lead agency for Result 
10  
As the lead agency for Result 10 the 
provider became accountable for 
delivering 70% of the most common 
government transactions online by 2017. 
Jan 2013 New governance 
arrangements 
In January 2013, a Digital Service 
Council was established to govern the 
Result 10 programme and champion 






On 18 February 2013 the Executive 
passed regulations defining client 
participation, duration and retention for 
electronic identity credentials.  
June 2013 ICT Strategy and 
Action Plan 
The Government ICT Strategy and 




PSISS rebranded as 
RealMe 
The PSISS was rebranded RealMe with 
the new brand launched on 1 July 2013. 
2012-2013 Studylink linked to 
increased customer 
adoption  
New logon creation increased from 
171,317 in 2011/12 to 552,025 in 
2012/13 which was attributed to 300,000 
Studylink signups   
2014 The mandate was 
extended by legislative 
reform to include crown 
entity client adoption 
The Executive enacted legislation to 
extend the coverage of the GCIO 
mandate.  The ICT functional leadership 
mandate was extended to incorporate 27 
selected Crown entities and District 
Health Boards, meaning a total of 60 
public sector clients were covered. 
2014 Result 10 Blueprint and 
actions  
The provider developed the Result 10 
Blueprint which contained ten priority 
actions.  Cabinet endorsed the blueprint 
in early June 2014.  
2014 PSISS redefined for 
2014 
 
Two services were available for 
customers, a RealMe login and a RealMe 
verified account.  A RealMe login 
allowed people to use the same username 
and password to access a variety of 
participating online services.  A RealMe 
verified account let people who have 
verified certain information about 
themselves, such as identity and address, 
securely release this information online 
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for clients to prove who they are or where 
they live.  
2014 Customers redefined Customers redefined to include New 
Zealand citizens living overseas, 
immigrants and visitors to New Zealand.  
2014 Blueprint made direct 
link between Result 10 
and PSISS 
Result 10 Blueprint Action 5 required 
client adoption of RealMe and integrated 
digital services, which directly connected 
the blueprint to PSISS adoption.   
2014-16 Executive directions 
were issued to Crown 
Entities  
Executive directions were issued under 
the Crown Entities Act 2004 section 107 
to use all-of-government services  
2015 Revised Strategy  The ICT Strategy and Action Plan was 
refreshed in February 2015 and approved 
by the Executive.  
2015 Project Assurance 
moved to Treasury 
Project assurance moved to Treasury as 
part of investment management function.  
2016 Provider continued to 
struggle to meet 
performance targets   
The provider had an interim goal for 
Result 10 of at least 53% of transactions, 
the result was only 50.7%. 
2017 Executive Reporting  The Executive reviewed the PSISS 
results from October 2016 to March 2017 
and announced Result 10 performance 
targets were on track to be delivered. 
2017 Targets changed for 
Result 10 to 2021 
A new Result 10 target was agreed with 
ministers.  The 2021 target was 80 per 
cent of transactions for twenty common 
public services to be completed digitally. 
2017 New ministerial 
portfolio 
New Ministerial Portfolio of Government 
Digital Services established, provider 
expected to support portfolio priorities.   
2017 to 18 Introduction of new 
online services  
 
Introduction of new DIA online services 
including SmartStart and Te Hokinga O 
Wairua End of Life Service which 
required PSISS accounts for access. 
2018 Privacy Trust Mark The IVS was awarded the Privacy Trust 
Mark by the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner.  
2018 Failed to deliver Result 
10 target 
The provider failed to deliver the Result 
10 performance target of 70% of New 
Zealander’s government transactions 
completed in a digital environment.  The 
results in the 2017/18 Annual Report 
were reported as 65.7%.   
Table Ten: Time Series 
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PSISS Performance Information  
The provider was accountable, as an agent, to the Executive for the provision of 
the PSISS.  The New Zealand public sector accountability framework requires 
specification of performance targets and adequate performance measurement, to 
enable the Executive to hold an agent accountable for their performance.  This 
section presents the performance targets and results reported for the PSISS, which 
have been summarised from provider annual reports from 2001 to 2018.   
Table eleven shows the performance information drawn from annual reports when 
the SSC was developing the PSISS.   
Year Result 
2001 Established Governance Group, e-Government Unit and Programme 
2002 Updated e-government strategy.  Cabinet approval sought for policy 
framework.  Terms of reference for project design approved. 
2003 Executive agreed to detailed design and scoping of authentication 
system.  Revised e-government strategy. 
2004 Design completed, implementation of authentication programme to 
commence 1 July 2004. 
2005 Cabinet approval to develop Identity Verification Service and integrate 
with Government Logon Service.   Piloting GLS with three clients. 
2006 Tested GLS and ready for release 30 June 2006. 
Table Eleven: Performance Information 2001-20061 
Table twelve presents the performance information, including targets and results, 
after the release of the PSISS.  The targets have been combined into six groups 
which show the areas of focus and how they changed over time.  Cells shaded red 
show where targets have not been met, cells shaded green show where targets have 









Table Twelve:  Performance Targets and Results 2007-20182 
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Target 24 250,000                    
Result 16 52,219                      
Target 15 to 25 100000 to 250000
Result 12 239,330                    
Target 10 to 15 150000 to 250000
Result 12 171,317                    29.9
Target 10 to 15 150000 to 250000
Result 10 525,025                    36.2
Target 10 2 50000 to 100000
Result 13 4 15212 39.3
Target 16 10 75000 to 100000
Result 11 1 34253 45.3
Target 16 10 75000 to 100000 53
Result 11 5 123400 52.2
Target 16 5 150000 to 175000
Result 17 4 137175 59.9
















In Chapter five we reviewed changes to PSISS governance arrangements covering 
the period 1999 to 2019 as a narrative evidenced from document analysis.  This 
narrative presented a perspective on PSISS governance derived from official, 
documented accounts.  Changes to governance arrangements, and supporting 
governance mechanisms, are presented to provide insight into who, based on 
official documents, was performing governance and what interaction occurred 
between parties.  The reported roles and interactions provide a point of reference 
for the grounded practitioner narrative (Chapter six) and an input for comparison 
with practitioner perspectives (Chapter seven) and theoretical integration (Chapter 




Chapter Six. Analysis: A Grounded Practitioner Narrative 
The narrative in this chapter was developed from the analysis of participant 
interviews to gain an understanding of the phenomenon of PSISS governance 
through the eyes and words of participants.  Participant responses also provided an 
insight into the use of terms in practice and an understanding of how these terms 
changed over time.  Several terms were used by respondents to refer to services, 
the parties involved and their interactions which changed over time.  Although 
multiple terms were used over time, to make it easier for the reader I have used 
consistent terms where possible, however, the variety of terms used is reflected in 
direct quotes.  The glossary in Appendix A cross-references alternatives to the 
commonly used terms below.  This chapter begins by introducing the central 
category which was developed through grounded theory analysis of practitioner 
responses using the governance framework elements as sensitising concepts.  The 
central category was derived through the combination of sub-categories to provide 
a theoretical explanation of the research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
Categories 
The categories to emerge from my data were: Adoption, Governance focus, 
Accountability, Resistance and Risk.  These categories are not discrete but are 
lenses through which to observe participants views and derived viewpoints to 
enrich understanding as much as possible.  As such they have been artificially 
teased apart as they overlap and aspects will be present across categories.  Where 
these aspects are presented has been based on balancing between duplication and 
inclusion for understanding, meaning at times it may appear arbitrary to the reader 
to have an aspect or quote included in one category and not the other.   
Adoption.  The respondents used several words for parties agreeing to use, or 
actually using, the PSISS.  The term respondents most commonly used to describe 
these actions was adoption and therefore was used in this research.  Two forms of 
PSISS adoption were identified by respondents: client and customer adoption.  
Clients create digital services integrated with the PSISS that customers can 
consume.   
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Respondents referred to client adoption of the PSISS in two stages.  Firstly, an 
agreement to use the PSISS and secondly to provide customer facing services 
integrated with the PSISS as the identity source.  Clients started as public sector 
agencies, however, as the PSISS evolved private sector organisations began 
producing customer facing digital services integrated with the PSISS.  Customer 
adoption also occurred in two stages.  The first stage occurred when customers 
signed up for a PSISS account and the second when they used the account to 
consume client services.  Customers were initially identified in the early 
governance of the PSISS as New Zealand citizens, however, non-New Zealand 
citizens began consuming integrated digital services, for example foreign people 
using a digital immigration service.   
The initially slow response of clients to adopt the PSISS led to two attempts to 
mandate client adoption.  The initial mandate was a directive issued by the State 
Services Commissioner.  The second mandate was an Executive mandate issued 
through a Cabinet minute.  The mandates created client resentment and not 
necessarily the response wanted by the Executive.  There were multiple barriers to 
adoption including lack of trust and concerns about integration and ongoing 
funding.  The Executive mandate eventually forced clients to adopt the PSISS 
however it led to downstream issues as customer adoption was reliant upon client 
services.   
Many respondents questioned whether use of a mandate would impact sector 
collaboration.  They saw sector collaboration as particularly important because the 
PSISS was dependent upon clients to create services integrated with the PSISS 
thereby increasing customer PSISS adoption to consume client services.  Some 
respondents were concerned about ongoing funding and whether that would affect 
the willingness of clients to adopt the PSISS.  They identified barriers to adoption 
that included integration requirements and a desire by the provider to drive 
adoption at the cost of service quality.   
Governance Focus.  Respondents identified an inconsistency in PSISS 
governance.  They believed the intention of the PSISS was to provide improved 
customer services and internal efficiencies for customer facing government 
services.  Some methods used to govern the PSISS were identified as conflicting 
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with the intended direction, particularly internal governance controls used to 
oversee PSISS implementation.   
Some respondents identified shared services as ‘system assets’ that provide public 
system value by enabling consumption of customer facing digital services.  The 
PSISS provides a shared identity service for integration with client services that 
can be digitally accessed by customers using their PSISS identity.  The respondents 
expressed views the PSISS had no actual public system value without customer 
facing digital services.  This view was in tension with the Executive expectation 
the provider would recover costs from clients.  Governance was perceived by 
respondents to have an internal focus upon the information system, including cost 
recovery for: the technology, programme and organisation providing the service; 
rather than focussing upon the wider public system benefits to clients and their 
customers.    
Accountability.  Some respondents raised questions about who was accountable 
for the delivery of services to clients and customers.  They also identified changes 
to accountability relationships over time.  These responses indicated a general 
confusion about the difference between accountability and responsibility, and who 
should be accountable to whom for what.  There were numerous respondent 
concerns about accountability between parties.  Clients were concerned the 
provider was not accountable for failure to deliver a service that met their needs, 
citing the movement of the e-Government Unit to DIA.  There were concerns that 
essentially the same people were running a service which clients were mandated to 
adopt.  The provider was unhappy that clients were not being held to account for 
non-adoption, even with the advent of the mandates.  There were questions about 
the applicability of horizontal accountabilities, particularly the ability to sanction 
non-performance.     
Risk.  The Executive authorised the provider to create the PSISS and provided SSC 
legislative authority to lead the sector with the ability to direct client adoption.  The 
provider was required to develop business cases for Executive approval before 
funding would be released and was required to report progress to the Executive.  
The provider had committed to meeting adoption targets and initially failed to do 
so, which introduced the risk of the PSISS being shut down by the Executive and 
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resulted in reduced central funding.  Clients were concerned about the ability of the 
provider to deliver the PSISS, particularly given funding constraints.  Clients 
believed premature adoption of the PSISS would expose them to risks of service 
failure or additional integration and running costs, so they avoided adoption which 
resulted in further pressure on the provider.   
Resistance.  Respondents identified client resistance to the PSISS that often 
manifested in passive forms.  Resistance was characterised as the ‘curse of the 
smiling faces’ through which clients paid lip service to the PSISS without 
committing to adoption.  Clients were frustrated by the perceived difficulty 
integrating with the PSISS and poor integration experiences reported by other 
clients.  Additionally, client resistance appeared to increase when the provider 
attempted to use a Cabinet mandate to compel client adoption.  Respondents 
believed client resistance was a barrier to collaboration which concerned them, 
particularly as the provider relied upon client services integrating with the PSISS 
to increase customer adoption.  Resistance was seen by respondents as contributing 
to the slow adoption of the PSISS and ongoing failure by the provider to meet 
performance targets.   
Central Category 
Using Corbin and Strauss’ method of grounded theory analysis I developed my 
central category using the five categories: adoption, governance focus, 
accountability, risk and resistance.  It was developed using a tool called process 
designed by Corbin and Strauss (2008) for exploring context through a sequence 
of evolving interactions.  In my analysis, I noticed that respondents referred to the 
process the PSISS went through either in terms of a software development lifecycle 
or a project management process.  For example Respondent 9 identified a “need for 
lifecycle development and tighter governance around build and review cycles.”  I 
inferred these respondents were trained in project management or software delivery 
and therefore sensitised to view the PSISS using these processes as a lens.  Further 
analysis of responses identified four stages for the PSISS.  
In the first stage the provider was exploring opportunities for shared services and 
settled on the concept of an identity solution.  This concept was created through 
consultation with public sector clients and manifested in a business case developed 
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for Executive approval.  The second stage occurred after business case approval 
whereby the provider was required to implement the PSISS based on the business 
case.  The PSISS required both client and customer adoption to realise the system 
benefits identified in the business case.  The third stage required the provider to 
work with clients to integrate their services with the PSISS, to enable customers to 
use the PSISS in stage four.  Clearly, without client services there would be no 
reason for customers to adopt the PSISS as they would not be able to use it to access 
any online services.  The provider therefore had to gain client adoption before 
customer adoption could occur.  These characteristics made for atypical 
information system governance arrangements because of these complex 
interdependencies between providers clients and customers. 
The four stages identified for my central category are: concept, implementation, 
client and customer.  
• Concept was used to describe the process of coming up with the idea and 
the plan for creation of the PSISS.   
• Implementation describes the process for putting the plan into effect 
through the actual creation and release of the PSISS.   
• Client denotes the adoption of the PSISS by clients for use in their online 
services that they supply to customers.   
• Customer involves customer usage of the PSISS to consume client 
services.   
The central category was used as a structure to present my grounded practitioner 





Figure Twenty: Grounded Practitioner Theory 
Concept 
The first phase is concept where the PSISS was envisioned and defined resulting 
in a business plan for the service.   
Adoption.  The provider had to sell clients on the concept and gain their backing 
for Executive approval.  As the PSISS had not been created there was no service 
for clients or customers to adopt.  Respondents identified collaborative 
development of the business case and subsequent Executive approval as a sign of 
early adoption, or at least client intention to use the PSISS when it was created.   
Governance Focus.  The PSISS started as a collaborative discussion between the 
provider and potential clients.  There were several unsuccessful early attempts to 
develop a shared identity service.   
In the 1990s SSC created interagency working groups to discuss online personal 
identity.  There was broad agreement around the need for identity but no real 
progress.   
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Later consultation across public sector Chief Information Officers led to 
discussions about the types of shared services that would make life easier for 
clients, leading to the creation of the e-Government Unit.  “When the e-
Government Unit became formalised it became the ICT branch at SSC” 
(Respondent 5).  The e-Government Unit was responsible for design, operation and 
governance of shared services, as well as persuading clients to adopt shared 
services.   
A concept was created acknowledging the increasing use of online channels for 
customer service delivery in the late 1990s.  It was agreed that identity verification 
was required for rich transactions between customers and government.  The e-
Government Unit developed a discussion paper to explore stakeholder views on a 
centralised identity service around the year 2000.  Focus sessions were run to gather 
clients who provided, or those who could provide, online services to adopt the 
PSISS.  There was “no formal governance except in the sense that the conceptual 
development was seen that everyone had an interest, so it was a general 
conversation” (Respondent 14).  Governance was put in place when discussions 
became more serious.  The business case was written and presented to a governance 
group consisting of SSC and DIA representatives.   
New Zealand Post produced a proof of concept solution on how the PSISS could 
work.  Based on the proof of concept the provider gained permission to proceed 
with design.  “Off the back of that policy and standards design was undertaken.  
Public consultation about privacy and government interaction was undertaken, 
resulting in the idea of the government logon service” (Respondent 3).   
SSC was charged with developing the PSISS concept into a reality.  “The bible was 
the business case for the particular scope and time” (Respondent 9).  The Executive 
signed off business cases.  The provider was accountable for delivery of business 
case benefits. “The business case showed a very strong business effect (asserting) 
that a centralised login and identity verification service was fundamental to use of 
online channels by the public sector” (Respondent 3).   
The PSISS was intended to start as a login service providing access to simple public 
sector services.  Customers would need to access services that required a greater 
176 
 
level of trust and the ability to use a range of services securely.  The provider was 
to develop these services later.   
Delivery of the business case would be performed by the provider reporting to the 
Executive.  Programme management disciplines were used to plan delivery of the 
PSISS, manage scope changes and develop metrics to measure delivery against 
programme objectives.  Gateways were established to provide line of sight from 
high level design to implementation.   
Vendors would be managed through contracts and service agreements where the 
vendor built what the provider told them to build and had no role in governance.  
Programme management was intended to focus upon time, cost and quality, 
however, there was a feeling among respondents the provider traded off delivering 
high quality to meet cost and delivery dates. 
Accountability.  Clients had accountability for their ICT and delivery of services 
to customers.  SSC identified opportunities for collaboration and joining up 
government.  In the mid-1990s inter-agency working groups discussed options for 
identity management.  At the time a Dublin Core identity wallet was the preferred 
option, however the New Zealand identity legislation made Dublin Core untenable.  
Sector identity services were shelved until the creation of the e-Government Unit 
at SSC.   
The Executive had approved the creation of the e-Government Unit, legislative 
empowerment and funding.  The Commissioner had sold the Executive the idea of 
shared services and was now accountable for “running the services, designing and 
governing the services and persuading people to use the services” (Respondent 5).   
Initially PSISS governance was predominantly vertical in nature consisting of 
departmental controls overseen by the State Services Commissioner who reported 
to the Executive.  The vertical nature of PSISS governance continued through 
concept and implementation.  When the PSISS was being explored there was no 
formal governance, except in the sense that public servants working on the PSISS 
in the e-Government Unit reported to the State Services Commissioner.   
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The provider was accountable for developing the idea of the PSISS and developing 
a business case for implementation that incorporated privacy.  The business case 
was expected to meet client and privacy requirements.  The consequence was the 
case would be approved, or it would not.  The Executive approved the PSISS 
business case with delivery to be overseen by a steering committee.  The provider 
became accountable for implementing the PSISS based on the approved business 
case.   
The provider was accountable to ministers.  This became challenging when parties 
in power changed after elections.  Accountability was enforced through existing 
vertical relationships.  Accountabilities for relationships between the Executive and 
provider were defined through performance agreements and the business case.  
Internally the provider relied upon employment contracts and project management.  
Clients were involved in the creation of the business case, however after sign-off 
had minimal accountabilities and little involvement.   
Risk.  Respondents viewed the concept stage as the Executive charging the 
provider to consult with clients to develop a business case that would define the 
creation of the PSISS.  As such respondents identified risks sitting with the 
Executive and provider.   
The Executive approved set up of the e-Government Unit and provided the State 
Services Commissioner with legislative authority and funding.  The potential 
failure of the e-Government Unit was identified as a reputational risk to both the 
provider and Executive.  To mitigate the potential for reputational risk the 
Executive required the provider to develop a business case for the creation of the 
PSISS.  The provider took on the role of venture capitalist as the PSISS had not 
been built, which was made more difficult as there were no comparable services.  
At the concept phase respondents identified the informal nature of governance as a 
risk.  The provider had to define the PSISS direction and bring public sector clients 
along with them.  The risk sat with the provider to come up with a cogent plan the 
Executive would agree to fund, the risk was mostly reputational.   
Much of the governance at this stage was informal as the provider and clients were 
unsure of what services they wanted.  Clients were consulted about a service that 
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did not exist, in New Zealand or overseas, and clients believed they would have the 
ability to choose to adopt or not.  The provider had no record of delivering ICT or 
shared services leading to thoughts that the service may come to nothing.   
The provider was focussed upon delivering an identity solution which needed to 
ensure privacy and security of customer information.  Early consultation occurred 
with the Privacy Commissioner to ensure the planned service did not run afoul of 
New Zealand privacy legislation.   
Respondents involved in the concept stage discussed several technical risks.  Much 
of the technology was in its infancy which made them expensive and cumbersome.  
Cost drove decisions changing risk profiles and technology options were passed 
over including secure access through two factor authentication.  The early focus on 
technology may have reduced the PSISS system outcome focus.   
Resistance.  Clients were involved in consultation and provided positive feedback 
on the concept phase.  The Executive required the provider to develop the business 
case, which was done collaboratively with clients.  Respondents did not identify 
any resistance from clients, customers or Executive as the concept of the PSISS 
was captured in a business case.  The business case was approved by the Executive, 
which was taken as endorsement.   
Implementation 
The second stage of the lifecycle is implementation where the process for putting 
the plan into effect and the actual creation, testing and release of the PSISS 
occurred. 
Adoption.  The PSISS development started in SSC where the login service was 
being built.  Datacom was the vendor contracted to build the PSISS.  The approach 
of the SSC was build the service and the clients will come.   
An anchor client was expected to be the Companies Office from the Ministry of 
Economic Development.  Requirements were developed, but the client pulled out.  
The provider was faced with a dilemma as it was perceived there was no value until 
adoption and the provider needed to integrate with client services to prove the 
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PSISS.  The provider identified two alternate pilot systems they could use to prove 
the PSISS and gain Executive sign off.   
The first system was the public sector shared workspace.  The shared workspace 
was only for public sector employee use and the PSISS added an additional login 
for existing users.  The second system was two factor authentication for Statistics 
New Zealand’s ATOM system which provided anonymised statistical data.  After 
initial setup and testing Statistics stopped their service.   
The PSISS was reported as proved to the Executive who approved release into 
production.  The provider now had to convince clients to integrate their customer 
facing services with the PSISS.     
Governance Focus.  The PSISS was created based on a general “need for 
something to happen around common identity and authentication” (Respondent 2).  
The PSISS “was seen to be a burgeoning requirement for identifying people online 
so they can interact with government online to reduce the burden of asserting 
identity across government, so using it for multiple purposes and applications.  It 
was defined by a core group at the SSC” (Respondent 15).   
Direction was not always clearly stated to respondents, with a feeling “there are a 
number of discussions behind the scenes about what should occur” (Respondent 
2).  The initial business case was developed by the e-Government Unit at SSC.  
Executive approval was provided however a respondent felt performance measures 
were unclear as structured “benefits management wasn’t there in the 1990s” 
(Respondent 5).   
The provider took security and privacy requirements extremely seriously.  “There 
could have been a completely different group of people who could have paid lip 
service to security and privacy that would have done it differently” (Respondent 
17).  There was debate about the use of legislation to govern the PSISS.  Initially it 
was believed compliance with the Privacy Act was enough, until it was realised 
that technology alone does not protect privacy in isolation.  The Privacy 
Commissioner became involved through the need to “ensure the identity PSISS is 
privacy enhancing,” (Respondent 5) and that the provider would “deliver an 
authentication service aligned with the Privacy Act” (Respondent 5).  The provider 
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worked with the Privacy Commissioner to develop an agreed policy that reflected 
privacy by design.  “New Zealand’s identity legislation made us shy away from a 
government supplied identity wallet.  We had a 1-day workshop with design and 
high-level principles for what is now the identity service” (Respondent 5).   
The design was lauded as a collaborative initiative with “everyone applying their 
minds to a common problem” (Respondent 14), a “common capability construct” 
(Respondent 4) for identity.  The PSISS was designed to provide secure customer 
identity and allow clients to digitally transform customer services.  Collaboration 
with the Privacy Commissioner provided the PSISS with an advantage as existing 
identity offerings did not meet the unique privacy settings in New Zealand as “it is 
hard to build a federated service that doesn’t leak identity data” (Respondent 11).  
The “Privacy Act prevents creation of a single identifier.  Federation needs a single 
identifier that spans federation” (Respondent 5).   
The provider had to overcome the challenge of providing a unique identifier to 
clients without passing customer identity.  The PSISS only passes a client specific 
identifier which means when customers “login using the PSISS credential this does 
not link you to a verified identity.  The client does not know who you are” 
(Respondent 5).  The PSISS “does not provide identity.  It provides a placeholder 
for credentials” as the PSISS “is essentially a unique key ring for a customer” 
(Respondent 5).   
A key ring is only useful if there are keys attached to it.  The challenge was to get 
clients to create services customers would want to get a key to access.  The more 
services the more keys, the greater utility and cost savings.   
Clients began to feel left out of the process.  There were concerns the provider 
would not meet their needs and was not listening.  There was a view the programme 
delivering the PSISS was more interested in technology delivery than ensuring the 
PSISS added system value.  Having their jobs reliant on the success of the service 
led to “perverse incentives” (Respondent 11) where “people involved in the 
programme think better to see it through than make corrections” (Respondent 11).   
In terms of enabling system outcomes the provider “become siloed and myopic” 
(Respondent 6).  The provider turned from a consultative approach to an internally 
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focussed developer.  The mantra was build it and they will come.  This extended 
into respondent comments about the design of the PSISS where “the people who 
built and designed it were guiding it based on their own beliefs” (Respondent 17).  
An internal focus was linked to people in the provider having to be seen to be doing 
something, “what we have done is reward people for producing products, they have 
become good at that” (Respondent 2).   
Governance was internally at SSC during PSISS implementation.  Initial reporting 
was based on programme management.  Service reporting was developed but 
“didn’t go anywhere” (Respondent 8).  The internal governance focus during 
PSISS implementation was identified in meeting the needs of the provider, delivery 
of the programme, building the information system and designing technical aspects 
of the PSISS.  Respondents were critical of the internal governance focus with the 
provider described as “bloated and arrogant,” (Respondent 9) the service was 
“buried in the delivery function” and the provider did “not have strategic focus” 
(Respondent 1).  To counter this some respondents believed governance groups 
“should have external representation” (Respondent 14).   
A pilot was conducted with NZ Post.  A senior manager disagreed with the 
approach and sent the PSISS to a competitive process, which Datacom won.  The 
PSISS was built by Datacom as there were no commercially available identity 
offerings.  PSISS development used a heavyweight waterfall approach to deliver 
what was viewed as a piece of national infrastructure.   
Datacom delivered most of the capability required, although there were concerns 
implementation did not meet the same standard as design, with the vendor offering 
“the A team set up and then getting the Z team to deliver” (Respondent 18).   
SSC had no experience delivering online services and struggled to find people with 
PSISS experience or a mix of technical and business skills.  Success for the 
programme was creating a PSISS.  The approach was criticised with some 
respondents advocating “going to market for a service proposition” (Respondent 
6).  
The PSISS was created believing build it and they will come, which was a little 
naive.  The provider attempted to engineer a technically perfect solution to avoid 
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risk, as it was safer to spend money to reduce perceived risks than to take a chance 
trying something new and introducing risk.  Risk aversion was part cultural and 
part driven by perceived client risk aversion with the intention of increasing 
confidence for adoption.  Respondents believed the time would have been better 
spent talking to clients to identify their needs.   
Respondents referred to technologists, indicating ICT professionals who were more 
interested in ICT than outcomes, who tended to “think in short cycles and have a 
poor understanding of economics making shared services more of an article of faith 
than we would like them to be” (Respondent 11).   
The technology focus was criticised for contributing to poor financial decisions and 
gold-plated solutions as “technologists love technology, but they are not financially 
literate” (Respondent 11).  Respondents identified a fascination with capital 
funding and replacement of existing technology, rather than considering alternative 
service provision models, like cloud services as technologists would lose the ability 
to purchase replacement technology for them to manage.   
The provider was shackled to an underfunded infrastructure and “caught in the 
previous investment cycle” (Respondent 6).  The choice to build the PSISS had 
burdened the provider with high sunk costs.  Respondents thought the PSISS 
should have been abandoned, however, “too many people with influence had their 
careers on the line” (Respondent 8). 
The provider bought in consultants to implement the PSISS which influenced the 
design.  “It was a $25-30 million-dollar project which spent too much on 
consultants, they had to have the best” (Respondent 8).  These consultants 
recommended best of breed solutions which were not always well implemented or 
supported.  In one instance the PSISS went down for a period due to the failure of 
a piece of supporting network technology which was a single point of failure.  
Production services were put at risk and preproduction was failing.   
The reliance on consultants reinforced the focus on technology, rather than 
outcomes.  “We are spending our money on high cost commodity.  Not on the 
valuable stuff.  We are focussed on the burden, so we can’t get our heads above 
water to resolve” (Respondent 11).  With a focus on the vehicle not the destination 
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the provider was making decisions through a technology lens rather than the needs 
of clients and customers.  By trying to make the information technology system 
more cost efficient they were not questioning whether it was the right vehicle for 
providing customer value.  The provider was seen to be “doing the wrong thing but 
doing it really well” (Respondent 11).  
The provider was comfortable designing and building the PSISS, however, they 
struggled with operations which included defining the levels of service and 
ensuring delivery met the defined levels.  Employees at the provider were rewarded 
for delivering technology.  They subsequently found it difficult to step out of their 
professional discipline as technologists.  Respondents were critical of the 
programme delivery stating “there was a poor handover to production” 
(Respondent 8).  They acknowledged there were issues with the quality of the 
PSISS stating “we have scored a few own goals digitally, and we need to aspire to 
do better” (Respondent 16).  The e-Government Unit imploded because they 
became the technology builders.  They used influence to get clients to commit to 
adoption.  SSC made commitments that clients did not support them with.  This 
undermined trust between the provider and clients, leading to bad blood.  The SSC 
could not get clients to come to the collective table, rather clients acted in their own 
interest.  
Respondents questioned “whether the technology is the right choice, some think it 
is cumbersome” (Respondent 9).  The PSISS took a long time to develop and when 
it was built clients did not have any services to integrate, leading to a longer delay.  
All this time the costs were being amortised and the provider was left with an 
albatross.  Treasury were asked to write off the costs but did not, resulting in 
provider resentment as the PSISS “would be financially viable if the debt was 
foregone” (Respondent 7). 
Some respondents indicated alternate methods may have alleviated the financial 
burden.  Twenty years ago there were “no signposts or previous solutions.  This 
was before online banking, before we expected and knew what we wanted to be 
private or shared.  Before Facebook” (Respondent 14).  Rather than having a large 
technology infrastructure burden the PSISS should rely upon existing public 
infrastructure, the “equivalent of a signature on a cheque” (Respondent 9).  These 
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respondents thought the provider running technology was inefficient and service 
quality could be improved through commercial or cloud offerings.  The PSISS was 
out of step internationally with other PSISS that were outsourced cloud offerings, 
for example taking a bank identity and using it as a credential.   
Respondents discussed numerous commercial identity offerings available today, 
when the PSISS was being designed there were not.  The provider was designing a 
federated identity for many stakeholders without signposts or existing solutions, 
which became exponentially difficult.  Alternate solutions are available today for 
a fraction of the price as “options in the market for identity & access offerings have 
increased dramatically” (Respondent 6).  Cloud offerings were also promoted for 
enabling quicker system changes to meet the changing needs of clients and 
customers as “turnaround time is reduced largely through the cloud” (Respondent 
11).   
Respondents identified other issues contributing to poor client and customer 
experience.  As the PSISS was one of the first shared services created for the New 
Zealand Public Sector there was always going to be a learning curve, however, 
there was a belief that the Executive did not tolerate failure or the ability to learn.  
Fear of failure encouraged issues to be buried or excuses to be made.  Upon 
reflection transparency was a key requirement for governance arrangements, with 
the provider learning “don’t bury things in the project it will only come back and 
bite you” (Respondent 9). 
Respondents tried to argue the PSISS had not completely failed “Has it delivered 
technically? yes.  For the money spent, has it provided value? no.  Adoption – no” 
(Respondent 8).  Similarly, “if you define success by the business case it has not 
been successful.  If you define success as does it work and does it do what it set out 
to do it was successful.  If you define success as living up to its potential, then 
definitely not.  The biggest failure is that it hasn’t won the hearts and minds of 
anyone” (Respondent 17).  The responses appear to reinforce the perception of 
provider focus on technology.  There was a belief the governance was designed by 
committee, without a customer focus. “I suspect by and large at a governance level 
defined by legislation, privacy etc.  Under the hood defined by technocrats and 
bureaucrats who provide direction” (Respondent 12).   
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The build it and they will come approach was criticised. “If done again, I would 
suggest a different approach to how it takes place.  Rather than a central agency 
there would be a co-design approach” (Respondent 2).  Many respondents believed 
the provider should have focussed upon the wider system benefits, rather than 
technology which is good for increasing efficiency or doing the wrong thing very 
well.  “The problem is people are too focussed on technology.  Technologists have 
focussed on technology making the change, it can be a catalyst or meet 
requirements, but it is only one of people, process and technology” (Respondent 
6).   
Clients were provided a shared identity service to integrate with their customer 
facing services, the problem appears to be the PSISS did not provide what they 
wanted.  “The GLS was flawed there was no way a client would use it because it 
would not provide enough verification.  It could not replace AD.  There were no 
rights attached, GLS was only yes or no for how many millions of dollars.  Because 
it didn’t provide the roles and rights with login it had no value.  The problem was 
adding a layer of complexity with no value” (Respondent 8). 
The suitability of SSC as provider was questioned.  “Anybody familiar with 
constitutional arrangement of the Executive branch will point out a contradiction 
of SSC having the ICT branch in that way.  That is why most of it was moved to 
DIA” (Respondent 5).   
Accountability.  The business case provided a governance frame which was 
mostly representatives from SSC.  Early governance arrangements relied upon 
existing vertical accountability relationships between the provider and Executive.  
The provider was required to report to members of the Executive through the public 
sector accountability framework.  Business cases needed to be approved and would 
set performance targets.  The Executive were accountable for approval of the 
business case authorising the PSISS.  Approval included financial approval to 
release funds to the provider.  The provider was required to report progress to a 
steering committee.  Ultimately the provider was accountable to the Executive who 
monitored the performance of the provider implementing the PSISS against the 
performance targets defined in the business case.   
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The PSISS was the first step in connecting personal information across public 
sector services for a “richer metasystem” (Respondent 17).  The needs of customers 
and clients were a focus for the PSISS during design.  “It was always about 
members of the public being able to control their data and an awareness that 
benefits would fall equally across the sector” (Respondent 14).  The GCIO at SSC 
set up a steering committee consisting of 4-5 public sector client chief executives 
who met monthly and reported quarterly to the Executive.  The steering committee 
oversaw the programme delivering the PSISS and was chaired by the Deputy 
Commissioner of SSC.  The steering committee provided a “collective view of the 
government entities” including client perspectives (Respondent 9).  Governance 
sub-committees were established to enable collaboration.  Clients were tasked with 
delivering customer facing services, however respondents believed Executive 
direction for client PSISS adoption had been lacking.   
Privacy was an important design consideration as the PSISS held personally 
identifiable information about citizens.  There was tension between the provider 
and security agencies when the provider pushed for legislative reform to 
institutionalise privacy as “without a specific law customers or police could request 
personal information” (Respondent 17).  Legislation was intended to increase trust 
of the provider by clients and customers.  The Privacy Commissioner participated 
in design to protect privacy and ensure compliance with the Privacy Act.   
The provider included public sector clients in the governance group.  Some clients 
participated in PSISS governance but did not adopt.  Client chief executives 
identified the strategic importance of the PSISS, although they were not helpful.  
They would attend meetings and obstruct progress.  Respondents believed the 
provider realised “different governance arrangements were required for different 
phases of the service lifecycle” (Respondent 6).   
Implementation of the PSISS was problematic as SSC were never service 
deliverers, however, they were expected to deliver a PSISS programme and a 
consensus across the public sector.  They came up with the concept of the PSISS 
and sold it as something the Executive should support and invest in.  What they 
struggled with was delivering adoption and culture change.  Respondents believed 
realising the vision required collaboration across the public sector, unfortunately 
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this did not appear to happen.  What they observed was technical people at the 
provider who want to just get on and deliver.   
During implementation the provider saw success as getting the money from the 
Executive to proceed.  Vertical accountability was much more straightforward than 
relationships with clients.  The provider was held accountable for delivering 
programmes and developing business cases.  Business cases were identified as “the 
Bible” (Respondent 9) for the scope of the PSISS and programme phases for 
delivery.  The provider was accountable for ensuring quality based on requirements 
captured in the business case, limiting the ability to change direction.   
Governance was internal to the SSC and accountability sat with line managers at 
the provider.  There were limited governance gates.  Performance was set and 
monitored by a governance group of senior managers from the provider.  
Employment contracts were quoted as forms of accountability, managers reporting 
to senior managers, to the Chief Executive who was accountable for performance 
targets and reporting to the Minister.  Progress against business cases were reported 
through programme management reports.  The PSISS was reviewed through 
contractual means and reported in the SSC annual report.   
The provider relied upon an external developer to build the PSISS.  Infrastructure 
delivery got entwined with the delivery of the service to customers.  Respondents 
believed the provider changed to delivering and supporting the technology, rather 
than benefits provided to customers.  Testing the PSISS against pilot systems 
became a technical exercise to ensure access and security, rather than ease of use 
or ease of integration with client services.  The PSISS was reported to the Executive 
as a success.  The Executive granted approval for the provider to release the PSISS 
and agreed client adoption performance targets.   
SSC had developed the PSISS and would be accountable for delivering adoption 
targets to the Executive.  When the PSISS was being introduced to clients “the 
structures and mechanisms for cross-government mechanisms were not there” 
(Respondent 17).  Feedback was mixed, coming from a range of stakeholders 
including public sector clients and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.  Clients 
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were expected to adopt the PSISS, however they could opt out of adoption.  The 
provider struggled to make the transition from developer to service delivery.  
Risk.  The PSISS was intended to enable government services to become customer 
centric.  A single access method for customers was preferable to having to 
remember individual accounts and passwords for each public sector client a 
customer could interact with online.  The PSISS was a proxy for national identity 
cards, which did not fit with the New Zealand culture.  By having an online identity, 
customer services could be provided without the need for a physical card or token.  
This provided surety about who the person was and what they could do online.   
The PSISS was a product of a different time with limited collaborative governance 
mechanisms and few federated identity solutions available.  The government took 
a risk and developed a bespoke system.  The provider led implementation of the 
PSISS, trusting their design with an attitude of “build and they will come” 
(Respondent 11).  The provider was criticised for excluding clients from decisions 
impacting them.  Some respondents identified customer tensions about government 
holding information about them like big brother. 
The Executive faced a risk the PSISS would be developed and no clients would be 
in a position to adopt the PSISS.  The response to this risk was to require the 
provider to develop business cases for implementation.  Respondents believed the 
provider was overly optimistic about adoption, essentially making a rod for their 
own back.  The Executive agreed performance targets with the provider and signed 
the business case.  Performance against business cases was reviewed by a steering 
committee and results reported to the Executive.   
When the PSISS was created governance was internal to the provider.  Programme 
governance was performed during the development of the PSISS with reporting, 
risk registers and a programme of work with individual work streams.  Internal 
provider controls were in place to mitigate risk including performance agreements, 
contracts and service levels.  This internal focus was intended to provide 
confidence the PSISS was well designed and implemented.  Internal controls did 
not provide confidence to clients that the PSISS would meet their needs.  
Respondents identified a need for external representation on the governance 
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groups.  “I have not observed any external or public representation on their 
governance, that is one of the biggest holes” (Respondent 14).   
The PSISS was developed as a technology service without an understanding of the 
risks associated with system-wide change to national identity.  PSISS 
implementation was run by the provider with the attitude of build it and they will 
come.  The use of technical requirements defined by the provider, as long as they 
did not conflict with the business case, reinforced the risk the PSISS would not 
meet client or customer needs. 
The provider knew best, they knew the technology required to create the PSISS 
and believed there were economies of scale to be gained across the sector.  They 
believed this argument would be enough for client adoption.  What they didn’t 
consider was the PSISS would take a long time to implement.  Compounding this 
delay, when the PSISS was implemented no clients were ready to integrate 
customer facing online services, and it would be years before they were.  This put 
the provider behind on adoption targets and raised the risk of PSISS failure.    
The provider sought to identify suitable client-based services that could be used as 
candidates to prove the PSISS in practice.  These candidates could be used to start 
driving customer adoption.  When there were no clients to adopt the PSISS the 
provider was left with an albatross, which made a large hole in their budget, 
however they believed the PSISS would be viable if the debt was written off, 
unfortunately Treasury disagreed.  
Respondents were critical of the provider for building the PSISS as alternate 
solutions are available today for a fraction of the price.  New commercial online 
identity services introduced a risk the PSISS would be left behind as it was built on 
old technology that could not be easily updated and was perceived as not meeting 
the changing needs of clients or customers.  The risk was the PSISS would require 
additional funding or risk being left behind.   
Resistance.  Statistics had been involved in the testing of the PSISS and had 
subsequently decided to stop using the PSISS.  As the provider had not involved 
other clients in implementation there was little or no buy in from potential clients.  
Client resistance was passive but building as they did not feel part of the process.  
190 
 
Clients were wary of adopting a PSISS from a policy agency with no track record 
of delivery.   
Respondents identified instances of active resistance from clients after PSISS 
implementation.  As clients were not involved in implementation they could sit on 
the side lines and raise concerns about the ability of the PSISS to meet their needs, 
which had not been sought or articulated during implementation.  The two pilot 
systems were not viewed as successful by respondents or clients, even though the 
provider had reported their successful integration to the Executive.  Statistics 
withdrawing gave other clients pause.  The public sector intranet added an 
additional login, which reduced the usefulness for clients who were compelled to 
use the PSISS to access the system adding an additional step.  As one respondent 
said it added “complexity with no value.  I changed roles three times in government 
and had to get three different logins for access to shared spaces” (Respondent 8). 
Client  
The third stage of the lifecycle is client where the service has been released and 
client adoption is sought to deliver PSISS integrated customer facing digital 
services.   
Adoption.  The initial provider was SSC, a central agency within the New Zealand 
Public Sector, whose early focus was upon gaining funding.  Success was viewed 
as the ability to create shared services “whether they worked is another thing” 
(Respondent 15).  The PSISS was designed to provide two identity services: GLS 
and IVS.   
Performance targets were based upon client adoption, under the belief client 
services would drive customer adoption, which would encourage more client 
services.  A focus on adoption metrics shaped formal governance mechanisms, and 
provider behaviour.  Respondents felt hard numbers could be understood, therefore 
provided value.  Softer measures were harder to define and measure as “there was 
no direct line of sight to the soft areas” (Respondent 4) which were more subjective 
and took longer to play out.   
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Adoption targets were optimistic.  The people writing the initial business case 
thought adoption would grow more quickly than it did.  Forecasting was not only 
inaccurate but also unadjusted by experience over time.  Once the timeframe and 
expectations were set they were hard to shift.   
The provider felt responsible for PSISS direction as they believed ministers and 
clients had a poor understanding of the PSISS and benefits it could provide.  The 
provider took a technology centric approach as “inherently people involved in 
technology like to solve technology problems” (Respondent 20), which clients 
criticised as a technology solution to a business problem.  The provider’s strength 
was a “weakness, they have (a technology) discipline which makes it hard to step 
outside their discipline to get a multidisciplinary approach” (Respondent 2).   
Consumers of the PSISS were identified as clients (public sector agencies) and 
customers (citizens).  Clients would use the PSISS as an identity source to provide 
digital services to customers.  The desired state was a system that met adoption 
targets for both clients and customers as well as reducing sector costs.   
The provider expected clients to adopt the PSISS without much encouragement.  
Programme management was used to measure and report performance against 
targets.  Business cases were evaluated against projected benefits and previous 
results.  Accountabilities for performance targets were built into performance 
agreements.  There was a soft marketing approach, whereas some respondents felt 
client adoption should have been compelled.  
Market readiness was questioned after implementation.  Building the PSISS based 
on a vision rather than demand from clients led to an adoption dilemma as clients 
were not ready to integrate with the PSISS, resulting in a three year wait for clients 
to catch up.  Without client services there would be no reason for customers to 
adopt.   
The provider requested direct funding which the Executive refused, so had to 
collect directly from clients which was a “terrible idea” contributing to client 
avoidance (Respondent 3).  The need for clients to commit funding from their 
existing baselines was not well received with some clients becoming hostile and 
unwilling to collaborate.  The focus on adoption, with additional client cost, 
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contributed to difficulties gaining client adoption which led to a downward spiral 
for the PSISS.   
Problems were identified with ongoing Executive commitment.  Respondents 
criticised the piecemeal approach to funding.  The importance of the PSISS was 
acknowledged by the Executive but not widely understood, leading to a half-baked 
approach to system investment where the technology for the PSISS was funded, 
however there was limited funding for system change.   
The PSISS was “an impossible sell if you are trying to nickel and dime recovery 
costs” (Respondent 20).  With respect to identity it was believed cost recovery was 
detrimental to cost effectiveness as charging clients disincentivised client adoption 
impacting customer adoption and outcome realisation.  
Some respondents were concerned with the provider’s inability to demonstrate 
PSISS costs and client benefits.  They believed the provider “should be able to 
demonstrate the costs of a central service and contrast against individual services.  
It should be straightforward to enable assessment” (Respondent 2).  Identity 
verification costs were buried in wider information system costs, making the PSISS 
appear an overhead cost for client digital services. 
The value proposition was “flawed as there was no way a government department 
would use it because it would not provide enough verification.  It could not replace 
active directory, GLS was only yes or no for how many millions of dollars?” 
(Respondent 8).  
The provider was under pressure to increase adoption to meet performance targets.  
The “mantra was get volume at any cost” (Respondent 16), which was challenging 
as the provider was charged with gaining critical mass from a standing start with 
no existing client digital services.  Client digital services who adopted the PSISS 
were painfully trivial and did not provide the “bums on seats” to meet performance 
targets (Respondent 18).   
To increase adoption, whilst waiting for client adoption, the provider insisted 
public sector employees authenticate through the PSISS.  This “was probably a 
mistake.  We have staff who authenticate at client then have to reauthenticate” 
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(Respondent 16).  Poor user experience further reduced client appetite to integrate 
customer facing services.   
Convincing clients was particularly difficult as some had never seen the PSISS and 
had little trust in a provider who did not have a track record of delivery.  Clients 
were seen to have an internal focus on their deliverables rather than wider system 
benefits.  “Most government entities would have been happier if the project hadn’t 
happened.  They could have carried on doing their own things” (Respondent 17).  
The provider was performing “fundamentally a sales role, through job descriptions 
and the performance framework, it was run like a sales organisation, with targets 
and rewards for hitting those” (Respondent 3).  The push to increase adoption led 
to acceptance of client services ranging from those with “nice new user interfaces 
to another agency having any old rubbish” (Respondent 20).   
Performance reporting was based upon client adoption, rather than customer 
adoption or integrated digital services used by customers.  This simplistic reporting 
raised questions about when client adoption occurred.  Clients could sign a 
memorandum of understanding agreeing to use the PSISS which was then reported 
as adoption, without any customer services integrated.  Even if clients agreed to an 
integrated service, several years could pass before the promised service was used 
by customers.   
The provider’s inability to deliver an easy to adopt PSISS caused concern as clients 
had further hurdles before they could create PSISS integrated digital services.  
Clients avoided adoption based on the PSISS reputation and adoption experience 
of clients.  Concerns were raised about accountability and potential liability in the 
event of PSISS system failure.  Reputational damage and financial risk appeared to 
sit with clients and they were not happy.   
The provider felt clients would “come up with a number of excuses, you could 
write a book on all of the excuses for getting out of all-of-government stuff.  They 
tend to be it is not going to work for the customer or it is too expensive, or it doesn’t 
fit within our programme at this point in time” (Respondent 15).   
Client concerns led to their half-hearted commitment, and affected adoption 
targets.  As provider SSC leveraged their role managing chief executive 
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performance, by using client chief executive performance agreements as a stick to 
drive client adoption resulting in lip service adoption, also known as the curse of 
the smiling faces.  Still clients were not buying into system benefits or trusting the 
provider who they saw as clipping the ticket.   
The provider struggled to get face time with client decision makers, this also 
contributed to limited trust between provider and clients.  Without time to influence 
key decision makers the time to market for integrated client services increased.  
Combined with a lack of influence with the “slow moving wheels of government” 
(Respondent 11) the provider was not meeting client adoption targets.  Client 
compliance was expected by the provider who became frustrated the Executive was 
not compelling clients to adopt the PSISS.  There was a feeling “senior sector 
leaders need to get past the slogan waving” and adopt the PSISS (Respondent 20).   
Key clients who could provide large scale customer services were visibly avoiding 
adoption as they had the resources to develop their own identity services.  The 
provider’s response was developing a plan for driving adoption through clients 
with high volume customer services as “80% of the spend comes from 20% of 
agencies” (Respondent 11).  Unfortunately, many of these already had working 
identity solutions.  To them the PSISS appeared to be an overhead because they 
thought “the cost (of using the PSISS) should be lower than doing it myself” 
(Respondent 2).  
Respondents believed, with hindsight, small to medium clients could have provided 
a better rate of adoption, because although smaller agencies might not provide the 
same scale, they would be more likely to collaborate as they did not have enough 
resources to implement identity services on their own.  One respondent had 
identified nine smaller agencies who agreed to adopt the PSISS, however, they 
found the agreement they brokered ran counter to existing all-of-government 
agreements and the plan was shelved.  It was counter-cultural in the public sector 
to only work with willing clients, as all clients were expected to participate and the 
provider’s response was to investigate their means to direct client adoption.   
At this time, PSISS benefits were not well identified or understood.  It was believed 
“until there are enough customers there is no system value” (Respondent 19).  
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Some respondents thought payback for identity services would be decades, 
however, the Executive set an expectation of a short-term payback.  
One of the intended PSISS benefits was reduced sector costs.  Standard service 
offerings were a way to provide consistency and reduced cost for all clients and 
customers.  While the PSISS was planned to provide cost reduction and 
consistency, clients expected flexibility.  Clients wanted enhancements, which 
would have limited the applicability of a commodity solution.  Tension mounted 
between the provider who wanted to provide standard service offerings and clients 
who wanted flexible, configurable services as part of the PSISS.  The PSISS was 
criticised as a commodity service that did not meet individual client needs.   
New business cases were developed capturing expected benefits and planned 
changes.  Adoption targets were defined “with metrics that were pretty easy to 
measure, reported to the steering group and to the Minster of State Services” 
(Respondent 3).   
Performance targets placed pressure on the provider to increase client adoption.  
Clients were put under pressure to integrate.  Although the PSISS had been reported 
as proven, clients complained integration was costly and challenging.  Clients 
attempting to integrate their services found the PSISS “does not work out of the 
box” (Respondent 20) meaning clients had to undertake substantial rework for 
integration.   
Clients believed adoption costs should have been offset by other client savings, 
which did not happen.  Respondents thought the PSISS was expensive for what it 
provided.  Building on cost tensions, respondents identified clients where digital 
services had to be reworked with built in identity solutions having to be removed 
to accommodate the PSISS.  The client was left with a digital service they had to 
modify, to remove the built-in identity components and still pay licensing and 
maintenance for the components they had removed.  Clients were frustrated at 
having to pay additional licence costs for components they were not using.  Clients 
resented being compelled to consume the PSISS, being levied to build the PSISS 
and to integrate.  The experience of those adopting the PSISS did not set the right 
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tone, one example given was the “Ministry of Health spending $750,000 for a 
service they did not use” (Respondent 8).  
Client complaints about adoption and integration were dismissed as emotional 
responses.  The provider believed clients were passionate about arguing for their 
existing and planned services, when they felt threatened they reacted emotionally, 
resisting PSISS adoption.  The theory was clients had committed significant energy 
to developing their services, including identity, which left them feeling threatened 
by the PSISS.  As a result, clients raised multiple concerns to try to retain control 
of their own systems.  This was viewed as the “illusion of control” (Respondent 
11) where clients wanted to maintain their own systems, which was not financially 
viable from an all-of-government perspective.  Clients just thought it was poor 
customer service and the provider protecting their reputation.   
Not meeting performance targets led to increased tension within the provider and 
with clients, damaging provider reputation and contributing to reviews and funding 
challenges.  The PSISS underwent several ministerial reviews.  “It was often 
presented to ministers, they would ask if it was worth continuing with.  The reports 
said it was strategically important and needed increased adoption, which required 
agency buy in.  These themes came up again and again” (Respondent 2).  Limited 
adoption meant the provider had to keep going back for more money further 
damaging their reputation with clients, becoming a vicious cycle.   
Where all-of-government collaboration required a mindset change, the public 
sector was seen to be in a jargon phase where collaborative working was discussed 
but the old method of investment case, funding and failure to meet performance 
targets continued.  Measured “against the business case it is an abject failure” 
(Respondent 16).   
Clients asked why they would participate when there were no visible benefits.  
Despite limited incentives for client adoption respondents felt public sector clients 
should be directed to use the PSISS as “CEOs don't give a shit about operations.  
Strongest levers are big sticks, mandatory” (Respondent 18) showing a desire 
within the provider to mandate PSISS adoption. 
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The PSISS was one of a suite of shared services provided by SSC.  Other services 
like the Government Shared Network were also beset with similar adoption 
challenges.  This led to another push to increase adoption.  The provider concluded 
if they compelled client adoption performance targets would be reached.  The 
provider sought to leverage the Commissioner’s legislative mandate, thereby 
creating a “burning platform to provide the motivation” (Respondent 2). 
The State Services Commissioner owned the PSISS and believed he had a 
legislative mandate which provided “the power to direct other agencies.  He was 
looking for an opportunity to use that power.  He issued the direction to the whole 
public service” they had to use shared services (Respondent 17).  The directive led 
to client resistance rather than willingness to collaborate.   
The provider attitude to client adoption changed from working to encourage client 
adoption to ensuring compliance.  If clients “needed authentication it had to be 
used” (Respondent 2).  The provider sent agents to increase client adoption, “I 
performed the role of selling the benefits of the GLS to agencies.  And sell, 
reminding them of the mandate” (Respondent 3). 
The directive was in place to increase adoption and to ensure the right 
conversations were had between provider and clients when new technology 
decisions were being made that involved identity.  Any new or modified digital 
customer services would be required to consider the PSISS.  This was intended to 
combat client avoidance of the PSISS, as the overriding feeling was clients would 
avoid the PSISS if they could. 
Clients criticised the provider for driving adoption without understanding their 
needs or adapting the PSISS to make adoption easier.  Client trust was eroded 
through loss of control over their services and compelled adoption.  Clients feared 
reliance on a third party PSISS built on technology that was rapidly becoming 
obsolete.  Clients did not trust the provider and were concerned about losing 
autonomy or the ability to make decisions to support the delivery of client 
outcomes.  As a result, clients continued to play the waiting game holding off 




The effectiveness of governance arrangements were questioned as the directive was 
a vertical mechanism employed in a situation where there was meant to be 
horizontal governance.  Clients were critical of governance introducing risk when 
it was meant “to mitigate risks” (Respondent 2). 
The time SSC spent as provider was disastrous, particularly when considering the 
wider e-government programme.  Respondents questioned whether a central 
agency should be providing shared services to clients, particularly given the 
Commissioner’s role managing client chief executives.  Having the Commissioner 
in conflict with client chief executives was concerning, particularly given the 
perceived PSISS & GSN failures.  There was a panic to get the programme out of 
SSC.   
Respondents identified a blip for the credibility and performance of the PSISS in 
2009/11 with the provider transition to DIA and the demise of the e-Government 
Unit, which set the PSISS “back a number of years and tarnished the brand” 
(Respondent 16).  Adoption slowed, contributing to a vicious cycle of limited 
investment, system stagnation and poor client experience leaving the new provider 
feeling they were on a hiding to nothing.   
The provider had a lack of role clarity resulting in fragmented decision making.  
There was conflict between DIA as provider and as client.  Across DIA people 
were trying to get the PSISS to do more things to create a new value proposition, 
creating more tension.  They suggested the PSISS manage client authentication and 
access controls.  Other clients were frustrated by the lack of a clear PSISS direction 
and believed governance was buried in the provider at DIA.  The provider led 
PSISS governance and was criticised for taking a technical rather than outcome 
focus.   
Respondents identified a need for an outcome rather than technology focus as 
“from a leadership perspective you can't make technology something that you bury 
your head in the sand, you need to understand the capability technology provides” 
(Respondent 20).  The technical governance focus was compared to giving 
management of our national currency to coin collectors, where they become more 
interested in the notes and coins than fiscal policy.  It was felt a focus on technology 
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provided a shiny solution that won international awards for technical design but 
wasn’t delivering outcomes for New Zealand or meeting adoption targets.   
Adoption targets shaped the performance reporting.  A focus on metrics limited the 
ability to conduct a richer discussion about outcomes.  Respondents felt constrained 
by the original performance targets, which were an aspirational “goal seek” 
(Respondent 3).   
The provider struggled to change public sector culture to gain PSISS acceptance.  
The sector was not ready, and it took time for clients to develop services and change 
their mindset.  Clients were observed as being outside looking in when it came to 
adoption, taking “the after you principle, as no agency wanted to be first” 
(Respondent 5).   
Integration continued to be challenging.  Clients were provided with open source 
components and a feeling that when it came to integration clients were on their 
own.  The provider argued once clients had one digital service integrated it became 
easier for subsequent services, the challenge was getting the first one up.  They 
later acknowledged “in the early days we knowingly accepted poor integrations, as 
we were quite desperate” (Respondent 19).   
Clients were having to rework services and argued a collaborative approach to 
integration would reduce both integration time and costs.  Respondents believed 
the provider should accept external authentication mechanisms rather than pure 
reliance upon a government built PSISS.  The existing PSISS would then be 
considered one of multiple identity options for clients.  Respondents thought 
engagement between provider and client should be smarter, providing clients with 
integration options so they could select, and only pay for, the PSISS components 
they required.   
Clients’ critical feedback was a catalyst for change.  Criticism about their adoption 
experience led the provider to realise they “had to get into the mode of customer 
focus, which we hadn't done before” (Respondent 19).  This was driven by a need 
to increase adoption to justify future Executive investment in the PSISS.  
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PSISS adoption remained slow and targets were not being met.  The PSISS had a 
reputation as an expensive product that met a need, but not in a user-friendly way, 
contributing to client resistance.  The provider employed client relationship 
management to overcome resistance.  Numerous technical documents were 
produced for clients to aid adoption, integration, and relationship building.   
The provider set out to engage with clients to understand what they needed from 
the PSISS.  Based on client consultation, the provider changed the PSISS roadmap 
to bring forward functionality including two factor authentication and improved 
integration.  Easier integration was seen to improve the relationship between the 
provider and clients; however, concerns about the rate of adoption remained.  Some 
respondents criticised adoption targets as overly optimistic with a belief they 
should be shifted back 10 years.  
To increase adoption the provider requested a strengthened mandate from the 
Executive to show “we have consulted enough now we use the stick” (Respondent 
17).  The Executive sent clients a message by issuing a Cabinet mandate, the PSISS 
was a mandated service with public service clients bound to adopt it.  If their 
services required authentication the PSISS had to be used.   
There was internal tension at the provider about the Cabinet mandate, with some 
respondents preferring a cost-effective solution that clients would want to use 
rather than forcing clients down a technology path.  Reliance on the mandate as a 
governance mechanism was criticised.  “At the time the mandate was seen to be 
useful but in the long run it removed the pressing need to treat government agencies 
as clients.  It caused conflict” (Respondent 17).  Other respondents believed the 
mandate was essential for authorising the provider to refuse the ability for public 
service clients to use other options.  One respondent called for the mandate to be 
further tightened by the Executive threatening to cut client budgets to ensure 
adoption.  
The mandate fuelled further client resistance, “middle to lower management felt it 
is like Parliament telling me what to do” (Respondent 19) which made it harder for 
the provider to get client adoption and realise performance targets.  The mandate 
was intended to gain critical mass for PSISS adoption, prompting collaboration 
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between provider and clients.  In reality, clients were avoiding PSISS adoption 
where possible.  Clients “would look at the exact (mandate) wording and argue 
from there” (Respondent 17).  Some clients came on board adopting the PSISS, 
others avoided adoption in some cases limiting their digital service offerings which 
ran contrary to the desired outcome.  
The mandate was viewed as a stop-gap to drive adoption, however there was a 
growing realisation collaboration was needed to drive adoption, as well as system 
investment.  PSISS results had been reviewed multiple times.  The broad 
conclusion was PSISS provision is challenging and there are no easy options.  After 
multiple reviews ministers and senior executives began discussing softer areas and 
the need for effective collaboration across the public sector.   
Public sector collaboration was identified as requiring a small group of tightly 
connected leaders, rather than a provider led PSISS.  The provider proposed new 
collaborative governance arrangements.  Increased client involvement in 
governance was expected to align client, customer and provider needs with 
Executive direction.  It was hoped alignment and client involvement would 
increase adoption and provide a stronger argument to the Executive for increased 
funding.   
Limited funding was impacting system improvements.  Technological change was 
also affecting the PSISS and public sector culture, as “technology has enabled 
delivery in ways we have not thought of, for example smartphones” (Respondent 
20).  The provider was expected to pick technology to meet future client and 
customer needs on a limited budget.  This was particularly challenging when 
running a service designed a decade earlier.  The Executive did not want to invest 
in bleeding edge technology, so the provider was left “a few investment cycles 
behind where we should be” (Respondent 20).  The fear was any new technology 
selected would be the wrong option, become obsolete or just not integrate with new 
client systems, further damaging adoption.   
Governance Focus.  After implementation the provider continued as an 
information system developer with an internal focus.  PSISS enhancements were 
planned and the provider was busy developing the Identity Verification Service.  
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They thought the hard work had been done as the PSISS had been built and clients 
would come.  They were wrong.  
New Zealand was one of the first countries to introduce PSISS, which was 
challenging.  “Early shared services need to break a lot of ground before they can 
deliver.  These services need to build connections to existing services, users, 
devices and methods for integration” (Respondent 4).  
The PSISS business case was built upon cost avoidance by avoiding multiple online 
identity processes with separate systems for verification.  Payback would be 
realised through adoption by all public sector clients and customers.  Customers 
were intended to benefit by having easier access to services, clients would not need 
to manage customer identity and the Executive would have greater confidence 
entitlements were being managed.  “When we set it up it was so that government 
could be assured that they were delivering the services to the people entitled to 
them.  Can’t pay taxpayer money when you don’t know they are who they say they 
are.  You need assurance that the right people are who they say they are” 
(Respondent 14).  Executive agreement was identified as signing off the business 
case.   
When the PSISS was at SSC the Executive were the ultimate governance group, 
supported by vertical governance arrangements between the Minister and e-
Government Unit.  Definitions of success were defined by a steering committee, 
then subject to independent review.  The provider reported to the Executive through 
the steering committee.  The Executive was seen to have set the wheels in motion 
and left the provider to drive.   
SSC attempted to establish horizontal governance, as provider and central agency, 
which led to the conclusion it “didn’t fit in SSC.  Horizontal governance doesn’t 
fit anywhere” (Respondent 9).  Although an all-of-government approach was 
discussed, it lacked a connected public sector network to support outcome delivery.  
SSC were “never product delivers and never a delivery agency” (Respondent 14).  
Despite these factors they were expected to deliver consensus and the PSISS to 
public sector clients.  Respondents criticised the provider for limited client 
consultation.  The provider’s challenge was getting a collective of clients 
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committed to the PSISS. “The first five years was getting people’s heads around it.  
Governance was people playing their roles in relation to their departmental 
responsibilities, with central agencies having an overview role” (Respondent 14).  
SSC struggled to convince clients to adopt the PSISS.  Lack of engagement was 
“part of the problem, not a lot of supporters” (Respondent 3).  The provider was 
accused of talking big and paying lip service as “branding and marketing is big, not 
the acknowledgement of the problems” (Respondent 17).  PSISS cost was an 
ongoing problem, particularly recovery of sunk costs.  Clients argued the PSISS 
was out of date and could be replaced for significantly less than they were paying.  
Issues with passing costs to clients led to relationship issues and “contributed to 
controversy” (Respondent 2).  A lack of cost transparency made comparison 
between PSISS or standalone identity services difficult.  Clients also expressed 
“concerns about losing control of customer experience” (Respondent 5) to the 
provider as they became dependent upon the PSISS. 
The PSISS was criticised for being “hard for people to integrate with” (Respondent 
11).  Clients wanted easy integration from the provider.  “From what I could see 
they didn’t do much to help clients” who were “left to sort out integration” 
(Respondent 5).  Clients lacked clear adoption guidance which led to rework of 
client services to enable integration.  “The institutional norms of different clients 
clashed” (Respondent 17), posing a challenge for increasing adoption.   
Clients who were attempting integration with the PSISS were left to wait for clarity 
on standards, or to forge ahead, praying they avoided reworking their solutions as 
they had spent their allocated project budgets.  They purchased solutions with 
identity components which they had to pay to licence and use.  After paying for the 
inbuilt identity component they had to pay extra for the PSISS and even more to 
integrate, requiring additional, often unbudgeted, funds to remove the existing “out 
of the box integration” and integrate with the PSISS (Respondent 8).  The removal 
of existing identity components was not easy as client systems required 
functionality the PSISS did not perform, leading to a requirement to use part of the 
client system identity and PSISS in parallel.  This became problematic for clients 
running and upgrading systems.   
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Initial attempts to integrate services were “not wildly successful, a dismal failure.  
More like let’s convince clients that we don’t” (Respondent 1).  Adoption came 
down to relationships, finding the right champion within clients to push adoption.  
Other clients, like Inland Revenue, were holdouts who heard poor adoption 
experiences and avoided adoption.  
The provider decided to “focus on the big clients” (Respondent 11).  Large clients 
played the waiting game and actively avoided adoption.  Respondents questioned 
whether smaller clients would be more likely to adopt quickly as “small clients are 
nimble, people get things done rather than worry about position” (Respondent 11) 
and “those who can make things happen do not always come from big clients, you 
should focus on those who are fleet of foot rather than the big ones” (Respondent 
11).   
Unfortunately, costs were “disproportionately expensive for small clients” 
(Respondent 11) and the PSISS did “not scale well given cost per user” 
(Respondent 7) so the provider did not publish the projected scaled costs.  This was 
problematic as many small clients would benefit the most from a shared service as 
they were fiscally and resource constrained, limiting their ability to implement 
robust identity solutions.  The provider did not provide incentives for small clients 
to overcome the fiscal or resource constraints so small clients avoided adoption.   
Even though clients did not have the bandwidth to contribute they voiced concerns 
about the ability of the PSISS to service the public sector.  As a result, many clients 
opted not to use the PSISS as they believed it did not meet their needs and may 
introduce undue risk to their ability to deliver services to customers.   
The game playing by clients and limited funding from the Executive meant 
opportunities for the PSISS to provide a national identity system were being missed 
as “New Zealand needed a grown-up conversation about this” (Respondent 12).  
The provider took the view clients were snowflakes, as they all saw themselves as 
unique and every client had “a story about why they are different and the complete 
mess if they adopt a shared service and things will go wrong” (Respondent 17).   
The provider was frustrated by clients’ inability to think beyond their own needs.  
“I am not sure clients have understood the value of it.  It becomes valuable when 
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multiple clients take it on and critical mass kicks in” (Respondent 15).  Clients 
would accept the logic, but culturally they were struggling to meet their day-to-day 
deliverables, let alone meet sector outcomes.  Clients ran projects focussed upon 
delivering information systems, rather than the wider system benefits, on time at 
the lowest cost.  Any other considerations, including the PSISS, were distractions.   
The provider had to push a service delivering limited value.  “We were spending 
our money on high cost commodity, not on the valuable stuff.  We were focussed 
on the burden so we can’t get our heads above water to resolve” (Respondent 11).  
Respondents argued meaningful delivery to customers takes time.  Time to market 
for the PSISS was three years, client services took a similar time, yet the provider 
was expected to deliver the original performance targets, which were considered 
unattainable.   
The provider had to act decisively to reach performance targets, as a result, 
stakeholders were not always in the provider’s line of sight.  The provider believed 
they could make better decisions using their expert knowledge without client input.  
Clients “felt threatened.  The quality of work on identity, and separating it from 
other attributes, it was difficult for government people to understand” (Respondent 
9).  The lack of understanding “polarised people’s perceptions of what will be 
accomplished leading to resistance rather than willingness to participate” 
(Respondent 2).  Rather than spend more time increasing understanding the 
provider attempted to drive adoption.  Clients could be involved later as decisions 
were time critical and imparting the understanding required to make decisions to 
clients needed time, time which the provider did not have.   
Public sector culture involved looking no further than one election cycle, further 
limiting the time available to put change in place.  The provider had limited time, 
resources and needed to get it right first time.  The public sector approach to risk 
was criticised, and respondents believed the tolerance for failure needed to change 
as it is “really hard to learn if you can’t fail” (Respondent 3).   
PSISS direction became what was best for the provider.  Governance decisions 
were seen to be reinforcing previous decisions and protecting the PSISS.  Fear of 
reputational damage meant SSC, as provider, continued to push the PSISS “even 
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though everyone knew it would fail, no-one had the guts to call it” (Respondent 6).  
Respondents believed the provider was being painted into a corner and holding the 
brush.  
Some respondents favoured collaboration over the provider’s internal “structures 
of accountability for delivering shared services, I’m not convinced they made much 
of a contribution.  They didn’t do the work to create and enable adoption.  The 
ideas that work are the ones where the clients actually contribute” (Respondent 11).  
Others argued clients had been “involved in the governance of the PSISS but were 
not adopting at the time, and are still not adopting, this is many years old and IRD 
are still not an adopter.  One of the dynamics that was occurring was it was 
strategically important at the time and high-level governance people would turn up 
at the meeting.  But they would turn up not to make it happen they would turn up, 
passive aggressive may have come to mind, and said they did not want the thing to 
proceed” (Respondent 15). 
The provider struggled with informal collaborative governance as it was “very 
difficult to communicate effectively across more than 30 people” (Respondent 11).  
Respondents believed collaborative governance efforts were hampered by the 
vertical nature of public sector accountability and pre-existing vertical controls 
with hard measures.  Adoption was something that could be measured, however it 
was somehow inadequate.  The adoption focus enabled the provider to report 
metrics, however there was a feeling that outcomes were ignored, because PSISS 
performance was measured against client adoption without considering public 
value.   
The PSISS had no real value to the sector without customer facing services.  
Customers saw little benefit to adoption while the public sector was consumed by 
conflict between provider and clients as they could get a PSISS identity but had 
limited client services they could access.  The PSISS was a “necessary but 
uncomfortable service to provide.  It got to the point where the service did not 
develop further and stagnated.  No one would invest in it due to the large 
investment required, which sealed its fate.  It needed significant adoption to 
become successful” (Respondent 17). 
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The PSISS was “not achieving targets, which caused pressure during funding time” 
(Respondent 13).  When performance targets were not met the attitude of the 
Executive towards the provider became negative.  The provider was placed under 
“continual pressure to drive uptake whilst reducing cost” (Respondent 13).   
The provider was subjected to assurance reviews.  Treasury was involved in PSISS 
governance however they “were only interested from a financial perspective, at 
times an annoying role” (Respondent 9), and the PSISS underwent “independent 
reviews from Audit NZ and gateway reviews” (Respondent 9).  The reviews 
usually coincided with funding requests to the Executive.  Results were presented 
to the Executive who “would ask if it was worth continuing with.  The reports said 
it was strategically important and it needs to get adoption up and clients across the 
line, which required buy in.  These themes came up again and again” (Respondent 
15). 
The Commissioner decided to leverage his legislative mandate under the State 
Sector Act to force client adoption.  “The Commissioner had the power through 
amendment to the Act.  It gave the Commissioner the ability to direct public sector 
clients” (Respondent 17).  The previous version of the Act had given public sector 
client chief executives the ability to say ‘No’ to the Commissioner.  They were 
responsible for their own outcomes and could refuse to use shared services.  “He 
was looking for an opportunity to use that power.  He issued the direction to the 
whole public service.  I had to go to DHB’s and told them they had to follow the 
mandate.  Half the problem of going beyond the public service was (clients saying) 
who the hell does the Commissioner think he is telling us what to do?” (Respondent 
17).  Respondents identified a power struggle looming over client adoption 
between the Commissioner and clients.   
The directive led to increased client resistance, as “if you are unpleasant no-one 
will follow your ideas” (Respondent 10).  “Some clients became hostile,” 
(Respondent 9) and in some cases clients were “shooting the messenger” 
(Respondent 11) leading to provider employee resentment as “the messenger does 
not want to deliver the message” (Respondent 11). 
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SSC was caught between Executive and clients.  Clients had participated in 
planning and governance, then disappeared when it came time to adopt.  The SSC 
felt “a lot of frustration about the position they had been put in, yet in another sense 
there were no real consequences for not meeting the business case” (Respondent 
3).   
SSC struggled with the addition of the e-government programme, which was an 
unnatural fit for a central, predominantly policy-based organisation.  SSC failed to 
meet performance targets and struggled to deliver the programme leading to 
questions from Treasury and the Executive.  There were even questions about a 
potential conflict of interest between the State Services Commissioner and client 
chief executives who were expected to adopt the PSISS.   
There were no real consequences until the programme “went bankrupt” 
(Respondent 3) leading to questions about whether governance oversight was 
adequate.  Support from senior management evaporated.  The GCIO was exited 
under a cloud and the e-Government Unit and programmes were transferred from 
SSC to DIA, which “set the whole thing back by a few years” (Respondent 16).  
When discussing the transfer of the e-Government Unit from SSC to DIA 
respondents “felt undermined at times” (Respondent 1) as they had invested a lot 
of their time and effort into the PSISS without much reward.   
Respondents identified a need for the Executive to take a leading role requiring 
clients to integrate customer facing services.  Until the move to DIA the Executive 
was viewed as delivering legislation that limited the ability of the provider to 
collaborate and to share information where “legislation is the greatest inhibiter, not 
technology, people or processes” (Respondent 7).  As the provider changed there 
was a changing attitude to the use of legislation as “we wanted some protection” 
(Respondent 17). 
After moving to DIA the provider struggled to get funding.  Although the Executive 
supported the move from a technology view “to a system asset administered 
through DIA as provider.  It was hard yards to get acceptance from ministers” 
(Respondent 10).  The Executive would only confirm a 12-month investment to 
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minimise fiscal exposure.  Short-term investment meant many longer-term 
strategic opportunities were foregone.   
Respondents believed reviews did not consider what was required to adequately 
run the PSISS.  “There have been countless reviews, if you want to create an 
infrastructural capability someone has to take a risk on the investment.  Going to 
SLT or board you need to invest in plumbing and pipes.  When they want to talk 
about the electronics and interface becomes really hard to make a case.  You need 
to make the case, it won’t work without plumbing” (Respondent 6).   
The public sector was expected to fund the PSISS and there were no other sources 
of funding.  Charging customers for the PSISS was unpalatable as was advertising 
revenue.  “Clients are the ones that pay, oddly enough the people who hold the 
accounts don’t pay at all” (Respondent 15). 
“Theoretically the Executive had the ability to stop.  I think though that the sunk 
costs ensured it continued” (Respondent 17), which was “why even though the 
discussions with ministers continue to be tense the initiative continues to be 
pursued” (Respondent 15).  The problem was “you get so far in and you cannot 
stop.  You can imagine stopping a service which has 100,000 users and saying it 
didn’t work, then what do you do because you have to find something else to 
provide identity for those users” (Respondent 15).   
Respondents struggled with the Executive as “there was no normalising view at 
Cabinet, the Prime Minister needs ministers to have autonomy to meet their own 
needs” (Respondent 11).  Ministers disagreed with each other and the goals of 
shared services.  The lack of unanimity contributed to client willingness to ignore 
the mandate.  The provider tried to develop closer relationships with the Executive, 
to gain acceptance of the PSISS as the national identity system.   
Commercial sustainability of the PSISS was questioned with the hand to mouth 
funding model.  The provider had “largely existed on subsistence funding and no 
real funding for 10 years.  They have done base level stuff but not moved forward 
to what people want or the market provides.  Operational funding has been top 
slicing” (Respondent 16) of client budgets, which led to grudges and did not 
provide enough money to make the PSISS effective. 
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Clients had been directed to adopt the PSISS, however they delivered their services 
and paid lip service to collaborative delivery.  The provider, both at SSC and DIA, 
set up cross-sector committees to increase collaboration, but there was a perceived 
lack of accountability from sector governance groups.  Having chief executives 
involved in governance was a “burden as the people in the governance forum push 
the risks back down rather than trying to resolve them” (Respondent 11).  Based 
on their experiences some respondents thought that “horizontal governance is a 
dog.  Everyone who is doing it is struggling with it” (Respondent 9).   
Respondents identified a lack of benefits clarity, which was compounded by 
changes that impacted governance continuity.  Changes to governance 
arrangements altered the stated purpose of the PSISS.  Historically there was a lack 
of clarity about what roles the PSISS would perform.  Clarity was required in 
documents to define the PSISS deliverables up front.  Some respondents thought 
PSISS infrastructure delivery became entwined with the delivery of the PSISS to 
clients and customers.  It became hard for the provider to separate the two.  The 
governance function was criticised as being “buried in one part of the organisation 
with limited exposure to other issues” (Respondent 1), with a “reliance on standard 
DIA governance mechanisms: finance, investment, capital planning, where a shift 
was required to make the service a true asset for the wider system, for 
accountability cannot sit within a single agency” (Respondent 1).  Another 
respondent agreed “the intentions were there from DIA, it was just not happening” 
(Respondent 17).  Governance became murky as it was embedded within DIA.  The 
provider tried to “direct and control for outcomes” (Respondent 11), which limited 
the strategic focus and the ability to deliver customer facing outcomes.   
Sectoral outcomes required customer adoption, which in turn required client 
services.  The problem was without a larger number of online client services, 
customers had “a thin relationship with government” (Respondent 1).  They would 
only use the PSISS once or twice a year, and when they did they would often forget 
their password, which represented little value. 
At DIA the PSISS still struggled to deliver adoption targets.  Although client and 
customer adoption were increasing progress was slow.  The provider realised they 
had introduced a risk developing the PSISS without client services to integrate.  
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The provider had worked for over a decade to overcome this risk by getting client 
services integrated and customers adopting the PSISS.  They now felt the Executive 
had gone off the PSISS and was making their role difficult.  Service performance 
and adoption were success factors, however some respondents were unsure about 
how the PSISS was performing, having “no idea about uptake or services” 
(Respondent 9). 
Clients had reservations about adoption which were reinforced by “historical issues 
about usability” (Respondent 2).  One issue for clients was the PSISS wasn’t user 
friendly and placed a barrier between clients and customers.  There were a lot of 
technical and operational documents, not much user documentation.  Clients found 
offering digital channels came at a cost, which left them with the option of 
additional expenditure or the avoidance of digital channels.  Clients become 
emotionally attached to their services, they had committed significant energy to 
developing and delivering to customers and felt threatened by the PSISS.  Clients 
were “passionate about their initiatives, technical solutions and arguing for them.  
When threatened they reacted emotionally” (Respondent 11).   
Integration concerns between clients, the provider and vendors were ongoing even 
after the move to DIA.  Clients wanted vendors of customer facing services to work 
with the provider to co-develop pre-integrated services that worked out of the box 
with the PSISS.  This would have removed the additional cost of integration faced 
by clients for implementation and future versions of services, “however, none of 
those vendors are willing to connect as they do not see the critical mass for the 
PSISS” (Respondent 7).   
Without central coordination, it would take a long time “to get 120 clients 
consuming common capabilities, each would have a long and expensive process” 
to adopt and integrate with the PSISS (Respondent 6).  The provider did not have 
a long time and was under pressure to deliver performance targets based on 
adoption, which drove the behaviour of the provider to “get volume at any cost” 
(Respondent 16).   
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The need to collaborate was a hindrance for delivery of outcomes.  The need for a 
more directive top down approach was cited by a respondent who was “all for 
benign dictatorships if they get on and do stuff” (Respondent 16). 
To overcome client resistance the provider sought government endorsement 
through a “Cabinet minute that refused the ability to use other options” 
(Respondent 9).  This provided a Cabinet enforced mandate requiring client 
adoption, meaning if clients “needed authentication it had to be used” (Respondent 
2).   
The mandate was intended to drive client adoption, which in turn was expected to 
lead to the “mass creation of customers” enabling the creation of much better, 
smarter services enhancing data broking and privacy (Respondent 1).  “The 
mandate was restated rather than new and reinforced” (Respondent 16), as it 
leveraged the same legislative mechanisms as the State Sector Commissioner was 
provided, reinforced by a Cabinet committee. 
The mandate added horizontal accountability to the existing vertical 
accountabilities between clients and ministers.  The provider had the ability to 
compel public sector client adoption, which changed the dynamic between provider 
and clients.  Previously the State Services Commissioner had attempted to compel 
adoption but had been widely ignored.  “Things have matured since the SSC days.  
SSC had no overarching mandate, which GCIO now does.  The mandate provided 
more pressure from the centre to collaborate” (Respondent 13).   
Adoption increased, however, what the provider found was interfering in the 
service delivery of clients is not trivial, particularly when you are trying to align 
clients across the public sector through the adoption of a PSISS.  The provider had 
the ability to compel adoption, however it was not prepared for the changes 
required to the sector.   
The mandate provided a short-term increase in adoption, however, it was believed 
mandates don’t work in the long term.  What was required was a “culture shift in 
the way the public service does business” (Respondent 13), to where clients have, 
and want, to use the PSISS.  “At the time it was seen to be useful but in the long 
213 
 
run it removed the pressing need to treat public sector clients as stakeholders.  It 
caused conflict” (Respondent 17).   
When reflecting on the use of the mandate a respondent, who was still working at 
the provider, stated when “CE’s have freedom, a mandate is a waste of time.  If the 
ideas are good, you do not need a mandate.  People will listen if the idea is good.  
Once listening they are more likely to adopt” (Respondent 11).  Compelling client 
adoption and integration was seen to “lead to 10 years of pain.  A ball of mud 
architecture.  People don’t do their research they pay 10% up front and 90% after 
implementation.  Client functionality of $1 requires $4 investment.  Sometimes the 
best idea is smack it on the head and rebuild” (Respondent 11).  Given these 
experiences some clients either paid the tax and avoided integration or just did not 
develop new online services, which impacted the ability for customers to interact 
with the government online. 
“The mandate had a negative effect.  Created odd dynamics, people not wanting to 
upgrade IAMS technology as it meant committing” (Respondent 3).  The provider 
used the mandate to promote the use of the PSISS by clients even though there 
were “many projects that have not wanted to do that” (Respondent 7).  Public sector 
clients were made to pay for the PSISS, whether they intended to adopt or not.  The 
plan was to “make them use it.  They levied clients to get it built like a form of 
taxation.  Making it optional was not considered” (Respondent 8).  Being forced to 
pay for a PSISS they may not use was frustrating, when the experience of clients 
adopting the service was also negative it set the wrong tone for collaboration.   
Centralised control by the provider limited collaboration across the sector leading 
to “questions about a federated model” for governance (Respondent 16).  Adoption 
had increased, however the provider still struggled to get certain agencies to adopt.  
Respondents believed a single agency taking the lead may have been naïve, 
increased client involvement in governance was needed to increase collaboration.   
PSISS adoption had been treated as a transaction.  The mandate was intended to 
drive the transaction.  Many respondents believed “mandates poison relationships” 
as “people do not like being beaten with a stick” (Respondent 11).  The mandate 
combined with top slicing of client budgets was criticised as damaging trust and 
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the will of clients to adopt and later collaborate.  Adoption increased, however, so 
did client resistance.   
Executive intervention was heavy handed and inefficient, and constrained 
collaboration leading to a belief it was better for the PSISS to be managed by the 
public sector.  Respondents favoured client collaboration over the mandate.  “If the 
ideas are good you do not need a mandate.  People will listen if the idea is good.  
Once listening they are more likely to adopt” (Respondent 11).   
The provider initiated a “fundamental re-conception of how the PSISS was going 
to grow and become successful” (Respondent 1), to turn around a perception of 
long-term failure and internal criticism.  Rather than trying to force all clients to 
adopt the PSISS respondents favoured a collaborative coalition of willing clients 
working to deliver performance targets.   
For the PSISS to succeed customers needed to have an online relationship with 
multiple client services using the PSISS.  There was an opportunity to provide more 
flexible identity options through the PSISS which “acts as a keyring holding a 
number of keys, the PSISS is the keyring itself.  I can add string keys to the ring.  
Clients can ask for other stronger key (held on key chain).  Customers can add new 
keys to the key ring, the keyring identity comes back not the key.  Then client 
investment is zero to use keys as the verification is based on the keyring” 
(Respondent 5).   
The provider identified a need for increased collaboration with clients and vendors.  
There were “opportunities to grow into an ecosystem with communities that want 
the PSISS to play nicely” (Respondent 7).  Collaboration would require different 
governance arrangements and participation across the service lifecycle with “a 
diverse group involved in different phases of the service to try to avoid group think” 
(Respondent 6).  A critical mass of client senior managers was required to influence 
the sector to gain a critical mass of client adoption.  
Accountability.  After implementation “the key measure was adoption” 
(Respondent 3).  Targets were set in the business case and placed the provider on 
a set trajectory for years to come.  There was no direct connection to customer use 
of client services.  Clients were expected to drive customer use of client services.   
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Clients were wary of change as cross-sector service delivery is challenging 
“particularly if you are trying to line up every single agency for the same effect” 
(Respondent 15).  Respondents identified increased client expectations for the 
provider to deliver identity capability improvements for the public sector.  The 
provider was faced with the challenge of meeting varying client needs with a PSISS 
that promoted consistency through a one size fits all identity service.   
SSC struggled to convince public sector clients to adopt the PSISS.  Client buy in 
was slow coming.  The provider was accountable for the PSISS, however 
respondents questioned whether they had the skills to deliver to their 
accountabilities.  Questions were asked about the capability of the people and 
governance arrangements, respondents were “not convinced they made much of a 
contribution.  They didn’t do the work to create and enable adoption” (Respondent 
11).  
The recollections of governance and accountability at SSC as provider were mixed, 
with some respondents claiming personal responsibility, others citing sector based 
horizontal approaches and others questioning whether the provider relinquished 
control.  One respondent thought the provider spent the first five years “getting 
people’s heads around it.  Governance in that sense was people playing the roles in 
relation to their departmental responsibilities, with central agencies having an 
overview role.  Which they don’t have now which is quite ironic” (Respondent 14).   
Public sector clients took longer than expected to come on board, which impacted 
adoption and therefore provider performance.  Another manager saw central 
control as “when I was a manager at the e-Government Unit governance was the 
central agency” (Respondent 14).  Attempts by SSC, as the central agency, to 
introduce governance were described as pseudo e-governance and inappropriate.  
Responses showed differing opinions of what governance arrangements were in 
place, indicating governance and accountability were not clearly communicated or 
understood. 
Performance was based on client adoption.  “Things like ease of use were not strong 
criteria in the thinking at that time” (Respondent 15).  After the PSISS was 
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implemented there were groups who were accountable for the PSISS, however 
respondents believed what was needed was a single point of accountability.   
Whilst the Executive was seen to support the PSISS it was believed “most ministers 
had a poor understanding of what the PSISS was or could be” (Respondent 1).  
Similarly, respondents believed the provider had roles mixed up making the PSISS 
difficult to understand.  There was a focus on commodity services rather than 
collaboration.  Subjectivity came into play and the provider focussed upon what 
was technically best for the PSISS rather than what was best for the sector.   
Respondents questioned the existing public sector funding model.  The provider 
was expected to recover costs from clients which created ill will.  As one 
respondent put it “there have been a number of makeshift approaches to investment, 
including chargeback to clients which created tension” (Respondent 20).  Cost 
recovery was viewed as part of a wider issue of no mature method for investing in 
system-wide assets.   
The provider struggled with lower funding and higher levels of accountability 
when providing services, which in “public policy are large issues” (Respondent 1).  
There were “countless reviews which have been critical of the PSISS without 
addressing the need for investment” (Respondent 6).  The provider needed funding 
for infrastructure but the Executive just wanted client services.  As a provider SSC 
felt “a lot of frustration about the position they were put in, however, in another 
sense there were no real consequences for not meeting business case goals.  I am 
not sure who was in charge and bore responsibility for not meeting business case” 
(Respondent 3).  This lack of clarity resulted in tension and further frustration. 
The provider worked to “increase adoption.  The main focus was the core public 
service departments,” (Respondent 3) although there were ambitions to extend 
across the public sector.  It was fundamentally a sales role defined through job 
descriptions and the performance framework.  It was run like a sales organisation 
with adoption targets and rewards in place for hitting targets.   
The provider believed delivery of the PSISS was all that was required.  There was 
a perceived lack of accountability to clients to meet their needs, leading to client 
resistance.  The provider was accountable to the Executive for meeting adoption 
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targets, which they failed to meet.  Performance metrics were limited which was 
reflected in limited provider accountability.  Respondents believed these factors all 
contributed to the provider being shifted from SSC to DIA.   
The State Services Commissioner backed the GCIO, “when the Commissioner 
stopped backing the programme it died” (Respondent 17).  The time SSC spent as 
provider “was a disaster, as a policy organisation it struggled with having a large 
programme running in the agency.  Lots of accounting issues distorted their balance 
sheet.  The programme was disproportionate to the purpose of a central agency 
whose core business was appointing chief executives and evaluating their 
performance.  There was a panic to get it out.  The Commissioner was judged on 
success of programme, the GSN went south and panic set in to get rid of ICT 
including the PSISS.  Results changed the reporting lines.  Almost the whole e-
Government Unit was shifted” (Respondent 17).  The provider became part of “a 
group in DIA who are responsible for delivery of the PSISS” (Respondent 2).   
Managers within the e-Government Unit struggled with the move from SSC to 
DIA.  The roles they performed changed and they had to adapt.  The provider was 
the vehicle to drive the adoption, but they needed additional support from the 
Executive to provide additional capacity and capability.  The provider needed to 
collaborate with external agencies and vendors.  They were making improvements 
it was just a little slow.  The provider hired staff to conduct “promotion, engaging 
with clients and integration management” (Respondent 19).  Presentations to 
clients were a leap of faith to get client senior management to adopt the PSISS.  
Liability was a thorny issue.  The argument was clients and customers were using 
the PSISS for client services meaning the government as a whole were liable, as 
agency liability is merely one dimension of governmental accountability, which 
did “not make sense.  If a DHB is using a service and get it wrong shouldn’t the 
DHB hold the provider liable? Governance was the solution.  The point was not 
liability, rather how do you fix this than hold parties liable” (Respondent 17).   
Governance was seen to be buried in one part of the lead agency with some 
respondents “amazed how informally (it was) defined.  DIA had sole responsibility 
built into their baseline, providing approval from Treasury to invest.  DIA could 
218 
 
run teams, market, product develop with little oversight.  Governance relied on 
standard DIA governance mechanisms like finance investment and capital 
planning” (Respondent 1).   
Respondents debated whether horizontal governance was employed by SSC, 
however, vertical governance returned with the transfer to DIA with respondents 
stating it was the provider that did all the work.  Respondents identified a need for 
governance arrangements to change and it was believed the best approach was for 
GCIO to lead cross-sector governance with client representation.  
Clients were slow to adopt, leading to tension between the provider and Executive 
as performance targets were not met.  The provider had limited power to compel 
client adoption.  The PSISS was in place to act as a broker of identity services 
between public sector clients and customers.  As one respondent put it “RealMe is 
fascinating.  I did RealMe 2009 business case review.  Before then 5-6 business 
cases said the same thing.  Basically, do you wish for the government singular to 
have a relationship singular with the public singular.  Or agencies to have 
relationships with different populations” (Respondent 11).  There were numerous 
internal and independent PSISS reviews by central agencies including Treasury, 
DPMC and SSC, with findings reported to ministers and the Executive.  
Respondents questioned the value of reviews, which had only concluded that 
PSISS were difficult to deliver.   
Legislative and regulatory changes affected the accountability relationships of 
client chief executives.  “Prior to that chief executives were only accountable for 
what they did, not for cross-government deliverables.  Legal accountability was a 
key inhibitor for adoption” (Respondent 17).  Legislative changes were designed 
to remove the inhibitor, although compelling use through a mandate raised 
concerns about liability and the ability for clients to deliver if the PSISS failed.  
Legislative changes removed Executive liability and opened the service to private 
sector clients.   
The GCIO was leading sector ICT collaboration.  The vendor, Datacom, was held 
accountable for operating the PSISS.  The accountability relationship with 
Datacom was contractual and performance was based on a service agreement.  The 
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vendor had no role in governance, they built what the provider told them to build.  
New Zealand Post was introduced to work with the provider to productionise the 
PSISS for use by banks.  Liability became even more complex when NZ Post 
became involved, introducing another party to the existing multi-party 
accountability.   
There was an admission a one size fits all governance approach did not work.  
Respondents believed the lead agency was considering changes to PSISS 
governance, and the wider shared services governance arrangements.  These 
changes included increased horizontal mechanisms, customer focus and sector 
accountability. 
Risk.  Clients had little confidence in the PSISS or the interface they were offered 
to connect to the PSISS.  There were issues with control as they felt the PSISS did 
not meet their needs or those of their customers, which led to the perceived risk 
that the PSISS could contribute to the failure of their customer facing services and 
reputational damage.  These factors limited client willingness to collaborate with 
the provider.   
The provider struggled with being a service provider and a government agency.  
There were challenges with how the provider could handle risk.  There was a 
recognition the PSISS introduced “too much risk to bury issues” (Respondent 9).  
The provider undertook reviews to identify and address risk.  The programme had 
a risk register and independent quality assurance.  Several other reviews were 
undertaken by Audit New Zealand and the gateway review programme.  To combat 
risk the provider relied on technical evaluations of the PSISS and ensured there 
was a robust process where “I’s were dotted, and T’s crossed” (Respondent 12).   
Risks were identified as occurring between the provider, sector and the 
government.  Governance was put in place to mitigate risks and oversee the 
delivery of the PSISS.  Internal assurance and risk mitigation performed by the 
provider did not address external risks, particularly the risks that arose from 
working collaboratively with partners. 
The disconnect between provider and clients contributed to the risk of non-
adoption.  The PSISS introduced cross-sector accountabilities for public sector 
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client chief executives.  The risk posed by these accountabilities was an inhibitor 
to adoption, which contradicted the intent.  The provider did not have a good 
relationship with client managers, many of whom felt threatened by the impact of 
the PSISS on their existing and future services.  The provider did not get 
meaningful face time with stakeholders or publish details of future PSISS changes.  
Time to market for PSISS changes took three or more years.  Clients either did not 
wait for changes and independently implemented their own services or were 
completely risk averse and held off, leading to an adoption lag.  The cumulative 
result was lower than forecast adoption.    
Respondents believed the business case oversold potential benefits.  The adoption 
forecast was not well understood, with the Executive expecting growth would 
occur quicker than planned.  Milestones were changed to camouflage the risk of 
not meeting adoption targets.   
The Executive reduced funding, limiting investment to maintain and upgrade the 
service as needs changed.  Underinvestment was criticised as contributing to a 
cycle of failure, introducing a risk transformation would not occur for customer 
services.   
Governance arrangements between provider and clients was subject to additional 
governance from the Executive and central agencies.  Numerous reviews were 
observed as risk avoidance exercises.  Executive risk aversion constrained funding 
needed to deliver system value.  The large number of reviews and internal controls 
added costs to the PSISS, taking money that could have been used for PSISS 
enhancement, as it was easier to spend money to reduce perceived risk rather than 
innovate and introduce risk.  The provider was required to introduce innovation 
whilst reducing risk to the Executive and meeting customer’s current and future 
identity needs.  The public sector had a “really ugly relationship with risk” 
(Respondent 11).  Governance of the PSISS was risk avoidance with the Executive 
passing risk back to the sector.  It was believed no investment would occur until 
there was a catastrophic event involving customer identity, until that point there 
would be minimal investment.   
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The provider failed to meet adoption targets, which introduced the risk of the PSISS 
being shut down by the Executive.  Clients were concerned about the ability of the 
provider to deliver, particularly given funding constraints, therefore avoided 
adoption, increasing pressure on the provider.   
The PSISS was not a successful shared service.  Client and customer adoption 
increased, however it was tempered by the time adoption took.  Slow adoption by 
clients and customers introduced risk to the provider limiting their ability to deliver 
the benefits agreed in performance agreements.  The Commissioner responded to 
the risk of non-adoption by attempting to compel client adoption, which failed to 
deliver performance targets leading to the PSISS being perceived as a failure.  The 
provider panicked and shifted the e-Government Unit and PSISS to DIA.   
The new provider responded to non-adoption by gaining a Cabinet mandate for 
client adoption.  The provider sought to establish control, the mandate helped to 
overcome some adoption barriers, however it increased tensions and damaged 
relationships with clients, where collaboration was required.  Clients were afraid 
of losing control and resented central controls, if clients could possibly avoid using 
the PSISS they would.  Large agencies were initially able to hold off the mandate.   
Growing dependencies between client and provider services required more 
collaborative governance.  When the PSISS was introduced it only performed 
authentication, which provided limited benefit.  Moving from simple online 
services to federated passport grade identity was a big jump.  The provider had to 
work with clients to understand the nature of services, interrelationships between 
services and ensure privacy and security for all customer and client facing services, 
which was “not something that is done every day” (Respondent 15).   
PSISS ownership introduced risk to DIA.  An inter-agency governance layer was 
introduced to mitigate risk, which caused tension within the provider.  The provider 
was subject to centralised controls which were seen by respondents as illogical and 
contradictory.  Conflict between the provider at DIA, programme management at 
SSC and assurance gateways at Treasury were seen to limit PSISS effectiveness.  
Centralised controls were a barrier to be avoided, with those delivering the PSISS 
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focussing upon delivery at any cost rather than changing the PSISS to meet the 
needs of stakeholders and centralised controls.   
The PSISS was designed the early 2000s.  Since then the use of online services, 
and security risks, had increased exponentially.  Clients services, and access to 
customer information were targets for exploit.  The PSISS has been enhanced to 
increase security and privacy, although more investment was required for new 
functionality and security.  Future opportunities, like multi-factor security and 
voice biometrics, would require collaborative development between provider, 
clients and vendors; as well as customer willingness to use these new services.   
The model of the provider operating an identity PSISS was criticised as out-of-date 
and adding risk to the Executive.  Outsourcing to third party providers were a viable 
alternative.  Respondents believed using a private service provider would reduce 
the perceived level of risk as ongoing provider failure reflected poorly on the 
Executive.   
Resistance.  Respondents identified a lack of trust in the provider, and a feeling 
the PSISS may fail, or cause client systems to fail.  Larger agencies played the 
waiting game resisting adoption, as did some clients involved in governance.  
Client reasons to not adopt increased when the PSISS failed to meet the needs of 
clients who did adopt.  When the provider failed to meet performance targets the 
Executive reduced funding leading to a downward spiral.   
Limited Executive financial support resulted in the provider having to “nickel and 
dime recovery costs” (Respondent 20) through the “top slicing of agency budgets 
which lead to grudges” (Respondent 16).  “Cabinet refused direct funding, so SSC 
had to collect from agencies” (Respondent 2).  The provider argued funding was 
insufficient, it “got to the point where the service did not develop further and 
stagnated as no one would invest in it due to the large investment required” 
(Respondent 17).  Clients disagreed and viewed the provider as “bloated” and 
“centrally arrogant” for taking their budgets (Respondent 9).  The PSISS was 
criticised for being over-engineered.  “Risk adversity drove that.  It is easy to spend 
money to reduce risk rather than to take a chance and introduce risk” (Respondent 
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18).  As a result, the PSISS was viewed as “a bit of a disaster.  Like the most 
engineered over managed programme of work” (Respondent 18). 
The provider “had to dispel that every agency needs it and will jump for it.  
They will not change until there is a reason, as it costs to change” (Respondent 
19).  SSC struggled to “convince the public service it was a good idea or get 
agency buy in” (Respondent 1).  They found client “trust was hard to build, 
easy to lose” (Respondent 18).  Clients felt threatened and they reacted 
emotionally.  The limited adoption made it “really, really hard in those early 
days” as it was “hard to justify investment when there was not many users” 
(Respondent 19).   
The provider attempted to sell the PSISS to large clients, unfortunately “the sales 
people didn’t sell the benefits to big agencies” (Respondent 8).  Larger clients had 
the ability to play the waiting game to avoid adoption.  Some large agencies were 
involved in governance but did not adopt the PSISS, which frustrated the provider, 
particularly after including client executives in governance groups.  Client 
executives attending governance meetings were passive aggressive and attempted 
to block the progress of the PSISS.  Clients argued governance groups were set up 
to meet the provider’s needs as the real power was “held by the senior 
management” (Respondent 4).   
Clients had many reasons why they were unique and could not adopt the PSISS.  
“Generally there was not confidence in the service or the interface, there was an 
issue with control as clients felt the service wasn’t good enough” (Respondent 15).  
Clients who adopted the PSISS complained about the experience, putting other 
clients off.  Others argued they had existing identity solutions meaning the PSISS 
would add additional cost without any identifiable benefits.  The provider was 
criticised for adding little value to clients and was viewed as “layers of ticket 
clippers between thinkers and engineers” (Respondent 11).   
PSISS adoption was viewed by respondents as optional, with an inference it was 
mandatory and enforced by the Executive.  Clients were not adopting or were 
agreeing to adopt then pulling out.  The Commissioner was frustrated by the lack 
of adoption and believed he was legislatively empowered to direct adoption so 
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“was looking for an opportunity to use that power.  He issued the direction to the 
whole public service” (Respondent 17).  Respondents felt the directive was 
required as public sector chief executives needed to be shown the stick to drive 
adoption.  As a result, “provider and clients clashed” (Respondent 17).  The client 
response was to resist and argue about the wording of the mandate to find reasons 
to avoid adoption.   
The Commissioner could not compel clients to adopt, instead he was reliant on 
ministers, however, sometimes ministerial goals conflicted with shared services, 
limiting client appetite for adoption.  Adoption targets were not met and the PSISS 
was seen to have failed.  The provider was seen to “lurch from crisis to crisis” 
(Respondent 2).  The “Commissioner was judged on success of programme, it went 
south and panic set in” (Respondent 1).  As a result, “almost the whole unit was 
shifted” to DIA (Respondent 17). 
Funding was limited and the PSISS put in a holding pattern.  “No one wants to 
invest until there is a catastrophic event.  It costs money to do it well, which eats 
into crown funding” (Respondent 20).  Even with agreements there was a lack of 
communication and respondents felt they “don't always know what has been 
discussed with ministers” (Respondent 20).   
Back at the provider “there is a mis-connection about what RealMe is and what 
people expect it to perform.  We are trying to limit it” (Respondent 20).  Outside 
the provider people in DIA were “trying to get it to do more and more things, this 
creates tension as they think RealMe is managing authentication and access 
controls for all agencies” (Respondent 20).  As the Department saw the provider as 
delivering technology to manage identity they did not see the provider as leading 
the sector.  “The biggest challenge has been people in the Department 
understanding how we operate as a capability.  It is based on managing ministers 
by pushing a wider agenda of system change” (Respondent 20).   
Existing sector funding and controls were frustrated as there “was no maturity on 
investment for system-wide assets, there have been a number of makeshift 
approaches to investment” (Respondent 20).  The makeshift investment approach 
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combined with a technical focus led the provider to “invest in the service and not 
the system” (Respondent 20).  
Clients complained the PSISS was “hard for people to integrate with” (Respondent 
11).  Integration led to increased, often unbudgeted, costs for clients, it got to the 
point where “people say based on reputation I do not want to participate” 
(Respondent 2).  The provider believed clients were making excuses “two of the 
main objections are the cost and usability of the service.  And the cost of integration 
against other priorities in the agency work programme.  That old chestnut” 
(Respondent 15).   
The provider believed change was inevitable and railed against the illusion of 
control where clients thought they could “afford to say we will have, hold and love 
our own tin” (Respondent 11).  Liability was a thorny issue, as client services 
became reliant upon the PSISS, they asked “if the service gets it wrong who is 
liable? Is there a liability agreement?” (Respondent 17), indicating clients wanted 
to treat the provider like any other service provider with contractual liability.  “The 
argument was people are using agency services so government as a whole is liable, 
agency liability is merely accountability.  Governance was the solution.  The point 
was not liability, rather how do you fix the service rather than hold liable” 
(Respondent 17). 
Presentations were made to client management where the “value proposition was a 
leap of faith” (Respondent 19) and client management were pressured to commit.  
Even with the mandate it was “hard to get commitment and realise benefits” 
(Respondent 19).  It was found that “mandates don’t work generally” (Respondent 
13) as they require a culture shift in the public sector.   
Respondents identified a need for shared accountability for the wider system, 
believing system accountability cannot sit with a single organisation.  Rather than 
trying to control PSISS adoption, there was a realisation the role of the provider 
was to enable clients to “think more creatively about delivering services” 
(Respondent 20).  Upon reflection a respondent admitted “there are some things 
done better at agency level.  RealMe is a small but critical enabling thing.  When 
you lose that focus you will annoy agencies and lose sight of what you are trying 
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to do” (Respondent 20).  The provider’s role changed from developing solutions 
and driving adoption to “performing an assurance, integrity and reliability function.  
Most of my work is working with partners, that is where the risk exists” 
(Respondent 20). 
Existing vertical governance arrangements were constraining collaboration.  
Although the Executive had enabled changes through legislation, BPS and 
collaborative governance, the “system-wide asset approach can be half baked.  I 
am not sure if New Zealand realise we need system investment” (Respondent 20).  
Rather than ask “how to get the best investment of government money on a single 
capability and make savings across agencies,” we should be focussing upon 
“leveraging capabilities that exist to deliver optimal citizen experience whilst 
delivering value for money” (Respondent 20).   
Funding and the need to recover costs was an ongoing concern.  The provider 
struggled to show improvements with limited resources and there was a view “set 
up costs need to be written off to national benefits” (Respondent 21).  There were 
fears the PSISS would be wound up or moved to a third party to make savings.  In 
the words of one respondent “this is an enabler why commercialise it?” 
(Respondent 20).   
Customer 
The fourth lifecycle stage is customer where client services are integrated with the 
PSISS and customer adoption is sought.   
Adoption.  Once clients and customers started using the PSISS, and identifying 
issues, the provider needed to take a more client and customer centric approach.  
User experience became significant with functions like system testing not done 
well, creating a negative impression and impacting adoption.  Respondents 
identified a “need to provide value to clients and customers” (Respondent 1), rather 
than simply deliver technology.  It was asserted the PSISS could provide greater 
utility and contribute to the public sector however it was not clear how this would 
occur.   
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Tensions rose as the provider had to operate within public sector constraints and 
meet customer needs and wants.  Technologists highlighted the technical qualities 
of the PSISS and became frustrated when “customers would make stupid 
suggestions” (Respondent 19) as managing technical expectations was difficult 
enough without adding customer needs.   
The PSISS was providing three distinct services: login, address verification and 
identity verification.  Respondents believed having “a centralised login and identity 
verification service was fundamental to use of the online channel by the public 
sector” (Respondent 3), and an essential part of developing a secure national eco-
system for digital services.  A validated identity would provide increased security, 
thereby enabling clients to securely offer higher-value digital services.  The PSISS 
could connect digital channels which customers could use knowing their personal 
information was securely managed.   
Customers would have a single secure identity rather than multiple different logins 
and passwords that would be easy to forget, providing a single identity they could 
use more frequently.  The frequency would increase the use of digital services and 
reduce the cost to clients for supporting customers.  More verified customers would 
increase client confidence to adopt the PSISS as they would reach more customers.  
The Executive would have assurance over privacy and security.  With customer 
consent client digital service providers could be granted access to customer identity 
data in real time.   
Verified services increased identity security and gave clients the ability to provide 
high value digital services to customers.  The verified identity had comparable 
strength to a passport, which could lead to digital on-boarding of flights if enough 
customers adopted the service.  The real benefit to clients came when validating 
multiple services as the PSISS would enable reusable identity, like adding a new 
key to a keyring.  The provider engaged clients and attempted to gain support by 
“needling senior agency people to commit” (Respondent 19). 
Respondents believed combining the mandate with an increased customer focus 
strengthened the case for PSISS adoption as public sector clients and their 
customers would be expected to use the PSISS.  Customers and clients remained 
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hesitant due to uncertainty about the future of the PSISS, so the provider required 
the Executive to demonstrate a long-term commitment. 
The Executive enacted new legislation to promote use of the PSISS, including 
allowing private sector clients to adopt, with the intention of increasing customer 
adoption.  Private sector clients could consume the PSISS without having to 
maintain their own identity information, just “like they do not create their own 
currency” (Respondent 1).  The provider partnered with New Zealand Post whose 
shops provided a physical location for customers to register for a verified account.   
The Executive endorsed the Better Public Services programme, new collaborative 
governance arrangements and the public sector ICT Strategy and Action Plan.  BPS 
outlined 10 priorities for government.  The target for Result 10 was to have an 
average of 70% of New Zealander’s most common government services performed 
online by December 2017.  The PSISS was explicitly identified as key for 
delivering Result 10.   
The Executive had strengthened collective responsibility to improve collaboration 
with clients to deliver outcomes, including “developing new operating models 
between CE and minister and the CE and their peers for the delivery of outcomes” 
(Respondent 2).  Changes to governance arrangements included an ICT senior 
leadership group and working groups, to assist in gaining client chief executive buy 
in, however, given the transformation of the public sector through BPS the PSISS 
was not a high priority for all clients. 
The provider was expected to help clients understand the PSISS and how it could 
enable digital service delivery.  A system-wide view was required to show client 
and sector benefits “so it becomes easier for agencies to see value and use the 
service, more connected, connecting services across government” (Respondent 
19).   
Some clients resisted the changes.  The introduction of the mandate and BPS led to 
pressure from the centre to collaborate.  Governance groups were seen to give the 
provider increased leverage.  The provider’s behaviour when pursuing targets 
increased client concerns outcomes were being sacrificed.  “The same thing is 
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happening with Result 10.  Starting with the 70% adoption figure rather than need 
to change; for example providing easier integration for services” (Respondent 20).   
Collaboration was promoted over the mandate with a call for a compelling 
argument for adoption rather than compelling clients to adopt.  The belief was the 
provider should listen to client and customer needs and make changes, however “it 
has taken a long time to resonate” (Respondent 20). 
Under BPS the provider saw themselves as a broker between clients and customers, 
which included private sector clients.  Adoption was increasing, however, the 
provider was not meeting performance targets.  Attention was paid to cultivating 
private sector clients, who remained hesitant to adopt the PSISS.  Inclusion of 
private sector services raised questions about the role private sector clients should 
play in collaborative governance, however, they were not given a place on 
governance groups.  Performance targets changed to customer adoption, based on 
the 70% usage set in Result 10.  Customers became people who consume digital 
services related to New Zealand, extending the definition of customers beyond 
New Zealand citizens to include international people interested in NZ digital 
services.   
The provider changed from a developer, which was primarily how SSC was seen, 
to a lead agency accountable for the PSISS, which was how DIA was viewed.  The 
Executive controlled finances, with the provider responsible for delivering the 
strategy of the government of the day.  A second accountability was to clients who 
acted as intermediaries providing services to customers.  Client needs included 
integration, security, shared investment models and system enhancements.  The 
provider was leading the network of consuming clients and overseeing the 
planning, change and operation of the PSISS.  Clients were still predominantly 
public sector agencies however the PSISS was gaining “minimal private sector 
exposure through banks” (Respondent 2). 
There was a desire to work with clients to develop new digital services to increase 
customer adoption.  Verified accounts were used to provide access to digital 
services based on customer life events to drive adoption, including tertiary study 
and immigration.  Client services like applying for a new passport were able to be 
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provided digitally using a verified identity.  The provider had increased their “focus 
on students and immigrants.  As people over 30 don't interact with government that 
much so we targeted students” (Respondent 19).  Student adoption made 
“Studylink a major contributor” (Respondent 16).   
Collaboratively working with clients through digital services like Studylink, gave 
the provider access to a large pool of customers.  When customers applied for a 
digital service they were provided with a tick box to apply for a verified PSISS 
account.  This could be done as they had just provided evidence of identity for a 
digital service which met verified account thresholds.  This tactic added hundreds 
of thousands of verified accounts. 
The large number of education providers maintaining customer information had 
resulted in multiple identity solutions with fragmentation and data quality issues 
across the education sector.  A federated solution could provide cheaper and faster 
enrolment processing using up-to-date student information.  This realisation led to 
increased education sector client adoption.   
The provider worked with clients to address integration concerns.  When clients 
connected new digital services the provider undertook a three-month early care 
support programme to resolve client issues.  The provider conducted client 
troubleshooting and created repeatable patterns to enable reuse.  An example of 
troubleshooting for Studylink was “students forget their username and password so 
we implemented a pin to help them” (Respondent 19).  Pin numbers were deployed 
using smartphone technology, which was something students were comfortable 
doing.  
Sector consultation led to the conclusion customers wanted a PSISS account that 
was easy to set up and could be issued both securely and quickly by the provider.  
Ease of adoption and ongoing use was an incentive to customers to engage 
digitally, with assurances identity information was used by the right people in the 
right way at the right time.  To improve customer experience the provider instituted 
internal customer satisfaction measures, developed in conjunction with clients.  
International customer needs were explored resulting in the introduction of a 
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Mandarin version of the PSISS to enable Chinese people to use a digital 
immigration service.   
Customer adoption was increasing, as was the belief services were better aligned 
to client and customer needs.  When asked if the PSISS was successful respondents 
felt they could not definitively comment as although performance targets were not 
being met, the PSISS “must also provide a value proposition as it is still in place” 
(Respondent 15).  Stopping the PSISS would introduce risks to clients and 
customers using the PSISS as it was embedded in several core government digital 
services.  Folding the PSISS would not be a simple, or cheap proposition.  Although 
the provider felt they were making progress towards Result 10 delivery, the PSISS 
was “just not there yet” (Respondent 15). 
Respondents identified two areas for improvement: improved performance targets 
and improved channels for customers to get verified accounts.   
Performance targets were based upon customer and client adoption, with no 
reporting on economic value or on privacy and security.  Respondents stated a need 
for performance targets to more accurately reflect system benefits to clients, 
customers and the nation. 
Some respondents criticised NZ Post as a store no-one used anymore.  They 
thought customers would be comfortable using their existing social media 
applications to manage identity information.  Leveraging commonly used systems 
like Facebook and Google for identity was being explored, however verified 
identity services would still be required for high value digital services like 
passports.   
Governance Focus.  The Cabinet mandate made the PSISS the “only way our 
services can be accessed by customers” (Respondent 7), strengthening the 
provider’s position and limiting the need for collaboration.  The provider was 
complacent, despite running for several years the PSISS was failing to meet 
performance targets.   
Respondents raised concerns about the internal governance focus.  Leadership at 
the provider were “older males running the show from within” (Respondent 10).  
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More attention was paid to vendor contracts than system outcomes.  Datacom was 
the vendor and New Zealand Post were the private sector partner.  When clients 
asked questions about the history of part ownership between these parties, 
respondents dismissed this as client trouble making.  The provider was resistant to 
collaboration which “could have led to more expectations and no ability to satisfy” 
(Respondent 16).  When dealing with clients the provider had “struggled to have a 
crisp message around value and what it does” (Respondent 5) and was criticised 
for being “locked into group think” (Respondent 6).   
Many respondents identified pressure to move the governance focus from return 
on investment to system-wide outcomes.  Governance had been implementing the 
PSISS using programme management, followed by a focus on adoption.  Results 
were based on number of clients and customers, nothing about economic value or 
how the privacy of services was ensured.  It was realised the PSISS was providing 
system benefits beyond the public sector.  The Executive were convinced to take a 
wider system view, endorsing increased digital transformation by providing 
direction for provider and clients to work together to deliver shared goals and 
increase adoption.  This led to discussions about including private sector clients.  
Technically there was no real limitation to private sector clients adopting the PSISS 
to provide online customer services, thereby potentially increasing client and 
customer adoption.  The limitation was legislative.  New Zealand Post was charged 
with developing the brand and engagement in the private sector and with 
customers.  Other central agencies were involved in developing legislation to 
enable non-public sector clients to adopt the PSISS.  The legislative change was 
followed by initiatives designed to increase collaboration.  
The Executive promoted increased collaboration across the public sector through 
BPS, the ICT Strategy and Action Plan, functional leadership accountabilities and 
a focus on transformation through life events and digital customer services.  The 
introduction of BPS and customer centred delivery provided a role for the PSISS 
to enable better outcomes for customers.  The ICT Strategy and Action Plan was 
developed to transform public sector services based on the needs of customers, 
predominantly through ten result areas using online channels.   
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The provider reviewed the suitability of collaborative governance arrangements.  
As the PSISS evolved so did the perceived need for collaborative governance, to 
promote “a coalition of the willing working with their peers to contribute to the 
future state, whilst performing their accountabilities” (Respondent 2).  
Collaborative governance and working groups were created to enable “robust 
debates about mutual areas of concern” (Respondent 6).  Involving clients in 
governance provided a voice for change.  Horizontal governance mechanisms were 
introduced but did not wholly replace existing vertical governance.   
Collaboration was supported by the “partnership group of 55 or so senior leaders 
from chief executive to tier 3 working together to achieve the accomplishment of 
the ICT strategy” (Respondent 2).  The partnership framework relied on “virtual 
teams working together” (Respondent 2) across the public sector.  The group 
oversaw changes to strategy or demand through a “collaborative decision-making 
process (where) no single agency makes all decisions” (Respondent 6).   
As provider DIA become the lead agency for Result 10, collaboratively supported 
by clients with “skin in the game” (Respondent 6) requiring them to adopt and 
contribute to the delivery of Result 10.  An important tool for collaboration was a 
formal participating client agreement that outlined expectations, committing them 
to more than regular conversations or informal meetings.   
The PSISS was identified as the “key to unlock government priorities” 
(Respondent 10) through Result 10, which introduced the 70% usage target.  The 
Executive endorsed the target and the new ICT Senior Leadership Group oversaw 
delivery.  Previously PSISS direction was a collection of “vague plans” 
(Respondent 1), whereas Result 10 provided a measurable target.  Results were 
measured and reported to the Executive, SSC, Treasury and DPMC quarterly.   
Technically, the PSISS improved security and privacy, providing customers “a 
common approach to engage with government on matters that are confidential in a 
secure fashion” (Respondent 2).  Customer experience was a different story with 
one respondent stating, “I shudder to use it” (Respondent 17) and another stating 
“it is clunky, and people can’t be bothered” (Respondent 14).  There was criticism 
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from respondents about the speed at which PSISS changes were made to enable 
new services like mobile phone access.   
The PSISS “was born in a different climate, people now are less concerned about 
a national identity system” (Respondent 6).  Respondents believed the relationship 
between customers and technology had changed since the 2000s.  Back then 
technology and people’s attitudes to technology were simpler.  The introduction of 
widespread internet and social media services had changed people’s attitude to 
online privacy.   
Customers were demanding online public sector services rather than accepting 
traditional paper or face-to-face service delivery.  “People don’t think that way 
anymore.  People don’t want to stand in line anymore” (Respondent 14).  
Previously the mantra was not to share information across clients, which was 
reinforced by legislation.  The PSISS provided customers the capability to allow 
their identity information to be shared through system authorisation, rather than 
having to gain an explicit agreement between clients.  “Privacy is important and 
we need to let the customer decide” what to share to provide ease of access to 
services they want (Respondent 6).  
Similarly, respondents believed the provider needed to change their previous 
internal, technology centric view to one collaborating with clients to deliver 
system-wide benefits.  Respondents believed “trust is required as well as 
technology” (Respondent 4) and “issues cannot be buried in the provider (who) 
can’t afford to hide things, however, covering things up is part of the culture” 
(Respondent 9).   
New ways of thinking were required to understand what shared outcomes were 
required.  The ambition for the PSISS changed from technology product to 
customer service, where the PSISS was used every day by “New Zealanders to 
access services from birth to death” (Respondent 10).   
The provider tried to improve existing technical solutions to provide customer 
value.  The PSISS provided one password to access multiple services, however 
customers were only allowed one verified account.  Customers could have one 
login to verify and others for transactions.  PSISS adoption was to become “the 
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first step in a person’s unique identity” (Respondent 17), the provider found the 
“biggest challenge for services is authentication, not identity” (Respondent 17).   
The PSISS let customers assert who they are, authentication let them show they are 
the same person every time by presenting a token or password.  The challenge was 
how to leverage this capability to provide something customers and clients would 
use.  Customers were redefined as “anybody entitled to any government service, 
members of the public not just citizens” (Respondent 14).   
Respondents identified several potential benefits including reduction of paper-
based forms, lower transaction costs and the ability to securely share information 
digitally.  As one respondent stated the potential savings from online services, 
coupled with security of customer information, “means the internationalisation of 
digital identity becomes key for nations” (Respondent 10).  The provider took an 
evidence-based approach setting up service delivery initiatives with clients to 
provide metrics of customer experience and satisfaction.  Clients began providing 
services based on customer needs, whereas previously “public policy used to drive 
behaviour” (Respondent 10).  The role of the provider was expressed as responding 
to customer and client needs with regulations in place to ensure protection and 
privacy.  Respondents presented the need for inter-connected customer centric 
services where a customer could access multiple client services to complete a life 
event, rather than having to perform several separate transactions for the same 
event.   
What respondents found was high value services required a greater level of trust, 
for example a birth certificate, passport or benefits approval where traceability and 
certainty are required.  Security and privacy become more important for 
authentication of high value client services.  The provider needed to present “an 
identity verification service that enables individuals to assert their identity with 
passport strength online” (Respondent 9). 
Respondents saw the PSISS enabling the sector to open up inter-client processes to 
deliver new customer services like “electronic on-boarding easy as that (clicks 
fingers)” (Respondent 5). 
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Whilst the broad target of 70% online customer usage was acknowledged as 
important, it was seen by respondents as too broad a goal.  There was a belief Result 
10 needed to be refreshed to increase focus upon customer life events and advising 
customers of entitlements, like the ability to vote at 18 and superannuation at 65, 
which were identified as existing gaps.   
The provider “worked with clients to integrate three customer services: voting, 
births deaths and marriages and student loans” (Respondent 13).  Despite the value 
of new customer services, the PSISS was still under threat in terms of long-term 
funding and sustainability, hence the ongoing reviews.  
Respondents identified personal agendas and personalities as barriers to PSISS 
success.  The provider was seen to be stuck in the middle of the Executive and 
clients trying to balance all needs through their service.  The PSISS needed “long 
term investment, but what we have is a perception of long-term failure” 
(Respondent 1).  The PSISS was considered “against the business case an abject 
failure” (Respondent 16).   
BPS and the ICT Strategy and Action Plan introduced common goals for the public 
sector.  Previous concerns about lack of clarity resurfaced and some respondents 
were unsure of the scope of governance groups.  The GCIO published regular 
performance reports as part of wider common capability reporting, however 
respondents believed there were other reports “however they have not published 
them” (Respondent 4).   
The PSISS was struggling and respondents saw it as a good idea poorly executed.  
There was a belief “if a new identity offering was released it would take off like 
wildfire, however the PSISS had too much baggage to be salvaged” (Respondent 
7).   
The PSISS was compared to a credit card company that needed to satisfy both the 
needs of clients who provide the services and customers who use the cards.  
Respondents believed like credit cards, shared identity services required costly 
large-scale infrastructure which makes establishment and cost effectiveness 
challenging.  Respondent 11 discussed this in terms of mobile technology where a 
lot of infrastructure is required to support a few users, but with more users it 
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becomes cheaper.  The first few PSISS customer services would not provide a 
return on investment, it only occurs with critical mass.  The provider was 
constrained by funding and the need to recover costs, particularly when client 
services to customers were not in place.   
The provider realised building the PSISS was uneconomic but necessary, placing 
them in potential conflict with the Executive, which became more challenging as 
the provider had “no direct channel to customers consuming client services” 
(Respondent 3) limiting their ability to influence adoption.  Failing to meet 
performance targets led to increased scrutiny and reduced funding, further limiting 
the provider’s ability to establish the required infrastructure.   
Respondents believed clients were not always working in the best interest of 
customers or the public sector. “In the private sector you can influence adoption.  
In the public sector you don’t have the ability to influence as much.  You get a lot 
of people who have the ability to make the right noises and build their careers” 
(Respondent 8).  Partnering with New Zealand Post was intended to provide access 
to customers through post shops, however it “provided access to stores that no-one 
goes to anymore.  No one visits the post office anymore” (Respondent 7). 
The provider hoped an increase in verified accounts would provide encouragement 
for private sector client adoption providing “a verified identity that can be used 
online interacting with government, it could be interacting with anyone” 
(Respondent 8).  The introduction of anti-money laundering legislation provided 
an opportunity for the PSISS to provide identity services to banks, who the provider 
targeted as an opportunity for driving large scale customer adoption.  The benefit 
to banks would be reduced administration costs with up-to-date customer 
information and customers could securely navigate between systems without 
having to remember multiple passwords.   
The provider believed, despite challenges, they had done a reasonably credible job 
delivering services under financial constraints with no security incidents, having 
“done a better job than SSC” (Respondent 16).  They argued the PSISS was a 
service ahead of its time, which lacked support and through lack of funding and the 
advancement of commercial identity services had become obsolete.   
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The Executive questioned the viability of the provider hosting the PSISS.  The 
technology was clunky, however the ability to share identity information securely 
and in line with the Privacy Act were valued by respondents.  The technology used 
for the “authentication element of the PSISS has done its dash, but have the identity 
sharing elements of the PSISS done their dash?  Absolutely not” (Respondent 11).   
The PSISS was a product of a bygone operating model.  The core business of the 
public sector was not technology as “running stuff is a distraction” (Respondent 6).  
The provider struggled to fit the PSISS into the wider public sector ecosystem.  The 
political agenda changed dramatically, commercial identity solutions proliferated 
and “New Zealanders’ attitudes changed from locking down identity to something 
that adds value if shared” (Respondent 6).   
Some respondents thought “government should get out of the authentication game 
and stick to identity.  The asset has always been that government is the issuer of 
identity and will continue to do so.  How we leverage the data is what makes it 
valuable” (Respondent 16).  There was a realisation the “asset is not the tin it is the 
information” and the provider is “not an ICT services organisation, we are a 
government public sector organisation, we should go to market for what we need” 
(Respondent 6). 
Respondents saw outsourcing the PSISS as an option as “federated solutions are 
commercially at a dead end, it only works for big players like Google or MSN” 
(Respondent 16).  Google and Facebook handle identity management for large 
numbers of customers.  It was felt that a larger number of public sector clients in 
New Zealand would use them rather than the PSISS, although “there are issues 
with trust with things like Facebook” (Respondent 20). 
Respondents viewed the PSISS as a valid interim step towards the delivery of 
identity services, believing the PSISS technology should be retired, with 
commercial or social media-based identity solutions picking up the identity 
function for online customer services.  The GCIO could provide the scope, demand 
expectations and outcomes to commercial providers who then report results to 
central governance, led by GCIO.  New Zealand could then “sell the brand overseas 
or provide complimentary services” (Respondent 2).   
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Stakeholder input was required to understand how they were directly impacted by 
changes to the PSISS.  While governance was observed as more mature there were 
areas that still required attention including lifecycle management and tighter 
governance around build and review cycles.   
Adoption of the PSISS by studylink and the Electoral Commission led to a wave 
of enthusiasm at the provider for the future of the PSISS.  The creation of sector 
governance groups had “been successful in creating discussion about what the 
future state should be” (Respondent 2).  A closer working relationship was also 
seen to contribute to increased client adoption.   
Accountability.  When the PSISS was moved the provider believed they had been 
put in a box and buried in DIA.  The buck was meant to stop with the Executive 
who were ultimately accountable for the PSISS.  Direction was set by the Executive 
through business cases and performance targets, which drove a focus upon 
adoption.  Ministers spoke about supporting the PSISS, although this was not 
consistent.  Executive involvement in governance was viewed as only occurring 
when things went wrong, mostly through reviews, contributing to tension between 
provider and Executive.  Constant reviews placed the PSISS “under threat in terms 
of long-term funding and sustainability” (Respondent 1).  The reviews were 
avoidance of risk by the Executive, which in turn placed risk on the provider which 
led to lost credibility with clients.   
Questions were raised about continuity of reporting.  “There used to be service 
reporting going to ministers.  I am not sure if reporting is happening now” 
(Respondent 15).  There was a yearly dressing down when annual reports were 
presented, and the provider was held to account for not meeting performance 
targets, which led to sanction through reduced funding.  The provider was 
accountable for non-adoption by clients but could not compel client adoption.  
Tensions between provider and clients were further increased by top slicing of 
client budgets to fund the PSISS.  Something had to change.   
The Executive set an expectation of collective responsibility requiring clients “to 
work together more closely” (Respondent 20), through a Cabinet minute mandating 
PSISS adoption enforced by a Cabinet committee.  The Executive was showing 
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“support for the idea clients had to collaborate.  The mandate was core government 
agencies being sent that message” (Respondent 17).  Clients adopted the PSISS 
because they had to adopt, not because they wanted to adopt. 
Respondents identified several collaborative governance groups and initiatives that 
were set up, and endorsed by the Executive, to oversee delivery.   
The Executive endorsed BPS which introduced and outlined ten priorities for 
government services.  Each priority was to be allocated a lead agency accountable 
for delivery.  BPS was supported by the ICT Strategy and Action Plan which 
presented ICT focus areas to enable delivery of outcomes.   
The GCIO at DIA struggled with the question “how do we ensure the customer 
experience of government services is effective?” (Respondent 16).  A senior 
leadership group was established consisting of a cohort of chief executives from 
across the public sector to facilitate transformation of services and collaborative 
delivery.  The senior leaders were supported by working groups to oversee 
implementation of the ICT strategy with GCIO as the functional leader.  
Respondents believed the actual “governance group was the ICT senior leadership 
group” who oversaw implementation (Respondent 2).   
The Service Innovation Working Group, consisting of tier 2 reports from the 
provider and clients, was accountable for setting direction and overseeing the 
delivery of Result 10.  Under Result 10 clients were expected to deliver customer 
facing services through online channels with identity provided by the PSISS, 
reinforced by the mandate.  As DIA was the lead agency, the provider was made 
accountable for delivering Result 10 whereby 70% of New Zealander’s most 
common government services would be performed online by 2017.  There was now 
a shared direction and plan endorsed by the Executive requiring provider and 
clients to deliver customer services using the PSISS.  The lead agency was expected 
to oversee “service delivery to drive the outcomes” (Respondent 6).   
Respondents argued accountability could not sit only with the provider, and 
reviews would highlight the need for multi-party accountability.  Public sector 
clients participated in sector working groups and were expected to assist delivery 
of Result 10.  Accountability was observed across the wider ecosystem.  “DIA is 
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leading the change as lead agency, although every stakeholder has skin in the game.  
From the Minister of Finance to NZ Post, agencies who are consuming and 
suppliers in the value chain.  They all have stakes in what it may look like” 
(Respondent 6).   
New governance arrangements were in place, however, there was a concern Result 
10 metrics did not accurately reflect sector needs.  Respondents asserted the 70% 
customer usage target was based on existing services which provided little 
incentive to integrate new services.  Furthermore, the provider was seen to be 
“gaming the system to meet deliverables” (Respondent 20) to ensure ongoing 
investment in the existing PSISS, rather than in new services.  This identified a gap 
in existing accountability arrangements and a missed opportunity to leverage the 
existing PSISS investment.  Respondents believed sector clients had a role to 
ensure this gap was identified and resolved, particularly under the mandate.  An 
example was provided where education sector clients worked with the provider to 
“nudge RealMe from its path into something with a slight customisation, which 
would make it a more attractive service for other sectors” to adopt (Respondent 
21).   
Risk.  The Executive had taken a risk approving the PSISS as they “will not get 
elected for an identity system but will get political damage for a poor system” 
(Respondent 20).   
The PSISS was not successful when measured against the business case, however, 
respondents believed stopping the PSISS would impact the credibility of New 
Zealand as a nation state by removing a key part of online service infrastructure.  
This placed the Executive and provider in a quandary.  Any changes would require 
bravery from the Executive as there was “more political risk than potential gain” 
(Respondent 20).  With limited client adoption the provider was forced “to keep 
going back for money.  Reputationally it affected how clients see them or perceive 
them” (Respondent 15).  The provider had “spent hundreds of thousands of dollars 
and needed investment to keep the service up-to-date and meeting customer and 




The provider was failing to meet performance targets and the Executive was 
concerned the PSISS was becoming a white elephant.  One option to increase 
adoption was to open the PSISS to private sector clients, but this introduced several 
risks including privacy and liability.  Legislation was introduced to extend PSISS 
adoption to clients beyond the public sector and to overcome privacy and liability 
risks.   
Respondents believed the Executive had reduced one set of risks through 
legislation, however they had introduced another through increased PSISS reliance 
by public and private sector clients, not to mention customers who were also voters.   
PSISS failure would impact client operations, and with hundreds of thousands of 
customers using the PSISS the reputational risk to the Executive would be sizeable.  
The provider was responsible for “minimising risk to ministers of getting it wrong” 
(Respondent 12), which increased the risk averse nature of the provider and limited 
the funding available for PSISS changes.   
Adoption was increasing, but the Executive were making it hard through reviews 
and limited funding.  Financial support was limited to 12-month periods, with 
caveats the provider had to ensure investments reduced Executive fiscal exposure.  
The caveats required expenditure on internal controls, rather than investment in 
technology and development.  Internally it was believed the provider required a 
four-year investment for improvement and continuity of the PSISS.   
Underinvestment meant the provider could not keep up-to-date with new methods 
for improved service provision to customers.  As a result, the provider explored 
outsourcing the PSISS.  Some respondents were wary, believing the PSISS was a 
“strategic imperative so can’t get outsourced” (Respondent 6).   
The PSISS came under threat from new methods of authentication like Google and 
social media.  These services had a lower threshold of security than the PSISS, 
however that was not always understood by customers or clients.  Respondents 
were concerned the Executive would look for a cheap, simple solution to a complex 
problem.  By handing the national identity solution to a social media company the 
Executive would be risking losing an asset of national importance and exposing 
customer data.   
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Resistance.  Respondents indicated the relationship between provider and clients 
had a low level of trust and clients were resentful of limited collaboration and 
additional integration costs.  At an outcome level the PSISS had the potential to 
provide sector efficiencies, and improved customer services but respondents saw it 
failing to deliver these benefits.  Performance targets may have identified potential 
benefits but respondents observed the provider failing to deliver.   
Client adoption was a prerequisite for outcome delivery as client services were 
required for customer adoption.  Client resistance was identified as a barrier the 
provider would need to address.  The Cabinet mandate was coercive, without 
introducing reciprocal client incentives for adoption.  Despite increased 
enforcement respondents believed clients did not trust the provider and still 
actively resisted adoption.  Customers required a reason to adopt but with only 
limited client services the PSISS provided limited customer benefits.  Respondents 
identified examples where the provider believed they knew what was best for 
customers.  “We are government and have to follow standards, we have better 
process for managing change and how to do it safely” (Respondent 19). 
The provider attempted to “resolve issues at service, agency and sector level” 
(Respondent 20).  Issues ranged from “changing a password used to be a nightmare.  
There are corresponding technologies now to help password refresh” (Respondent 
18), to being “cognisant of the end-to-end customer experience, we have nearly 
100 services and not all have modern interfaces range from nice new mobile UI to 
another agency having any old rubbish.  We need to get control over the end-to-
end customer experience” (Respondent 20).   
Education agencies found “current arrangements around RealMe were not going to 
work” (Respondent 21).  They were frustrated students had to perform multiple 
interactions “for what they consider the same process, e.g.  getting a student loan 
and passing information to IRD” (Respondent 19).  The provider needed customer 
adoption, providing the education sector leverage “to make RealMe a better fit for 
what we wanted” (Respondent 21).  After lengthy negotiation the education sector 
“bankrolled the tertiary work to nudge RealMe from its path into something with a 
slight customisation, which would make it a more attractive service for other 
sectors” (Respondent 21).   
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Education sector clients believed “there are a lot more things people could spend 
money on than processing student enrolments.  Quicker cheaper and easier for 
education providers will transfer into better services for students” (Respondent 21).  
Some respondents believed this was the role the PSISS should play as a system 
asset.  Through collaboration the provider and clients approached education as a 
joined-up sector providing a “technology bridge to tertiary” (Respondent 21).  
Respondents saw service improvements providing benefits to clients, customers 
and the provider.  Students could carry their identity between schools and tertiary 
providers, clients gained access to up-to-date customer information and customer 
adoption figures swelled when large numbers of students signed up to apply for 
funding through studylink. 
The provider struggled with Executive resistance.  With limited funding the PSISS 
was “behind where we should be” (Respondent 20).  There was frustration the 
provider had to pitch to the Executive to make changes like mobile enhancements 
that were common in commercial offerings.  The provider delivered the PSISS with 
a small team “run on low resources over the years.  Most of the money goes into 
development, the budget for resources is really small” (Respondent 19).   
The provider was given Executive support through BPS approval and the ICT 
Strategy and Action Plan.  Many respondents were frustrated by ongoing reviews 
and limited funding.  The provider had to undergo reviews when requesting 
funding, placing the future of the PSISS in doubt.  Despite the number of reviews, 
it was believed “none of the reviews have done more than broadly conclude this is 
hard and there are no easy options” (Respondent 20).   
The provider struggled to present system benefits in dollar terms.  The PSISS 
enabled other services to be provided, however making it recover costs was viewed 
as counter-productive.  Although “more systems and clients are adopting” 
(Respondent 18) the PSISS had “not been successful for a collaborative service” 
(Respondent 1), with respondents critical of the time it had taken.  It was believed 
clients adopted because the mandate said they had to adopt, which raised concerns 
as future collaboration would require the provider “to act in a socially successful 
and empathetic way, not telling people what to do” (Respondent 1). 
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Chapter six presented the results of my analysis, bringing about the construction of 
a grounded theory which found respondents perceived PSISS governance as a 
process in practice.  This finding was supported through construction of a rich 
practitioner narrative on PSISS governance which explored the four stages of the 
governance process using the categories generated through grounded theory 
analysis.  The practitioner perspectives captured in this narrative were analysed 
using the governance framework and governance characteristics model from my 
literature review in Chapter two as sensitising concepts, which resulted in the 
identification of eight themes from the practitioner perspectives on PSISS 




Chapter Seven. Discussion: A Governance Practice Narrative 
This chapter creates the first iteration of theoretical integration brought about 
through reflexive comparison of the practitioner perspectives in the grounded 
practitioner narrative in Chapter six with theory and the official narrative in 
Chapter five.  The term participant was used to describe the combination of 
practitioners from both narratives used to create this governance practice narrative.  
Theoretical integration was organised using the conceptual governance framework 
developed in my literature review.  Eight themes of theoretical interest emerged 
from this process: 1) Conflicting ideas of governance; 2) Fluid governance 
boundaries; 3) Protecting our privacy; 4) Implementing systems or outcomes?; 5) 
Accountability deficits; 6) Mandating collaboration; 7) Is technology different?; 
and 8) Collaborative governance, the art of the state.  I discuss each of these themes 
in turn, in the light of existing scholarship and theory.   
Theme One: Conflicting Ideas of Governance 
Participants talked a lot about governance, but it became evident they did not talk 
about governance in the same way.  For example: when the PSISS was being built 
at SSC, governance was identified as an internal provider-based ICT and 
programme management process; other participants pointed to what the Executive 
and cross-agency governance groups did as governance; and others pointed at the 
Cabinet mandate as governance.  These different takes on governance reflected in-
practice notions of governance, similar to those seen in theory.   
Discussions of governance in the literature reveal a contested concept with a range 
of different definitions (Frederickson, 2005).  The practitioner perspective 
appeared to reflect confusion occurring among participants about what governance 
meant for the PSISS and mirrored the differences in corporate governance, IT 
governance and collaborative governance literatures.  Elaborating on these 
distinctions, corporate governance occurs within an organisational boundary and is 
commonly characterised as vertical in nature with clear delineation between the 
roles of the board and management presented in codes of practice.  The board sets 
the direction and puts controls in place to ensure delivery of the direction by 
247 
 
management.  A key focus of corporate governance is risk management to reduce 
potential liability for the shareholders and board members.   
Information technology governance in contrast has procedural characteristics 
giving the impression of a set of processes and controls reported to the board to 
assist in the delivery of organisational goals (ITGI, 2005a, 2008a).  It is commonly 
presented as supporting organisational, predominantly corporate, governance.  
There is agreement that ICT requires direction and control (Van Grembergen, 
2004), however, there is confusion about who performs IT governance.  IT 
governance is commonly performed by a combination of executives and 
management which has contributed to challenges for developing common 
definitions of accountability.  Finally, collaborative governance spans 
organisational boundaries and introduces non-hierarchical governance.  The focus 
of collaborative governance is delivery of outcomes that single organisations could 
not deliver alone.  The use of collaborative governance has been promoted for 
transformation, innovation and provision of customer centric services (Ansell & 
Gash, 2008; Rogers & Weber, 2010).   
My analysis turned to whether these governance forms relate to PSISS in practice.  
Public sector ICT shared services were identified in my literature review as an 
opportunity to improve processes and enable collaborative improvement of 
customer services, shared outcomes and even democracy (Brewer, 2006; Janssen 
et al., 2012; Banoun, Dufour, & Andiappan, 2016).  My grounded practitioner 
narrative showed participants highlighting the significance of collaboration, risk, 
vertical direction and controls in the governance of the PSISS.   
In the concept phase practitioners portrayed a focus was on public sector 
collaboration to deliver a system asset that would benefit clients and customers.  
The PSISS started as part of the e-government programme and SSC intended to use 
cross-sector collaboration to create improved services for customers.  The 
Executive provided the State Services Commissioner legislative authority to lead 
e-government initiatives and approved a programme of service creation.  Further 
Executive support was signalled through ministerial press releases promoting 
shared services (Mallard, 2003, 2004).  SSC established the e-Government Unit 
and it started a process of collaborative consultation with the sector on the creation 
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of the PSISS.  The Commissioner stated e-government initiatives were intended to 
deliver business value rather than be a big ICT project.  This statement appeared to 
be attempting to allay concerns about large public sector ICT failures (State 
Services Commission, 2001).  This collaboration facilitated the development of a 
business case providing the specification for the PSISS, which the Executive 
approved. 
Later, during the implementation phase participants observed the provider 
reverting to vertical ICT project governance to develop and release the PSISS.  
Some participants believed this was driven by risk aversion.  As evidenced in 
literature, collaboration is challenging and can be time consuming (O'Flynn, 2009).  
Practitioners believed the provider had paid lip service to collaboration and 
changed tack under pressure to deliver.  The provider had a vertical accountability 
relationship to the Executive and was accountable for delivery of the PSISS.  The 
provider had no experience of delivering online services and project success had 
by then become identified as delivery of a PSISS as specified in the business case.  
Practitioners believed these pressures made delivery of the ICT project the prime 
focus of the provider during the implementation phase.  To manage doubts about 
SSC’s project capability the provider engaged a third party to develop the PSISS.  
The provider’s belief at this time appeared to be once the PSISS was built, clients 
would use it even though collaboration with clients ceased.  The apparent focus on 
risk and vertical governance between the Executive and provider shows 
characteristics of corporate governance.   
Despite the earlier assurances of the State Services Commissioner, the PSISS was 
being governed as a large internal ICT project.  In the implementation phase 
governance was observed as residing internally within SSC and reliant upon 
programme management controls.  The use of programme management and a focus 
on ICT deliverables indicated a procedural IT governance focus.  Even the use of 
the term implementation by participants indicated a bias towards an ICT project 
delivery, rather than the broader use of implementation we see in public 
administration literature which has an outcome focus (Hupe & Hill, 2015).   
Practitioners believed client trust was brittle as a result of governance changes as 
clients were shut out of the development of the PSISS.  There was only limited 
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collaboration and clients were unsure what was expected from them.  It manifested 
little appetite from clients to adopt the PSISS.  As a consequence, when the PSISS 
was released clients did not have customer facing services ready to connect.  
Despite the lack of client readiness participants said the provider ploughed on to 
deliver the adoption targets defined in the business case.  Participants mentioned 
concerns within the provider that performance targets were overly optimistic.  This 
was borne out when the provider failed to meet initial targets and clients showed 
active resistance to adoption.  Client resistance increased when clients had poor 
integration experiences with the PSISS.  Several reasons that contributed to the 
poor experience were seen to be unbudgeted costs and difficulty integrating with 
client existing third-party applications, many of which had built in identity 
solutions that had to be redesigned to accommodate the PSISS.  This indicates 
misalignment between the provider and clients.  The provider saw the E-ID as 
identity, which met their needs to integrate between systems, whereas clients 
needed additional identity functionality to authenticate users and other resources.  
The success of the PSISS depended upon client adoption and clients resisted 
adoption by leveraging existing vertical governance arrangements.  Negative 
adoption experiences also contributed to an erosion of trust between clients and 
provider.       
Practitioners believed existing vertical governance relationships with ministers 
strengthened client resistance to adoption.  Clients were accountable to their 
responsible minister for delivery of contractual obligations.  Client ministers had 
more clout than the Commissioner.  Clients were seen to have little incentive to 
adopt the PSISS.  Adoption appeared to introduce risks to clients’ vertical 
deliverables.  When faced with a choice between using their limited resources to 
deliver their vertical deliverables or taking on additional risk and collaborating by 
adopting the PSISS, clients shied away with the full support of their minister.  
Practitioners observed these mixed signals and questioned whether the government 
was fully behind the PSISS. 
The PSISS failed to deliver the business case benefits, creating reputational risk for 
the Commissioner arising from increased Executive scrutiny through reviews and 
limited funding.  The risk increased after the failure of another PSISS, GSN, 
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leading participants to conclude that the e-Government Unit had failed.  SSC’s 
apparent failure as provider was viewed as particularly embarrassing as because of 
SSC’s system-wide responsibility for advising agencies how to run large projects 
(State Services Commission & Treasury, 2000, 2001; State Services Commission, 
2011).  The State Services Commissioner panicked and reacted to shift the risk of 
shared service failure.  Implementation of the PSISS and other shared services were 
moved to the Department of Internal Affairs.  SSC as provider was held to account 
for poor client adoption, although participants believed the provider did not have 
the authority to enforce client adoption resulting in an apparent accountability 
deficit (Schillemans, 2011).   
The failure drove Executive risk aversion and the strengthening of vertical 
governance arrangements.  In 2010 the Executive introduced a mandate, enforced 
through a Cabinet committee, to compel client adoption indicating increased 
vertical governance.  Participants identified the mandate as a mechanism to 
increase client accountability backed up by an Executive committee as an 
accountability forum.   
In response to the global financial crisis at that time, the Executive expected the 
public sector to ‘do more with less’ (Small, 2009b).  Post mandate changes 
strengthened the vertical relationships between Executive, provider and clients, and 
provided opportunities for increased collaboration.  Participants saw these were 
legislative reform, Better Public Services, the ICT Strategy and Action Plan, new 
governance groups and the introduction of blueprints and result areas, particularly 
Result 10 which directly reinforced client adoption of the PSISS.   
The PSISS had started as a collaborative initiative but when risks emerged the 
Executive, provider and clients were all observed to revert to vertical governance 
arrangements.  The corporate and information technology governance forms 
observed in practice appear to have reinforced the vertical governance 
arrangements.  Tight vertical governance appears to be a common response to risk 
reinforced by the risk averse nature of the public sector.  Both the SSC and 
Executive reverted to vertical governance when collaborative methods became 
difficult and the potential risk of failure increased.  Collaborative methods were 
promoted by the Executive and provider, however participants saw the Executive, 
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provider and clients relying upon vertical governance, particularly direction and 
controls when risk arose.   
Limited trust in the provider to deliver may have contributed to low client adoption, 
particularly before the second mandate and Executive level accountability forum 
were introduced.  After the mandate was introduced most clients did not trust the 
provider or PSISS to meet their needs, however they were compelled to adopt.  In 
the years since the Cabinet mandate, client adoption and integration of customer 
facing client services have increased.   
In summary, PSISS governance was observed to change modes over time, and so 
too the governance roles played by the provider, clients and Executive.  The 
provider and clients were observed playing both governance and management 
roles, begging questions about the distinction, particularly in the public sector, 
which is picked up in the next theme.   
Theme Two: Fluid Governance Boundaries  
In my discussions with participants on the influence of governance on the PSISS I 
noticed differing perspectives about who was performing governance.  Governance 
arrangements appeared to be changing over time and participants did not provide a 
clear, common understanding of who was performing governance and where the 
boundaries between governance and management were.   
My literature review identified lack of clarity about governance and management 
as problematic and leading to conflicts of interest.  In corporate governance, the 
board performs governance, setting direction for management to follow.  In IT 
governance a combination of executives and management perform governance.  
Collaborative governance crosses organisational boundaries and introduces 
governance mechanisms that may be performed by separate and multiple 
organisations.   
With the introduction of collaborative inter-organisational governance, participants 
can be asked to perform multiple, sometimes conflicting, roles for a shared service.  
In practice participants identified examples of governance being performed by the 
Executive, the provider and clients.  For example: the provider undertook 
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governance during implementation of the technology, the Executive passed 
legislative and regulatory reforms including mandates and clients were involved in 
initial consultation and cross-sector governance groups.  These roles occurred at 
different stages of the lifecycle meaning governance arrangements were changing 
over time.   
Practitioners saw changes in who was performing governance contributing to 
reduced role clarity and blurring boundaries for governance.  This was problematic 
in two ways:  
• participants were performing multiple potentially conflicting roles, and  
• participant confusion about who performs governance (the Executive, 
provider or clients).   
Participants also identified potential conflicts of interest for the Executive, provider 
and clients.  These are shown in the following examples. 
The provider had a role to deliver shared services that contributed to outcome 
delivery, thereby meeting the needs of stakeholders including the Executive, clients 
and customers.  An example of conflict occurring when trying to meet these 
different stakeholder needs was highlighted in the concept and implementation 
stages of the PSISS.  Having been empowered by the Executive, the provider 
consulted with clients to collaboratively develop the concept of the PSISS to 
business case.  The provider was then expected by clients to perform the role of 
collaborative partner and system developer.  However, the provider’s primary 
focus then became delivering an ICT project as defined in the business case rather 
than collaboration with clients to meet their needs.  According to participants the 
provider was preoccupied with IT governance through internal controls and 
meeting the Executive-directed performance measurements in the business case 
and collaboration was ignored.  The absence of client collaboration then led to 
client resistance and was not addressed by governance.       
In the official narrative, a conflict of interest is seen between Executive intention 
for clients to adopt the PSISS and client’s need for deliverables.  Participants 
identified situations where client representatives were involved in a governance 
group for the PSISS and advocated adoption of the PSISS; while at the same time 
253 
 
in their own organisation, made decisions not to adopt the PSISS as a client.  This 
was known as the “curse of the smiling faces” (Respondent 15).  Clients prioritised 
their activities based on their vertical accountabilities to their own organisation and 
their minister.  Ministers seemed more focussed upon their portfolio interests than 
unanimity to support a public sector goal when it came to PSISS adoption.   
The Commissioner did not have the ability to compel client adoption and individual 
ministers chose not to compel adoption by their departments, revealing a potential 
gap in governance oversight.  The Executive moved to close this jeopardy through 
use of the Cabinet mandate and introduction of an Executive level accountability 
forum, which participants said improved accountability and role clarity by 
compelling client adoption.  It also had the effect of enforcing unanimity among 
the Executive, potentially addressing the erstwhile accountability deficit among 
ministers (Schillemans, 2011).    
The common practice for management to escalate issues to governance for 
resolution is evident in the literature.  Lack of role clarity, and uncertainty about 
who performs governance can affect escalation (e.g.Hilmer, 1993).  As shown in 
the first conflict of interest example the provider believed they were performing 
governance, however neither they nor the Executive appear to have addressed the 
issue of collaboration to reduce client resistance.  In the second example the 
Executive did eventually use their governance role to address client adoption and 
the accountability deficit.   
A lack of clarity about who performs governance, particularly between governance 
and management can be dangerous.  There are numerous examples in the literature 
where lack of role clarity has led to large public sector ICT failures often costing 
millions (Gauld, 2006).  Elsewhere failures led to legislative remedies including 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which introduced codes of conduct incorporating role 
clarity (McGowan & Brisendine, 2003; Damianides, 2005).  These legislative 
changes are comparable to the PSISS where legislative change, mandate and an 
Executive level accountability forum were put in place with the effect of moving 
governance mechanisms from the provider to the Executive.    
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The Executive also oversaw structural changes to governance arrangements: the 
introduction of new governance groups at the Executive, chief executive and 
deputy chief executive levels.  The group with ministers was explicitly called 
governance whereas the other two were referred to as leadership groups in 
publications (Department of Internal Affairs, 2017c, 2018b).  The leadership 
groups were provided autonomy to set service direction through creation of 
charters and blueprints for the ten result areas (Scott & Boyd, 2017).  Although 
charters and blueprints increased role clarity, leadership groups appear contrived, 
sitting somewhere between governance and management, resulting in some role 
ambiguity (Hammond et al., 2019).    
Theme Three: Protecting Our Privacy 
Privacy is particularly important for governments with personal information a form 
of currency in the digital age (Polykalas & Prezerakos, 2019).  The PSISS holds 
personally identifiable customer information about New Zealanders and others 
requiring authentication for government and non-governmental customer-facing 
client services.  This makes the PSISS valuable as a national asset and makes it a 
potential target.   
New Zealand’s unique privacy legislation was a hurdle for the PSISS.  A 
participant stated whilst privacy could have been identified as a barrier and cut out 
of project scope, collaboration with the Privacy Commissioner appears to have 
increased the public value through endorsement of the PSISS by the Privacy 
Commissioner as a “privacy enhancing service” (Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner, 2019).   
Having built an identity solution that enhanced privacy obviated the need for  many 
of the recent data privacy issues raised by legislation like GDPR which required 
governance controls over privacy, particularly for citizen’s personally identifiable 
information (Bennett, 2018).  It also means in theory that identity needs only be 
changed once rather than by every client.  The centralised PSISS identity 
information has the potential to be the most up-to-date identity information for an 
individual.  The individual updates their information only once for multiple client 
services.  Providing the customer with the ability to decide which clients have 
access to their information also allays some privacy concerns.  Customers can opt 
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to use services, or not, which places the control of personal information in the 
customer’s hands.   
The combination of international legislation, the value of the information in the 
design and delivery of services and the need to protect citizens’ personal 
information require governance assurance of privacy and adequate security 
mechanisms to protect the information.  In my grounded practitioner narrative we 
saw that the PSISS was contractually developed and run on behalf of the provider.  
Later the provider partnered with New Zealand Post to enable access to post shops 
for creating verified identities.  Internationally other contractual mechanisms have 
been used to provide identity PSISS.  Examples include: consortia delivering a 
single identity PSISS and multiple vendors providing identity PSISS centrally 
regulated by the provider (Eaton et al., 2017; Stalla-Bourdillon et al., 2018).   
Providers do not always have the resources or expertise for in-house development 
or operation of PSISS, and public sector organisations are commonly under 
pressure to reduce costs.  Participants identified cloud computing as providing cost-
effective outsourcing models for providers to oversee delivery of PSISS.  Whatever 
the model selected, personal information is an asset to be protected, which is 
reflected in the Privacy Act (1993).  The provider is accountable for ensuring the 
PSISS meets the legislative requirements of the jurisdiction.  The damage that can 
be caused when outsourcing agreements fail to protect national identity information 
is highlighted by international failures such as the leak of confidential identity 
information from Sweden including driver licence, vehicle and military 
information undermining confidence in the government (Anderson, 2017).   
The impact of introducing ICT services into the public sector, and through 
government services to customers, needs a holistic perspective.  Academic 
literature provides numerous examples where project management, particularly 
technology projects, can focus on development and release into a production 
environment without considering the wider impact over time (Gauld, 2006; 
Stephen et al., 2011; Hodgson et al., 2019).  This appears to be particularly 
important for PSISS where the three domains and governance forms intersect in 
practice.   
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Theme Four: Implementing Systems or Outcomes? 
Participants had different views on what was meant by implementation.  The 
academic literature provides insights into understanding the different views, and 
how they may have contributed to issues in practice.   
Public administration literature identifies implementation as the realisation of 
policy goals or outcomes (Hupe & Hill, 2015).  In information systems literature 
the term implementation is commonly used as part of a lifecycle to mark the 
development and delivery stages of an information system to operational support 
in a production environment (Lainhart, 2012).  Although IT governance is intended 
to ensure alignment with wider corporate goals (Weill & Ross, 2004), failure to 
think beyond the delivery of a project and consider the wider outcomes or needs of 
customers has led to criticism of IT governance (Gauld, 2006; Provost, 2012).  
Achieving outcomes appears to become even more problematic when meeting the 
needs of multiple organisations through shared services.   
The term implementation was used by practitioners to refer to the development and 
deployment of the PSISS into operation.  They stated PSISS development, under 
SSC as the provider, was conducted using project management and overseen with 
programme gateways.  They viewed the delivery of the PSISS through a project or 
software lifecycle lens identifying governance as a process.  Use of the notions of 
gateways and lifecycles shows the influence of IT governance and information 
systems literature on PSISS governance.   
The lifecycle approach to PSISS governance appears to have led to a focus on 
delivering the next stage of the technology project without consideration of any 
wider system outcomes.  The implementation phase was internally governed and 
did not involve clients.  This contributed to “perverse incentives” where people at 
the provider were rewarded for delivering technical solutions.  In client adoption, 
the participants believed clients were not involved in system implementation, with 
the risk that clients were unprepared for adoption as they would have little or no 
experience of the PSISS.   
When the PSISS was created clients were not ready, and in some cases were 
unwilling to use the PSISS.  Clients did not have specific performance targets for 
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the PSISS, limiting their accountability and desire to participate.  These factors 
were identified as contributing to the provider failing to meet performance targets.   
Focusing on client adoption in isolation appears consistent with a lifecycle 
approach where focus is on the current stage of the lifecycle in isolation from the 
end outcome.  Basing provider performance targets on client adoption alone acted 
to incentivise the delivery of technical solutions in the system implementation 
phase.  It might have made sense when looking at the lifecycle stage in isolation 
but as Respondent 11 put it they were “doing the wrong thing but doing it really 
well.”   
Clients were not implementing the PSISS, and in some cases actively resisting 
adoption.  Active avoidance, involving clients not providing online channels if it 
meant integrating with the PSISS, was counterintuitive as customers suffered.  
The PSISS was missing an outcome focus.  New online services, one of the 
outcome objectives, were not occurring because of internal public sector conflict.  
In the view of participants, a long time was spent getting from system 
implementation to client adoption and this, it was argued, diminished the outcome 
focus.  While clients and the provider were debating client adoption, the PSISS was 
doing little to contribute to outcome delivery, shared or otherwise.   
The influence of three domains and governance forms appears to have contributed 
to fluid governance boundaries, as shown in the use of the term implementation.  
The term implementation was employed by the provider based on an ICT 
perspective, incorporating elements of project management.  Instead, if a public 
administration perspective had been taken the policy direction might have 
remained in focus through to delivery of the policy outcome or customer value.   
In practice there appears to have been an information technology governance focus 
and attempts to deliver the PSISS using ICT service delivery and project 
management methods.  The definition of implementation as delivery of the system 
limited the focus on customers.  This appears to have been reinforced by a push to 
get clients to adopt the PSISS rather than customer services delivered, because 
customer performance targets were not present until the 2010 annual report.  The 
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actual use of online services by customers was not a reported performance metric 
until 2012 when new governance arrangements were approved by the Executive.   
The provider required client adoption and service integration to deliver outcomes.  
The introduction of the 70% target made the reliance on clients more explicit.  
Although the provider was accountable they had limited ability to influence client 
adoption, raising questions about the applicability of accountability mechanisms 
used for the governance of PSISS.  Clients argued for simple, cost effective PSISS 
integration before adoption.  Limited integration funding or other incentives were 
provided to clients.  Clients were compelled to adopt the PSISS through the Cabinet 
mandate, which was enforced by the Executive.  Participants indicated there was 
little need for the provider to make changes to the PSISS as consultation involved 
reminding clients of the mandate. 
Clients intervened to make PSISS integration easier.  The education sector used the 
provider’s failure to meet performance targets as an opportunity to negotiate, 
offering to create services for tertiary students that would require them to use the 
PSISS in exchange for changes that would make integration with the PSISS easier.  
The clients successfully negotiated the change, however the provider probably 
should have considered client and customer needs as part of system implementation 
without having to negotiate after the PSISS was in operation.      
The PSISS concept stage started in 2001 and it took 17 years to get close to reaching 
the 70% target.  PSISS delivery would have benefited from a more explicit outcome 
focus from concept to customer adoption, rather than the next stage of the lifecycle 
in isolation.  IT governance, through the use of ICT and project management 
methods, appears to have contributed to a fragmented approach to PSISS delivery.  
Because it focussed upon deliverables for each stage in isolation, the 
interdependency between the stages was not recognised and, in the end, appears to 
have increased the time to deliver.  These factors also increased risk and cost, whilst 
decreasing the ability to deliver outcomes in a timely manner.   
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Theme Five: Accountability Deficits 
Participants raised concerns about collaboration as clients and providers relied 
upon each other to meet performance targets, but they did not trust each other.  Each 
party wanted to hold the other to account for non-performance.  
Provider performance targets were dependent upon delivery of client services to 
customers, raising concerns about the provider’s inability to influence client 
adoption or hold clients to account for non-adoption.  Participants questioned 
whether the provider could be held accountable for the actions, or lack of actions, 
of clients.  Conversely clients raised questions about liability, in the event of a 
PSISS system outage resulting in customer service failure with financial and 
reputational damage.  Clients wanted the ability to hold the provider to account for 
non-delivery or damages like they would with a private sector service provider.  
Participants questioned whether clients holding the provider to account was 
practical in the public sector.   
Other participants questioned whether a focus on accountability was too litigious 
for collaborative delivery of shared outcomes, preferring shared outcomes where 
accountabilities could be shared by multiple parties.  This appears to contradict 
accountability literature where accountability is about providing an answer for 
actions that were or were not taken by an individual (Gregory, 2007).  In this 
literature accountability commonly has an agreement that defines what is to be 
delivered, who is delivering, whom they are delivering to and the specified 
performance level (Bovens, 2007).  This enables enforcement through an 
accountability forum where performance can be rewarded or sanctions imposed 
(Sorensen, 2012).  I explored this using accountability literature from the three 
governance forms.   
Corporate governance is generally undertaken by a board who represent the needs 
of shareholders or stakeholders.  The board sets direction and oversees the 
performance of management in delivering that direction, holding them to account 
for their performance, with board members ultimately held to account by 
shareholders (Hilmer, 1993).  In contrast, IT governance defines processes and 
roles accountable for delivery (ITGI, 2006).  The governance group set objectives 
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and accountabilities which are monitored and reported to enable performance 
assessment (Lainhart, 2012).  
In public administration literature, the relationship between accountability and 
performance is often expressed in terms of an accountability framework where 
agencies, in this case provider or clients, are delegated the authority to make 
decisions and held accountable for attaining a specified level of performance 
(Cook, 2004; Gregory, 2007).  Formal agreements are established to specify 
performance expectations, with controls put in place to measure performance 
(Schick, 1996; Norman, 2003).  Performance measurement is used to track progress 
towards attaining specified performance goals, which are usually expressed in 
terms of outputs and outcomes.  The provider and clients are afforded autonomy to 
perform their day-to-day roles without intervention from the Executive (State 
Services Commission, 2008c).   
The selected accountability literature from the three governance forms reflects 
vertical governance, and appear to draw from principal–agent theory (Hart, 1995; 
Broadbent, Dietrich, & Laughlin, 1996).  Accountability is defined through 
formally defined governance mechanisms including roles, processes and 
performance agreements.  Performance is monitored and the agent held to account 
for delivery, or non-delivery.  Some scholars have questioned the suitability of 
these vertical governance mechanisms in the public sector, particularly for 
collaborative initiatives (Boston & Gill, 2011; Bryson et al., 2014).   
Schillemans (2011) questioned whether vertical accountability mechanisms were 
sufficient to meet the accountability needs of horizontal relationships.  His belief 
was if vertical accountability mechanisms were insufficient they created an 
accountability deficit, which may be resolved through the addition of horizontal 
accountability mechanisms.   
The PSISS crosses organisational boundaries and the relationship between clients 
and provider is horizontal, given that neither party can direct the other.  Although 
there were horizontal relationships in play participants noted that the provider and 
Executive reverted to vertical accountability mechanisms and sanctions for 
performance management and to increase adoption, which may have affected the 
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inability to enforce create horizontal accountability arrangements thereby creating 
an accountability deficit (Schillemans, 2011).   
Participants identified accountability tensions between the clients and provider, 
which may indicate the presence of accountability deficits.  The provider wanted 
clients to be held to account for non-adoption of the PSISS.  Clients told 
participants they wanted the ability to hold the provider to account for poor PSISS 
performance or damages due to PSISS failure impacting their customer facing 
services.  Participants identified accountability deficits for both parties, reflecting 
the two-way relationship between provider and client.   
The first deficit is the ability of the provider to enforce public sector client adoption 
of the PSISS.  The provider sought and obtained vertical mechanisms in the form 
of two separate mandates to enforce client adoption.  Despite the mandates, 
participants observed clients resisting adoption and not integrating customer facing 
services with the PSISS.   
The second deficit is the ability for clients to hold the provider to account for the 
performance and continued provision of the PSISS.  There were concerns the 
PSISS would be shut down, leaving clients with a bill and no identity service.  
Other concerns were the service would not meet performance requirements leading 
to a poor customer experience which the clients would have to front, even if fault 
could be attributed to the PSISS.  Participants identified a desire by clients for 
contractual enforcement which is common for ICT service provision.  It is 
questionable whether a public sector organisation would seek legal remedy from 
another public sector organisation for damages.  As the PSISS is provided to public 
and private sector clients, there could be an argument for damages caused by a 
PSISS provided to private clients.  In the case of the PSISS the legislation limits 
the liability and states there is no cause for action to recover damages.  Participants 
believed clients were frustrated that they had to adopt the PSISS and were 
potentially held accountable by customers for service failure of a service they had 
no choice but to use. 
Boston and Gill (2011) explored accountability design in the New Zealand public 
sector using both vertical and horizontal mechanisms.  They identified the residual 
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impact of the NPM reforms and reliance upon vertical accountability relationships 
given the risk averse nature of the public sector.  What they observed was an 
apparent inability for vertical arrangements to adapt to dynamic situations.  Vertical 
accountability mechanisms require  consistency of measures and methods to enable 
comparison over time, making them suitable for stable environments (Gregory, 
2006, 2007).   
Participants observed changes to the PSISS since the concept phase began in 2001.  
The name and scope of the PSISS have changed several times, strategies have been 
re-written, private sector clients have been included and the provider has changed.  
The performance focus has changed from creating a business case, to building a 
system, to client adoption and finally customer usage.  Vertical mechanisms were 
used for accountability, resulting in tensions between provider and clients.  Clients 
were compelled to adopt the PSISS and appeared to have little leverage to influence 
change. 
Theme Six: Mandating Collaboration 
The use of mandates was a hot button for participants, soliciting passionate 
responses for and against the use of a mandate to increase client adoption.  There 
were two situations where an Executive mandate was issued for client adoption of 
the PSISS.  In the first situation SSC was the provider and the second occurred after 
the PSISS was moved to DIA.  Participants, particularly those involved in 
governance when SSC was the provider, believed a mandate was a waste of time.  
One participant, involved in governance when DIA was the provider, believed the 
mandate was useful for mopping up resistance.  As performance targets were not 
met under either mandate, I have looked to the literature for explanation.   
Collaborative governance literature focuses upon horizontal governance across 
organisational boundaries and the interaction between the organisation, 
participants and the external environment (Osborne, 2010; Ansell et al., 2016).  
Scholars have promoted collaborative governance for services like PSISS that cross 
organisational boundaries (Janssen et al., 2012).  That said, the increased focus on 
horizontal inter-organisational governance has not removed vertical governance 
arrangements in the public sector, which is similar to how NPM did not fully 
replace the bureaucratic form (Dunleavy et al., 2005).  These assertions are 
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supported in my grounded practitioner narrative which identified vertical and 
horizontal governance mechanisms in practice.  
In the public sector the Executive can issue mandates to influence implementation 
of public policy.  A mandate can provide Executive direction for agencies to follow, 
which can be viewed as vertical governance (Hill & Hupe, 2009).  This raises 
questions about using vertical governance mechanisms for collaborative initiatives, 
which I explored by contrasting my analysis of responses with academic literature, 
particularly a group of studies on mandates in the New Zealand public sector in the 
1990s.   
May et al (1993, 1995; 1996) identified two types of mandate: coercive and 
cooperative.  May questioned the applicability of coercive mandates to the New 
Zealand public sector due to the autonomy of clients which had been provided 
through the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.  Rather than coercive mandates, 
cooperative mandates were recommended as they provided technical and financial 
assistance to clients to increase commitment.  Participants believed the mandates 
were coercive and resulted in conflict, with neither offering incentives for client 
adoption.  Use of these coercive mandates damaged trust between client and 
provider and limited the willingness of clients to create new services.   
May went further to identify three mandate design considerations, which I have 
adapted to explore the two mandates:  
1. State clear goals and how they will be implemented. 
2. Maintain focus beyond the technology solution to the desired outcome. 
3. Consider both provider and client commitment and capacity to deliver. 
The first design consideration proposed by May was stating goals and how they 
will be implemented.  The complexity of cross-sector changes requires clearly 
stated goals and specified implementation mechanisms and processes.  Case studies 
have shown inconsistent goals, weak oversight and limited resources can force 
clients to decide whether to comply with mandates (May, 1993).   
The first mandate was created before the PSISS was released.  Participants believed 
the PSISS started from a general belief that something had to be done about identity 
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and they were feeling their way in the dark.  Performance was based on delivery of 
technology and there were concerns about perverse incentives with success being 
seen by participants as delivering technology.  The second mandate was created 
after the move to DIA, which participants attributed to the failure of SSC as 
provider.  Participants believed the mandate placed stronger sanctions upon clients 
to force adoption.  Participants identified changes that built upon the initial mandate 
including the introduction of new governance groups, legislation, the ICT strategy 
and result areas which provided guidance on implementation and accountabilities.   
The second design consideration is maintaining focus upon outcomes rather than 
technology.  Cross-sector mandate design needs to incorporate policy, provider and 
client co-operation and implementation concerns, particularly costs (May, 1995).  
Mandate design for cross-sector initiatives like PSISS need to maintain an outcome 
focus beyond the immediate technology deliverable.   
Under the first mandate participants observed an initial outcome focus in the 
concept phase where provider and clients collaboratively developed the business 
case for the Executive.  They believe that changed when the provider began system 
implementation without clients.  The participant assertion the provider had 
developed the PSISS without client input probably contributed to the lack of 
planning for integration costs.  Focussing upon the delivery of technology limited 
the ability to deliver outcomes which depended upon client and customer adoption.   
The second mandate strengthened sanction enforcement through an Executive level 
committee.  Participants believed client resistance was to be mopped up through 
the mandate.  Participants indicated reliance upon clients to produce online services 
using the PSISS, combined with client resistance led to client agreement to adopt 
the PSISS however some clients simply did not create new online customer 
services.  Client adoption may have occurred in principle, however outcomes for 
customers do not appear to have been realised.  
The third design consideration was the capacity of provider and clients to deliver.  
Clients operate under financial pressures with limited resources constraining their 
ability to deliver their existing programmes.  Adding cross-sector deliverables to 
their existing programmes increases the pressures on clients potentially placing 
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them in a position where they are too stretched to comply with the mandate (May, 
1993).   
Under the first mandate participants believed client resistance grew when clients 
were expected to fund unexpected integration costs from their existing funding 
baselines.  Similarly, participants found the provider believed they were 
underfunded and complained that they could not fund changes to keep the PSISS 
current.  The Executive response was for funding to be drawn from client baselines, 
which clients saw as a PSISS tax, increasing client resistance.  Clients were faced 
with conflicting goals, either the PSISS or their existing targets, and no more 
money.  Limited financial incentives appear to have damaged client and provider 
commitment and trust.  The curse of the smiling faces reflects May’s assertion the 
use of coercive mandates in a low trust environment results in “reluctant 
compliance marked by delay and half-hearted efforts” (May, 1995, p. 90). 
The second mandate was enforced by a Cabinet committee which participants 
viewed as a stronger sanction.  Participants were concerned that despite the 
mandate clients were still resisting the adoption of the PSISS.  Integration had been 
a particular pain point with clients expected to use their existing baseline funding 
to pay for integration.  Compelling clients contributed to low trust between clients 
and provider which led to concerns about limited collaboration.  The second 
mandate created a virtual monopoly where clients had to adopt the PSISS, 
regardless of whether it met their needs or was cost effective.  The provider had 
little incentive to provide better services and the provider was not funded to update 
the PSISS or provide enhanced services.  Clients appeared to be left with a service 
that was not easy to integrate with, which may become out-of-date, and they had 
to use.   
Theme Seven: Is Technology Different?  
In reviewing the literature on information systems, governance and public 
administration I canvassed some debates about the role of technology.  Despite 
some thought in information systems literature that technology determines strategic 
direction, it is commonly held ICT is best suited to enable delivery of 
organisational objectives.  This view was supported by the Auditor General who 
found clear organisational objectives were required to guide the ICT selection after 
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reviewing large scale project failures in the New Zealand Public Sector (Provost, 
2012).  She found successful projects focus on strategic or customer outcomes they 
are trying to achieve, whereas projects that failed commonly focussed on getting 
the technology right at the expense of outcomes and consequently did not deliver 
the stated outcomes or needs of customers.  
In the official narrative, SSC created the e-Government Unit with aspirations to 
convert public administration processes and culture to an all-of-government 
approach.  Yet we also have many participants criticising SSC for adopting a 
technology centric approach to PSISS delivery.  Thus, the State Services 
Commissioner, perhaps channelling the concerns highlighted by the Auditor 
General, had a generalised fear about e-government initiatives his agency was 
responsible for delivering becoming large technology centric projects and failing. 
In the early days of the PSISS many participants observed the provider 
collaboratively working with potential clients to develop the PSISS business case.  
However, once the case was approved by the Executive the provider’s stance 
changed.  Participants observed the outcome focus all but disappeared and 
technological considerations then set the PSISS direction.  They also believed this 
shift in stance was leading to perverse incentives for delivering technology.  The 
technology-centric approaches to governance and implementation, discussed in the 
previous sections tended to reinforce this view.  To the contrary participants 
believed technology should meet client and customer needs, rather than be an end 
of itself.   
From participant accounts and document analysis, it appears governance of the 
PSISS system implementation followed IT governance practices using project 
management and internal process-based controls for development.  The provider 
saw themselves as primarily accountable for technology delivery, contracted 
through a third-party developer.  Some participants thought the provider focussed 
upon delivery of the PSISS at the expense of clients and customers, which appears 
short sighted when the provider was reliant upon client services to increase 
customer adoption.   
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Combining project management and internal process controls with a technology 
centric view, as we saw in the narratives, can result in the governance focus also 
being on technical deliverables.  Project scope was set by the business case.  This 
gave SSC an imperative to deliver on the business case without delay or fail, 
providing incentives to deliver a technology product rather than an outcome.  Some 
participants believed the provider focus on delivering technology through project 
management with internal process controls limited client involvement.  Although 
the PSISS was tested using three services, the way this was done did not add 
credibility and confidence in the technology to deliver business outcomes.  
Participants noted that two of the services used for testing were SSC-internal 
services where the PSISS added an extra layer of authentication and the third was 
a client service that stopped using the PSISS after testing.  
Limited client involvement amplified the problems arising from the focus on 
technology rather than business outcomes.  When the PSISS was released clients 
did not appear to be ready to adopt the PSISS and this was attributed by participants 
to the lack of client involvement during the technology build.  Even worse 
participants remarked that the first clients who attempted to adopt the PSISS 
became burdened with unbudgeted costs and integration issues which increased 
their time and cost of PSISS adoption, and further deterred other would-be clients.  
The participants observed increased adoption time and cost leading to resentment 
from clients who were adopting the PSISS and avoidance from clients who were 
considering adoption.   
Low adoption rates in turn triggered Executive reviews and funding limits for the 
provider.  A vicious cycle was described by one participant where the provider was 
responsible for an expensive information system liability rather than a system asset 
capable of delivering the strategic outcomes sought by SSC.  Instead the pressure 
was on SSC as the technology provider to increase client adoption without regard 
to the original business outcome.   
Most participants believed by the time the PSISS was moved to DIA there was 
open client resistance to PSISS adoption and latent hostility between clients and 
provider.  A Cabinet mandate was used to compel client adoption, which many 
participants believed only increased client resistance.  On the other hand, other 
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participants reflected concerns that the mandate made the provider bloated and 
removed the need for the provider to make client adoption and integration easier.   
The governance focus on internal processes and technology with limited client 
involvement led to poor client experiences and resistance.  Client resistance further 
fuelled unwillingness to collaborate, which was significant as the desired outcomes 
required the PSISS to integrate client services to provide customers an incentive to 
use the PSISS.  Client resistance contributed to low adoption, which put the 
provider under financial pressures and the PSISS under constant review.  The 
mandate used to increase client adoption failed and the provider continued not to 
meet many of its performance targets.   
Theme Eight: Collaborative Governance, the Art of the State 
Whilst the provider was criticised for poor collaboration with clients during system 
implementation, many participants were positive about collaboration between SSC 
and the Privacy Commissioner, which was described as contributing to a privacy 
enhancing identity PSISS.   
Privacy settings in New Zealand were initially a barrier to PSISS introduction.  The 
legislation and powers of the Privacy Commissioner set a high bar for the PSISS 
to attain.  Participants who raised this point believed consultation with the public 
and Privacy Commission in the concept phase coupled with collaborative design 
of the PSISS with the Privacy Commission ensured privacy and security concerns 
were included in system requirements and how the system was implemented.  The 
Privacy Commissioner has continued to act as an advocate promoting and 
endorsing the PSISS as a privacy enhancing identity service.   
It is curious then why the two examples of collaboration involving the provider 
during the system implementation phase described here played out so differently.  
Upon reflection on my data, it seems the Privacy Commissioner and provider had 
a common outcome they were seeking which was ensuring the privacy and security 
of personal information.  Under the Privacy Act (1993) the Privacy Commissioner 
was responsible for monitoring the impact of technology on privacy and 
investigating privacy breaches.  The provider was introducing a new PSISS for 
customers to access public sector services online using personally identifiable 
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information.  As evidenced in my literature review introduction of common goals 
as shared objectives was a prerequisite for inter-organisational collaboration (e.g. 
Vangen & Huxham, 2012).  This appears to have been provided through the 
collaborative agreement of principles and in more detail through development and 
testing of privacy requirements for the PSISS between the provider and Privacy 
Commissioner.  In contrast although the provider collaboratively developed the 
business case with clients during the PSISS concept phase, collaboration stopped 
when system implementation started.  
Development and testing of an information system against detailed requirements 
are safeguards used to reduce issues for system clients and customers (Langer, 
2008).  Collaboration with the Privacy Commissioner allowed a perspective on 
privacy requirements the provider may not have considered.  Collaborating with 
clients also might have introduced client requirements, for example integration, as 
part of system design and enabled testing against those requirements.  The business 
case provided a high-level agreement between clients and the provider.  This was 
insufficient for success when it appears the devil was in the detailed requirements 
and testing.  The experiences of other New Zealand projects, where successful 
delivery of shared outcomes and customer needs requires detailed interaction as 
well as a high level agreement of direction, should have led the provider (e.g. Ryan, 
Gill, Eppel, & Lips, 2008).  I continued to explore these assertions through the 
governance arrangements introduced after the Cabinet mandate.   
My governance practice narrative shows the PSISS continued to fail to meet 
performance targets even after the imposition of mandatory client participation.  
That clients were resisting adoption and exhibiting a low level of trust in the 
provider’s client focus and their technology product that they had no ownership in, 
is linked to these failures.   
After the Cabinet mandate there were changes to governance arrangements as well 
as some public-sector wide changes such as the introduction of Better Public 
Services, new legislation, the ICT Strategy and Action Plan, new governance 
groups and result areas.  These were identified as improvements in the coherence 
of the public administration and IT governance which contributed to increased 
adoption and client focus.  
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We saw in the literature that a lack of direction, controls or inadequate governance 
structures can result in misuse of power, particularly in the public sector 
(e.g.Collier et al., 2001).  When SSC was the provider they were accountable for 
performance targets including client adoption.  The curse of the smiling faces was 
cited as an example of clients appearing to indicate agreement to adopt the PSISS 
in governance forums, but not adopting it in practice.  Many participants believed 
clients did not have to adopt, so they didn’t, and the SSC could not compel 
adoption.  When performance targets were not met the SSC was deemed to have 
failed and the PSISS was moved to DIA.  The Executive introduced the second 
mandate which provided the ability for the provider to seek Cabinet sanction, 
although it was seen by participants as increasing client resistance.  
When the outcome focus changed from being about the technology to being about 
the PSISS enabling customer centric services, the PSISS outcome began to change.  
With DIA as the lead agency, supported by seven other client agencies who made 
a commitment to deliver Result 10 as the Service Innovation Group, DIA was 
enabled to deliver.  The collaborative development of the Result 10 Blueprint 
which detailed the activities to be performed to deliver Result 10 through the 
PSISS, gave provider and client commitment to a common set of goals.  These 
activities were also viewed as part of Better Public Services, which was a whole of 
government priority, and aligned with the ICT Strategy and Action Plan which also 
linked to Result 10 as an all-of-government direction.  This in turn enabled 
performance figures to be set for customer usage based on the agreed 10 common 
transactions delivered through client services.  So by this time in the PSISS life we 
saw some mutual reciprocity for results emerging in the process, a factor often 
highlighted in the collaborative government literature (e.g.Emerson et al., 2011).  
It took the form that the common Result 10 goals were converted into 
organisational goals where the lead agency was accountable for the delivery of the 
blueprint activities with clients accountable for increasing online usage of their 
services.  The new governance arrangements establish individual accountabilities 
for clients and provider which worked in a way that had reciprocal benefits for the 
PSISS in all the organisations concerned: the PSISS outcome is aligned with the 
Result 10 goals, and with a wider all-of-government direction.   
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The issue of new service integration was still outstanding.  Some participants 
believed the Service Innovation Group maintained an insular view focussing on the 
performance targets rather than new services.  Although the blueprint discussed 
introduction of new client services it took direct negotiation with tertiary education 
agencies to address integration concerns.  As a result, customer adoption results 
surged and the RealMe website has a large section for tertiary students indicating 
they are a significant group of customers adopting the PSISS (Department of 
Internal Affairs, 2019b).   
New client services were not included in reporting, and online reporting was 
archived before the 2017 deadline (Department of Internal Affairs, 2017d).  As 
shown in Chapter two, public sector accountability was criticised in theory for 
changing performance measures leading to an inability to compare results over 
time (e.g. Gregory & Lonti, 2008).  There are several examples where performance 
targets have changed from year to year or been modified when targets were not 
met.  This raises questions about gaming of the system (e.g. Hood, 2002) or 
whether PSISS operate in a dynamic environment where accountabilities need to 
change to meet the needs of stakeholders (e.g. Banoun et al., 2016).  My grounded 
practitioner narrative highlighted examples of both of these occurring in practice.  
Reflecting on literature and practice has highlighted a need to ensure accountability 
design includes enough flexibility to ensure changing client, customer and 
Executive needs are met; whilst ensuring this flexibility does not lead to system 
gaming where performance targets are changed, or reporting stopped to reduce 
accountability or transparency.   
The construction and reflective exploration of the eight themes in light of academic 
literature provided insights into gaps between theory and practice.  Starting with 
memo writing to explore the interplay between themes I have developed these 
insights in the following chapter where I conduct further theoretical integration, to 




Chapter Eight. Theoretical Integration: Refining the Theory 
The synthesis of the official and grounded practitioner narratives in the previous 
chapter did not always connect cleanly making the picture more of a collage than 
a neatly fitting jigsaw.  Pulling back from the collage to try to make sense of the 
governance picture, in this chapter, I identify some recurring patterns that represent 
potential governance issues.  Finally, I examine the critical governance issues this 
process bought into focus, conducting reflexive analysis of these issues against 
current academic literature, concluding the chapter with a table outlining insights 
for academic knowledge.     
I found governance roles could be viewed from three perspectives.  The first 
perspective is based on agency theory, and is reflected in the accountability 
framework, where the provider acts as an agent for the Executive delivering 
services to clients and customers.  I have decided to call this perspective delivery.  
A second perspective was reflected in performance documents and through reviews 
of the PSISS and sector ICT.  In these documents there were numerous assurance 
functions designed to minimise risk to both provider and Executive.  I have decided 
to call this perspective assurance.  A third perspective focussed on roles apparently 
intended to increase sector alignment and, in some cases, improve the emphasis on 
outcome delivery rather than delivery of a service in isolation from its intended 
purpose in terms of system change.  I have called this perspective system strategy.   
In this chapter I use the three perspectives: delivery; assurance and system strategy 
to further explore PSISS governance issues, as shown in Figure twenty one.    
 
Figure Twenty One: Three Perspectives Governance Model  
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When considering an issue, the perspective tends to influence the actions and 
interactions that are emphasised and therefore the results.  The three perspectives 
help us to see the extent to which governance is multifaceted in the way it is 
required to operate to address numerous issues at one time.  While considering all 
three perspectives in an integrated way, I began thinking of this three perspectives 
governance model I had developed as an analytical device with three different 
lenses each capable of seeing an issue from a particular perspective, while the other 
perspectives remain in view.  Thus, my governance metaphor is that of a multi-
sided lens where each face has three points representing my three governance 
perspectives.  Issues can therefore be explored individually or as groups from all 
three perspectives.   
I began writing memos on governance issues raised in the eight themes and linked 
theory and practice (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  This process surfaced seven critical 
governance issues to explore through the three perspectives to increase the 
understanding of why certain actions were taken and explain why things may have 
unfolded in the PSISS the way they did (Charmaz, 2017).  This process was assisted 
by my deeper contemporary re-imersion into academic and secondary 
documentation, synthesised in the final part of Chapter 2, to further insight derived 
from my theoretical integration.  In the sections that follow, I explore the seven 
critical governance issues in turn:  
• Issue One: Public sector governance 
• Issue Two: Conflicting interests  
• Issue Three: Coverage of Cabinet direction 
• Issue Four: Accountability 
• Issue Five: Misaligned expectations impacting collaboration 
• Issue Six: Is ICT different? and 
• Issue Seven: Privacy and security 
Public Sector Governance 
PSISS governance sits within a wider public sector governance frame.  
Practitioners identified governance as a process to deliver the PSISS, similar to 
project management or a service lifecycle, reflecting the influence of IT 
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governance.  As shown in my literature review, IT governance evolved from 
corporate governance, with alignment viewed from an organisational rather than 
public system lens, stopping at the organisational boundary (Rusu & Viscusi, 
2017).  The primary parties involved in PSISS governance were identified by 
practitioners as the Executive, provider and clients.  These parties do not reflect the 
external sector, service users or assurance roles, indicating the focus was upon 
delivery by the provider.   
The official narrative identified public sector initiatives intended to deliver 
outcomes (e.g. MFO, BPS) led by the SSC.  At times explicit linkages were made 
between the PSISS and wider system outcomes, although this appears to have been 
constrained by PSISS governance.  Similarly, participants commonly complained 
about the assurance role played by Treasury which was focussed on funding rather 
than outcomes.   
PSISS governance occurs within wider public sector governance arrangements.  
The official narrative identified additional roles involved in wider public sector 
governance, particularly in public system leadership and assurance.  These roles do 
not have the same level of influence on the private sector organisations, information 
systems or management domains, which inform the corporate governance and IT 
governance forms.  The system leadership role of the SSC as distinct from its 
provider role and assurance roles are cases in point.  Public sector assurance 
functions external to the provider include the Auditor General, Ombudsman, 
Treasury, Privacy Commissioner and Government Communications and Security 
Bureau (GCSB) who all place additional assurance requirements on public sector 
services.   
The use of IT governance and corporate governance forms appears problematic 
without considering the wider public sector governance arrangements.  Sector 
alignment is more complex than corporate alignment given the number of 
stakeholders, and the additional assurance requirements requiring consideration for 
PSISS governance arrangements.   
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Conflicting Interests  
Practitioners identified tensions between parties, outside of the Executive, 
performing public sector and PSISS governance.  My triple lens model allows 
examination of the governance focus through the perspectives: delivery, assurance, 
and system strategy.  There appears to be a tension, if not conflict, between these 
perspectives; for example: it would be challenging to reduce risk, deliver services 
and align sector activities all at the same time.  The academic literature about 
project management also predicts tensions, and conflict, between the delivery of 
time, cost and quality (Babu & Suresh, 1996).  Roles were explored to provide 
insight into the tensions within and between perspectives.  
Tensions were observed occurring within organisations and across organisational 
boundaries.  Six governance and delivery roles were identified.  The system 
strategy perspective had guidance and monitoring roles.  Assurance also had 
guidance and monitoring roles.  The delivery perspective had a role providing the 
PSISS to clients and customers.  A sector ICT leadership role was identified by 
participants, however, it is unclear where this role should reside.  Participants 
identified tensions between perspectives, and between perspectives and the sector 
ICT leadership role, these included:  
• Delivery and Assurance 
• Delivery and System Strategy 
• System Strategy and Assurance  
• Sector ICT and System Strategy  
• Sector ICT and Delivery and  
• Sector ICT and Assurance. 
The tensions also morphed across the three timeframes where PSISS governance 
arrangements changed, particularly perspectives and roles.  These timeframes are 




 Figure Twenty Two: Governance Timeframes 
In the first timeframe sector ICT and delivery resided at SSC and assurance was 
shared between SSC and Treasury.  In timeframe two sector ICT and delivery were 
transferred to DIA, and SSC led assurance.  In timeframe three assurance was 
transferred to Treasury.   
The distinction between system strategy and sector ICT presents opportunities for 
further investigation as shown in Figure twenty three.  Practitioners observed 
tensions in the movement of the sector ICT (GCIO) role to DIA.  The original 
intention was to move the PSISS delivery function to DIA but retain the sector ICT 
role at SSC.  This appears consistent with Westminster public sector literature 
separating the policy and implementation functions.  However, the perceived 
failure of the GSN, and by association other PSISS, saw both delivery and sector 
ICT moved to DIA.  While public sector capability development remained at SSC, 




Figure Twenty Three: Sector ICT 
Examining the changed governance arrangements led me to think about the link 
between governance more generally and IT governance.  As noted  in the literature 
review there is a tension between IT governance and corporate governance with 
questions asked about whether IT governance should be considered as part of the 
corporate governance arrangements or as a separate discipline (De Haes & Van 
Grembergen, 2009).  The prevailing view, and the one adopted for this research, is 
that IT governance supports corporate governance (Weill & Ross, 2004).  Similar 
questions arise when placing IT governance in a public sector context.  The 
challenge is that, in the literature IT governance, and alignment, is commonly 
viewed through an organisational, rather than sector lens (Rusu & Viscusi, 2017).  
This appears problematic for collaborative public sector governance arrangements 
and public sector ICT shared services and is a gap not addressed in the literature.   
Reflecting upon my governance practice narrative I observed tensions where sector 
ICT was treated as distinct from system governance arrangements.  Additional 
tensions were observed as emerging from Executive initiated changes to 
governance arrangements.  This reflection led to the construction of an extended 
public sector governance model, which was used as a lens to reflexively identify 
and analyse critical governance issues.  The extended model is constructed 
diagrammatically in Figure twenty four: Extended model construction.  
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Operating context.  
The Government authorised the PSISS as 
part of wider sector ICT strategies to 
deliver shared services to the public 
sector.    
 
Sector governance functions.   
System strategy, delivery and assurance 
governance functions were identified as 
spanning the operating context in the 
governance practice narrative.    
Governance forms.   
Collaborative, corporate and IT 
governance forms were observed in 
governance arrangements. These forms 
were all observed as containing strategy, 
delivery and assurance in practice.  
Governance functions and forms.  
Governance arrangements were observed 
as bi-directional with nested public 




 Reflexive analysis.   
Analysis of critical issues led to 
identification of tensions occurring at 
multiple points across the context.  
Extending the model to include these 
tension points enabled reflexive analysis 
of governance tensions across the 
system.  
Figure Twenty Four: Extended model construction  
I have used the extended model in Figure twenty five to present practitioner 
identified tensions identified through the previous exploration of conflicting 
interests to illustrate the inter-related nature of public sector governance 
arrangements.     
Provider Tensions.   
Respondents identified tensions 
between Sector ICT strategy and 
delivery at SSC.  Both parties blamed 
each other for service failure, which 
was reported in newspapers.   
System and ICT Tensions.  
Governance arrangements changed, 
moving the PSISS from SSC to DIA.  
Respondents identified tensions 
between SSC and DIA, highlighted in 
the subsequent ICT strategy and 
published statements by GCIO which 
reduced the role of SSC, contributing 
to tensions between system and sector 
ICT strategy.      
Figure Twenty Five: Extended model tensions  
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The extended model has been used to illustrate the remaining critical governance 
issues, to provide insights into the relationship between governance arrangements 
and tensions.  
Coverage of Cabinet Direction   
Over the life of the PSISS Cabinet issued numerous directives to parts of the New 
Zealand public sector.  Practitioners found these directives problematic for PSISS 
governance arrangements, particularly for gaining both client adoption and trust.  
Directives required clients to adopt the PSISS, provide their ICT strategic plans to 
the sector ICT functional leader (in DIA) and to comply with guidance and 
monitoring requirements for projects and investment.  My models’ three 
perspectives: system, delivery and assurance, allow exploration of issues arising 
from these directives.  I begin by identifying the different parts of the New Zealand 
public sector and then explore the coverage of directives and potential implications.   
Governance literature, particularly corporate and IT governance forms, use 
direction and controls to ensure direction is followed.  Assurance, in the form of 
monitoring and reviews, are employed to review compliance with direction and 
controls.  Oversight of direction, controls and assurance is conducted by a 
governance group, commonly the board, enabling consistency and transparency.   
The outcome purpose of the PSISS direction was observed in sector ICT strategies, 
controls in the mandates compelling adoption and assurance in project guidance 
and monitoring.  These were used to cover the Executive expectation sector ICT 
alignment is directed, the PSISS is used and assurance is provided.  Consistency 
and transparency were required to ensure the people expected to deliver are 
provided direction, covered by controls and their actions are monitored.   
I chose to review coverage of direction, controls and assurance using three 
common-use groupings for the New Zealand Public Sector, namely: Public 
Service, State Services and State Sector (State Services Commission, 2019b).  
These groups are increasingly inclusive subsets of public sector entities represented 




Figure Twenty Six: Public Sector  
Table thirteen identifies changes to the governance coverage of the three 
perspectives.   
Year Sector ICT  Delivery  
(Directed Adoption) 
Assurance  
2001   Public service, and part 
of state services (crown 
entities as directed)  
2006 State services 
invited to use 
  
2007  Public service and 
parts of the state 
sector 
 
2008  Public service and 
parts of the state 
sector (crown agents) 
 
2010  Public service 
directed, state service 
invited to adopt. 
 
2011   Public service and part 
of the state services 
(crown agents) 
2012 Public service and 
part of state 
services 
  
2013 Public service and 




Public service and part 
of state services 
(crown agents) 
 
2017   State services with 
some exceptions 
Table Thirteen: Governance Coverage 
The first observation regards the extent of coverage.  The maximum coverage for 
any of the examples is state services and there appears to have been no intention of 
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directing the entire state sector.  My second observation was the difference in 
coverage over time.  The directives do not appear to have been designed to provide 
consistent coverage for: PSISS adoption; ensuring the PSISS was included in 
strategic plans; or assurance to ensure the PSISS was included when clients 
invested in new systems or made changes to existing systems.  From this we could 
infer the lack of a consistent process for ensuring PSISS adoption over time, which 
amounts to a governance oversight or gap.   
Looking at the coverage individually, direction for adoption began before the 
PSISS was released as the GLS.  Direction was issued to public service departments 
in 2007 and was increased to include all crown agents the following year.  Although 
there was some confusion after the 2010 directive, the direction to use the PSISS 
appears to have covered the public service and crown agents until the present day 
indicating a consistent focus upon delivery.      
Sector ICT alignment was merely encouraged until a directive was issued in 2012.  
This highlights a misalignment between delivery and system in that early period.  
Although clients were directed to adopt the PSISS there was little oversight of 
client strategies to enable strategic alignment or have assurance mechanisms in 
place to ensure PSISS adoption.  Clients could independently plan system changes, 
meaning misalignment might not be observed until projects were well underway 
and difficult to stop.  At that later stage PSISS adoption would require additional 
planning and funding, or avoidance which is what was observed in practice.   
Misalignment was particularly marked when the project delivery, system 
leadership and assurance functions all resided at SSC.  Sector ICT strategic 
alignment was not directed until the PSISS and sector ICT role moved to DIA.  
Even then, the coverage of the directives remained inconsistent between adoption 
and sector ICT alignment.  The coverage of project guidance and monitoring 
appears to have remained constant whilst at SSC, with the direction increasing 
coverage from the public service to the state services, with some exceptions, after 
assurance moved to Treasury. 
The lack of coverage indicates a reduced ability to enforce PSISS adoption across 
the state sector, with the inconsistent coverage indicating a lack of alignment across 
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governance controls to monitor whether clients are following the directive to adopt 
the PSISS.  The inconsistent governance arrangements at public sector level 
contributed to sector ICT strategy and PSISS governance tensions, which is 
highlighted in Figure twenty seven.  
Inconsistent Governance.  
Changes to public sector 
governance arrangements across 
the three perspectives contributed 
to a governance gap with 
inconsistent strategy, delivery and 
assurance requirements for public 
sector clients impacting adoption 
and contributing to tensions 
between provider and clients.   
Figure Twenty Seven: Inconsistent Governance  
Accountability 
A lack of accountability has been identified as a governance issue contributing to 
PSISS failure (National Audit Office, 2012).  Accountability was defined from 
theory as a relationship where someone is accountable for something to someone.  
The accountable party is delegated the authority to deliver the specified 
deliverables, with performance evaluated resulting in sanction or reward.  Failings 
in these can result in an accountability deficit, which is treated through changes to 
accountability mechanisms (Schillemans, 2011)  
The official and grounded practitioner narratives identified two key accountability 
relationships: between the Executive and the provider; and between the provider 
and clients.  The Executive provider relationship was vertical in nature and 
enforced through contract.  The relationship between the provider and clients was 
a horizontal one amongst organisational peers, which has been identified in theory 
as difficult to maintain, which may explain the resorting to vertical mechanisms 
including mandates to enforce client PSISS adoption.  These accountability 




Accountability Relationship – Executive and Provider.  The first provider was 
the SSC, authorised by the Executive to create the e-Government Unit and the 
PSISS (GLS and IVS).  The Commissioner was accountable for delivery of the 
PSISS to the Executive through the State Services Minister and Cabinet committee 
and in turn held his own staff responsible for PSISS delivery through their 
employment contracts.  The Commissioner’s role in introducing shared services 
was empowered by legislation.  For the first six years performance was based upon 
developing e-government strategies and the implementation of the PSISS.  The 
accountability mechanisms were based on performance agreements and approval 
of business case milestones, which created the reward of ongoing funding.  
Performance criteria in business cases were not always specific or measurable, and 
largely ignored client engagement and integration as necessary conditions for 
PSISS success.  These early issues represented accountability deficits because of 
no specified targets for initial client agreement and integration results.  
Subsequently, they were specified but the provider still failed to meet the targets 
and was sanctioned by the transfer of the sector ICT and delivery roles from SSC 
to DIA.  At DIA, the performance criteria changed to include customer targets, 
which unfortunately were not met.  In response to continuing failure the specified 
targets were reduced enabling the provider to deliver.  Sanctions were applied 
through the reduction of funding, and increased Executive and assurance scrutiny.  
The Executive’s role became more active: providing direction and defining 
priorities; passing legislation enabling the provider to offer the PSISS to private 
sector clients; issuing a Cabinet minute directing public sector adoption; and 
endorsing the strategy to 2017.  The provider began meeting some performance 
targets.   
Monitoring changed from major ICT projects to major projects, led by SSC.  
Ironically, SSC had failed to deliver shared services itself while performing 
monitoring over the programme during the failure, which suggested a conflict of 
interest and an accountability deficit, which was addressed in 2015 when 
monitoring was passed to the Treasury.  
At DIA, the GCIO was accountable to the Executive, through a Cabinet committee, 
for the delivery of the BPS Result 10 target which specified 70% of transactions 
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for a set of ten selected services would be performed online.  A lack of interim 
targets indicates limited performance specification and measurement of results 
which had previously been identified as a governance failing in information 
systems, corporate governance and public administration literature (Hilmer, 1993; 
Gauld, 2006; Gregory & Lonti, 2008).   
Many participants indicated a belief the PSISS would not reach its 2017 targets, 
although in March 2017 the provider reported to the Executive that Result 10 would 
be met by the end of 2017 (Dunne, 2017b).  Illustrative of the accountability 
deficits, this was not the case.  The performance target was not clear.  There was 
contention about the delivery date, some sources said 30 June 2017 and others 
December 2017, and results were not reported until after June 2018.   
Result 10 performance was published in multiple locations including annual reports 
and web sites, with numerous discrepancies.  The only source of PSISS 
performance which reported results for the entire reporting period was DIA annual 
reports.  The various web sites had stopped reporting results by June 2017.  Table 
fourteen highlights these inconsistencies in reporting in over half of the years (in 
yellow).  
Table Fourteen: Reported Result 10 Results3  
Accountability deficits are reflected in inconsistent reporting, limited specification 
and constantly changing performance metrics.  Inconsistency in accountability 
 
3 Sources: (Department of Internal Affairs, 2013a, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a; State 










June-12 29.90% - 30.4 - 29.9 
June-13 37.30% - 
 
36.2 36.2 
June-14 39.30% - 
 
39.3 39.3 
June-15 45.30% - 
 
45.3 45.3 
June-16 50.70% 49.7 
 
52.2 49.7 
June-17 58.00% 59.9 
 
- - 






mechanisms was previously observed in New Zealand public sector reporting and 
criticised by scholars for not enabling comparison or consistent review (Gregory & 
Lonti, 2008).  From the inconsistent reporting, I also infer limited alignment within 
the provider and across the assurance agencies, an issue identified as problematic 
in governance literature (Subramaniam et al., 2013; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).   
The GCIO was accountable for delivery of Result 10, which was not met.  
However, the Service Innovation Group consisted of senior officials from eight 
major public sector service delivery clients jointly committed to work together to 
deliver Result 10, which included the Action Five requirement to adopt RealMe 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2014b).  Hence my attention next to the 
accountability relationship between clients and provider. 
Accountability Relationship: Provider and Clients.  When the PSISS was 
released in 2007 the State Services Commissioner was legislatively authorised to 
lead shared services, however the performance targets were not met as evidenced 
in the perceived failure of the PSISS and transfer to DIA.  Participants believed 
that clients did not trust the provider and even if they agreed to PSISS adoption, 
they did not participate which was identified as the curse of the smiling faces.   
The second mandate involved legislation, regulation and the introduction of 
formally agreed Result 10 performance targets with clients represented by a cross-
sector governance group, which agreed to a charter and blueprint which committed 
clients to adopt the PSISS and deliver integrated digital transactions (Department 
of Internal Affairs, 2014b).  Given the PSISS failure to meet performance targets, 
participants in the governance group, and their role in the integration and delivery 
of services to customers, warrants attention.  There were 11 members, although 
only five of them had services contributing to delivery of Result 10.  The grounded 
practitioner narrative identified senior executives attending governance meetings 
to obstruct progress, highlighting an accountability deficit given their agreement to 
participate.   
Action Five provided a more explicit client accountability requiring PSISS 
adoption, which was agreed to by the sector governance group.  Two of the clients 
delivering services for the basket of ten were not present on the governance group, 
287 
 
limiting the ability for the group to hold them to account, identifying another 
accountability deficit.   
To explore whether Action Five was effectively governed, I retrospectively applied 
Result 10 as a means for requiring PSISS use.  I attempted to use client services 
posing as a customer and found of the ten Result 10 client services: 
• Two of the client services required use of the PSISS.   
• Five of the client services had the PSISS as an option and 
• Three did not use the PSISS.   
I next investigated whether client agencies were reporting their online usage 
results, and whether these results were consistent with those reported by the 
provider.  I found that only five of the clients reported online usage results in their 
annual reports.  In addition, two of the five clients reported results that varied by 
more than ten percent from results reported by the provider, as shown in Table 
fifteen.   




Use PSISS  
Police  Pay for fine on time  70.1% 70% No  
MSD  Apply for Financial 
Assistance  
57.2% - Optional  
DIA  Renew adult passport  58.3% 58.66% Yes  





IRD  Pay Individual Tax  87.8% 
 
Optional  





DOC  Book Department of 
Conservation asset  
37.0% - No  
Customs  SmartGate departures 
and arrivals  
69.0% 55% No  
MBIE  Apply for visa  36.4% 59% Yes  
NZTA  Online transactions   42.0% 41% Optional  
 Table Fifteen: Action Five4  
 
4 Sources: (Department of Internal Affairs, 2017d, 2018a; Ministry of Business 




Although clients had formally agreed to use the PSISS, and collaborative 
governance arrangements were established, what I found was non-use of the 
PSISS, inconsistent reporting and a lack of monitoring or sanction, which presented 
additional accountability deficits.   
The accountability relationship between clients and provider illustrated the 
(in)effectiveness of mandates for client adoption by the provider at both SSC and 
DIA.  Scholars questioned the use of mandates, particularly in the New Zealand 
public sector (May, 1993, 1995; Nitkin, 2012).  In the case of SSC, the mandate 
was legislative, and given the perceived failure and subsequent transfer of the 
PSISS, it did not result in performance targets being met.  Other scholars have 
advocated the use of enforceable agreements and externally based authority to 
overcome horizontal accountability issues (Boston & Gill, 2011).  The second 
mandate was combined with agreed targets for Result 10 set through the charter 
and blueprint.  The GCIO was provided external authority through the Cabinet 
minute and legislation.  The Result 10 targets of 70% online use and Action Five 
were measurable and they do not appear to have been followed consistently by 
clients.  Many clients did not report their results and two of the five that did were 
not consistent with results reported by the provider.   
The provider led sector ICT and had assured the Executive targets would be met 
but failed to deliver and did not address the accountability deficits.  There appears 
to have been no sanction for failing to meet targets or address accountability 
deficits as new targets were set to 2021.  The new targets were unclear as the 
provider did not specify what services would be included, which, combined with 
the strategy to 2017 not being replaced until November 2019, indicate wider sector 
ICT leadership accountability deficits between provider and Executive.    
Theory indicates the use of vertical, and horizontal, governance mechanisms 
require effective accountability relationships (Dormer & Ward, 2018; Lopes & 
Farias, 2020).  Accountability deficits were identified in both accountability 
 
Zealand Customs Service, 2018; New Zealand Police, 2018; New Zealand 
Transport Agency, 2018) 
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relationships, and across sector ICT, assurance and delivery roles.  The use of 
vertical mechanisms for horizontal relationships does not appear to have been 
effectively monitored given the accountability deficits and lack of sanctions.  The 
addition of horizontal governance arrangements may have intended to increase 
accountability, however inconsistent and conflicting reporting appears to have 
contributed to accountability deficits.  These tensions are highlighted in Figure 
twenty eight.  
Provider inability to enforce. 
The public sector governance 
arrangements, particularly 
assurance mechanisms, did not 
enable enforcement of 
mandated adoption by clients.  
This was observed as leaving 
the provider’s performance 
dependent upon clients, with 
limited ability to compel 
adoption.    
 
Collaborative governance. 
The provider attempted to 
address the inability to hold 
clients to account though the 
introduction of inter-agency 
Sector ICT governance 
arrangements.  This did not 
address the accountability deficit 
and was compounded by 
inconsistent and conflicting 
reporting.    
 
Figure Twenty Eight: Accountability Deficits  
Misaligned Expectations Impacting Collaboration  
Many participants identified integration between the PSISS and client services as 
a critical issue affecting adoption.  They disapproved of the limited consultation 
and testing during implementation and believed it contributed to integration issues 
as expectations were misaligned.  The practitioner narrative provides examples of 
technical and cultural integration issues between provider and clients.   
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Integration was identified by participants as time consuming and requiring 
additional, often unbudgeted, client expenditure.  The technical overview of 
identity services summarised in the literature review presents the evolution and 
associated challenges in the provision of federated identity.  Based on practitioner 
responses the provider saw identity services as provision of a verified identity, 
whereas clients saw identity services as identity and access management.  
Respondent 8 summarised how many saw the limitations “It could not replace 
active directory, GLS was only yes or no for how many millions of dollars.  The 
problem was adding a layer of complexity with no value.”  Clients avoided 
adoption, and when those who did adopt the PSISS had integration issues, client 
resistance increased.  Culturally clients had been provided autonomy through the 
NPM reforms with the introduction of corporate governance arrangements.  These 
arrangements provided potential clients with the belief they could resist adoption.   
Collaborative governance theory promotes agencies working together to deliver 
complex outcomes.  The governance practice narrative (Chapter seven) indicates 
this occurred in the concept phase but decreased during implementation when the 
provider took a more autonomous, build it and they will come approach.  When the 
PSISS was released and adoption figures were not met the response was to mandate 
adoption.  The technical integration issues, additional client costs and misaligned 
expectations were not addressed, as shown in Figure twenty nine. 
Misaligned expectations.       
During development a technical 
focus was observed as contributing 
to tensions between provider and 
clients.  Mandated adoption was 
observed as inconsistent with 
outcome realisation and increasing 
these tensions.   
 
Figure Twenty Nine: Misaligned Expectations      
New Zealand-based academic research identified issues with the use of coercive 
mandates in the public sector, instead promoting the use of incentives in 
conjunction with mandates.  International E-ID literature provided examples of 
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similar tensions where mandates were employed to increase adoption without 
providing incentives, contributing to client resistance and slower than expected 
adoption.  Incentives could have been used to address participant issues including 
additional costs to clients and technical challenges with integration.  Instead what 
happened was compelled adoption and increased client resistance.  Performance 
targets were based upon client and customer adoption and later customer usage of 
the PSISS.  Performance documents show the provider commonly failed to meet 
these targets.  Practitioners saw the service as a failure, and possibly more 
importantly the minister commented in the new digital strategy that “digital identity 
and informed consent tracking, are patchy or not present” (Department of Internal 
Affairs, 2019c, p. 17).   
Is ICT Different?  
IT governance is a distinct governance form that has emerged from information 
systems literature, raising questions about whether ICT initiatives should be 
governed differently.  The governance perspectives model allows exploration of 
the governance arrangements for ICT initiatives.  It begins with the assurance 
function before exploring tensions between the system strategy, sector ICT and 
delivery roles.   
In the 1990s assurance focussed upon major ICT projects, which is unsurprising 
given the high-profile failure of public sector ICT projects at that time.  As a 
result, Treasury and the SSC issued guidelines for managing and monitoring major 
ICT projects.  SSC performing system, assurance and delivery roles appears to have 
led to a blurring of the lines with the same organisation performing conflicting 
system roles.  The failure of shared services resulted in delivery and sector ICT 
leadership being moved to DIA.  SSC took ownership of assurance with its focus 
changing from ICT project delivery to project assurance, indicating a view that ICT 
projects should be considered as part of business initiatives, rather than requiring 
separate assurance, similar to the corporate governance view that ICT is just 
another input.  Later the assurance focus shifted again from projects to system 
investment, with assurance moving from SSC to Treasury in 2015.  Even with a 
system investment focus, the continued use of gateway reviews reinforced the use 
of a discrete project approach for delivery (Treasury, 2017).   
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Throughout the life of the PSISS the use of project assurance in governance 
arrangements appears to have influenced the practitioner view of governance as a 
process, which scholars have criticised as shifting attention from system outcomes 
to project deliverables (Hodgson et al., 2019).   
Practitioners were critical of the technology focus during PSISS implementation 
when SSC was provider and accountable for system, assurance, sector ICT and 
delivery.  The PSISS failure resulted in tension emerging between these roles.  
Delivery was run by GTS who were critical of the role played by the GCIO 
performing sector ICT leadership.  The GCIO blamed poor results on the 
performance measurement system, arguing that project management did not 
include wider system benefits.  The GCIO was removed and GTS were moved with 
the GCIO function to DIA.   
The new GCIO, endorsed by the Executive through legislative reform and Cabinet 
mandate, released the sector ICT strategy to 2017 and introduced collaborative 
governance arrangements.  The SSC was only mentioned in passing in the strategy, 
pointing to a disconnect between system and sector ICT leadership.  This was 
reinforced by the GCIO, Colin MacDonald.  “In 2012 Cabinet gave me, as 
Government Chief Information Officer, the mandate to integrate the plans of all 
agencies, to recommend collaboration and consolidation where advantageous, and 
to direct government departments to adopt all-of-government initiatives” 
(Department of Internal Affairs, 2013b, p. 3).   
Later the role of the State Services Commissioner was legislatively changed in the 
State Sector Act (1988, p. 16) from “to review the machinery of government across 
all areas of government” in 2007 to “the Commissioner's role is to provide 
leadership and over-sight of the State services” in 2013, indicating as DIA is part 
of the State Services that the GCIO was subject to system leadership, which was 
confirmed with subsequent changes to governance arrangements.  The GCIO name 
was changed to the Government Chief Digital Officer with a new head of DIA 
appointed GCDO in 2018, the sector ICT role is now referred to as a functional 
lead.  “The GCDO is the government functional lead for digital.  Functional leads 
are charged with developing and improving a designated area across 
government.  The roles are delegated to specific CE’s by the State Services 
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Commissioner” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2019a, p. 1).  Sector ICT appeared 
to have autonomy through the Executive empowerment of the GCDO in DIA, 
however this appears to have been changed as the sector ICT role is now formally 
delegated by the Commissioner, along with other functional lead roles intended to 
provide coherence and leadership across the public sector. 
Corporate and IT governance literatures promote ICT alignment through vertical 
controls.  Moving GCDO under the Commissioner was an attempt to increase 
alignment, however issues emerge when viewed through the perspectives model.  
The ICT strategy to 2017 was updated in 2015 and was not replaced until 
November 2019 indicating a two-year gap without an ICT strategy.  In early 2017 
PSISS targets were refreshed to 2021 in the absence of a strategy, with the new 
target 80% of transactions completed online, however at the time they had not 
specified which services would be measured.   
A new government, elected in late 2017, announced in January 2018 that BPS 
would not continue in its current form and has embarked on a programme of public 
sector legislative reform, supported by SSC, still underway at the time of writing.   
Governance arrangements changed from a focus upon technology requiring special 
arrangements to alignment with system outcomes.  Assurance moved from 
specialised ICT project monitoring to project and later system investment 
assurance.  Sector ICT leadership roles have been aligned to system leadership.  All 
along, direction has been missing, as highlighted in the limited specification of 
PSISS goals, the time gap between ICT strategies and the stopping of BPS with 
future direction apparently dependent upon legislative change, which is highlighted 
in Figure thirty.   
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Technology or Outcomes?  
Public sector governance 
inconsistencies between 
system strategy, delivery and 
assurance combined with a 
lack of direction were 
observed as contributing to 
tensions both within the 
provider and between clients 
and provider.       
 
Figure Thirty: Technology or Outcomes  
Privacy and Security  
Privacy and security appear to be two of the tensions present when deciding what 
type of governance arrangements to implement.  Theory indicates privacy and 
security are concerns for PSISS, particularly E-ID, which was supported by the 
official and grounded practitioner narratives.  The public sector is held to a higher 
standard for privacy and security, particularly through increased scrutiny from 
privacy and security assurance functions like the Privacy Commission and GCSB.   
The two most common goals of PSISS were identified as reduced costs and 
improved services to customers.  Examples from literature identified improved cost 
efficiency through inclusion of private sector providers for improved utilisation 
and adoption.  Similarly, outsourcing the development and support of the PSISS 
was seen to reduce costs, with some participants suggesting the use of social media 
providers for increased scale and ease of use for customers already using social 
media platforms.  Compromised Swedish government data shows the potential 
dangers of outsourcing.  Similar large-scale compromises of social media platforms 
have resulted in hundreds of thousands of accounts and personal information being 
open to misuse.      
Reflecting upon these issues led me to consider how governance arrangements can 
address privacy, security and use tensions.  I have explored this through an 
illustrative example in Figure thirty one, contrasting governance and service 
delivery (Y-axis), which is reflective of the tension between governance and 
management in literature, with the intention of getting past a technology centric 
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focus on the information system rather than the desired system outcome, without 
losing sight of the relationship between governance and delivery.  The X-axis 
represents the decision to include private sector client services, which provides 
access to additional services, and increased customer adoption and usage but 
introduces additional security and privacy concerns.   
 
Figure Thirty One: Tensions 
Governance and delivery differ when involving the private sector.  Outsourcing to 
a vendor does not remove the accountability for governance, and governance was 
retained within the public sector for the PSISS and most E-ID examples from 
literature.  Tensions appear to arise when crossing national boundaries, which 
reduces the ability to ensure privacy and security, introducing data sovereignty 
concerns.  Similarly adopting a market model, like a social media offering, limits 
the ability for governance to make changes to the shared service, in this case the E-
ID.  The reduced influence is represented by the lightening of the shading.   
The illustrative example identified interrelated tensions present in the governance 
and delivery of PSISS that need to be considered when designing governance 
arrangements.  The tensions are representative rather than exhaustive with privacy, 
security, cost and adoption included based on assertions drawn from literature, and 
narratives, providing a useful starting point for future empirical research.  Inclusion 




Figure Thirty Two: Privacy and Security Tensions  
Integrated Theory 
This chapter introduced my public sector governance model, which integrates three 
perspectives: system strategy, delivery and assurance; as presented in Figure 
twenty four.  The model provides a method for analysing both horizontal and 
vertical PSISS governance arrangements and was extended to include wider nested 
governance incorporating sector ICT and public sector governance arrangements.   
The model was used to conduct reflexive analysis of seven critical governance 
issues.   The analysis illustrated the requirement for PSISS governance to integrate 
all three perspectives to provide a more nuanced approach to governance that 
integrates PSISS, sector ICT and public sector governance arrangements.  It also 
enabled comparison of the themes that emerged from my governance practice 
narrative with current academic literature to identify theoretical insights, which 
have been grouped as:  
• Provision of new insights for theory, 
• Challenging or extending existing theory, or  
• Confirmation of existing theory. 
Provision of New Insights  
Issue One: Public sector governance.  Analysis of the practice narrative found that 
PSISS governance occurs within wider public sector governance arrangements.  
Further analysis identified additional roles in public sector governance leading to 
the identification of the three perspectives and construction of the initial public 
sector governance model presented in Figure twenty one.  Recent academic 
Privacy and Security.            
Public sector governance tensions 
were observed as greater for PSISS 
between adoption, cost, privacy and 
security than for private sector 
services.  These tensions were 
observed as increasing the 
complexity of delivering the PSISS 




literature highlighted the limitation of corporate and IT governance forms within 
the public sector (Wilkin & Chenhall, 2019) with other academics promoting a 
holistic approach to addressing nested governance (Steelman, 2016; Lips, 2019).  
The construction of the initial public sector governance model based on the three 
perspectives provided a lens for researching nested governance arrangements with 
empirical evidence from the practice narrative and was supported by the framework 
and characteristics model to identify governance in practice.   
Issue Two: Conflicting interests.  Conducting reflexive analysis of the practice 
narrative through the lens of the initial public sector governance model highlighted 
tensions between the three perspectives.  These tensions were observed in 
governance arrangements within organisations and across organisational 
boundaries, particularly where governance roles changed over time.  Reflexive 
analysis of these tensions enabled the extension of the initial governance model, as 
presented in Figure twenty four.  This extended model incorporates analysis of 
vertical and horizontal governance arrangements as well as exploration of tensions 
within nested governance arrangements for the PSISS, sector ICT and the public 
sector.  Recent academic literature has identified tensions between governance 
forms, including IT and corporate governance (Wilkin & Chenhall, 2019), inter-
organisational governance arrangements (Klasic & Lubell, 2020; Lopes & Farias, 
2020) and nested governance in the public sector (Lips, 2019).   Existing 
governance frameworks have been criticised for being too prescriptive with calls 
for research to improve the understanding of these tensions through participant 
perspectives (Gash, 2016; Gustafson & Hertting, 2017).  The extended model 
provides a lens to explore inter-organisational tensions present in nested public 
sector governance arrangements, which is supported by empirical evidence from 
reflexive analysis of critical governance issues derived from practitioner 
perspectives.   
Challenging or Extending Existing Theory 
Issue Three: Coverage of Cabinet direction.  Over the life of the PSISS Cabinet 
issued numerous mandates, which practitioners found problematic.  Reflexive 
analysis, using the extended model as a lens, indicated these mandates were 
inconsistently applied across the three perspectives through the life of the PSISS.  
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Recent academic literature has explored tensions over the use of vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms in governance arrangements across organisational 
boundaries (Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2016; Stafford & Stapleton, 2017).  These 
tensions have been explored by researching dimensions including authority 
(Papadopoulos, 2016; Sorensen & Torfing, 2016; Gjaltema et al., 2019) and the use 
of mandates or agreements (Gash, 2016; Schou & Hjelholt, 2018).  The extended 
model provided an opportunity to empirically explore the presence of tensions in 
inter-organisational governance arrangements relating to mandates and authority, 
which has been conducted through reflexive analysis of the issue of Cabinet 
directive coverage.  This analysis provides empirical evidence for the finding that 
inter-organisational governance arrangements need to consider comparative 
coverage for strategy, delivery and assurance.   
Issue Seven: Privacy and security.  The practice narrative identified adoption, cost 
reduction, privacy and security as tensions present when designing PSISS 
governance arrangements.  Security and privacy have been identified as important 
design considerations for PSISS (Melin et al., 2016; Houser & Voss, 2018) and as 
socio-political perspectives which impact governance (van Dijck & Jacobs, 2020).  
Other academics have voiced an expectation that PSISS governance arrangements 
need to meet growing privacy and security concerns (Houser & Voss, 2018; van 
Dijck & Jacobs, 2020).  Recent privacy legislation, including the GDPR and 
Privacy Act, have increased tensions for governance arrangements to address 
privacy (Stalla-Bourdillon et al., 2018).  Reflexive analysis has led to the creation 
of a tensions model for governance arrangements, presented in Figure thirty one, 
which provides an illustrative example of interrelated tensions present in PSISS 
governance and delivery, and empirical evidence of PSISS governance tensions 
between privacy, security, cost and adoption.       
Confirmation of Existing Theory  
Issue Four: Accountability.  Practitioners identified tensions arising through a 
perceived lack of accountability in key relationships.  For example: the provider 
was seen as lacking accountability through failing to meet targets, with clients 
criticised for not adopting the PSISS even when directed.  Recent academic 
research has questioned the applicability of traditional vertical governance 
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arrangements, particularly for inter-organisational initiatives like PSISS (Torfing, 
2016a; Lopes & Farias, 2020).  Others have criticised the introduction of horizontal 
governance arrangements with multi-party accountabilities as adding to 
accountability deficits and increasing tensions (Dormer & Ward, 2018).  This 
research provided an opportunity to empirically explore the presence of these 
accountability tensions in governance arrangements.  Reflexive analysis using the 
extended model as a lens presented empirical evidence of accountability tensions 
and system wide accountability deficits.  The analysis explored accountability 
deficits for two relationships, firstly the accountability relationship between 
Executive and provider and secondly the accountability relationship between the 
provider and clients.   
Issue Five: Misaligned expectations impacting collaboration.  The grounded 
practitioner narrative identified misaligned expectations between Executive, 
provider and clients.  The use of mandates and limited collaboration were identified 
by participants as contributing to these disconnects.  Reviewing recent academic 
literature identified examples where researchers attempted to address the 
complexity of governance across multiple organisations through mandates or 
collaborative governance mechanisms (Ansell et al., 2016; Lopes & Farias, 2020).  
Even with the increased body of research it has been claimed little is known about 
collaborative governance, with existing research criticised for producing 
prescriptive governance arrangements (Gash, 2016) and providing limited 
knowledge of practitioner perspectives (Gustafson & Hertting, 2017).  This 
research provides empirical evidence of practitioner perspectives and analysis of 
changing combinations of vertical and horizontal governance arrangements used in 
PSISS governance to address tensions and align goals.     
Issue Six: Is ICT different?  The practice narrative highlighted practitioner 
concerns about technically focussed PSISS governance, in particular whether ICT 
initiatives should be governed differently.  IT governance has emerged as a distinct 
governance form in academic literature and practice (Wilkin & Chenhall, 2019).  
Recent literature has been critical of technology led governance approaches (Lips, 
2019), the projectification of the public sector leading to a short term focus and 
fragmentation (Hodgson et al., 2019), and ICT project failures (Lofgren & Allen, 
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2019).  The extended model provided a lens for reflexive analysis of tensions in 
the governance of ICT projects.  Analysis found a reliance on project management 
controls, which was reinforced by the grounded theory where practitioners viewed 
governance as a process, and a governance focus change from technology requiring 
special arrangements to alignment with outcomes.  Although analysis indicated a 
move to outcomes, governance direction issues were identified, including the 
interval between ICT strategies and public sector direction being placed on hold.  
The analysis provides empirical evidence of a technology project focus in PSISS 
governance arrangements and practitioner perceptions of broader public sector 
project governance tensions.       
Summary 
Table fourteen summarises the results of theoretical integration by presenting 
current academic literature, related critical governance issues and the nature of the 





Current Literature Findings – Critical 
Governance Issues 
Governance Issues that 
Confirm Theory 
Governance Issues that 
Challenge or Extend Theory 
New Insights 
Under corporate governance the board 
oversees organisational strategy, delivery and 
assurance.  A system wide governance 
approach is advocated for public sector 
governance (Steelman, 2016; Lips, 2019).  
Issue One. System 
governance - Aligning 
System Strategy, Delivery 
and Assurance.   Presented 
empirical evidence of 
perceived tensions.  
 Presented model for public sector 
governance using system 
strategy, delivery and assurance 
showing different parties 
providing oversight.   
Nested governance exists between corporate 
and IT governance (Wilkin & Chenhall, 
2019).  Nested governance is also present in 
the public sector (i.e. government, central 
agencies and agencies).  Tensions have been 
identified in academic literature between 
these nested governance arrangements (Lips, 
2019).  
Issue Two. Conflicting 
system interests.  Presented 
empirical evidence of 
perceived tensions between 
nested governance 
arrangements.  
 Presented extended model to 
explore nested governance 
tensions for public sector 
governance.  Issues were 
explored through observed PSISS 
governance tensions.  
Challenges or extensions to existing theory 
Academic literature presents conflicting 
views on the role of government and 
governance arrangements required to 
authorise agents (Papadopoulos, 2016; 
Sorensen & Torfing, 2016; Gjaltema et al., 
2019)  
Issue Three. Designing 
governance arrangements for 
outcome delivery using three 
perspectives.   
 Presented empirical evidence of 
perceived tensions arising from 
inconsistent coverage of 
government authorisation.  
Found system governance 
arrangements need to consider 
comparative coverage for 
strategy, delivery and assurance.  
Tensions have emerged in literature between 
service delivery performance targets, privacy 
and security.  These tensions have been 
identified in PSISS design  (Melin et al., 
2016; Houser & Voss, 2018), and socio-
Issue Seven. Use of 
governance arrangements to 
address conflicting 
governance drivers.  
Presented empirical evidence 
of perceived tensions between 
 Presented governance 
arrangements model highlighting 
tensions between privacy, 
security, adoption and cost.   
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Current Literature Findings – Critical 
Governance Issues 
Governance Issues that 
Confirm Theory 
Governance Issues that 
Challenge or Extend Theory 
political perspectives (van Dijck & Jacobs, 
2020).    
privacy, security, adoption 
and cost. 
Confirmation of existing theory – through examples of nested governance issues 
Academics have identified cross-
organisational accountability as challenging 
and resulting in accountability deficits (Gash, 
2016; Papadopoulos, 2016; Stafford & 
Stapleton, 2017; Dormer & Ward, 2018; 
Gjaltema et al., 2019; Hammond et al., 2019; 
Wilkin & Chenhall, 2019).    
Issue Four. Accountability 
Deficits – System wide 
accountability.  Presented 
empirical evidence of system 
wide accountability deficits. 
Empirical evidence of 
deficits/tensions and 
exploration of horizontal 
and vertical governance 
combinations. 
 
Conflicting views in literature about the use 
of horizontal or vertical governance for 
PSISS, particularly the use of mandates or 
agreements (Bang, 2016; Bovaird & Loeffler, 
2016; Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2016; 
Schou & Hjelholt, 2018) 
Issue Five. Aligning 
Disparate Goals.  Identified 
tensions between 
government, provider, clients 
and customers impacted 
performance.  
Presented empirical 
evidence of the use of 
combinations of 
mandates and agreements 
in PSISS governance to 
address tensions through 
alignment of goals.    
 
Use of project management is widespread in 
the public sector, however it has been 
identified as contributing to fragmentation 
and focus on short term deliverables 
(Derakhshan et al., 2019; Godenhjelm et al., 
2019; Lofgren & Allen, 2019)   
Issue Six. Is ICT different? – 
Identified wider issue of 
technical focus, examples of 
projectification and technical 
deliverable focus.  Stated 
need to align information 
systems with outcomes, 
rather than technology 
projects. 
Presented empirical 
evidence of technology 
project focus and 
perceived impact on 
outcome delivery.  
 




Chapter Nine. Conclusions, Contributions and Limitations 
This study investigated public sector ICT shared service governance from a 
practitioner perspective.  The practice focus was chosen to overcome the challenges 
posed by the partially siloed, multi-disciplinary nature of governance treatment in 
the literature.  A single PSISS was researched through practitioner insights gained 
through interviews with PSISS participants.  These were analysed using grounded 
theory, supported by a governance framework and characteristics model as 
sensitising concepts, to identify governance and governance forms in practice, to 
answer my research questions.  This chapter recaps the findings as the answers to 
my research questions and presents the mid-range theory created through 
theoretical integration of theory with grounded practitioner, official and practice 
narratives constructed for this research.  This is followed by the contributions my 
research makes to theory and practice.  Finally, I present the limitations of my 
research and suggestions for future research.   
Answering Research Questions.  Internationally governments have invested 
heavily in PSISS to enable cost savings and improved services to customers, while 
academic research and practitioner publications have shown these benefits are 
commonly not realised.  Governance, and more specifically governance 
arrangements, have been identified as contributing to this perceived failure.  The 
academic literature informing PSISS governance lacks coherence and comes from 
multiple theoretical foundations.  Practitioners are expected to use this literature 
from multiple domains, with associated governance forms, to develop PSISS 
governance arrangements.  This led me to ask my research question: how is PSISS 
governance perceived in practice?    
Grounded theory was used to conduct analysis of practitioner interview responses, 
following the approach advocated by Corbin and Strauss (2008).  This led to the 
conclusion that practitioners perceived PSISS governance as a multi-perspective 
process.  In this case the process, or critical category, was similar to a project or 
system lifecycle with four phases: concept, implement, client and customer as 




Figure Thirty Three: Grounded Practitioner Theory 
The central category was created through the integration of five categories: 
adoption, governance focus, accountability, risk and resistance into a cohesive 
theory.  The categories represented five significant PSISS governance issues or 
perspectives respondents expected governance arrangements to address throughout 
the process.  The grounded practitioner narrative, in Chapter six, provided a rich 
description of the governance arrangements and issues through the stages of the 
governance of PSISS process.   
Governance as a process reflects the influence of the IT governance form upon 
PSISS governance, including the common use of project management and solution 
lifecycles to oversee delivery.  These and other vertical governance mechanisms 
were used to govern the PSISS, further highlighting the use of IT governance 
aligned to the corporate governance form.  The roles involved in vertical 
accountability relationships were the Executive and provider, and through 
mandates clients were accountable to the provider under legislation and later 
Cabinet.  In some cases, horizontal conflict between provider and clients was 
attributed to other vertical relationships between ministers and clients, leading to 
the strengthening of mandates, which was indicative of vertical governance 
mechanisms being used to overcome horizontal governance issues.  Collaborative 
governance arrangements were occasionally implemented, however practitioners 
believed PSISS governance in the main was reliant on vertical governance 
mechanisms.   
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The practitioner perspective provided an answer to my first research question, and 
formed a starting point for theoretical integration to answer my second research 
question: How have governance arrangements addressed critical issues in public 
sector governance?      
My theoretical integration consisted of reflexive analysis using my grounded 
practitioner narrative, official narrative and extant theory.  The literature review in 
Chapter two provided an initial theoretical narrative.  The official narrative, based 
on case documents (Chapter five), provided a partial perspective, which was then 
integrated with my grounded practitioner narrative (Chapter six) and existing 
theory (Chapter two) to form the governance practice narrative presented in 
Chapter seven.   
Further reflexive analysis resulted in the creation of a mid-range theory presented 
in Chapter eight.  The mid-range theory consists of a multi-perspective governance 
model that was used to reflexively explore seven practice-informed critical 
governance issues, which found the following:  
PSISS governance was identified as a process and appears to be influenced by the 
IT governance and corporate governance forms.  Corporate governance and IT 
governance arrangements are most commonly designed for a single organisation, 
and do not reflect the wider public sector governance context.  Analysis identified 
PSISS governance arrangements also sit within nested public sector governance 
arrangements, as presented in the perspectives model, which identified a 
requirement for PSISS governance to consider additional system roles, not just 
delivery.   
Public sector assurance roles are interorganisational, which is not common in 
corporate or IT governance literature.  Public sector delivery comes under 
additional scrutiny from a public accountability perspective, limiting the adequacy 
of PSISS governance arrangements based on IT or corporate governance forms.   
Public sector governance arrangements, as identified in the six roles, changed over 
time, and influenced PSISS governance arrangements.  The case shows conflicting 
perspectives about whether sector ICT is a system asset or merely service delivery.  
The relationship between PSISS governance and public sector governance raises 
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questions about where the sector ICT role sits, particularly given the expectation 
established in literature that IT and corporate governance arrangements are best 
vertically aligned.     
The PSISS critical case enabled exploration of two different mandates.  Reflexive 
analysis identified inconsistent coverage for the three perspectives over time.  
Corporate governance literature promoted consistency of direction, controls and 
assurance coverage to the exclusion of public service system objectives, which 
indicates a governance oversight gap.  These inconsistencies contributed to 
difficulties enforcing mandates and indicated a lack of alignment between sector, 
assurance and delivery roles. 
Accountability deficits were identified in both vertical and horizontal 
accountability relationships.  Comparison of official narrative and practitioner 
perspectives with academic accountability literature identified inconsistency in 
reporting, performance criteria changes, multiple failures to meet targets, limited 
performance measurement and accountability gaps.  The lack of sanction for clients 
and provider for failing to meet formally defined performance criteria indicates the 
presence of accountability deficits and questions the effectiveness of monitoring.   
Misaligned expectations between clients and provider were highlighted through 
integration issues, which manifested in technical and cultural examples.  The 
provider and clients had differing identity requirements, which were compounded 
when implementation occurred with limited collaboration.  Client resistance, 
reinforced by poor integration experiences and additional costs, resulted in low 
adoption.  Contrary to literature findings on mandate use, vertical governance was 
employed, through mandate, to compel adoption, resulting in increased client 
resistance, performance targets still not met and the PSISS perceived as a failure.   
Separate governance arrangements for ICT were identified in literature and 
practice, including the IT governance form and practitioner perspective that PSISS 
governance was a process.  Tensions were noted when these arrangements were 
explored from a wider public sector perspective.  The arrangements were at odds 
with public sector assurance for this case.  Although the focus of assurance started 
with major ICT projects in 2001, it moved to major projects in 2011 and then 
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system investment in 2015.  Similarly, strategic alignment is a common 
requirement observed in corporate and IT governance literature, however, tensions 
between the system and sector ICT roles raised questions about alignment across 
the public sector.  
Privacy and security are critical issues for the governance of the PSISS, and 
according to international research for E-ID PSISS.  Reflexive analysis revealed 
tensions between these issues and commonly stated PSISS drivers of reduced cost 
and improved customer service, as represented in performance targets by increased 
adoption.  These tensions pose yet another governance challenge.  This list of 
governance issues is not exhaustive and further exploration could lead to 
identification of additional issues and tensions.   
Contributions 
Firstly, my mid-range theory introduces a public sector governance model, derived 
from the perspectives of those people exercising governance, which integrates 
three perspectives: system strategy, delivery and assurance to enable exploration 
of vertical and collaborative governance arrangements.  This model has been 
extended to enable analysis of nested governance which occurs across PSISS, 
sector ICT strategy and public sector governance arrangements.  My case study 
evidences how this works in practice through reflexive analysis of seven critical 
governance issues, using the model.  This analysis contributed to the body of 
academic knowledge by illustrating the requirement for PSISS governance to 
integrate all three perspectives to provide a more nuanced approach to governance 
that integrates PSISS, sector ICT and public sector governance arrangements.             
Secondly, my research contributes a method for researching a complex 
phenomenon in practice, in this case public sector ICT shared service governance.  
Using a single approach without adaptation would have provided a narrow answer.  
Instead I had to develop a unique and creative approach to investigate the 
phenomenon.  Synthesising three perspectives of governance and applying these to 
nested governance at all three levels: PSISS, sector ICT strategy and public sector 
enabled construction of a mid-range theory.  Through analysis of critical 
governance issues this theory provided insights into how current literature fits 
together, or not.  This model was constructed using a grounded theory of practice, 
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literature informed governance framework and characteristics model, each of 
which could be reused in future research.  
Thirdly, my research makes a contribution to our empirical body of literature, 
where we lack knowledge about PSISS governance, by providing an illustration of 
my public sector governance model through analysis and rich description of a 
PSISS case in New Zealand, which could be used to inform practice in New 
Zealand or overseas.    
Limitations 
This thesis presents governance of a single critical case through a practitioner 
perspective, however in the process misses out on several other perspectives.  My 
intention was to use my research to provide a specific contribution.  Selection of 
one critical case, viewed through constructivist, qualitative research using 
grounded theory, soliciting information through interviews and conducting 
research into a single PSISS based in New Zealand are all factors that limit the 
universal application of my research.  Generalisability was not a goal of my 
research (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2014).  I made research design 
considerations with the intent of creating a rigorous, repeatable contribution to the 
body of knowledge, which I believe I have attained.  A single critical case was 
selected to obtain richness through grounded theory, rather than exploration of 
multiple cases.   
Future research   
My grounded theory found PSISS governance was perceived as a multi-perspective 
process, with adoption, governance focus, accountability, risk and resistance as 
areas of concern for PSISS governance in practice.  Future researchers could 
undertake research to test and build upon these findings.  
Theoretical integration led to the identification of seven critical governance issues.  
Reflexive analysis of these issues against current academic literature, using the 
three perspectives model, enabled contributions to the body of knowledge.  Future 
research could be conducted using the three perspectives model through the 
exploration of the seven, or other, critical issues.   
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My research methodology and models could be used to conduct governance 
research into another PSISS case or in different sectors including not-for profit, 
multi-national organisations or PPP’s.   
Researchers could use my governance framework and/or characteristics models as 
sensitising concepts for future governance research.   
Concluding Statement  
Internationally PSISS have promised improved customer services and cost 
reduction for governments.  Large investment in these systems has failed to deliver 
the expected benefits.  Governance and governance arrangements have been 
identified as contributing to these failures.  Reviewing literature identified a siloed 
body of knowledge from multiple domains.  I set out to reduce the gap between 
theory and practice knowledge by asking my first research question how is PSISS 
governance perceived in practice?    
Conducting research grounded in practice has produced findings that challenge 
existing knowledge on how governance operates and is defined in practice.  
Conducting grounded theory analysis I found that PSISS governance was perceived 
to be a process, which is supported through a rich practitioner narrative.  
Theoretical integration of my grounded theory with case documentation and 
existing theory enabled me to answer my second research question:  How have 
governance arrangements addressed critical issues in public sector 
governance?      
I found PSISS governance arrangements exist within nested public sector 
governance arrangements.  Reflexive analysis led to the construction of a public 
sector governance model consisting of three perspectives, providing a lens to 
explore critical PSISS governance issues across nested governance arrangements.  
I used this lens to reflexively explore seven practice grounded critical governace 
issues, resulting in a mid-range theory, a rich case description and insights to 




Appendix A: Glossary 
Adoption.  Several terms were used in practice and theory to identify parties 
agreeing to use, or actually using, the PSISS.  Adoption was the term used in this 
research to collectively describe these actions, which was explored in terms of 
PSISS adoption by clients and customers.   
Cabinet.  Cabinet leads the Executive branch of government, directing individual 
ministers, who in turn direct public servants, in particular chief executives, who act 
as administrative heads of agencies. 
Client.  A client integrates with the PSISS to provide customer facing online 
services.  Clients started as public sector agencies, however, as the PSISS evolved 
private sector organisations were introduced.   
Collaborative governance.  Collaborative forms of governance were proposed to 
oversee the delivery of public value through joined-up-government.  Labels were 
proposed in public administration literature for the new governance form.  These 
included post-NPM, collaborative governance, network governance, digital-era 
governance and new public governance.  I have selected the label collaborative 
governance, based on the intention of increased inter-organisational collaboration 
Corporate governance.  Corporate governance defines the roles and 
responsibilities of participants involved in directing and controlling an 
organisation.  Corporate governance is commonly based on agency theory, 
otherwise known as the principal-agent model, which was selected to represent 
corporate governance in this research. 
Customer.  A customer gets an identity from the PSISS provider that enables them 
to consume integrated digital services provided by clients.  Customers were 
originally New Zealand citizens, however, over time non-New Zealand citizens 
began consuming client services.    
E-government.  e-government is the use of ICT to deliver improved government 
services and provide public value.   
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Electronic identity.  An electronic identity (E-ID) is an electronic form of 
identification which is provided digitally.   
Executive.  Government ministers collectively constitute the Executive who 
administer or execute policy.   
Governance.  This research explores governance using governance forms that 
emerged from three academic domains, these governance forms are: corporate 
governance, IT governance and collaborative governance.  Governance has been 
defined for this research as the four elements and fifteen sub-elements in the 
governance framework used to identify governance, and the characteristics model 
to identify governance forms, in practice. 
Governance arrangements.  Governance arrangements are patterns of 
governance elements e.g. structures, roles and relationships; put in place to set 
direction and enable delivery of objectives.  
Governance mechanisms.  Governance arrangements are supported by 
governance mechanisms including policies, processes, procedures and controls.   
ICT.  Information and communications technology (ICT), or simply ‘technology’, 
were used to describe implemented or planned systems, as they were terms 
commonly used in practice.  Other names identified from theory and practice 
include information technology (IT), information systems (IS), and in recent public 
sector documents digital services.   
IT governance.  IT governance is the decision-making ability and accountability 
framework that encourages the right sort of behaviour for the use of ICT.   
Participants.  The term participant was used to describe parties taking part in the 
research from Chapter seven onwards following the integration of narratives.   
Perspectives model.  Theoretical integration enabled the identification of three 
public sector governance perspectives: delivery, system and assurance.  My 
perspectives model was constructed as an analytical device with three different 
lenses each capable of seeing an issue from a particular perspective, while the other 
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perspectives remain in view.  This model was used to explore critical governance 
issues in Chapter eight.  
Provider.  The term provider is used to refer to the agency providing the PSISS to 
clients and customers.  The provider changed over time from the SSC to DIA.   
PSISS.  Public sector ICT shared services are a combination of three areas: public 
sector services, shared services and ICT services.  Public sector services are 
services provided on behalf of the government, either by public sector agencies or 
external providers.  The identity PSISS explored in this research is referred to as 
the PSISS, as it has been called by several different names in practice.  These names 
include: Government Logon Service (GLS), Igovt logon (igovt), Identity 
Verification Service (IVS), Data Verification Service (DVS) and RealMe.  
Public sector services.  Public sector services are services provided on behalf of 
the government, either by public sector agencies or external providers.   
Public sector organisations.  Participants, official documents and academic 
literature have identified public sector clients using a variety of names including 
departments, agencies, crown entities and crown agents.  The term client or public 
sector client was used to when discussing public sector agencies in terms of the 
PSISS.  As discussed in Chapter two, when discussing the wider public sector, 
department has been used prior to the introduction of NPM legislation, with the 
term agency used post.   
Public sector governance roles.  A group of six public sector governance roles 
were identified through theoretical integration.  These roles inform the perspectives 
model and were used to explore critical governance issues in Chapter eight.  The 
roles are: system guidance, system monitoring, assurance guidance, assurance 
monitoring, delivery and sector ICT leadership.   
Respondents.  The term respondent was used to describe for people who took part 
in the interviews which were used for the grounded theory analysis.   
Shared service.  Shared services consolidate and standardise specialist functions 
into a provider that could support an organisation or group of organisations.   
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Appendix B: Interview Schedule 
Interviewee:          Interview Date:  
1.       First Research Question: How Do Practitioners Perceive PSISS Governance 
in Practice? 
Supporting questions – to be asked at interviews: 
2.       What is the service? 
a.       What is the purpose of the service? 
b.      How is the service defined? 
c.       Who are the customers? 
d.      Who provides direction? 
  
3.       What role have you played in the service? 
a.       What were you expected to deliver? 
b.      Who were you expected to deliver to? 
c.       How was this defined? 
  
4.       Who else played a key role in the service? 
a.       What was their role 
b.      What were they expected to deliver? 
c.       Who were they expected to deliver to? 
d.      How was this defined? 
  
5.       Has the service been successful? 
a.       How was success defined? By whom? 
b.      How was success measured? By whom? 
c.       How was success reviewed? By whom? 
d.       What were the results? What was the impact on the service broker? 
e.      How was success reported? To whom? 
f.      Did the results change anything about the service? 
  
6.       What challenges has (the service) faced? 
a.       What was the response to these challenges? Who oversaw it? 
b.       Who was affected? 
c.       Were challenges overcome? How 
d.       What could have been done differently? 
  
7.       What opportunities does (the service) face? 
a.       What are the potential benefits? To whom? 
b.      What is being done? 
c.      Who is leading it? 
  
8.       Is there anything else? 
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315 
 
Appendix D Codebook 
Two rounds of coding were performed in this research, the first was used to 
construct the grounded theory presented in Chapter six, and the second to generate 
themes for theoretical integration presented in Chapter eight.  A codebook has been 
constructed at the end of this appendix consisting of tables which provide the names 
of codes, descriptions and examples.   
Coding for Grounded Theory 
An Nvivo instance was set up and interviews were loaded.  Initial coding was based 
on sensitising concepts from the governance framework.  NVivo tools and 
techniques promoted by Corbin and Strauss (2008) were used to construct refined 
concepts, which were used to construct categories and finally the central category 
which provided the basis for the grounded theory presented in Chapter six.  The 
coding conducted for the grounded theory is presented in Figure thirty four.  
 
Figure Thirty Four: Coding for Grounded Theory 
Sensitising concepts are presented in at the end of the appendix.  Concepts, 
categories and central category then presented to show the progression from 
concept to categories to central category.   
Coding for Theoretical Integration 
A new NVivo instance was set up to enable creation of new concepts for theoretical 
integration.   NVivo tools and techniques promoted by Corbin and Strauss (2008) 
were used to identify concepts and categories which were used to construct the 
themes, which presented in Chapter seven and used to conduct the theoretical 
integration presented in Chapter eight.   Concepts, categories and themes used for 









Element Sub-Element Definition Example 
Direction  Governance direction is the overarching policy or plan 
rather than detailed instruction for operational 
management. 
“DIA had sole responsibility – built into baseline, 
approval from treasury to invest. Run teams, market, 
product develop etc. with little oversight. Relied on 
standard DIA governance mechanisms – finance 
investment., capital planning.” Interview 1 
 Autonomy The freedom to act and freedom from controls. “CE’s have freedom. Mandate is a waste of time. If the 
ideas are good you do not need a mandate.  People 
will listen if the idea is good.  Once listening more likely 
to adopt.” Interview 11 
 Legislation and 
Regulation 
Legislation is law.  Regulations are rules or directives 
made by the Executive that can have a technical nature 
and may need to be updated frequently making 
legislation unsuitable.  
“The public accountability – PFA for shared governance 
and programmes were not in place when we were 
working.  RealMe was a driver for that legislative 
change.” Interview 17 
 Performance 
Specification 
Performance specification defines the expected level 
for deliverables, these should be clearly defined and 
measurable. 
“Suspect by and large at a governance level defined by 
legislation – privacy etc. under the hood defined by 
technocrats and bureaucrats who provide direction. 
Also software providers shape.” Interview 12 
Controls  Governance controls are mechanisms put in place to 
ensure directions are followed. 
“Nature of common capabilities like RealMe highlight 
the need to get buy in and stakeholder engagement 
and commitment. More than command and control.  
Yet that is the natural known way to work – it can be 
highly counter-productive.” Interview 1 
 Accountability Accountability is about providing an answer for actions 
that were or were not taken by an individual.  
“If you think about the people – formal structures of 
accountability for delivering shared services – not 
convinced they made much of a contribution.  They 




Performance measurement involves the creation, 
analysis and reporting of agency activities against 
specified performance criteria.  
“Outcomes- result 10 – 70% of common transactions 
online by 2017 – tracking well – sub set of 8 services 
across agencies. Can influence. Measured and 
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Element Sub-Element Definition Example 
reported to ministers – SSC, treasury and DPMC – 
under BPS to ministers quarterly.” Interview 13 
 Responsibility Responsibility relates to issues about choices based on 
conflicting options, once the decision is made the 
individual or group can be held culpable for their 
action, or inaction.   
“I was the six or seventh person who have looked after 
real me at stages of evolution.  My role to build 
partnerships with agencies – build awareness. Reorient 
public sector and DIA leadership” Interview 1 
Structural 
Governance 
 Structures relate to the formal roles and relationships 
and the provision of authority that empowers them.  
“Delivering to ministers – government of the day. Real 
me as a system asset – system benefits from not just 
public service.” Interview 1 
 Authority Authority is the formally empowered ability to act. “Things have matured since the SSC days – no 
overarching mandate – which GCIO now does – no ICT 
action plan – less services and less service maturity.  
Result 10 helps. Mandate. Development of more 
common capabilities. More pressure from the centre 
to collaborate.” Interview 13 
 Formal Roles Formal roles are codified descriptions of the functions 
performed by positions and groups. 
“CE to make sure meet SOI targets and performance of 
agency.” Interview 13 
 Formal 
Relationships 
Formal relationships are the codified descriptions of 
activities that occur between positions and groups 
performing functions. 
“Who delivering to – governance group – a bunch of 
chief executives and tier 2. Competent chair.  Latterly 
became CIO council” Interview 11 
Informal 
Governance 
 Informal governance elements influence governance 
structures, direction and controls.  Often these factors 
are intangible or not formally captured and include 
culture, informal roles and relationships, leadership, 
political interests and trust. 
“I don’t have role based authority.” Interview 10 
 Culture Culture is the implicitly understood assumptions and 
practices of organisations.  
“Governance issue – need to see government behind 
first.  Not too dissimilar to other public service 
infrastructure.” Interview 1 
 Informal Roles Informal roles are un-codified functions performed by 
positions and groups. 
“Personal – dim view until 2010 that I saw value – 




Element Sub-Element Definition Example 
 Informal 
Relationships 
Informal relationships are un-codified activities that 
occur between positions and groups performing 
functions. 
“The first five years was getting people’s heads around 
it.  Governance in that sense was people playing the 
roles in relation to their departmental responsibilities, 
with central agencies having an overview role.” 
Interview 14 
 Leadership Leadership is a broad field with several different 
perspectives.  Leadership focuses on the role played by 
leaders steering, shaping and influencing governance. 




Political interests are the personal goals and agendas 
of individuals and groups. 
“Personalities can get in the way of service success” 
Interview 1 
 Trust Trust is the level of confidence and belief that exists 
between individuals and groups. 
“SSC made commitments that the agencies did not 
back them on.  That undermined trust and e-govt 




Grounded Theory Concepts, Categories and Central Category 
Central Category: Governance perceived as a process.  
The central category was constructed through analysis of the categories: Risk, Accountability, Adoption, Resistance and Governance 
focus. 
Category: Risk  
Respondents identified risk as constraining the PSISS, with risks to the Executive, Provider and Clients.  The category risk was 
constructed through analysis of the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Accountability Expressed thoughts on accountability for 
the PSISS 
“If you think about the people – formal structures of 
accountability for delivering shared services – not 
convinced they made much of a contribution.” Interview 11 
Addressing risk Expressed thoughts about the 
effectiveness of risk mitigation 
“the purpose of governance is to mitigate risk.  Mitigate 
the risks associated with delivery, not delivery itself, that is 
the role of the PM” Interview 2 
Bureaucracy impacts service delivery Professed beliefs that delivery was 
impacted by the bureaucratic nature of 
the public sector 
“There has been countless reviews – if you want to create 
and infrastructural capability someone has to take a risk on 
the investment.  Going to SLT or board – need to invest in 
plumbing and pipes when they want to talk about the 
electronics and interface – really hard to make a case.” 
Interview 6 
Cross sector risk Perceptions of the risks faced by cross 
sector initiatives 
“We perform assurance, integrity and reliability function.  
Most of my work is working with partners - that is where 
the risk exists.” Interview 20 
Failure to address risks Examples where respondents thought 
risks were not addressed 
“the governance forum pushes the risks back down rather 
than trying” Interview 11 
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Fiscal risk Examples where respondents identified 
financial risk 
“No one wants to invest until there is a catastrophic event.  
It costs money to do it well - which eats into crown 
funding.” Interview 20 
Negative effect of controls Examples where respondents identified a 
negative effect of controls  
“Assurance response is profoundly illogical – fight between 
gateway and major projects …I have seen no evidence that 
the central controls are working.” Interview 11 
Non-participation Expressed views on non-participation “Prior to that CE was only accountable for what they did – 
not for cross government deliverables.  Legal accountability 
was a key inhibitor for adoption.” Interview 17 
Non-performance Expressed views on non-performance “Ministers were supporting the service – it is the nature of 
the government system - you have vertical accountability 
and we are moving to more horizontal accountabilities with 
the GCIO.  So interfering in the stack for service delivery of 
an agency is not a trivial thing.  If you are trying to line up 
every single agency for the same effect.” Interview 15 
Overselling benefits Examples where respondents thought 
the PSISS was being oversold and could 
not deliver to expectations 
“I don’t think the forecast of uptake were well understood 
– people thought we would grow quicker than we planned.  
Needed long term view.  Steering committee and cabinet 
were reported to.  Reported to the programme manager.  
Definitions of success needed to be set with treasury and 
steering committee. Independent review.  Milestone 
changes due to risk.” Interview 9 
Privacy risks Examples where respondents identified 
privacy risk 
“Should there have been a law to govern RealMe.  I 
thought no – it complies with the privacy act – until I 
realised that technology cannot protect privacy in 
isolation.” Interview 17 
Provider centric risk approach Examples where respondents identified 
the provider focussing on their risks  
“Generally, there was not confidence in RealMe or the 
interface, there was an issue with control as they felt the 
service wasn’t good enough therefore, we can’t influence 
it.  This goes back to collaboration and co-design.  There 
would have been a lot better response. Mandates are still 
important but there are other factors – they created a 
tension with the agencies.” Interview 15 
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Relationship damage Examples where respondents identified 
relationship damage 
“hiatus of a couple of years did damage to the uptake 
path” Interview 9 
Reputational risk Examples where respondents identified 
reputational risk 
Service left to DIA, demise of e-government unit. Set the 
whole thing back by a few years and tarnished the brand.” 
Interview 16 
Risk aversion of public sector Perceptions of public sector risk aversion “Risk adversity drove that.  Easy to spend money to reduce 
risk rather than to take a chance and introduce risk.  Part of 
the issue was being able to sell to other agencies - give 
them a degree of confidence.” Interview 18 
Risk of providing wrong type of service Perceptions of the PSISS being the wrong 
type of service to meet needs 
“Challenge – operating model out of date – trying to build 
and run yourself as government.” Interview 6 
Risk sharing across sector Examples where respondents identified 
risk sharing 
“Higher agency and citizen adoption. Also think greater 
sharing risk with commercial entities.  Share risk with 
others.” Interview 7 
Risk to careers Perceptions of the PSISS as a risk to 
people’s careers 
“One of the issues is you get so far in and you cannot stop.  
You can imagine stopping a service which has 100,000 
users and saying it didn’t work, then what do you do – 
because you have to find something else to provide 
identity for those users.” Interview 15 
Risks not understood Examples where respondents believe 
risks were not well understood 
“back then there were no signposts or previous solutions. 
This was before online banking, before we expected and 
knew what we wanted to be private or shared.  Before 
Facebook.  Intuitively trying to work out the conversation.  
Do you know at that point you need governance. It is not 
like you started with a service plate – at that stage they did 
not know what they wanted.” Interview 14 
Security risk Examples where respondents identified 
security risks 
“If you are the people who are accountable for taxpayer 
money you need to ensure security – to the highest level of 
assurance.  You need to do your best to deliver the service 
(money) to the right people.  You need to provide 
assurance.” Interview 14 
Service failure Expressed thoughts on service failure “Not wildly successful – dismal failure. More like let’s 
convince clients that we don’t.” Interview 1 
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Technical focus may impact outcomes Examples where respondents though 
technical focus may impact outcomes 
“Don’t be prescriptive about how, rather focus on what 
(outcomes)” Interview 6 
Technology risk Expressed thoughts on technology risk “SAML 2 upgrade affected by windows 95 machine.  Had to 
ship logs to US for f5 to fix.  Prod at risk as dev and preprod 
failing.” Interview 8 
 
Category: Accountability 
Some respondents raised questions about who was accountable for the delivery of services to clients and customers.  They also 
identified changes to accountability relationships over time.  The category accountability was constructed through analysis of the 
following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Who accountable Who is accountable for the PSISS  “SSC – never product deliverers – never a delivery agency.  
Expected to deliver a consensus.”  Interview 14 
Accountable for What are they accountable for delivering? “An important part was things you could be accountable for 
programme plans and business cases.” Interview 9 
Accountable to whom To whom are they accountable for delivery “Ultimately they deliver to ministers” Interview 13 
Accountability forum How are they held to account for delivery 
or non-delivery? 
“Commissioner was judged on success of programme – GSN went 




Respondents used several words for parties agreeing to use, or actually using, the PSISS.  The term respondents most commonly used 
to describe these actions was adoption and therefore was used in this research.  The category adoption was constructed through analysis 




Concept Description Example 
Agency adoption Instances of agency PSISS adoption  “Companies Office (was) reluctant to be an early 
adopter... it may have gone faster but not sure that 
would be a better result in the end.” Interview 9 
Barriers Barriers to adoption “At the time it was seen to be useful but in the long 
run it removed the pressing need to treat government 
agencies as customers.  It caused conflict. The 
argument was we have consulted enough now we use 
the stick.  It caused conflict at the ground level.  People 
would look at the exact wording and argue from there. 
Classic argument was education sector had their own 
solution.” Interview 17 
Citizen adoption Instances of agency PSISS adoption “SSC used to report on uptake on an agency basis not 
process or citizen, one of the problems.” Interview 16 
Culture The impact of culture on the PSISS  “Discussion is about culture.  People would accept 
logic – but culturally it is difficult to do more than meet 
day to day needs of agency.” Interview 11 
Incentives Perceived incentives for PSISS use “What incentivises the CE or minister to adopt a 
service?… it comes down to personal motivation” 
Interview 18 
Mandate Instances of mandates intended to increase PSISS 
usage 
“I performed the role of selling the benefits of the GLS 
to agencies. And “sell” – reminding them of the 
mandate.” Interview 3 
Non-adoption Instances of non-adoption of the PSISS “There were agencies across the governance at that 
time which included IRD and MSD. A few other key 
agencies at a governance level.  They were in 
governance but were not adopting at the time, and are 
still not adopting – this is many years old and IRD are 
still not an adopter.” Interview 15   
Process Processes implemented for the ongoing governance of 
the PSISS  
“Barriers – people, process technology – cause 





Respondents identified multiple instances of client resistance to the PSISS.  The category resistance was constructed through analysis 
of the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Avoidance Instances where avoidance occurred “a story about why they are different and the 
complete mess if they adopt a shared service and 
things will go wrong.”  Interview 17 
Benefits and resistance Relationship between benefits and resistance “Depends how measure.  Against the business case an 
abject failure.” Interview 16   
Conflict and resistance Relationship between conflict and resistance “Commitments made.  Cabinet refused direct funding.  
SSC had to collect from agencies. Terrible idea. If no 
proactive demand there was now proactive aversion 
to the service.” Interview 3 
Customers and resistance Instances of customer resistance “cognisant of the end to end customer experience, we 
have nearly 100 services and not all have modern 
interfaces range from nice new mobile UI to another 
agency having an old rubbish.  We need to get control 
over the end to end customer experience” Interview 
20 
Delivery and resistance Impact of delivery on resistance “I shudder to use it these days.” Interview 17 
Funding and resistance Relationship between funding and resistance “you can't align the funding with the benefits 
realisation. Returns are non-realisable” Interview 21   
Government support and 
resistance 
Relationship between Govt support and resistance “There is no normalising view at cabinet PM needs 
ministers to have autonomy to meet own needs.  No 
balance” Interview 11 
Integration or implementation 
and resistance 
Relationship between Integration, implementation 
and resistance  
“a bunch of factors – technical – integration. Very 
emotional factors – already committed significant 
energy to idea which is threatened by shared services. 
People can be passionate about initiatives – technical 
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solutions and arguing for them. When threatened 
they react emotionally. Interview 11 
Liability and resistance Relationship between liability and resistance “That was a difficult issue – argument was people 
using agency services – government as a whole is 
liable – agency liability is merely accountable.  It does 
not make sense.  If DHB using service – and get it 
wrong – shouldn’t DHB hold other liable?” Interview 
17 
Mandate and resistance Relationship between mandate and resistance “polarises people’s perceptions of what will be 
accomplished leads to resistance rather than 
willingness to participate. Interview 2 
Risk and resistance Relationship between risk and resistance “hope the technology does not become obsolete” 
Interview 18 
Threatened Instances where clients were identified as feeling 
threatened 
“felt threatened. The quality of work on identity – and 
separating it from other attributes, it was difficult for 
government people to understand.” Interview 9 
 
Category: Governance Focus 
Respondents identified an inconsistency in PSISS governance.  They believed the intention of the PSISS was to provide improved 
customer services and internal efficiencies for customer facing government services.  Some methods used to govern the PSISS were 
identified as conflicting with the intended direction, particularly internal governance controls used to oversee PSISS implementation. 
The category governance focus was constructed through analysis of the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Barriers  Barriers to realising system asset value “SSC – never product deliverers – never a delivery 
agency.  Expected to deliver a consensus.   Detailed 
consideration of the issue and come up with a plan 
and options for government.  An analysis that said was 
this worth investing in? Then expected to deliver the 
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buy in from government agencies to back something 
that the government needed.  DIA had the 
responsibility for delivering the product.” Interview 14 
Cost impact Cost recovery impacts realisation of system asset “layers of ticket clippers between thinkers and 
engineers.” Interview 11 
Cultural change Instances that identify cultural change required for 
system value 
“adoption has a cultural underlay that didn’t come 
through. It wasn’t dealt with.  Shared services 
governance needs to address the soft elements and 
future technology.” Interview 4 
Critical mass Difficulties building critical mass to enable system 
benefits 
“Good example – cloud services for tools and 
information services – wouldn’t it be great if our 
people and parties could use real me to access those 
services.  However none of those vendors are willing 
to connect as they do not see the critical mass from 
other agencies.” Interview 7 
Expected benefits Expected benefits from PSISS “Major beneficiary is the individual who has more and 
more frictionless contact with government but 
maintains control.  Second beneficiary is government 
who does not have to rebuild.” Interview 9 
Failed to deliver system value Instances where the PSISS failed to add system value “Hard to get commitment and realise benefits.” 
Interview 19 
Lack of system asset 
perspective 
Respondents identified lack of system perspective “No one was talking digital transformation – there was 
lots of hype.   No one was in business case stage so 3 
years + to wait for services to use GLS.” Interview 3 
Lessons learned Lessons learned from undertaking the PSISS “Lessons learned – aggregate demand first.” Interview 
3 
System asset focus Respondents identified need to focus on system asset 
value rather than technology instance 
“I performed the role of selling the benefits of the GLS 
to agencies. And “sell” was reminding them of the 
mandate.” Interview 3 
Other options for delivering 
system value 
Respondents identified other options for delivering 
system value 
“From what I could see they didn’t do much to help 
clients. Why didn’t the PSISS partly absorb the cost of 
the new component the client needed. Or in some 
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cases have a freeware version that could be used.” 
Interview 5 
Potential for system benefits Respondents identified possible system wide benefits 
resulting from the PSISS 
“locked into group think, need the ability to get fresh 
thought.  Outcome focus.” Interview 6 
Provider focus Respondents identified a focus on internal provider 
needs  
“When function is buried in agency – can lose sight of 
strategic focus – real me multifaceted – customers, 
value, service offerings, enable – adds to complexity – 
how do we put it in a box –stop it being a problem. 
Need to understand before you can govern. Too 
simplistic a view will put it in a box. Makes governance 
more difficult. Interview 1 
Selling benefits of PSISS is 
difficult 
Expressed identified challenges selling the benefits of 
the PSISS to clients 
“Informal governance very difficult to communicate 
effectively across more than 30 people.” Interview 11 
Sunk costs Expressed identified a belief stopping the service will 
be difficult due to uptake and sunk costs 
“We are spending our money on high cost commodity.  
Not on the valuable stuff.  We are focussed on the 
burden so we can’t get our heads above water to 
resolve.” Interview 11 
Technical focus Expressed identified the Provider taking a technology 
focus for the PSISS 
“Igovt probably had stakeholder engagement. When 
shifted to DIA, specialists took an identity centric view 
of the work. Technical domain view. Trust and identity 
– data brokering is different. Multiple domains of 
expertise touched on by real me.  Buried in one part 
of organisation – limited exposure to other issues. Like 
giving role of our currency to coin collectors rather 
than economists. Needs right policy settings and care 
– due to wide ranging concerns rather than delivery 
focus. Interview 1 
Unclear purpose for service Expressed identified a lack of clarity for the PSISS I spent a lot of time on this. Felt undermined at times 
– need to be patient – sometimes people don’t get it.  
Need to find better ways to explain.  Not worked to 
date.  Logic is flawed for sustainable. Need to look for 




Concepts, Categories and Themes for Theoretical Integration 
Theme One Conflicting Ideas of Governance  
Theme One was constructed using three categories: Collaboration, Risk and Vertical mechanisms.  
Collaboration was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Horizontal mechanisms Respondents identified horizontal governance 
mechanisms in practice 
“Nature of common capabilities like RealMe 
highlight the need to get buy in and stakeholder 
engagement and commitment. More than 
command and control.  Yet that is the natural 
known way to work – it can be highly counter-
productive.” Interview 1  
Collaboration opportunities 
 
Opportunities for collaboration after legislative 
reforms including: BPS, ICT strategy, lead agency, 
blueprints 
“GCIO should lead the governance – it is a multi-
agency responsibility.” Interview 14 
Improved services for customers Respondents identified instances or possible 
customer service improvements  
“had to get into the mode of customer focus 
view, which we hadn't done before.” Interview19 
Collaborative consultation 
 
Respondents identified collaborative 
consultation, including business cases and 
blueprints 
“Public consultation about privacy and 
government interaction.  Resulted in government 
logon service.” Interview 3 
 
Risk was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Resistance or avoidance Perceptions of client resistance or avoidance of 
the PSISS 
“polarised people’s perceptions of what will be 
accomplished leading to resistance rather than 
willingness to participate.” Interview 2 
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Dependence on adoption Belief that success relied upon adoption “SSC used to report on uptake on an agency basis 
not process or citizen, one of the problems.  Very 
simple, has an agency committed?” Interview 16 
Lack of unanimity Perceptions of limited government unanimity in 
support of PSISS 
“Sometimes ministers views conflict with shared 
services. So trouble delivering outcomes.” 
Interview 11 
Limited funding Perceptions that the PSISS was underfunded “caught in the previous investment cycle.” 
Interview 6 
Reviews Perceptions of the impact of reviews on the PSISS “People don’t do their research – 10% up front 
90% after implementation. Functionality $1 
requires $4 investment. Sometimes best idea is 
smack it on the head and rebuild.” Interview 11 
Little incentive to adopt Perceptions that clients had little incentive to 
adopt the PSISS 
“Despite a compelling business case what are the 
incentives for an agency to use the service?” 
Interview 18 
Limited client resources Perceptions of limited resources at clients to 
adopt the PSISS 
“The fundamental problem with real me is the 
cost.  There would be higher adoption by 
agencies if running costs were substantially 
lower. Interview 7 
Limited provider resources or experience Perceptions of limited resources of experience 
for delivery of the PSISS 
“Those participating are good public servants 
with limited domain experience.” Interview 11 
Limited government backing Perceptions of limited government support for 
PSISS 
“Most ministers and people in public sector have 
poor understanding of what real me could be.  
Limited information. More focussed on 
Commodity vs collaboration.” Interview 1 
Reputational risk Perceptions of reputational risk in public sector “Agencies asked the question. What if the service 
gets it wrong – who is liable?” Interview 17 
Compelled adoption Perceptions about compelling client adoption “The government mandate was important to get 
the critical mass going.  To ensure the right 
discussions were had.” Interview 15 
Failure or perceived failure Examples where the success or otherwise of the 
PSISS was discussed 
“people say based on reputation I do not want to 
participate.” Interview 2 
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Agency influence Examples where agencies influenced the 
direction of the PSISS 
“we had scale to nudge RealMe from its path into 
something with a slight customisation, which 
would make it a more attractive service for other 
sectors.” Interview 21 
Lip service Examples where the provider was perceived to 
be going through the motions 
“branding and marketing is big, not the 
acknowledgement of the problems.” Interview 
17 
Lack of clarity or readiness Discussion about client readiness to adopt the 
PSISS 
“No one was in business case stage so 3 years 
plus to wait for services to use” Interview 3 
Poor client experience Examples where poor client experiences were 
identified 
“cost of integration is underestimated as most 
systems come with out of the box integration 
which they have to take put and out in RealMe”. 
Interview 8 
  
Vertical mechanisms was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Vertical directions and controls  Examples of vertical governance and controls “Steering committee and cabinet were reported 
to.  Definitions of success needed to be set with 
treasury and steering committee. Independent 
review”. Interview 9 
Internal facing governance Examples of Internal IT and project processes as 
Governance 
“Reported to the programme manager.” 
Interview 9 
Legislative authority and regulatory mandate Examples of regulation and legislation providing 
mandate 
“State sector act – formally defined – any time 
interacting with agency (authentication) sharing 
of identity. Are a mandate.” Interview 11 
Executive - provider relationship Perspectives on the relationship between the 
Executive and provider 
“mantra was get volume at any cost” Interview 
16 
Technical focus Examples of focus on business case, IT 
deliverables 
“The bible was the business case for the 
particular scope and time” Interview 9 
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Design approach Perspectives on design approach  “If done again, I would suggest a different 
approach to how it takes place.  Rather than a 
central agency there would be a co-design 
approach.” Interview 2 
Performance targets Examples of performance targets and delivery “Report to central agencies to ministers – 
measure lots of different things, target no of 




Theme Two Fluid Governance Boundaries 
Theme Two was constructed using four categories: Confusion about who performs governance, Clients role, Executive role and 
Provider role 
Confusion about who performs governance was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Lack of clarity Examples of lack of clarity whether executive or 
provider or clients performing governance 
“Measure – not sure. e-govt unit picked up 
design.  In govt a proxy for success would be in 
the business case.  May not be stated, however 
the utility value should be there to enable the 
minister to back. Benefits management wasn’t 
there in the 1990’s but you have to show value, 
what was the value.” Interview 5 
Multiple parties Examples where multiple parties or individuals 
were believed to be performing governance 
“There used to be extensive multiagency 
arrangements for governance. Then it went 
under the auspices of the digital services council 
and now I am not sure.” Interview 15 
Leadership groups Examples of role of leadership groups and clarity 
or confusion 
“Service innovation group – result 10 in TOR.  
Not sure if RealMe included” Interview 2 
  
Clients role was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Client involvement Examples where clients are involved in 
governance and implementation 
“everyone applying their minds to a common 
problem has been outstanding. The product is 
neither here nor there, you can’t have reached 
the product without collaboration.” Interview 14 
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Adoption through participation Advocated adoption through governance group 
participation  
“involved in the governance of the PSISS but 
were not adopting at the time, and are still not 
adopting, this is many years old and IRD are still 
not an adopter. Interview 15 
Client on adoption Examples where clients decided not to adopt, 
resistance and avoidance 
“IRD governance but not adopting.  Every agency 
has a story about why they are different and the 
complete mess if they adopt a shared service – 
and things go wrong.” Interview 17 
Vertical accountabilities to ministers Examples of vertical accountabilities to ministers “SSC – a lot of frustration about position they 
had been put in.  in another sense there were no 
real consequences for not meeting business 
case.” Interview 3 
 
Executive role was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Legislative backing Executive passed legislation and regulation for 
PSISS and delivering portfolios 
“Regulators to ensure protection, and privacy.” 
Interview 10 
Not enforcing adoption Examples where the Executive did not enforce 
direction 
“Sometimes ministers views conflict with shared 
services. So trouble delivering outcomes.” 
Interview 11 
Direction to adopt Mandate and executive level enforcement “CEOs don't give a shit about operations 
Strongest levers are big stick – mandatory” 
Interview 18 
Delegation Discussion of legislative reform, BPS, Strategy, 
results, governance groups with lead agencies 
“Who – ministers – meet measures of result 10.  
Service innovation working group – more specific 
initiatives (then to ICT senior leadership group – 
for ICT strategy and action plan).” Interview 13 
 
Provider role was constructed using the following concepts: 
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Concept Description Example 
Provider governing and managing Views on provider governing and managing “At the time the role of the govt CIO was being 
established – entire programme team dedicated 
to the GLS, they were critical to the programme.” 
Interview 3 
Provider governing and implementing Perception provider performing governance and 
implementation of PSISS 
“too many people with influence had their 
careers on the line.” (Respondent 8 
Provider sector direction and monitoring Perception provider providing sector direction 
and monitoring as well as implementing projects 
“the governance was provided by central agency 
– SSC was in charge.” Interview 14 
Provider expectations Perception provider expected to collaboratively 
develop concept and had to develop and deliver 
PSISS 
“SSC – never product deliverers – never a 
delivery agency.  Expected to deliver a 
consensus.   Detailed consideration of the issue 
and come up with a plan and options for 
government.” Interview 14 
Internal control focus Perception of internal controls focus and delivery 
of business case 
“Time cost quality – see success factors – may be 
date vs trade offs for delivery.” Interview 4 
Ignored client needs  Perceptions of ignored client needs and 
collaboration 
“We should focus on those who are fleet of foot 
rather than the big ones.  Sme’s are tragically 






Theme Three Protecting Our Privacy  
Theme Three was constructed using four categories: Benefits of privacy enhancing, Privacy Enhancing Service, Privacy in New 
Zealand and Risk  
Benefits of privacy enhancing was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Protect citizens and customers Examples where provider protects clients and 
citizens 
“There could have been a completely different 
group of people who could have paid lip service 
to security and privacy that would have done it 
differently. Should there have been a law to 
govern RealMe.  I thought no – it complies with 
the privacy act – until I realised that technology 
cannot protect privacy in isolation.” Interview 1 
Customer focussed design Ease of use for customers and to update 
information 
“The ultimate customers are the citizens – the 
idea is to reduce the transaction cost for them 
and provide new services for them.” Interview 15 
Assurance of privacy and security Perspectives on privacy and security assurance  “Privacy Act prevents creation of a single 
identifier. Federation needs a single identifier 
that spans federation.” Interview 5 
Partnering Examples of partnering e.g. NZ Post for verified 
identity 
“redefinition occurred when post bought 
onboard with Post as physical location.” 
Interview 6 
 
Privacy Enhancing Service was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Privacy Discussion on relationship with privacy “Would kick start ecosystem – mass creation of 
customers. – data brokering and privacy – could 
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be kicked off. Much smarter better services.” 
Interview 1 
Privacy Commissioner Role of the Privacy Commissioner “Privacy commissioner – involved – needed to 
ensure identity service is privacy enhancing.” 
Interview 5 
Privacy enhancing Perceptions on privacy enhancing services  “New Zealand privacy settings are unusual, it is 
hard to build a federated service that doesn’t 
leak identity data.” Interview 11 
 
Privacy in New Zealand was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Legislation Discussion of relationship with legislation “deliver an authentication service aligned with 
the Privacy Act.” Interview 5 
Barrier to PSISS Examples where legislation was viewed as a 
barrier  
“New Zealand privacy settings are unusual, it is 
hard to build a federated service that doesn’t 
leak identity data.” Interview 11 
Privacy by design Examples where privacy was a part of design “New Zealand’s identity legislation made us shy 
away from a government supplied identity 
wallet. We had a 1-day workshop with design 
and high-level principles for what is now the 
PSISS identity service.” Interview 5 
Become an asset Discussion on whether privacy was considered an 
asset 
“the client does not have to manage identity” 
Interview 13 
Committed to privacy Discussion on commitment to privacy “There could have been a completely different 
group of people who could have paid lip service 
to security and privacy that would have done it 





Risk was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Design risk Risk to provider of poor design Developing something complex with a large 
number of stakeholders becomes exponentially 
difficult. Interview 14 
Social media risk Risks associated with Facebook and other social 
media 
“Some models for authentication were emerging 
later - could have used to simplify.  Now Google 
and Facebook do similar - model not tight 
enough. Interview 18 
Other options Examples of commercial solutions- like Facebook 
for identity 
“There are open systems that could solve the 
same problem.  If you think about google or 
Facebook – that have identity management.  
What is the role they could or should play in this 
kind of service.  I am sure more citizens use them 
than RealMe.  Could take further with other 
attributes associated with me – salary, 
qualifications – that give eligibility to transact or 
have eligibility.  There is so much more they 
could do in that space.” Interview 3 
Can't ignore privacy Risk of privacy concerns not being addressed “Privacy by design – not in 2002 – the fact we 





Theme Four Implementing Systems or Outcomes? 
Theme Four was constructed using three categories: Integration, Outcome focus, and Project or technology focus 
Integration was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Poor experience Instances of poor client experience of PSISS “a bunch of factors – technical – integration. 
Very emotional factors – already committed 
significant energy to idea which is threatened by 
shared services. People can be passionate about 
initiatives – technical solutions and arguing for 
them. When threatened they react emotionally. 
Interview 11 
Agency intervention Instances where agency intervention occurred “There are a lot more things that people could 
spend money on than processing student 
enrolments. Quicker cheaper and easier for 
providers will transfer into better services for 
students.  Access the services they need.” 
Interview 21 
Service integration Creation of services to increase numbers – 
leveraging those against performance targets  
“Result 10 which started with the 70% figure but 
needs to move for example to easier integration 
for services as the discussion becomes nuanced.  
Metrics are easier to talk and measure.  The 
provider will game the system to meet 







Outcome focus was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Goal tensions Relationship between 70% focus and outcomes “This is a hygiene factor.  Are result 9 and result 
10 linked to the achievement of 70% of services 
online? They may have done the metrics, 
however they have not published them.” 
Interview 4 
Implementation  Views that implementation is everything after 
policy (outcome and customer service focus) 
“Governance group was the ICT Senior 
Leadership group” as they oversaw the 
implementation of the ICT Strategy and Action 
Plan” Interview 2 
Examples of client, customer or outcome focus Discussion on arrangements including 
collaborative governance arrangements - 
customer, 70% target 
“Outcome of RealMe – more clear now.  With 
government BPS, functional leadership 
accountabilities, transformation across system, 
life events and citizen centric focus.” Interview 6 
Customer stats Perceived timeliness of customer performance 
stats 
“Presented to customer – if used more than once 
it has value for the customer. Use is a constraint 
as they do not use it often. If only used once or 
twice a year.” Interview 7 
Interdependency  Perceived reliance on each other to deliver 
system value to customers 
“I don't think the environment was ready for the 
service, it is only getting there now.” Interview 
21 
 
Project or technology focus was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Performance and accountability Perceptions on performance and accountability “not sure of number of individuals who have set 
up account. Think 1.5 million people have login, 




Incentives to deliver technology Perceptions on incentives to deliver technology “the people who built and designed it were 
guiding it based on their own beliefs.” Interview 
17 
Client resistance to integration Discussions of resistance, unreadiness to adopt, 
lack of client involvement 
“why would I contribute when there is nothing in 
it for me? Interview 18 
Compel adoption Discussion of effect of mandate and pressure to 
adopt PSISS 
“The argument was we have consulted enough 
now we use the stick.  It caused conflict at the 
ground level.  People would look at the exact 
wording and argue form there.” Interview 17 
Client perception Discussion of client perception of performance 
and meeting their needs 
“doing the wrong thing but doing it really well.” 
Interview 11 
Original outcome focus Perceived intention of PSISS  “came out of work by the SSC about 2006, 
evolved through an identity standard and what 
was seen to be a burgeoning requirement for 
identifying people online so they can interact 
with government online to reduce the burden of 
asserting identity across government” Interview 
15 
Performance based on adoption Perceptions on relationship between 
performance and adoption 
“Success was measured by adoption at the time 
and transactions.  Some operational robustness 
measures.  Was really bums on seats.  Was 
painfully trivial systems.  Some larger ones 
onboard now.” Interview 18 
Reminding of the mandate Examples where a mandate was reinforced by 
empowered public servants 
“The power to direct other agencies.  He was 
looking for an opportunity to use that power.  He 
issued the direction to the whole public service” 
Interview 17 
Increased risk  Examples where IT governance resulted in 
increased risk, cost and decreased ability to 
deliver on time 
“continual pressure to drive uptake whilst 
reducing cost.” Interview 13 
Implementation as getting system in production Perceptions on implementation success “things got funded and plans put in place. Uptake 
plans and the like, whether they worked is 
another thing” Interview 15 
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Internal governance Examples of internal governance and associated 
perceptions 
“Throughout the process we have had so many 
reviews it has not been funny. Many 
independent reviews that have only really came 
to the conclusion that it is quite hard.” Interview 
20 
Assurance controls for projects Examples of programme gateways and assurance 
controls 
“Some people think it was over engineered. For a 
multi-agency  - Project risk register – 
independent QA from a technology perspective, 
Audit NZ also did reviews.  Also put through the 
gateway review programme.  More people 
looking at it the better off you are.  I think there 





Theme Five Accountability Deficits 
Theme Five was constructed using three categories: Accountability, Performance and Relationship aspects  
Accountability was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Provider accountable for client Perception that provider accountable for client 
action or inaction, 
“User uptake and secondary on agency adoption. 
That was defined in the business case.” Interview 
15  
Accountability forum Examples of accountability forums “people in the governance forum push the risks 
back down rather than trying to resolve them.” 
Interviewee 11 
Remedy with new arrangements. Examples of new governance arrangements 
intended to resolve issues 
“To get a deeper discussion - related to result 10 
discussions and the creation of the GCIO role.” 
Interview 20 
Sanctions in horizontal governance Discussions on ability to sanction horizontal 
governance mechanisms or hold to account 
“horizontal governance is a dog. Everyone who is 
doing it is struggling with it” Interviewee 9 
Accountability in public sector Thoughts on whether accountability is practical 
in the public sector 
“When nudging large systems there are multiple 
agendas - within sector, DIA, providers.  
Essentially it is the complexity of those agendas. 
Need to develop universal (or near universal) 
value propositions.  Benefits that can be realised 
by a diverse range of stakeholders.” Interview 21 
Shared outcomes or accountabilities Thoughts on shared outcomes or accountabilities “We need to come to the table as public 
servants. Not representatives of individual 
organisations.” Interviewee 10 
Changing accountabilities Thoughts on changing accountabilities “Based on uptake with other drivers including 
risk management and authoritative data 




Performance was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Focus of performance, Thoughts on focus of performance “has taken a long time to resonate - only really 
the last 2-3 years.  To deliver more targeted and 
focussed services. adoption has been identified 
as slow but increasing” Interview 20 
Failing to deliver, Thoughts on delivery failures If you define success as living up to its potential 
then definitely not. The biggest failure is that it 
hasn’t won the hearts and minds of anyone. Not 
public, not agencies, not DIA, possibly those 
working on it.” Interview 17 
Meeting targets Thoughts on clients and providers experiencing 
reliance on others to meet performance targets 
“no direct channel to customers consuming client 
services.” Interview 3 
Client views Thoughts from client about provider – liability for 
system failure, poor performance, reputational 
damage 
“hiatus of a couple of years did damage to the 
uptake path” Interview 9 
Roles, processes and performance Formal examples of roles, processes and 
performance agreements 
“DIA had sole responsibility – built into baseline, 
approval from treasury to invest. Run teams, 
market, product develop etc. with little 
oversight. Relied on standard DIA governance 
mechanisms – finance investment., capital 
planning.” Interview 1 
Views on change  Thoughts about changing performance criteria, 
reporting gaps, rewriting strategies, shift to DIA 
“Service left to DIA – demise of e-government 
unit. Set the whole thing back by a few years and 






Relationship aspects was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Low trust Discussion of low trust relationships “Public policy at large issues with benign and 
benevolent government expectation. Low trust – 
higher account. Lower funding.” Interview 1 
High client autonomy Discussions of autonomy of clients  “CE’s have freedom, a mandate is a waste of 
time. If the ideas are good you do not need a 
mandate.  People will listen if the idea is good.  










Theme Six Mandating Collaboration 
Theme Six was constructed using four categories: Common issues, Mandates, First Mandate and Second mandate 
Common issues was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Performance targets not met Examples where performance targets were not 
met 
“not achieving targets (which) caused pressure 
during funding time. Not hitting targets and 
benefits puts additional pressure on funding.” 
Interview 13 
Use of collaboration or horizontal mechanisms Thoughts on the use of collaboration or 
horizontal mechanisms 
“Changes to strategy or demand is a 
collaborative decision making process.” Interview 
6 
Legacy governance Thoughts on legacy vertical governance 
mechanisms 
“Agencies deliver services they’re tasked with 
delivering, while told to deliver collaboratively it 
has been lacking.”  Interview 13 
Integration issues Examples of integration issues “Not convincing agencies to embed it, take it up 
and drive customer uptake. This is deep seated – 
two of the main objections are the cost and 
usability of the service. And the cost of 
integration against other priorities in the agency 
work programme.  That old chestnut.  You could 
actually come up with a number of excuses, you 
could write a book on all of the excuses for 
getting out of all of government stuff.  They tend 
to be it is not going to work for the customer of it 
is too expensive.  It doesn’t fit within our 




Conflicting goals Examples where conflicting goals surfaced “It is one of those things when there is not 
enough gain to motivate everyone to do it.” 
Interview 15 
Coercive mandate Examples where coercive mandates were 
identified  
“Half the problem of going beyond the public 
service was who the hell does the commissioner 
think he is telling us what to do?” Interview 17 
Damaged trust and resentment  Instances where client trust was damaged and 
resentment surfaced  
“Why would I install something that adds costs 
but no real value?” Interview 5 
Not create new services Examples where clients avoided service creation The government mandate was important to get 
the critical mass going.  To ensure the right 
discussions were had.  Before someone changed 
their technology or offered a new service they 
would consider RealMe.  You got a tendency that 
if they could possibly avoid it they would.  This 
was done for a wide range of reasons – from a 
loss of control or a general dislike of the centre.” 
Interview 15    
Lack of incentives Perception of lack of client benefits “not clear where benefit exists, needs foresight.” 
Interview 1 
 
Mandates was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Direction Instances where direction was discussed in 
relation to mandates 
“had the power … to direct other agencies.  He 
was looking for an opportunity to use that 
power.  He issued the direction to the whole 
public service. … In terms of the mandate the 
politicians provided support for the idea that 
agencies had to work closer together.  The 
mandate was core government agencies being 
sent that message. Interview 17 
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Incentives or assistance Instances where incentives or assistance were 
discussed in relation to mandates 
“how do we manage and provide for ongoing 
development. How do we make on boarding 
easier?” Interview 6 
Commitment and capacity Instances where commitment and capacity were 
discussed in relation to mandates 
“Sub – committees to enable collaboration. 
Agencies deliver services they’re tasked with 
delivering, while told to deliver collaboratively it 
has been lacking.” Interview 13 
Limited resources Instances where limited resources were 
discussed in relation to mandates 
“You got a tendency that if they could possibly 
avoid it they would.  This was done for a wide 
range of reasons – from a loss of control or a 
general dislike of the centre.   It has been 
mandated since 2008, but it hasn’t drifted up 
since then.” Interview 15 
Outcome focus Instances where outcome focus was discussed in 
relation to mandates 
“Locked into group think, need the ability to get 
fresh thought.  Outcome focus.” Interview 6 
 
First Mandate was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Flawed or Waste of time  Instances where mandates were perceived as a 
waste of time or flawed 
“Mandates are barely worth the paper they are 
written on. ... The mandate had a negative effect.  
Created odd dynamics, people not wanting to 
upgrade IAMS technology as it meant 
committing” Interview 3 
Feeling way in the dark Perception that provider was unclear about 
direction 
“No one was talking digital transformation – 
there was lots of hype.   No one was in business 
case stage so 3 years + to wait for services to use 
GLS.” Interview 3 
Poor fit Perception that the PSISS didn’t change as needs 
changed (poor fit) 
“Many people involved in the programme think 
better to see it through than make corrections.” 
Interview 11   
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Perverse incentives Perception that perverse incentives were in place I have seen no evidence that the central controls 
are working.  Those participating are good public 
servants with limited domain experience.  We 
should avoid large IT projects – Perverse 
incentives- business case does not.  Dangerous 
enthusiasms – once trajectory is set then can’t 
stop.” Interview 11   
Failure of SSC Perception of SSC failing to deliver “not achieving targets caused pressure.” 
Interview 13 
Inability to sanction Perception of inability of SSC to sanction 
agencies 
“defined as optional, perception (was) it is 
mandatory or government enforced big brother.” 
Interview 7 
Curse of the smiling faces Perception of agencies saying one thing and 
doing another 
“SSC went down a cue performance objectives 
and use as a stick this drove lip service adoption.  
Curse of the smiley faces.”  Interview 16 
 
Second mandate was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Collaboration impacted by mandate, Examples where mandate impacts collaboration “Formal structures of accountability for 
delivering shared services – not convinced they 
made much of a contribution.  They didn’t do the 
work to create and enable adoption.” Interview 
11 
Dependency on client services, Thoughts on provider being dependent upon 
clients 
“Not easy to get it to work e.g. first mobile phone 
user – have to pay a lot. When more users 
cheaper. Start for real me is hard – when more 
agencies offer services then build critical mass – 
in the face of immediate minister needs in 
investment cycle (3 years) is hard. Need to build 
base.” Interview 11 
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Client reaction and resentment, Examples of client resentment and reaction 
towards the provider 
“The government mandate was important to get 
the critical mass going.  To ensure the right 
discussions were had.  Before someone changed 
their technology or offered a new service they 
would consider RealMe.  You got a tendency that 
if they could possibly avoid it they would.  This 
was done for a wide range of reasons – from a 
loss of control or a general dislike of the centre.   
It has been mandated since 2008, but it hasn’t 
drifted up since then.  You can’t think that in the 
intervening seven years that agencies have not 
replaced their technology or put a new service 
out.  Generally there was not confidence in 
RealMe or the interface, there was an issue with 
control as they felt the service wasn’t good 
enough therefore. We can’t influence it.  This 
goes back to collaboration and co-design.  There 
would have been a lot better response. 
Mandates are still important but there are other 
factors – they created a tension with the 
agencies.” Interview 15 
Mandate suitability Views about mandate suitability “At the time the mandate was seen to be useful 
but in the long run it removed the pressing need 
to treat government agencies as clients.  It 
caused conflict.” (Respondent 17 
Stronger sanctions Views on the need for stronger sanctions “control that everyone has to use this.  The way 
to operationalise is cabinet directive and refuse 
the ability to use other options.”  Interview 9 
Compelled to adopt Instances of compelled client adoption “Mandates poison relationships – people do not 





Theme Seven Is Technology Different?  
Theme Seven was constructed using four categories: PSISS Creation Focus, Implementation and client, and Technical Focus   
PSISS Creation Focus was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
AOG focus Examples of a focus on All of Government 
deliverables 
“the business case was essentially that a 
centralised login and identity verification service 
was fundamental to use of the online channel by 
the public sector.” Interview 3  
Technology fear Fear of technology focus overtaking outcomes “IT short cycle, poor understanding of 
economics, article of faith more than we would 
like them to be.” Interview 11 
Concept Collaborative work on concept - creation of 
business case 
“Public consultation about privacy and 
government interaction was undertaken, 
resulting in the idea of the government logon 
service” Interview 3 
 
Implementation and client was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Failed to meet targets Discussion of failure to meet performance 
targets 
“If you define success by the business case it has 
not been successful. If you define success as does 
it work and does it do what it set out to do it was 
successful. If you define success as living up to its 
potential then definitely not.” Interview 17 
Low adoption rates Discussion of low adoption rates leading to 
reviews, vicious cycle, limited funding, pressure 
and failure, transfer to DIA 
“IVS – not reached targets of last few years, have 




Client resistance to mandate Discussion of client resistance at being left out, 
increased by mandate – bloated provider quote 
“Interfering in the stack for service delivery of an 
agency is not a trivial thing.  If you are trying to 
line up every single agency for the same effect.” 
Interview 15 
Loss of outcome focus Discussion of lost outcome focus, tech focus, 
perverse incentives to deliver tech 
“spent hundreds of thousands of dollars - need 
to still invest to keep the service up to date and 
meeting needs.  - underinvestment leads to 
another cycle of failure.” Interview 20 
Technology enabler Examples of views where Technology should 
enable not drive outcome 
“this is an enabler why commercialise it?” 
Interview 20 
Performance impacts satisfaction Examples where technology was driver and 
performance reinforced to detriment of 
customers and clients 
“They did a good job of promulgating case 
studies. One of the challenges was the drive for 
uptake led to the view that if we forced public 
service to use RealMe they would get work and 
private utility.  That was probably a mistake.  We 
have staff who authenticate at agency then have 
to reauthenticate. Cabinetnet is an example.” 
Interview 16 
Client and customer needs Examples where should have focussed on 
outcome and customer 
“there are some things done better at agency 
level.  RealMe is a small but critical enabling 
thing.  When you lose that focus you will annoy 
agencies and lose sight of what you are trying to 
do.” Interview 20 
Provider review Perceptions of review of the provider and PSISS  “There were multiple reviews where the whole 
service was reviewed.  This usually coincided 
with budget requests where they needed to 
convince ministers to continue to fund the 
service as a worthwhile thing to invest in.” 
Interview 15 
Lack of client involvement Lack of client involvement – instances of 
resistance and increased risk, failure to meet 
targets 
“Big agencies playing the waiting game can kill 
participation.” Interview 11 
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Limited client incentives Views on limited client incentives “many projects that have not wanted to.” 
Interview 7 
 
Technical Focus was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Technological determinism Examples of technology led business change “The problem is people are too focussed on 
technology.  Technologists have focussed on 
technology making the change, it can be a 
catalyst or meet requirement, but it is only one 
of People, Process and Technology.” Interview 6 
Project deliverables Examples of technology focus and project 
management as governance 
“Client as govt is easier to deal with.  Project 
owner - gets dosh to spend.” Interview 18 
Internal governance Examples of internal governance where provider 
needs were put first 
“We are in the jargon phase.  From governance 
of roles - it radically changes the role of sponsor.  
The investment model calls for a different way of 
thinking - not just a massive investment then get 
into another case.” Interview 20 
Vertical governance Instances of vertical governance in practice “Hard yards to get acceptance from ministers.  
Only confirm 12 month investment – industry 
cautious.  So 4 year investment.  With a view to 
reducing fiscal exposure to the crown.” Interview 
10 
Ignore outcomes Ignoring client and customer and outcomes. “$25-30 mil project – too much on consultants – 
had to have the best. If you end up with very 
important people working for you and they are 
paid then the top need to get paid.” Interview 8 
Technical delivery Focus on technical deliverables, perverse 
incentives, business case 
“I have been profoundly frustrated … I don’t 
know who provides direction, my perception 




Theme Eight Collaborative Governance, the Art of the State  
Theme Eight was constructed using four categories: Creation intention, New governance arrangements and Privacy  
Creation intention was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
AOG focus  “RealMe was the earliest all of government 
approach to trying to solve a problem where 
there wasn't a marketplace of vendors.” 
Interview 20 
Fear of technology focus  “Real innovation is at the service end not the 
technology end.” Interview 6 
Collaborative work on concept – creation of 
business case 
 “When I was doing it there was no formal 
governance except in the sense that the 
conceptual development was seen that everyone 
had an interest so it was a general conversation.  
We led the discussion on key issues. It wasn’t 
until it started to become a serious discussion 
about having a crack at this that formal 
governance models were put in place.  I started 
leading a conversation and came in later.” 
Interview 14 
Collaboration stopped with system 
implementation 
 “When the e-government unit became 
formalised it became the ICT branch of the SSC” 
Interview 5 
Changed when implementing – tech centric 
project and failing 
 “there was a heavyweight waterfall approach - 
exclude business people from technology 





New governance arrangements was constructed using the following concepts: 
Concept Description Example 
Provider failure Examples where the provider failed to deliver 
performance targets even after mandate 
“They didn’t do the work to create and enable 
adoption.” Interview 11 
 
 
Collaborative creation Views on collaborative creation of result 10, lead 
agency, BPS, ICT strategy etc and positives of 
changes to governance arrangements  
“Citizen centricity is the key – integration point – 
BPS outcomes from an enabling environment – 
ICT – integrator is citizen. Integrator needs to be 
the government – require multiple agencies that 
the citizen needs to know and navigate – for 
compliance or social benefit and. Intervention – 
inefficient. All about inter op and information 
sharing – better to deal with government.” 
Interview 6 
Shared goals  Thoughts on shared performance goals and 
accountabilities including improvements and 
increased adoption as a result of participation, 
Shared performance targets and accountabilities 
“Sub – committees to enable collaboration. 
Agencies deliver services they’re tasked with 
delivering, while told to deliver collaboratively it 
has been lacking.” Interview 13 
Integration issues Examples of perceived PSISS integration issues “left agencies to sort out integration” Interview 5 
Customer groups Quotes that show significance of customer 
groups e.g. student adoption 
“Quicker cheaper and easier for providers will 
transfer into better services for students.  Access 
the services they need.” Interview 21 
Dynamic governance Dynamic environment and need to change 
performance targets 
That the CE of IRD as a steering committee 
member was important.  Not what he said when 
he was there but that he was there.” Interview 9 
Accountability and transparency Instances of accountability and transparency 
issues 
“Transparency for governance is the big learning 
– don’t bury things in the project – it will only 
come back and bite you.” Interview 9 
Low agency trust Low level of trust due to low involvement “Shared network, e-govt network imploded 
because they became the builders.  They used 
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their influence to get agencies to agree to 
commit to the network.  SSC made commitments 
that the agencies did not back them on.  That 
undermined trust and e-govt activity in ICT. The 
central agency was not able to get govt 
departments to come to the collective table – 
they were acting in the interest of the individual 
agencies.” Interview 14 
Governance changes Changes to governance arrangements (BPS, 
Result 10 groups, ICT strategy etc) 
“Things have matured since the SSC days – no 
overarching mandate – which GCIO now does – 
no ICT action plan – less services and less service 
maturity.  Result 10 helps. Mandate. 
Development of more common capabilities. 
More pressure from the centre to collaborate. 
Interview 13 
Collaboration and adoption Improvements and increased adoption as a result 
of participation, Shared performance targets and 
accountabilities 
“Result 10 – outcomes for customers – drives to 
needs for customers – services” Interview 13 
Inability to compel adoption Thoughts on the inability of the provider to 
compel adoption 
“The argument was we have consulted enough 
now we use the stick.” Interview 17 
Client refusal Refusal to adopt, poor experience, increased 
client resistance, lack of understanding 
“I am not sure clients have understood the value 
of it.  It becomes valuable when multiple clients 
take it on and critical mass kicks in.” Interview 15 
SSC failed Perception of SSC failure to deliver “The Commissioner was judged on success of 
programme, the GSN went south and panic set in 
to get rid of IT including the PSISS.  Results 
changed the reporting lines.  Almost the whole e-
government unit was shifted.” Interview 17 
Customer focus Ideas to change customer focus  “Many levers, cost is one of them, (we should) 
help agencies defray cost and absorb more up 




Privacy was constructed using the following concepts:  
Concept Description Example 
Privacy enhancing PSISS Discussion of privacy enhancing service and 
collaboration 
“Privacy commissioner – involved – needed to 
ensure identity service is privacy enhancing.” 
Interview 5 
Collaborative design Examples of collaborative design of the PSISS “identity side of authentication.  Architected so 
the government couldn't link information across 
agencies. Interview 18  
Continued privacy Discussion about ongoing privacy of PSISS “It is secure and there has never been a privacy 
leak so successful. At an outcome level not at 
all.” Interview 17 
Development and testing with privacy 
commission 
Examples of working with stakeholders to ensure 
wider privacy requirements met 
“Privacy by design – not in 2002 – the fact we 




Appendix E:  Memo Examples 
One of the quality criteria promoted by Corbin and Strauss (2008) is evidence of 
memos.  This appendix provides two examples of memos that were used to 
construct categories.   
Example Memo One: Governance Focus for Implementation 
Description This is a sample of the content from the memo used to construct 
the Governance Focus section for the Implementation Category.  
Code: The initial code was called Information System vs System Asset, 




This memo contributed to the construction of the Implementation 
stage for the central category. 
Analysis 
notes: 
Footnotes are used to identify the Interviewee by number. The 
term stage was used for analysis of when the respondent was 
involved in PSISS governance (1=at SSC, 2= SSC and DIA, 3 = DIA 
only). Where direct quotes are not used in the text, direct quotes 
from the analysis database (NVivo) are placed in the footnote.  
Additional NVivo codes that were used for analysis are also 
included in footnotes.   
 
The PSISS was created based on a general “need for something to happen around 
common identity and authentication.” (Respondent 2)5  The PSISS “came out of 
work by the SSC about 2006, evolved through an identity standard and what was 
seen to be a burgeoning requirement for identifying people online so they can 
interact with government online to reduce the burden of asserting identity across 
government, so using it for multiple purposes and applications. It was defined by a 
core group at the SSC who defined the standards.” (Respondent 15)6   
The provider took the security and privacy requirements extremely seriously.  
“There could have been a completely different group of people who could have 
paid lip service to security and privacy that would have done it differently.” 
 
5 Interview 2 (stage 3) “The impression of RealMe is it grew out of a need for something to happen around 
common identity and authentication.” Interview 2 (stage 3) Unclear purpose for PSISS 
6 Interview 15 (stage 2) The PSISS “came out of work by the SSC about 2006, evolved through an identity 
standard and what was seen to be a burgeoning requirement for identifying people online so they can interact 
with government online to reduce the burden of asserting identity across government, so using it for multiple 
purposes and applications. It was defined by a core group at the SSC who defined the standards.”  Interview 15 




(Respondent 17)7  There was debate about the use of legislation to govern the 
PSISS.  Initially it was believed that compliance with the Privacy Act was enough, 
until it was realised that technology alone does not protect privacy in isolation.8  
The Privacy Commissioner became involved as they needed to “ensure the identity 
PSISS is privacy enhancing,” (Respondent 5) 9 and that the provider would “deliver 
an authentication service aligned with the Privacy Act.” (Respondent 5)10  The 
provider worked with the Privacy Commissioner to develop an agreed policy that 
reflected privacy by design.  “New Zealand’s identity legislation made us shy away 
from a government supplied identity wallet. We had a 1-day workshop with design 
and high-level principles for what is now the PSISS identity service.” (Respondent 
5)  To ensure compliance the provider “didn’t build until the policy was in place.” 
(Respondent 9)11  
Example Memo Two: Client Accountability 
Description This is a sample of the content from the memo used to construct 
the accountability section for the Client category  





This memo contributed to the construction of the Client stage for 
the central category. 
Analysis 
notes: 
Footnotes are used to identify the Interviewee by number. The 
term stage was used for analysis of when the respondent was 
involved in PSISS governance (1=at SSC, 2= SSC and DIA, 3 = DIA 
only). Where direct quotes are not used in the text, direct quotes 
from the analysis database (NVivo) are placed in the footnote.  
Additional NVivo codes that were used for analysis are also 
included in footnotes.   
 
 
7 Interview 17 (stage 1,2)  
8 “There could have been a completely different group of people who could have paid lip service to security 
and privacy that would have done it differently. Should there have been a law to govern RealMe.  I thought no 
– it complies with the privacy act – until I realised that technology cannot protect privacy in isolation.” 
Interview 17 (stage 1,2) culture change required for system value, pressure from centre 
9 “Privacy commissioner – involved – needed to ensure identity service is privacy enhancing.” Interview 5 
(stage 1,2,3) barriers to realising system asset value, privacy settings 
10 “to deliver an authentication service that aligned with the privacy act.” Interview 5 (stage 1,2,3) barriers to 
realising system asset value, privacy settings 
11 “Privacy by design – not in 2002 – the fact we didn’t build until policy was in place.” Interview 9 (stage 1,2) 




Once the PSISS was implemented “the key measure was adoption.”12 (Respondent 
3).  The provider was expected to increase adoption of the PSISS by clients and 
customers.  The targets were set in the business case and placed the provider on a 
set trajectory for years to come.  There was no direct connection to customer use 
of client services.  Clients were expected to drive customer use of client services.13    
Clients were wary of the change as “interfering in the stack for service delivery of 
an agency is not a trivial thing, particularly if you are trying to line up every single 
agency for the same effect.” (Respondent 15)14  Respondents identified an 
increased client expectation on the provider to deliver improvements to the identity 
capability of the public sector. The provider was faced with the challenge of 
meeting the different needs of clients with a PSISS that promoted consistency 
through a one size fits all identity service.     
The SSC struggled to convince public sector clients to adopt the PSISS.15  The 
provider had to convince clients that SSC could deliver a PSISS and the at the 
PSISS was a good idea.  Client buy in was slow coming. The accountability for the 
PSISS was attributed to the Government Chief Information Officer. 16  The provider 
was held accountable, however respondents questioned whether the provider had 
the skills to perform the roles they were accountable for performing.17  Questions 
were asked about the capability of the people and formal structures in place to 
deliver the PSISS, respondents were “not convinced they made much of a 
contribution.  They didn’t do the work to create and enable adoption.”(Respondent 
11)18  
 
12 Interview 3 (Stage 1,2)  
13 “Citizens and agencies to adopt services.  No direct channel to citizens.  Agencies were channel for driving 
uptake to public.  Uptake – the business case set up trajectory of signed up users over years.” Interview 3 
(Stage 1,2) (F,F,T,F) 
14 “Ministers were supporting the service – it is the nature of the government system  - you have vertical 
accountability and we are moving to more horizontal accountabilities with the GIO.  So interfering in the stack 
for service delivery of an agency is not a trivial thing, particularly If you are trying to line up every single agency 
for the same effect.” Interview 15 (Stage 2) (F,T,F,F) 
15 “SSC – deliver – not sure – convince public service that it was a good idea. Sell us on the idea – get agency 
buy in. very early days.” Interview 1 (Stage3) (T,F,F,F) 
16 “(name removed) - the GCIO.” Interview 8 (Stage 1,2) (T,F,F,F) 
17 “They go to those accountable (need access to better skill).” Interview 11 (Stage 2) (T,F,F,F) 
18
 “If you think about the people – formal structures of accountability for delivering shared services – not 
convinced they made much of a contribution.  They didn’t do the work to create and enable adoption.” 
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